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outlaw2001it

Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger talks about Flight 447

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Ronan O Cadhain wrote; "I'm not too sure it would have made a difference if the side-sticks were mechanically linked..."

I would have to disagree.

 

As soon as Bonin (pilot flying) said he had been pulling back on the stick the whole time, Robert realised what was happening and jumped in straight away and flew the aircraft, but by which time it was too late.

 

If it were a Boeing, Robert would have seen it, taken over a lot earlier and maybe saved the aircraft.

 

Its just perplexing why Bonin would pull back on the stick.

 

It was drilled into me, 'nose down-power on' in a stall, its basic airmanship and should be a cakewalk for an experienced pilot.

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Don't know if anyone noticed, but it would be very difficult to fly any plane with "yolk".

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I would have to disagree.

 

As soon as Bonin (pilot flying) said he had been pulling back on the stick the whole time, Robert realised what was happening and jumped in straight away and flew the aircraft, but by which time it was too late.

 

If it were a Boeing, Robert would have seen it, taken over a lot earlier and maybe saved the aircraft.

 

Its just perplexing why Bonin would pull back on the stick.

 

It was drilled into me, 'nose down-power on' in a stall, its basic airmanship and should be a cakewalk for an experienced pilot.

 

Robert only realised when the Captain said it, he didn't realise up until that point. It was only when the Captain announced: "no no no don’t climb", that it clicked with Robert that they were stalling. Even then though, they were at 8,000' and likely the aircraft was lost.

 

But agreed, there's no reason they should have gotten themselves in that situation to begin with.

 

Regards,

Ró. 


Rónán O Cadhain.

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Maybe I missed this but what was the pitch attitude after the PF pulled the control stick back?  Wouldn't the higher pitch attitude have been noticed on the ADI when scanning the instruments?

 

Airbus


Al Kaupa

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I agree with Sully, BOTH the training AND cockpit re-design is the way to go here. Relying completely on one or the other is leaving an open door and not doing their best for future crews and passengers alike. Training alone may not be enough under certain circumstances. When an emergency occurs, the more training, tools and options you have available at the time will only help to improve your odds of surviving it.

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I also agree with Sully on this one. Had this been a yoke that was linked together then Robert would have seen it right away. The side stick is too far away from Robert to see what Bonin was doing as he was most likely trying to make sense of what was happening from the instruments. Had there been a yoke between him and the instruments he would have seen what was happening instantly. 

 

Even if Airbus mechanically linked the two sticks he could have at least glanced to his stick to see what was happening as well, but this would have taken longer to notice compared to a yoke.This was a very unique situation.

 

I never cared for the 'If It Ain't Boeing' kind of comments as I see neither company as being any better then each other, just different. Truth is neither company can produce aircraft quickly enough to keep up with the market demand. 


Matthew Kane

 

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I am with Ro on this one. Truth is, no matter how many links and redundancies you provide, human factors will find a way to get it wrong at the wrong time.

 

The MD82 that crashed in Venezuela entered a deep stall from the pilot pulling on the yoke all the way to the ground, and the yokes were mechanically linked.

 

The 757 that crashed in the Caribbean also was pulled into a stall and crashed. There are several others. I think further human factors study needs to be done on this.

 

When professionals get into an emergency, each has a job to do, there is hardly time for one to be double checking what the other is doing, particularly when visual cues and horizon is lost, as evidenced by the 757, and MD80 and the A330 crashes. One pilot would trust that his co worker is trained and is performing the right process. That is the biggest failing here.

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Maybe I missed this but what was the pitch attitude after the PF pulled the control stick back? Wouldn't the higher pitch attitude have been noticed on the ADI when scanning the instruments?

 

Airbus

Pitch attitude was never that extreme from 3 to 13 degrees, AOA however was somewhere in the region of 40 by the time they became fully stalled, around 16 at the point the aircraft reached 38000ft

 

All this talk about side sticks...Look, many flight crew have stalled a perfectly flyable aircraft by holding the yoke in their lap when they should have been pushing, some have even fought the stick pusher.

 

You have to actually believe you are stalled (or at least approaching stall) to perform the correct recovery. For part of the descent towards the ocean they where not sure if the aircraft was climbing or descending, at the point that the V/S got so high they didn't believe the instruments, onboard it would have felt like they we're flying level or in a shallow descent.

 

 

 

PNF

2 h 10 min 31,2 Go back down

2 h 10 min 32,2

According to that

we’re going up

 

PNF

2 h 10 min 33,7

According to all

three you’re going

up so go back down

 

PF

2 h 10 min 35,2 okay

PNF

2 h 10 min 35,8 You’re at…

2 h 10 min 36,4 Go back down

PF

2 h 10 min 36,7

It’s going we’re

going (back) down


Rob Prest

 

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In area known for severe weather, particularly where airspeed indicators can be affected by icing, surely if technology can broadcast a 'running commentary' as demonstrated by AF447's ACARS system, GPS can offer an alternative albeit crude system to give some indication of forward/vertical movement ?

It has always appeared strange to me that the preservation of life in an aircraft is dependant upon an airspeed measuring device, unreliable in this incident, that relies on a constantly changing medium (air) in order to inform aircrew of their surroundings.

I have heard, so often, that aircraft accidents are the result of a number of factors, which individually are not serious, but linked together in a chain of events can be catastrophic. Wasn't this incident triggered by the AP disconnecting because of no airspeed input ? This surely was the start of the chain of events.

Why not substitute, when such a loss of airspeed input occurs, a 'standby' GPS input, albeit a coarse indication, of forward movement ? How about a side radar return from heavy precipitation/cloud ice ? Surely some indication would be available to maintain AP operation, with a possible aural warning that the change of input had been detected ?

Would that be feasible ?

If such a system were possible, it would still not excuse lack of training, or awareness of the aircraft's state, but I feel that at least, an alternative 'low resolution' airspeed input would have been of some assistance ?

I also feel here that the captain should not have left the cockpit under such circumstances, where an area of extreme weather was possible. (or at least left an instruction to be recalled in any unusual situation). I realise that under the pressure that the two junior pilots were under, they probably may have not considered calling the captain. According to the CVR he was the first to appreciate what was occurring, but he returned to the flight deck too late to save the flight, and did not have enough time to appreciate what was happening.

 

Bill

 


 

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They already had a ground speed readout provided by GPS.. GPIRS, GPS/IRS mix


Rob Prest

 

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Why not substitute, when such a loss of airspeed input occurs, a 'standby' GPS input, albeit a coarse indication, of forward movement ? How about a side radar return from heavy precipitation/cloud ice ? Surely some indication would be available to maintain AP operation, with a possible aural warning that the change of input had been detected ?

 

Something I have wondered about: why couldn't the autopilot itself fall back on pitch and power -- a standard pitch and standard thrust that would keep the aircraft level at a safe speed?  Seems to me this would be much better than suddenly startling the pilots by disconnecting, with a massive accompaniment of warning sounds and lights.  Apparently the basic problem of loss of accurate airspeed information was lost in the welter of warnings that did appear.

 

Mike


 

                    bUmq4nJ.jpg?2

 

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Something I have wondered about: why couldn't the autopilot itself fall back on pitch and power -- a standard pitch and standard thrust that would keep the aircraft level at a safe speed? Seems to me this would be much better than suddenly startling the pilots by disconnecting, with a massive accompaniment of warning sounds and lights. Apparently the basic problem of loss of accurate airspeed information was lost in the welter of warnings that did appear.

 

Mike

It is a scary thought when people start suggesting that more automation is the answer to prevent screw ups. All they had to do is follow a simple UAS procedure.

 

In the case of 447 many claim that if they simply did not touch anything they would have likely survived..

 

AP/FD.......................................................... ................... OFF

A/THR......................................................... .................... OFF

PITCH/THRUST:

Below THRUST RED ALT...............................................15° / TOGA

Above THRUST RED ALT and Below FL 100......................................................... ....10° / CLB

Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100......................................................... ......5° / CLB

 

The above is a "Memory item"

 

The Af447 crew went TOGA, then to IDLE, back to TOGA.. they pulled like mad, extended the speed brakes, left the FD on.. Swapped controls without stating "I have control" causing Dual input to sound & flash..

 

In other words chaos.


Rob Prest

 

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It was drilled into me, 'nose down-power on' in a stall, its basic airmanship and should be a cakewalk for an experienced pilot.

 

Hi,

 

The problem is they didn't realize they were in a stall.

 

Regarding interlinked yokes (or even side sticks), I am no commercial pilot but it makes sense to me that having those would have been a great help.

 

The PF (pilot flying) behavior is so hard to understand (after the facts mind you) that quite a few pilots I know wonder if the PFD (primary flight display) still operated (ie showed AOA/pitch) correctly. But having said that, no one has been able to prove that the PFD display was wrong. 

 

Rgds,

 

Bruno

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You guys need to get a copy of "Outliers". There is a section on cabin crew behavior and some of its causes. I'm not totally sure it describes much in this case except for communication. At any rate, it is a very interesting read.

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It is a scary thought when people start suggesting that more automation is the answer to prevent screw ups. All they had to do is follow a simple UAS procedure.

 

Didn't mean to scare you!  However the fact is that an Airbus is highly automated already.  It seems to me that a good part of the problem was the sudden shift from full automatic control to full manual control.  The autopilot's logic reached a condition in which in effect it said "I give up, I'm dumping the plane in your lap."  From what I recall of versions of the accident report, there was no clear annunciation of the primary problem, loss of reliable airspeed data.  It is quite possible the PF was concerned about an overspeed condition -- also potentially dangerous, and not implausible without airspeed data.  So what would be so terrible if the autopilot's logic had followed the simple procedure you mention, CLB and 5o nose up? 

 

Also want to note that the NTSB found the startle factor to be important in the Colgan Air crash, where the pilot pulled up the nose in response to an approach to stall warnning, causing an unrecoverable low altitude stall, going against training and obvious correct practice.

 

Mike


 

                    bUmq4nJ.jpg?2

 

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