SFO- Asiana 777 crash

[evaamo 549]

 

>>Quite simply, the pilots didn't understand their airplane.

 

 

I agree! but not only that... there's definitely a CRM issue at Asiana (and in many other asian airlines as well, according to friends who fly or flew for some of them). IIRC there were two additional pilots serving as instructors (I believe the PF was being closely monitored as this was his checkride), but neither said a word to the captain with regards to his airspeed management. I understand it is difficult to judge these events from the ground, but I would have been specially careful in checking the A/T mode display in the PFD after they mistakenly toggled FLCH to command a descend and had the MCP set to a higher altitude (which resulted in an even more unstable approach after they corrected manually). I mean, after all, it was the job of these senior pilots serving as checkride instructors to monitor the actions of the captain, who had accumulated a shy 50 hours in the T7.  The whole thing is a nightmare and it is unfortunate that this accident claimed 3 lifes and left an important number of people with permanent wounds. Terrifying for us frequent flyers.

 

cheers

-E

[RWFeldman 159]

 

 

after they toggled FLCH and had the MCP to a higher altitude (which resulted in an even more unstable approach after they corrected

 

As bad as everything prior to that was, seems to me that was the whole initiation of the disaster. Right or wrong,I have never used FLCH for decent let alone on an final approach.

[Steve Dra 7,574]

OMG....that is the saddest display of airmanship and CRM I've ever seen from a "professional" aircrew!!

 

You can't blame the airplane, you can't blame the systems.  I know nobody here watching the animation would come to any other conclusion.

Ryan pretty much said it...the crew did not know the airplane.

 

Those who've been flying the PMDG 777 for a while know what an easy and precision bird it is to fly when you take the time to learn it, and understand that at all times, (and this applies to ANY automated plane) YOU fly the plane!  If you let it, and rely on it to fly YOU, then the outcome will be eventually what we witnessed at SFO. This is especially true when you try to take control when you've gotten it as misconfigured as they did!

There was not a single "pilot" in that cockpit...there was 3 "system monitors" who neglected to look out the window, see the ground rushing up, and make the obvious decision to go around.

Rule number one when landing heavies....if you are not stabilized x amount of miles before touchdown, go around.  They broke this rule plain and simple. This is not a freaking Cessna 150!  The actions of the pilots (or lack of) is reprehensible in my opinion. 

[evaamo 549]

As bad as everything prior to that was, seems to me that was the whole initiation of the disaster. Right or wrong,I have never used FLCH for decent let alone on an final approach.

 

Absolutely... I would expect such an action from a rookie first officer being overloaded and landing in awful weather conditions; not from a crew of 4 (at least one of them senior and serving as checkride instructor) landing in perfect VFR, winds calm and non-rush hour traffic. Awful.

 

cheers

-E

[Tom Allensworth 1,532]

 

 

Unfortunately, I'm not sure the report can be trusted. They seem more interested in whether Boeing will be more or less liable, rather than enhancing aviation safety by correctly assing the failures and inadequacies leading up to the accident (primarily one of crew training).

 

I think the report blows that skepticism out of the water...

 

Quoting the summary:

 

 

the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error;

 

The "inadequately described" documentation must have only been inadequate only for the Asiana pilots. No other 777 operators seem to have a problem with automated functions leading to a crash.

[Brian Doney 127]

I really feel that even with the seemingly obvious mistakes made in this incident, I have no place to really judge what happened. I am firmly on the more casual side of the fence in terms of how seriously I take my sim time nowadays. 

 

That said, everything from the HOLD annunciation on-wards was cringe-worthy, the questionable choice of FLCH in the first place notwithstanding.

[evaamo 549]

Rule number one when landing heavies....if you are not stabilized x amount of miles before touchdown, go around.  They broke this rule plain and simple. This is not a freaking Cessna 150!

 

I know of some airlines that have SOP to G/A if unstable at 1,000ft AGL in VMC ... when "the book" mention 500ft VMC and 1,000ft IMC.

 

In this case, funny you should mention it, I would dare to say that a Cessna 150 pilot would have done a much better job at landing that aircraft. At least he or she would have turned off all the unfamiliar automation features of the airplane and just proceed to manually FLY the da***ed thing!!

 

cheers

-E

[Steve Dra 7,574]

 

 

The "inadequately described" documentation must have only been inadequate only for the Asiana pilots. No other 777 operators seem to have a problem with automated functions leading to a crash.

 

Exactly Tom! And I don't know about other simmers here, especially ones who fly the 777...but personally, I've flown the PMDG 777 around the world twice now, vaguely read the documentation, and have not managed to crash it yet.  Have I been high on approach and try to get her down to land?  Sure...but i knew to go around when it wasn't going to happen.  They never seemed to get that message.

 

117 knots, 140 feet from the water, and at least 5 plane lengths to the edge of the ramp (not even close the the TDZ)....and the throttles are still at IDLE!  You see in the the transcript read (supposedly from the PNF)..."Its low".....It's low?  OMG I'd be grabbing the throttles and the yoke and trying to save my life! 

 

Unbelievable.  Can you imagine the conversation from the crew in that plane that was on the taxiway facing them...seeing what a horrible job they were doing flying the plane.  I can imagine it was a lot of explisitives and "power, power, power" and "Go around you idiots!" 

[Don t moderate me this way 882]

This basically seems like another case of Gotta Landitis to me, aggravated by the instruction/training situation, after muddling up the automation of the aircraft.

 

The no. of casualties in that crash (three, of which two probably could have been averted by using a simple device called seat belt) could easily have been much higher.

[Budbud 227]

 

 

Quite simply, the pilots didn't understand their airplane.

 

I'm not a professional pilot nor I would claim having enough knowledge to "judge" the event, but I think it is pretty scary if pilots (including Training pilots...) don't understand the way their aircrafts work, with 300 persons behind...

 

How is that possible? Aren't their competency assessed in simulators?

[3-2-1-Now 126]

I think the report blows that skepticism out of the water...

 

Quoting the summary:

 

 

The "inadequately described" documentation must have only been inadequate only for the Asiana pilots. No other 777 operators seem to have a problem with automated functions leading to a crash.

 

Operators get a customized version of the Boeing official flight manuals. To write the Boeing manuals from scratch just for one airline isn't going to happen - far too much cost involved, never mind all the legalities of getting the documentation certified.

 

Something must have gone very wrong in the training department of Asiana if they are concluding that "poor documentation" is part of the cause of the accident. Makes me wonder if they wrote unofficial documentation and used those for training instead. AFAIK flight manuals are not localized, so if you fly a Boeing aircraft, you get the manuals in English.

 

Best regards,

Robin.

[FLEX1978 373]

 

 

I know of some airlines that have SOP to G/A if unstable at 1,000ft AGL in VMC ... when "the book" mention 500ft VMC and 1,000ft IMC.

 

Stable approach criteria is for all airlines.  Some SOP modify it to 1000ft IMC or VMC.   I would like to know who selected FLCH? Was it the check captain in the right seat?   FLCH, Idle thrust below 500agl! no excuses for that kind of incompetence.  

 

This is not the first 777 incident involving an unstable approach using FLCH with the thrust in HOLD.  Hopefully the final report will mention this.

 

Regards 

[Steve Dra 7,574]

 

 

I would like to know who selected FLCH?

 

At 11:26;25 the narrator indicates it was the pilot flying.  I would assume this was verified by the NTSB through interviews with the crewmembers in the cockpit.  

I can imagine the interview with the 3rd pilot who calls "Sink rate sir" 3 times in a span of 10 seconds said something like "and the idiots up front ignored me until we were at 140 ft, 114 kts and 5 plane lengths from the edge of the seawall."  Not that he could actually see it because at that time they were in a 10 degree pitch up with the yoke almost in the pilot's laps...yeah...no clear signs of a botched approach or impending stall there!  :rolleyes:

[max2770 74]

I'm no airline pilot, but why was the AP engaged so low?  On a clear day with the T7, the absolute latest I'll disconnect the AP is on GS capture.

 

Also, speed is one of the crucial things to monitor, I'm taking flying classes and my instructor would throw me out of the plane if I couldn't tell him what speed we're going in the half second after he asked me when we're on final approach.

 

And four seconds to put the throttle back up after "airspeed low" warning?  What was he doing, picking his nose?  His hand wasn't on the levers?

[FLEX1978 373]

I'm no airline pilot, but why was the AP engaged so low?  On a clear day with the T7, the absolute latest I'll disconnect the AP is on GS capture.

 

Nothing wrong with using the automatics to help reduce workload, besides 1000 ft is not that low. It was a visual approach, they could have flown it VNAV or just stuck with V/S or FPA down to 200ft.

 

Using the A/P down to minimums is fine as long as you are ahead of the aircraft managing the energy and using the best modes for the job.

 

This turned from a high energy approach (KSFO seems to be famous for slam dunks)  to being slow, un-spooled and no way near stable approach criteria.