NWA A319 accidentaly lands at KRCA instead of KRAP

[Guest Tim757]

Martin-Have you ever executed a lot VOR approach in an actual left seat in line operations?You seem to think that once the pilots have the field they continue to check the NAV data. Other than the obvious reason demonstrated in this incident the NAV data on a VOR approach is pretty useless once the runway is in sight and a visual approach is started. Something tells me in the flight sim world the same thing happens....When you do a evolution day-in, day-out it loses it edge. When you couple that with a highly automated environnment it gets even "duller". It is when the "everyday" hoo-hum creeps in that operational mistakes are more likely to be made.You will find that most major operational errors occur when the crew are performing routine functions...like taxiing to the active. There are several human factors dynamics that settle in with a crew-the SOPA/SMAC/CRM that "this is the way we do it" over and over.You get a line crew who gets "Runway heading, climb to 5,000" each flying-day for a year and give them "Runway heading, climb to 6,000'" you better have a good crew to ensure everyone is on the same page. (When dialing in an altitude change we have to physically keep our hand on the altitude select knob until the other crewmember acknowledges the altitude change) I have yet to read the transcript but something tells me they were cleared for the approach, had visual contact with the runway, reported they had the field and the rest is history.Another interesting factor I just caught is maybe due to the redesign of the Jeppson style approach plate the new "briefing strip" format cuts down on the actual "looking" at the plan-view of the approach. Again, seeing what we "want" and used to seeing vs what we should "see".The simple answer Martin to understanding this is that there are still humans involved.Tim757

[Guest Martin]

>Have you ever executed a lot VOR approach in an actual left>seat in line operations?No, I only have "left seat" experience in the C172 so far.>You seem to think that once the pilots have the field they>continue to check the NAV data.But what field? Surely it's a good idea to cross-check with any available sources that it's the right field you're looking at. And if they were actually executing a VOR approach I imagine that they would have figured out that they hadn't even reached the IAF when they were about to land. Because of this it sounds more likely to me that they were on a visual approach, in which case it's easier to understand how they picked the wrong runway.>When you do a evolution day-in, day-out it loses it edge. >When you couple that with a highly automated environnment it>gets even "duller". It is when the "everyday" hoo-hum creeps>in that operational mistakes are more likely to be made.Of course, I understand that. Even after just 60 hours total flight time in C172s I find complacency lurking sometimes! It may be an explanation for this incident, but not an excuse.>You get a line crew who gets "Runway heading, climb to 5,000">each flying-day for a year and give them "Runway heading,>climb to 6,000'" you better have a good crew to ensure>everyone is on the same page.Slightly off topic, but there are ways to come around this problem. In Europe it's not uncommon that an altitude will not be given with the SID clearance (usually "pilot nav" SIDs and not radar vectoring), because the SID chart simply states "unless otherwise specified, climb to 5000 ft". If ATC just says "cleared to XXXX via ABC 1A departure, squawk..." you will climb 5000 ft, and if they say "... ABC 1A departure, 6000 ft..." you will probably notice that it wasn't the normal clearance, and remember the altitude restriction.Martin767 fetishistIt's a lot like life and that's what's appealing

[Guest Tim757]

Martin"Excuse"? Didn't say it was an "excuse"-believe me there are no excuses for this-only a series of events, actions and judgements that lead up to the landing. Root cause analysis will beat this to death much more than we do in AVSIM (Though I find a lot of the good observations and understanding by the "informed contributers" thought provoking). Spent many hours flying the Atlantic Market and have experienced the various methodologies of ATC over there. The balance there is between efficiency and clutter. So far I haven't seen any system that is fool-proof. We get the same thing in the States at busier fields where they will amend the altitudes etc on the clearance.Cross checking of course is a wonderful idea and should be done-but on the list of things that have to be done during the approach sequence its kinda near the bottom. Since this type of "operational error" is not that frequent the judgement will stay with the crew that they are at the right airport.Don't under-estimate the C-172...great plane and complaciency in it will hurt you just as much. I forget what the figures are but they are something like 100 hrs, 500 hrs, 1000 hrs 5000 hrs where a "cluster" of incidents happen to pilots.It is a tough vocation-not only do we have to keep up with changes in the industry we have to maintain that attitude where we don't "know" everything and spend time learning and re-learning. That, I find is the difference between an airman and a pilot.Tim757

[Guest Martin]

>"Excuse"? Didn't say it was an "excuse"You didn't, but that was how I (mis)interpreted the tone of your post. I think we are really agreeing on most points - it's just that all the points don't come across the way they were intended.>Cross checking of course is a wonderful idea and should be>done-but on the list of things that have to be done during the>approach sequence its kinda near the bottom.Maybe it is. But I fail to see how it isn't obvious to the crew that they are at the wrong airport, by just looking at the ND. But I say that, of course, almost entirely based on virtual Airbus/EFIS "experience". Still, to me it seems it's just a matter of looking at the screen in front of you, seeing KRAP much farther away than you think it is, and KRCA just where you intend to land!In aviation we always try to learn something from mistakes, in order to avoid making new ones, but yet landing at the wrong airport - while not a very common mistake - is not a unique one, so I hope something can be done and is done to make it easier to avoid just this mistake.>Don't under-estimate the C-172...great plane and complaciency>in it will hurt you just as much. I forget what the figures>are but they are something like 100 hrs, 500 hrs, 1000 hrs>5000 hrs where a "cluster" of incidents happen to pilots.I've read about those "caution areas" of experience as well. Hopefully the complacency that sets in can reduced by being aware of it.>It is a tough vocation-not only do we have to keep up with>changes in the industry we have to maintain that attitude>where we don't "know" everything and spend time learning and>re-learning. That, I find is the difference between an airman>and a pilot.If you're implying that I seem a bit like a "know-it-all", you're not the first one. ;-) But I learn new things every day, especially when it comes to aviation... by reading these forums (remembering to take some things with a grain of salt!), and sometimes even by pulling out my CPL theory books! (Taking those with a grain of salt as well, since apparently they didn't have anybody proof-reading them...)Martin767 fetishistIt's a lot like life and that's what's appealing

[Guest Tim757]

Martin--Naw, not making excuses but trying to shed a little light on the way it "is" at times.As far as making errors that are "obvious" that kinda goes back to the concept of "Monday Morning Quarterbacking". It was "obvious" to that particular crew that that was the runway. The reason it was "obvious" to them is that they discounted the other indications. Seems odd but I am trying to recall when I really "Looked" at the paineted runway numbers since my eyes are flipping from the touchdown zone to the far end of the runway. Self examination is fun at times (ouch).I think any pilot who is serious about staying alive should wander over to the WWW.NTSB.GOV website and poke around the accident/incident reports. When you read them you will get that "what were they thinking" feeling. On the final reports the investagators do a pretty good job of trying to not only factor in the issues but try and see where the pilot's mind was at.Think of it as akin to "Get Home-itis" - in their situational awareness the runway was right where they thought might/should be so they discounted-discontinued "looking" for the field.Not implying at all that you are a "know-it-all"...if anything I would say you are a really good "student" of flying who doesn't accept the standard memorized answers but wants to understand the "why". Keep the inquiry part going because it will keep you from becoming a smoking-hole in your career/hobby/passion. I'd enjoy having you in the right seat as long as you order the chicken.It is the simple, first brush, un-analyzed solutions that really don't go to the root of the cause. That is why the NTSB/FAA really does get into all aspects of an incident/accident. Go to "school" on other people's painful lessons.Tim757

[Guest Martin]

>Naw, not making excuses but trying to shed a little light on>the way it "is" at times.That's much appreciated. Where I fly this type of incident is very unlikely to happen as the landscape is forest, forest, forest, lake, forest, lake, forest, forest, lake, lake, forest, town, airport, forest, lake, forest, forest. You get the idea. :-) Not that many "wrong" airports to land at.>As far as making errors that are "obvious" that kinda goes>back to the concept of "Monday Morning Quarterbacking". It>was "obvious" to that particular crew that that was the>runway. The reason it was "obvious" to them is that they>discounted the other indications.Of course - this almost goes without saying, if they had had any doubts, they would have gone around or talked to ATC. All I'm saying is that since humans function like this, there must be ways to reduce the risk of incidents like this happening. Maybe an aural warning like I mentioned earlier, or an adjustment to SOPs - just speculating here. But as you say, no system is fool proof.>It is the simple, first brush, un-analyzed solutions that>really don't go to the root of the cause.Very true, but sometimes those solutions are very close to the truth, very similar to the conclusion of the incident/accident investigation. The thing is we don't know how close before the final report is published.Martin767 fetishistIt's a lot like life and that's what's appealing

[rickalty 0]

"Maybe it is. But I fail to see how it isn't obvious to the crew that they are at the wrong airport, by just looking at the ND."The human mind has an incredible ability to interpolate partial data to fill in a picture with what it expects to see. This is why so many accident investigations - in many fields - include the phrase "But I was sure I saw...."I have been on NTSB accident investigation teams (Shipping, not aviation) and "Why wasn't that obvious to you?" comes up ALL the time.The expected to see Rapid City, so they saw Rapid City.Richard

[Yoda967 23]

>Screwed by the military again:-lol How is this comment funny? Go back and read the FARs. The PILOT (not ATC) is responsible for safe NAVIGATION of the aircraft. You've written some good, helpful posts, for which I am grateful...but now, you're just another one of those people who likes to bash the military. How sad.Kurt KalbfleischChief Fire Controlman (Surface Warfare)United States Navy (Retired)

[Guest Johnny]

Guys, you all can relax now. I just figured how this whole mess happened! I checked with my wife and as usual it was all MY FAULT! I can't explain it, but as with everything else... I am to blame! ;)JohnnyKTUS/AVQ

[Guest Erick_Cantu]

Wow, I guess they're in some pretty deep KRAP now, aren't they? :-hah

[Guest jbpropilot]

This happened to a Delta flight in 1997 bound for Orlando International. He landed on 9L at Sanford (KSFB). I was on the Comair flight line when that guy landed. Image our surprise having never seen a domestic commercial jet ever at SFB.A bus came to pick up the passengers and take them and their bags to International. The jet left about an hour after that.Jay BirchCFI, CFII, MEIAzalea Air, Inc. (KBFM)http://www.clearedasfiled.com/images/simpics/jaycfi.gif

[MarkW 1,479]

The same thing almost happened to an Air Canada A319 last year. Story below.------------------------------------------------------------Posted by chris on September 4th @ 16:24 Impeded by fires, Airbus approaches too-short airstrip.. Tom Blackwell National Post Click 'Read More' for the full story. Officials are trying to determine why an Air Canada jetliner with 87 passengers on board appeared on the verge of landing at the wrong airport, head-on toward another plane, after becoming "lost" over mountainous British Columbia terrain recently. A small Cessna was attempting to touch down at the opposite end of the same runway at tiny Vernon airport and veered out of the way, in an incident one aviation insider called a "huge embarrassment." Had the Airbus A319 from Toronto landed, it would have faced major problems, because the strip is too short for such planes. The Air Canada pilots, who were making a visual approach because of restrictions imposed by nearby forest fires, finally pulled back up. After air traffic controllers informed them they were in the wrong place, the pilots flew 60 kilometres south to Kelowna, the correct destination, and landed safely. "The pilots descended low enough that, for all intents and purposes, they appeared to be lost, and that's a concern," said Bill Yearwood, regional manager of the Transportation Safety Board. "It is important for aircraft and pilots and operations to always know where they are and where they're going." The safety board has launched an investigation into the incident, which occurred just before 7 p.m. on Aug. 23, concerned about how and why the plane got so low that it lost sight of its intended destination. Mr. Yearwood said it is unlikely the incident could have resulted in an accident, because visibility was good and the crew would have been able to avoid any obstacles, even if they were lost. They also would have eventually noticed they were at the wrong airport and avoided landing at Vernon, he said. But one airline industry source called the episode unheard of for pilots of a modern plane with cutting-edge navigational systems. "It's a huge embarrassment," said the source, a pilot who asked not to be identified. "My guess is the guys just had their heads out the window and weren't aware of where they were ... Truth is, this could have been very serious." The flight management system aboard an Airbus has a "moving map" display that shows the plane's position relative to airports. It should have made it clear Air Canada Flight 183 was in the wrong spot, the pilot said. Runway 23 at Vernon is 3,360 feet long, less than the minimum of about 3,800 feet needed to land such a plane, a discrepancy that could have led to an over-run of the strip, the source said. Laura Cooke, an Air Canada spokeswoman, said she could offer few comments about the incident while it is under investigation, except that the plane made one approach, did a "go around," meaning the approach was aborted, then landed safely. The raging forest fires in the region helped set up the incident. The flight carrying 87 passengers and a crew of five would normally have landed at Kelowna using instruments. But using instruments could have led the plane into restricted airspace, where water bombers and firefighting helicopters need to fly unimpeded, Mr. Yearwood said. For that reason, the Air Canada crew was told to make a visual approach. While airlines have pre-set procedures for visual landings at different airports, Air Canada has no such guidelines for approaching Kelowna runway 15 in that direction. The crew had to come up with its own plan. For reasons yet to be determined, the pilots descended so low, to about 2,100 feet eventually, that they lost sight of Kelowna airport, Mr. Yearwood said. They were soon "lined up" with the runway at Vernon airport, and pilots at that airfield reported the Air Canada jet appeared on the approach to land there, he said. However, the board has not determined whether the crew did try to touch down at the wrong airport. An occurrence report filed with Transport Canada by air traffic controllers said they got a call moments later from the pilot of a Cessna 152 who said he had been preparing to land at one end of Vernon runway 23 when he saw the Airbus coming in from the other direction. The Cessna pilot with Okanagan Aviation Services "gave way and observed the aircraft in the missed approach," the report said. Mr. Yearwood said it is unclear how close the aircraft were to each other. "Certainly it would make a big impression on a little pilot that doesn't normally see big airplanes in the area, coming at him from the other side," he said. The Cessna pilot declined to comment.

[rickalty 0]

"a Cessna 152 who said he had been preparing to land... when he saw the Airbus coming in from the other direction." "Certainly it would make a big impression on a little pilot"That may be the understatement of the year. :-)Richard

[Guest Tim757]

Wonder if the controllers where graduates from the MicroSoft FS9 School of Air Traffic Controllers....?Tim757