If the PAPI lights were operational, then surely the pilots should have known that they were way too low ages before the actual touchdown? Why did they not correct for this when they still had time?

 

 

They were trying to correct it.... with pitch and no throttle sadly until it was too late. Seems to me maybe they were expecting A/T to be dealing with the throttles.

 

EDIT: I was late.

In some ways it sounds like a philosophical difference: do you trust automation so much that you prefer to rely on it rather than risk of human error to handle all but the most marginal conditions? Some could argue that's a complete abdication of responsibility. As we witnessed in the Japanese government in their response to the nuclear disaster that evolved post-tsunami.

 

Or do you see technology, no matter how impressive, as fundamentally an aid to sustained, trained, active human skill and experience? Where it's nice to have all the confirmations automation will give you, but it's never acceptable to substitute such confirmations for the crew's own experience and responsibility at every moment to fly the plane?

 

Have a look for children of the magenta line and it will make sense. I think Ro summed it up anyway, whenever conditions are favourable click off the AP and AT and fly the plane. I am only 35 but can see a whole new generation of pilots rolling out, too scared to hand fly and consider a non precision approach to be a complicated burden.

 

I'm sorry, but I'm not getting whatever it is you are laying down. My point was that a visual approach risks unstable approaches in the airline world because of the lack of ATC and instrument guidance for approach and the rarity with which most airline pilots fly an approach like that makes it threat.

 

But that's the thing, if you do it often enough, it's not a threat. It only becomes a threat if you let it. What we emphasise is that failure to remain current is a threat, so we remain current, and as such, there is no threat. That means I can safely say for any pilot where I work, carrying out a visual approach is second nature and would never be considered a threat unless in marginal VMC.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

That's good.  Practice is good, but it does beg one question though.  Does the pilot monitoring at least have the guidance up on his side of the cockpit to keep an eye on how the pilot flying is doing while he is practicing his pure visual approach with a couple hundred people aboard?

So, Ronan, FLEX1978, w6kd, I understand you're all suggesting that visual manual approaches require frequent practicing/training as well, lest they become no less dangerous than other types of approach. But that's exactly KevinAu's point...

That's good.  Practice is good, but it does beg one question though.  Does the pilot monitoring at least have the guidance up on his side of the cockpit to keep an eye on how the pilot flying is doing while he is practicing his pure visual approach with a couple hundred people aboard?

 

Sure, he's the pilot monitoring, he's there as a second pair of eyes, he's not being paid to sit there and look pretty. The problem in this accident is that the culture means that he won't actually call him out on it. You need a very low cockpit gradient, if not a non-existent one 99.9% of the time.

 

So, Ronan, FLEX1978, w6kd, I understand you're all suggesting that visual manual approaches require frequent practicing/training as well, lest they become no less dangerous than other types of approach. But that's exactly KevinAu's point...

 

Not quite, I'm suggesting that it isn't dangerous unless you let it become dangerous. When you phrase it as "requires frequent practice/training" you make it sound like a chore, when really it's much easier than other forms if you do it on a semi-regular basis.

 

 I guess what I'm saying is that a threat is only something beyond your control, as such, flying visually is not a threat.

 

Regards,

Ró.

Well, I understand the issues with Korean culture in the cockpit, but I don't think the NTSB has even interviewed any of the pilots yet, so I don't think anybody really knows whether any of them noticed the situation developing at all until it was too late or spoke up or not.  I'm not even sure if the Kook really is the captain.  On one hand they say he was in training and on the other they say he was the captain.  Do they have captains in training as pilot in command over there at Asiana?  Do you really think CNN would understand the difference between a checkairman in the right seat versus an FO in the right seat?  I think the information we have right now is less than complete.

Not quite, I'm suggesting that it isn't dangerous unless you let it become dangerous. When you phrase it as "requires frequent practice/training" you make it sound like a chore, when really it's much easier than other forms if you do it on a semi-regular basis.

 

 

I guess what I'm saying is that a threat is only something beyond your control, as such, flying visually is not a threat.

 

Regards,

Ró.

What I am saying is that a purely visual approach can be a threat because it is something not done often by airline pilots. Airline pilots conduct most approaches using guidance from instruments and are setup by ATC in a proper position to begin approaches. In a visual approach situation, the pilot with have neither guidance from instruments nor proper positioning by ATC. And it may have been a long time since they've had to do an approach like this as well. That is why a visual can be considered a high threat event. Yes, if you practice it, then it lessens the risks. I applaud you for that, Ro. And for you, Ro and the rest of Aer Lingus, I am sure it is not a threat because you recognize the risks and practice the procedure often. However, constantly practicing visual approaches to mitigate their inherent risks like Aer Lingus does may not necessarily be true at Asiana or any other airline.

 

They must have been way below the glidepath at the start of that video. Surely there was enough time from then to get the engines spooled up again?

 

 

 

Yes, there probably was. But either they relied on the automation (which was not effective), or they controlled throttles manually but didn't realize the decaying speed. Or one of them (pilot monitoring) realized the situation but didn't tell the other pilot (flying) because of that 'steep cockpit gradient'.

What I am saying is that a purely visual approach can be a threat because it is something not done often by airline pilots. Airline pilots conduct most approaches using guidance from instruments and are setup by ATC in a proper position to begin approaches. In a visual approach situation, the pilot with have neither guidance from instruments nor proper positioning by ATC. And it may have been a long time since they've had to do an approach like this as well. That is why a visual can be considered a high threat event. Yes, if you practice it, then it lessens the risks. I applaud you for that, Ro. And for you, Ro and the rest of Aer Lingus, I am sure it is not a threat because you recognize the risks and practice the procedure often. However, constantly practicing visual approaches to mitigate their inherent risks like Aer Lingus does may not necessarily be true at Asiana or any other airline.

 

But the thing is it doesn't have to be on the airline. Even if we didn't place that emphasis on flying visually and manually, I'd still do it, as I know I'd need practice. If I were to ever feel like "Hey, haven't done an auto-land/VOR/NDB/RNAV approach in a while, I should practice one", then that's what I'll do, I don't need to be told that I need to practice it. The same should be true of all pilots, we should all have an awareness of areas we are weaker in, and focus on them. We're supposed to be constantly learning.

 

Now if Asiana had forbidden Visual approaches unless required to perform one then that's a serious failing on their part and I'd hope that wasn't the case. However if it isn't, then the pilots there should fly whatever approach they feel they need a bit of currency on as long as it's practical. It's down to the pilot to make sure they're keeping current, and if they're not they need to point this out to their training department and ask for help.

 

I understand that they have a very stringent policy regarding their FDM, and if this is causing pilots to shy away from taking less precise approaches then they need to ask themselves the true cost of doing this.

 

Regards,

Ró.

But the thing is it doesn't have to be on the airline. Even if we didn't place that emphasis on flying visually and manually, I'd still do it, as I know I'd need practice. If I were to ever feel like "Hey, haven't done an auto-land/VOR/NDB/RNAV approach in a while, I should practice one", then that's what I'll do, I don't need to be told that I need to practice it. The same should be true of all pilots, we should all have an awareness of areas we are weaker in, and focus on them. We're supposed to be constantly learning.

 

Now if Asiana had forbidden Visual approaches unless required to perform one then that's a serious failing on their part and I'd hope that wasn't the case. However if it isn't, then the pilots there should fly whatever approach they feel they need a bit of currency on as long as it's practical. It's down to the pilot to make sure they're keeping current, and if they're not they need to point this out to their training department and ask for help.

 

I understand that they have a very stringent policy regarding their FDM, and if this is causing pilots to shy away from taking less precise approaches then they need to ask themselves the true cost of doing this.

 

Regards,

Ró.

 

You're right, it _should_ be incumbent upon each individual pilot to try and keep his skillsets current.  And you would think or hope that each pilot thinks this way.  But honestly, do you really think everybody out there is like that?  If everybody out there is so conscientious and hard working, why are FAA inspectors still busting pilots for flying around with out of date Jepps or FOMs?  Why are pilots still overrunning runways?  The ugly fact is people are human.  They are going to get lazy, they are going to get rusty, they are going to forget, they may not even have the opportunity to practice something even if they really wanted to and they going to screw up.  Unless you officially or culturally make it procedure that somebody practice some type of approach they haven't done in x number of weeks, then you are still just hoping and you really don't have any clue about what goes on in a cockpit other than yours.  The only thing you can really do is recognize the risks and threats for each flight and consider ways to mitigate them.

Apparently there was no glide slope as it was switched off!!! Modern pilots get so used to the on board computers handling everything except the tea that when something happens they are out of the loop and by the time they respond it's too late to recover. Ithink the manufacturers should learn from the old days and perhaps design ap's to have manual throttle again!

When I say glide slope I was not making any reference to any on board computer systems or instrument flight systems. I was merely referring to the 3% glide slope which is the international standard for landings. It is also on Approach charts and those charts can be for a variety of different approach types. Ie not necessarily ILS. Can be visual or distance (DME).

 

When you fly an aircraft as a pilot you will discover that landing visually there is a correct way to land. A stabilised approach on a correct slope angle is established and controlled with using power to adjust descent rate and attitude to control speed.

 

Now the Asiana crew were landing visually and had no need to operate an IFR approach unless directed to by the Tower. I would say this approach was visual seeing the footage and the beautiful day in San Francisco when it crashed.

Yes, and that is exactly why I've been saying the visual approach is a threat in the airline world. Most airline pilots rarely do the kind of manual flying where you have no help from automation and no guidance from navigation for the landing approach. Therefore, whenever put in that situation, the results are often some kind of unstable approach since it is not done often. That's good that you conscientiously try to emphasize turning everything off for practice. Obviously, you do recognize that there is an inherent threat in the visual approach. Otherwise, you wouldn't be emphasizing it.

I think you underestimate the amount of manual flying that is conducted by pilots these days.

 

Also you probably don't realise that pilots do visual approaches almost all the time. Even night flying you can get a clearance for visual approach.

 

You got to remember though that you have passengers on board the aircraft and the AP is essential in cruise in keeping the flight smooth. The AP is one of the greatest inventions and has enabled long distance flight in a short amount of time to be as smooth as effectively possible.

When you fly an aircraft as a pilot you will discover that landing visually there is a correct way to land. A stabilised approach on a correct slope angle is established and controlled with using power to adjust descent rate and attitude to control speed.

 

This is probably why I can't understand what happened during this approach. When I hand fly my simulated airliners, I always use power to control the rate of descent when on final approach. I don't touch the stick at all. That being the case, it is hard for me to understand why these guys couldn't have easily powered out of that "well below the glideslope" approach (and that's what it was, based on what I can see in the video). They presumably have the airliner on some kind of AUTO setup, but I am clueless in that department!

This all seems very odd to me. So far the FDR says that all was functioning properly particularly noting the engines. This pilot had apparently 10,000 hours including on the 744.  Its basic  rudimentary principles of flight irregardless of aircraft to keep your aircraft at or above VREF while being aware of your AoA. Im no real world pilot but assuming all was functioning great mechanically and electronically, why are you not adding power as soon as it drops below VREF and by all means go around if its not a stabilized approach. At the very least, go and land 2-3000 ft from threshold if you have to than land short. There is plenty of stopping power on the 777 especially after burning off 10.5 hours of fuel. 

 

The only thing that comes to mind now is perhaps a vision problem or something that occured on final. Otherwise why the delay in calling for a GA when your in trouble like that. 

 

All in my opinion or POV of course. I dont claim to know it all in the least before you flame me. Just saying someone with that many hours should know better if the majority of simmers who have been flying for a while know that basic principle. There is no shame in going around unless hes nearly running on fumes or on emergency approach. 

 

I hope that all victims involved that survived are able to recover to the best that is possible and may strength endurance be with all the families associated by it including those that perished.
 

You're right, it _should_ be incumbent upon each individual pilot to try and keep his skillsets current.  And you would think or hope that each pilot thinks this way.  But honestly, do you really think everybody out there is like that?  If everybody out there is so conscientious and hard working, why are FAA inspectors still busting pilots for flying around with out of date Jepps or FOMs?  Why are pilots still overrunning runways?  The ugly fact is people are human.  They are going to get lazy, they are going to get rusty, they are going to forget, they may not even have the opportunity to practice something even if they really wanted to and they going to screw up.  Unless you officially or culturally make it procedure that somebody practice some type of approach they haven't done in x number of weeks, then you are still just hoping and you really don't have any clue about what goes on in a cockpit other than yours.  The only thing you can really do is recognize the risks and threats for each flight and consider ways to mitigate them.

 

But that's just it, we have inspectors, if you don't meet the standard, you don't fly, that should be enough incentive to people to make sure they remain current because if they don't, they're out of their jobs. I'm not sure how the FAA does it, but the IAA will make you jump through hoop after hoop in their proficiency checks. You must make the cut. So even if they're not concerned about a time some day in the future, they should be concerned about their 6 monthly sim check and their annual line check, as well as any other spot checks done over the course of the year.

 

I will give you that I only know the culture in my airline, and that I'm not that exposed to other pilots ways of doing things, but as pilots we always need to be constantly at the top of our game, and anyone that thinks that that doesn't require practice is deluding themselves and should not be on a flight deck. We all have the odd lazy day where we'll leave the AP in till 500', I'm not denying that, that's perfectly fine, but to become complacent is not excusable.

 

Regards,

Ró.