(...), but it's as if they were expecting the autothrottle to manage the airspeed. Could there be a difference in the logic of the B777 autothrottle compared to what he had flown before.(...)

 

 

The PF (new on type 777 with 40+ hours) had logged hours in the 744 for example. But:

 

- The 744 gives speed protection in FLCH only with A/P on.

- The training Captain had logged 3.000+ hours on type 777 and should have been aware of any "traps". (Those are what he has to teach in particular!)

The PF (new on type 777 with 40+ hours) had logged hours in the 744 for example. But:

 

- The 744 gives speed protection in FLCH only with A/P on.

- The training Captain had logged 3.000+ hours on type 777 and should have been aware of any "traps". (Those are what he has to teach in particular!)

something which just strikes me when I read this. The 747 is higher, I mean the cockpit. Right? When the PF used to land in a 747 before, could it possibly be that he had a wrong perception of his height and expected to be higher above ground? On the other there were for sure the call outs for height so the 777 told them their height. Plus the checkairman should be used to the 777 height. So take this as thinking loud and don't flame me ;-)

Live CNN stream of latest NTSB briefing is about to start (sorry no link)

something which just strikes me when I read this. The 747 is higher, I mean the cockpit. Right? When the PF used to land in a 747 before, could it possibly be that he had a wrong perception of his height and expected to be higher above ground? On the other there were for sure the call outs for height so the 777 told them their height. Plus the checkairman should be used to the 777 height. So take this as thinking loud and don't flame me ;-)

 

I don't think perception of height causes you to decelerate the aircraft into a stall?  From what we've seen the aircraft was in a high-energy approach and was not stabilized on the approach at 1000 ft AGL as generally recommended.  I assume this recommendation is based on experience that it is too hard to manage the various inputs after this point with likelihood of error.  If it is correct that this approach was not stabilized at 1000 ft then of course the question is why the decision was taken to continue with the approach.

 

Given that the decision was made to continue the approach, then I would like to see evidence of the situation awareness of the PF and PM/PNF with emphasis on understanding the physical inputs experienced as well as use of cockpit instrumentation and finally the interaction of the automation with the PF control inputs.

 

As an aside from a human factors standpoint, I know modern displays attempt to provide additional cueing to the pilot, things such as speed or heading trend bars.  How useful/effective are such aids in the context of final approach in visual conditions?  We also hear from time to time about different military philosophy where providing AOA cueing apparently is favored.  Is this something worth further consideration?

 

scott s.

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777 has an AOA indicator as a company option

something which just strikes me when I read this. The 747 is higher, I mean the cockpit. Right? When the PF used to land in a 747 before, could it possibly be that he had a wrong perception of his height and expected to be higher above ground? On the other there were for sure the call outs for height so the 777 told them their height. Plus the checkairman should be used to the 777 height. So take this as thinking loud and don't flame me ;-)

747 may be higher off the ground, but then I would think he would be coming in too high, not too low unless I'm missing something here.

something which just strikes me when I read this. The 747 is higher, I mean the cockpit. Right? When the PF used to land in a 747 before, could it possibly be that he had a wrong perception of his height and expected to be higher above ground? On the other there were for sure the call outs for height so the 777 told them their height. Plus the checkairman should be used to the 777 height. So take this as thinking loud and don't flame me ;-)

 

using that logic you would expect him to come higher above the threshold with the 777 since he is used to a higher point of view in the 747 being that low the perspective should have looked even worst if we assume the difference does play a role

 

actually i've kept wondering these days since the accident and trying to imagine the the view and perspective of the runway they had in front of their eyes. it must have look clearly wrong. consider the image below. there is some paved surface + a displaced threshold + the aiming point is still some good distance from the threshold. how could they be so comfortable with the view for not to abort the landing??  :Shame On You:

I read somewhere that they hit TOGA earlier then what was initially reported. Hopefully this NTSB report will shed some light. It's starting now btw

 

 

something which just strikes me when I read this. The 747 is higher, I mean the cockpit. Right? When the PF used to land in a 747 before, could it possibly be that he had a wrong perception of his height and expected to be higher above ground?

 

If they still thought they were sitting in a 747, they should have assumed that their aircraft reaches even lower! 

Watching the press briefing now... Interesting stuff.

Watching the press briefing now... Interesting stuff.

Yep, from what I gather they descended in V/S not FLCH, doesn't explain why the A/T didn't maintain speed.

Yep, from what I gather they descended in V/S not FLCH, doesn't explain why the A/T didn't maintain speed.

 

she said it was armed but maybe it was not engaged in speed mode ??

And three(!) pilots were on the flightdeck during the approach. That's two PM.

Very surreal photo in many ways.. Flight 214 arrives at SFO

 

NTSB update is over. What have we learned?