fsx-ms If I manage to master high-end add-on planes, would I be able to fly them in real world?

[BlueStar 323]

 

 

take AF447. If the pilots were more familiar with the systems and understanding, they would have seen that they were getting incorrect speed readouts, rather than think "oh it must be some weird computers going strange"

 

If AF447 had an AOA like my MD-11 then we wouldn't be having this conversation.

 

blaustern

 

 

The "hard part" PSX did for me - systems, and understanding how it all comes together.

 

PSX is a procedures trainer, a lot different than PMDG. :smile: 

 

I still say if the A/P was disconnected and the aircraft was out of trim, all these desktop simmers couldn't get it back in trim so they could engage the A/P.

 

blaustern

[blackopscc1 14]

That's very interesting. What I also found interesting was a thread some months ago started by a newcomer to FSX who was looking for advice about what to do next. Most responders seemed to be saying "...buy the PMDG NGX and start learning the systems."

Several years ago when I was first learning to fly, I was told by one of my flight instructors that the difference between mastering a small Cessna and being able to fly a large transport category aircraft, was akin to the difference " between driving a Yugo and a Kenworth truck ". That dates me I know. But there is an element of truth to it...

 

What I found out in the FFS is that the mass of one of these large aircraft is not so easily replicated in desktop simulators, (the IP said even the level D sim I was in "struggles" to fully replicate the true feeling of inertia one experiences with a nearly 1M pound aircraft in real air). I had absolutely no problem "flying the flight director", or with any of the other aspects of managing the "stick and rudder" flying skills.....except when the automatics were not available.

 

That is when I became aware of how much skill and training is necessary to be able to acclimate to the "feel" of such a heavy (in case of 747) aircraft, and manage its energy well. That is where I fell behind, and without the "electronic help", was not able to fly it well.

 

As an aside, I thought about what that old flight instructor told me all those years ago, and I just went ahead and purchased American Truck Simulator :-). I'm going to try and take a shot at driving an actual loaded Peterbilt or Mack (Rubber Duck...), but only after driving the sim for about a week or two. Even bought a replica of the 18 speed shifter knob with high range and a splitter... I want to see just how bad I do, as well as finding out whether the comparison he made all those years ago is actually valid or not?

[SpiritFlyer 987]

​I'm not a real pilot, but I play one on FS!  

[N400QW 205]

Did you stay as a Holiday Inn too? :wink:

[ErichB 3,638]

No one thinks they will be a master of an airplane though, you are arguing a point I do not see others have ever tried making.

 

Only because I have heard it expressed before.  Not here - but at an airport - and on more than one occasion.

[skelsey 765]

If AF447 had an AOA like my MD-11 then we wouldn't be having this conversation.

 

What makes you think that the pilots, having already ignored:

 

- A high nose attitude, coupled with:

- Low and decreasing airspeed, coupled with:

- A high rate of descent

 

All on the PFD in plain view in front of them (OK, the speeds were, at one point, unreliable, but the pitch and altimeter unwinding were still there), would have taken any more notice of a little AoA indicator (which may or may not have been reliable itself, given the vanes were only usable above 60kias).

 

I am as mystified as anyone else as to why they kept pulling back, but I don't think an AoA indicator would have stopped them.

[Bidartarra 39]

What makes you think that the pilots, having already ignored:

- A high nose attitude, coupled with:

- Low and decreasing airspeed, coupled with:

- A high rate of descent

All on the PFD in plain view in front of them (OK, the speeds were, at one point, unreliable, but the pitch and altimeter unwinding were still there), would have taken any more notice of a little AoA indicator (which may or may not have been reliable itself, given the vanes were only usable above 60kias).

I am as mystified as anyone else as to why they kept pulling back, but I don't think an AoA indicator would have stopped them.

People underestimate how much ones vision can tunnel under certain circumstances. The FO was completely focused on the loss of speed info and didn't see anything else probably.

We had an air France captain at my paragliding club when AF447 happened, he was completely puzzled, he couldn't comprehend why it crashed, why they didn't recover.

 

He did told us though that he thought pilots completely trained in the civilian world seem to be more scared of stalls than former military aviators like he was, as in the French Naval Aviation he had his fair share of dynamic and low speed stalls practice.

 

Its always easy to replay a game afterwards.

[skelsey 765]

People underestimate how much ones vision can tunnel under certain circumstances. The FO was completely focused on the loss of speed info and didn't see anything else probably.

And that is exactly my point. From watching the animations, actually, it seems to me that he was desperately trying to follow the Flight Director (which had reverted to VS +2500 or thereabouts and therefore was indicating completely unachievable pitch-up commands). As I say, I am skeptical that adding an AoA gauge would have made any difference at all to where his attention was!

[Bidartarra 39]

And that is exactly my point. From watching the animations, actually, it seems to me that he was desperately trying to follow the Flight Director (which had reverted to VS +2500 or thereabouts and therefore was indicating completely unachievable pitch-up commands). As I say, I am skeptical that adding an AoA gauge would have made any difference at all to where his attention was!

And it was not the first time this loss of airspeed indication happened on 330s. Air Caraibes and also Air France (IIRC) had several reports of such incidents, Air Caraibes was very fast to replace all their pitots, Air France was not.

 

Edit source in French (sorry)

http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2009/06/09/air-france-a-t-il-tarde-a-remplacer-les-sondes-pitot_563432

 

Air Caraibes had their pitots changed by September 2008 after the first of two incident was reported in July 2008. Second incident happened in September 2008 (before the completion of the replacement).

[Boeing or not going 578]

Wow, 10/10 for sweeping assumption.

 

What that video makes clear in fact is that it's not a generational thing at all, but an approach to training. Did you even watch it? Listen to what he says:

 

"I am sorry for making you like this..."

"Look what this pilot that I trained did..."

"Don't be defensive...this is how we made you..."

 

Hi message is simple. This is how we approached training. We were wrong. This is what we need to change.

 

I can see nothing there that's objectionable on any level and certainly nothing that amounts to, or even comes close to some form of "generation hatred".

 

If the AF447 pilot in the right seat had conducted stall recovery as it's taught in even a Cessna 172, he wouldn't have killed everyone on the aircraft. There's no great systems knowledge required for that.

 

Maybe it's true to say that a better knowledge of the Airbus's different laws and when and why it applies them might have helped them understand why the systems were acting strangely, but that doesn't alter the fact that the aircraft could have been saved by an application of basic stick-and-rudder knowledge.

You don't get to complain about sweeping assumptions when you link everyone to a video "children of the magenta line"

 

That talking point is used to insult younger pilots as being inexperienced at "'real flying" and only knowing computers. But if the AF447 pilots knew computers, they would have seen an unreliable airspeed and realised they were in a stall. Basic stick and rudder knowledge without knowing the systems is why they crashed in the first place.

[nealmac 260]

If the AF447 pilot in the right seat had conducted stall recovery as it's taught in even a Cessna 172, he wouldn't have killed everyone on the aircraft. There's no great systems knowledge required for that.

 

Maybe it's true to say that a better knowledge of the Airbus's different laws and when and why it applies them might have helped them understand why the systems were acting strangely, but that doesn't alter the fact that the aircraft could have been saved by an application of basic stick-and-rudder knowledge.

Actually, while basic "stick-and-rudder" knowledge would be needed, the pilots didn't even know they were in a stall. Knowing they were in a stall would have made a difference.

[N400QW 205]

Grandpa used to say "If the dog hadn't stopped to take s... he would have caught the rabbit" He referred to "Ifs" in this context quite a few times.

To "get behind" a large or small aircraft in automated or manual flight in critical phase is a recipe for fatality and there is no turn off crash detection or reset button.

 

A reread of #248 blackopscc1 experience in Lvl D type simulator up thread can shed a lot of light on the subject. :wink:

[KenG 492]

The number of modern, young pilots that I teach that have no clue when I say primary and supporting instruments is staggering. I'd guess well over 75%. 

 

When I say partial panel most of these same people think reversion mode, just hit a switch and select the secondary ADC or AHRS.

 

People who use automation as a crutch to hide poor piloting skills need to be routed out and called out. 

 

Modern avionics have had a significant increase in Situational Awareness, but those so dependent on these systems, loose all SA when these systems start to fail or provide erroneous information. 

 

You can bet if you end up in my sim you will have to fly and approach without use a Flight Director and Autopilot and mostly likely have to do that one engine inoperative. 

 

I teach professional pilots, not button pushers. 

[vololiberista 205]

And it was not the first time this loss of airspeed indication happened on 330s. Air Caraibes and also Air France (IIRC) had several reports of such incidents, Air Caraibes was very fast to replace all their pitots, Air France was not.

 

Edit source in French (sorry)

http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2009/06/09/air-france-a-t-il-tarde-a-remplacer-les-sondes-pitot_563432

 

Air Caraibes had their pitots changed by September 2008 after the first of two incident was reported in July 2008. Second incident happened in September 2008 (before the completion of the replacement).

All they had to do in AF447 in fact was nothing! If they had done nothing and just monitored thrust against attitude. Pretty much leaving everything as it was previously set then the airspeed would have come back. They forgot their basic training and totally ignored the stall warning. The Captain came back and did not assess the situation properly. To be honest my cat would have made a better job because curling up on the pilot's seat was all that was necessary.

[ErichB 3,638]

All they had to do in AF447 in fact was nothing! If they had done nothing and just monitored thrust against attitude. Pretty much leaving everything as it was previously set then the airspeed would have come back. They forgot their basic training and totally ignored the stall warning. The Captain came back and did not assess the situation properly. To be honest my cat would have made a better job because curling up on the pilot's seat was all that was necessary.

I think airlines need to start paying flightsimmers to sit quietly amongst the passengers on every commercial flight, just in case they are needed to save the day from incompetent pilots. I'd feel alot safer knowing they were there. I might apply, myself.