Chaos in the Cockpit

[JBlack 8]

I watched this documentary for the first time today.. Stunning and unbelievable.

How could the flight crew get it so wrong?

 

 

[michal 44]

And AirAsia 8501? Practically the same stuff, the same errors (underlying technical issues were different). And it happened after the Air France accident, you would think pilots had learned something from the first one. This to me is even more bizarre.

[JBlack 8]

And AirAsia 8501? Practically the same stuff, the same errors (underlying technical issues were different). And it happened after the Air France accident, you would think pilots had learned something from the first one. This to me is even more bizarre.

 

Too true.

 

Spoiler alert!

 

As a mere armchair pilot, it seemed to me that the stick control on the Airbus was a major factor in the crash.  If the Airbus used standard yokes instead then the captain would have spotted at once that his co-pilot was still pulling back on the yoke despite having handed over control to him. 

Or if  the flight sticks had even been situated centrally instead of on the far side, it would have been far easier to spot the co-pilot's constant death grip on that stick, which was hidden from view by his arm and body.

 

Yes? No?

[Chris Crawford 49]

Too true.

 

Spoiler alert!

 

As a mere armchair pilot, it seemed to me that the stick control on the Airbus was a major factor in the crash.  If the Airbus used standard yokes instead then the captain would have spotted at once that his co-pilot was still pulling back on the yoke despite having handed over control to him. 

Or if  the flight sticks had even been situated centrally instead of on the far side, it would have been far easier to spot the co-pilot's constant death grip on that stick, which was hidden from view by his arm and body.

 

Yes? No?

 

I believe its more along the lines of pilots getting complacent with automated systems, and not knowing how to properly recover from adverse situations. If the F/O was full aft on the stick, and the captain wasn't aware of it, that just comes down to bad CRM. If you're at a high power setting, with the controls aft, and the aircraft is buffering and losing altitude, the first and foremost thing you should do, is lower the nose. Not raise it. It all comes down to proper piloting and aircraft control. The side-sticks have nothing to do with it. If you lose airspeed indications, or it climbs rapidly because of a pitot issue, what do you do? Leave the thrust in a known power setting, and continue the flight. The LAST thing you should do, is decrease thrust. Just my 2 cents

[JBlack 8]

If the F/O was full aft on the stick, and the captain wasn't aware of it, that just comes down to bad CRM.

 

Interesting. But It still seems logical to me that the stick was a factor in the crash, and a quick googly search seems to confirm my suspicions.

 

Smithsonian AirSpaceMag

Steve Satre

 

One big factor in the Air France 447 accident: uncertainty as to who was flying the plane.

 

Here’s the part that I believe was a major contributor to the accident. On the Airbus, when one pilot makes a control input (e.g. pulling back on the sidestick), the other pilot has no indication of this control movement. Compare this to more traditional aircraft, which have control yokes in front of both pilots. On these planes, when one pilot moves the yoke, the other pilot’s yoke moves in tandem. If I hold full back stick, this is glaringly obvious to the other pilot. Apparently this is not so on an Airbus. In addition, when both pilots move their respective control sticks, the inputs are averaged. So, when the senior FO made an attempt to lower the nose of the plane, his efforts were stymied by the junior FO who was holding back stick throughout the descent.

 

http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/the-verdict-on-air-france-447-5117879/

 

AirFrance flight 447

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

In April 2012 in The Daily Telegraph, British journalist Nick Ross published a comparison of Airbus and Boeing flight controls; unlike the control yoke used on Boeing flight decks, the Airbus side stick controls give little visual feedback and no sensory or tactile feedback to the second pilot. Ross reasoned that this might – in part – explain why the handling pilot's fatal nose-up inputs were not countermanded by his two colleagues.[235][237]

 

In a July 2012 CBS report, Sullenberger suggested that the design of the Airbus cockpit might have been a factor in the accident. The flight controls are not mechanically linked between the two pilot seats, and Robert, the left seat pilot who believed he had taken over control of the plane, was not aware that Bonin had continued to hold the stick back, which overrode Robert's own control.[2]

[ExNusquam 11]

Vanity Fair did a phenomenal piece on AF447, covering automation and human factors.

 

One of the pieces that their article brings up is how Airbus works around not having mechanically linked flight controls, which is to have a automatic callout of "DUAL INPUT" whenever both pilots touch the controls. This callout is heard several times on the AF447 CVR, and the FDR also recorded multiple pushes of the sidestick priority button, signifying one seat was trying to override the other. If they'd had mechanical controls they likely would have been wrestling with each other for control. This was a tragic breakdown in CRM, not some kind of fault in flight control design. It's worth noting that both AAR214 and CJC3407 both involved prolonged improper flight control inputs, and both the DH8D and 777 have mechanically linked flight controls. 

[Chris Crawford 49]

Interesting. But It still seems logical to me that the stick was a factor in the crash, and a quick googly search seems to confirm my suspicions.

 

Smithsonian AirSpaceMag

Steve Satre

 

One big factor in the Air France 447 accident: uncertainty as to who was flying the plane.

 

Here’s the part that I believe was a major contributor to the accident. On the Airbus, when one pilot makes a control input (e.g. pulling back on the sidestick), the other pilot has no indication of this control movement. Compare this to more traditional aircraft, which have control yokes in front of both pilots. On these planes, when one pilot moves the yoke, the other pilot’s yoke moves in tandem. If I hold full back stick, this is glaringly obvious to the other pilot. Apparently this is not so on an Airbus. In addition, when both pilots move their respective control sticks, the inputs are averaged. So, when the senior FO made an attempt to lower the nose of the plane, his efforts were stymied by the junior FO who was holding back stick throughout the descent.

 

http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/the-verdict-on-air-france-447-5117879/

 

AirFrance flight 447

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

In April 2012 in The Daily Telegraph, British journalist Nick Ross published a comparison of Airbus and Boeing flight controls; unlike the control yoke used on Boeing flight decks, the Airbus side stick controls give little visual feedback and no sensory or tactile feedback to the second pilot. Ross reasoned that this might – in part – explain why the handling pilot's fatal nose-up inputs were not countermanded by his two colleagues.[235][237]

 

In a July 2012 CBS report, Sullenberger suggested that the design of the Airbus cockpit might have been a factor in the accident. The flight controls are not mechanically linked between the two pilot seats, and Robert, the left seat pilot who believed he had taken over control of the plane, was not aware that Bonin had continued to hold the stick back, which overrode Robert's own control.[2]

 

Just comes down to CRM. Whoever needs to take over the controls, the pilot just needs to state "I have the flight controls". Other pilot should relinquish the use of the controls immediately. Nothing more, nothing less. There doesn't need to be a battle between who has authority over the aircraft.

[Morrigan 90]

 

 

Or if  the flight sticks had even been situated centrally instead of on the far side, it would have been far easier to spot the co-pilot's constant death grip on that stick, which was hidden from view by his arm and body.
 
Yes? No?

 

We don't know. What was presented in the TV screening isn't necessarily what actually happened in the cockpit at that time and we have no idea where the captain stood. He could have spotted something or maybe wouldn't make a difference.

 

It all comes down to the human factor though. We can all say we would get it right every time, even fatigued in extremely stressful and panic inducing situation. But it's not true. The psychological factors are very complex and are constantly researched, improving the training of new and active pilots. What happened was tragic but cause was not uncommon.

[michal 44]

 

 

In addition, when both pilots move their respective control sticks, the inputs are averaged.

Correct and by the way that was also a contributing factor in the Air Asia crash. This "averaging" is very spooky. 

[KevinAu 441]

No amount of crm or stick design would have saved them. That flight was doomed the day that pilot began his flight training. This crash is a result of the techniques taught at these flight training schools geared towards ab initios and airline focused youngsters. Instead of teaching their students the basics of flying an airplane and understanding the wing, they skip the basic understanding of flight and focus on precise pitch and performance right from the beginning. The problem is that planes only behave that way in certain portions of the flight envelope, once outside of that area, the controls work differently and requires a pilot to change some very heavy mental gears in order to operate the controls properly. The pilot of that AF flight never made the mental realization that the plane was not going to react the way they had taught him It would.

[JBlack 8]

No amount of crm or stick design would have saved them.

 

____The pilot of that AF flight never made the mental realization that the plane was not going to react the way they had taught him It would.

 

The pilot finally realised what was happening though and tried to pull the nose but he....

 Oh never mind.  Accidents will happen I guess, no matter how many checks and balances are put in place.

[Overload 91]

No amount of crm or stick design would have saved them

 

 

I can't believe that when the Captain finally came to the flight deck, had it been a convention yoke arrangement, that observing the pilot flying was pulling the yoke way back, he couldn't have failed to recognise the stall situation for what it was.

Also when the more experienced pilot not flying tried to take control, it would have been obvious to him if the other pilot was interfering or not.

 

A well written article that has been mentioned on AVSIM before is here:

 

http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash

 

Eugene

[KevinAu 441]

I can't believe that when the Captain finally came to the flight deck, had it been a convention yoke arrangement, that observing the pilot flying was pulling the yoke way back, he couldn't have failed to recognise the stall situation for what it was.

Also when the more experienced pilot not flying tried to take control, it would have been obvious to him if the other pilot was interfering or not.

 

A well written article that has been mentioned on AVSIM before is here:

 

http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash

 

Eugene

My point is there are many pilots out there who were taught in a manner that keeps them from naturally making the correct control actions when outside the normal flight regime. That is the root of the problem with in flight upset crashes in airline aviation.

[JBlack 8]

My point is there are many pilots out there who were taught in a manner that keeps them from naturally making the correct control actions when outside the normal flight regime. That is the root of the problem with in flight upset crashes in airline aviation.

 

Okay I take your point. But I wouldn't mind betting that if your average flight-simmer was introduced to that cockpit situation and handed control, then he or she would probably 'naturally' opt to push forward on the stick instead of constantly pulling back hard on it.  I do realise that this is the classic question 'Could a flight-simmer' save a plane in an emergency?.' But I think in this case a simmer with a few years experience might well have saved the day as he/she would tend to have a more open mind and an instinctive grasp of the situation, albeit in an amateur capacity. Which sort of proves your point as well. 

 

Another fantasy scenario I envisaged was to have a large red button on the panel which, when pushed, would force the autopilot to engage and select whatever parameters were available to it, or  else 'best guess' parameters if no data existed.   The end result might be successful and certainly couldn't do more harm than three human pilots in a muddle

 

Talking of crashes.  How come the Crash Modelling topic got closed down tonight despite only being opened for 3 days, yet the American Truck Simulator topic is still open despite being started nearly three weeks ago! -and despite not even being a flight simulator-related topic!  Both topics have almost exactly the same number of replies (around 113) yet it seems that lobbying by a few non-crash damage members has swayed admin to shut down a lively and constructive debate that's only several days old. Meanwhile Truck Simulation is apparently okay to debate for weeks on end on Avsim,  and it features actual crash damage.  (Scratches head.)

 

End of rant

[ExNusquam 11]

 

 

Okay I take your point. But I wouldn't mind betting that if your average flight-simmer was introduced to that cockpit situation and handed control, then he or she would probably 'naturally' opt to push forward on the stick instead of constantly pulling back hard on it.  I do realise that this is the classic question 'Could a flight-simmer' save a plane in an emergency?.' But I think in this case a simmer with a few years experience might well have saved the day as he/she would tend to have a more open mind and an instinctive grasp of the situation, albeit in an amateur capacity. Which sort of proves your point as well. 

You've never flown a real airplane, have you?

 

The best stick and rudder IFR guy I've ever flown with never played FS. One of the worst I've flown with played a ton. I don't really think you can draw a connection there.