Ethiopia crash

[threexgreen 3,133]

2 hours ago, norman s said:

So I ask again how do we find out how this information was relayed to the worldwide operators.

 

2 hours ago, KevinAu said:

I dont’t know.

Apart from how it's done, Ethiopian Airlines' spokesperson confirmed a short time after the crash that the bulletin issued by Boeing and the FAA had been passed on to their 737 pilots. Unless they didn't bother they definitely knew.

Edited April 11, 2019 by threegreen

[Wink207 78]

2 hours ago, KevinAu said:

 .... Boeing also has a hand in this since it is a change to the flight manual. So I imagine it would be communicated via the product support that Boeing would be providing to Ethiopean even if the FAA doesn’t include them on the mailing list.

I'm sure it would be. Ethiopean has quite a large fleet of Boeing aircraft, including 737s, 767s, 777s, & 787s. Good customer.

[norman s 15]

Perhaps a more robust method of sending the information down the line to the people who really need it may be required!

The AD seems pointed to US operators and leasing companies.Does this also get passed on to European regulators etc and by whom ,FAA or Boeing.?

[threexgreen 3,133]

7 minutes ago, norman s said:

Perhaps a more robust method of sending the information down the line to the people who really need it may be required!

The AD seems pointed to US operators and leasing companies.Does this also get passed on to European regulators etc and by whom ,FAA or Boeing.?

Why would anything more robust be required or any change at all? They got the news, nothing went wrong there. Even if we don't know exactly how it's done, it is done and works. I think it would be rather far fetched to think when an AD for a particular aircraft is released there aren't adequate ways to get this out reliably to every carrier operating said aircraft.

[cowpatz 243]

It all depends on what information is provided to the flight crew and how.
If it is anything like the 777 then that would have been tucked in with 19 other ops and a hand full of company technical bulletins.

How have you reached the conclusion that they did not follow the procedure?

On Apr 4th 2019 at 09:00z Ethiopia's Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) released a brief note on their Facebook account (but not on their website):

Preliminary findings on ET 302 crash:

1. Aircraft’s airworthiness was certified;
2. The crew were capable of flying& followed Boeing’s procedures;
3. Take off appeared normal;
4. Crew followed all procedures, but was unable to control the aircraft.

Kevin do you plan on marketing your flying suits?....you know the blue latex ones, complete with cape and the big letter S emblazoned on the front?
If you are could you flick one my way.....

If it is anything like the 777 then that would have been tucked in with 19 other ops bulletins

 

[KevinAu 441]

6 minutes ago, cowpatz said:

It all depends on what information is provided to the flight crew and how.
If it is anything like the 777 then that would have been tucked in with 19 other ops and a hand full of company technical bulletins.

How have you reached the conclusion that they did not follow the procedure?

On Apr 4th 2019 at 09:00z Ethiopia's Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) released a brief note on their Facebook account (but not on their website):

Preliminary findings on ET 302 crash:

1. Aircraft’s airworthiness was certified;
2. The crew were capable of flying& followed Boeing’s procedures;
3. Take off appeared normal;
4. Crew followed all procedures, but was unable to control the aircraft.

Kevin do you plan on marketing your flying suits?....you know the blue latex ones, complete with cape and the big letter S emblazoned on the front?
If you are could you flick one my way.....

If it is anything like the 777 then that would have been tucked in with 19 other ops bulletins

 

No need to start mocking people. The preliminary report made by the ethiopean government was meant to spin the public narrative. I reached the conclusion that they did not follow procedures properly from

1. The reactivation of the trim system after it was placed in cutoff.

2. The lack of any evidence of verbalisation of any abnormality procedure on the transcript.

By the way, I just got the email version of the next aw&st article on the max. Now they are disputing the ethiopean government’s assertion that there was no birdstrike and are also saying the crew did not follow procedures as well.

Also, something as important as that AD would have been highlighted to the crew. If ethiopean is like any any of the airlines I have flown for, information such as that would have been part of an alert or safety bulletin, perhaps even along with an email alerting you of its impending distribution. Which would also have been highlighted on different colored paper such as orange or green or red if they still used paper. If they use ipads, their publications app would also likely have required some receipt acknowledgment response.

[Garys 209]

cowpatz - As a pilot with 31 years experience flying Boeing aircraft, I would like to ask why you are so easily able to dismiss the blatant lack of airmanship displayed by the captain when he gave permission to the first officer to cutout the stabilizer before unloading the flight controls. This is fundamentally the reason that they were unable to control the aircraft thereafter and clearly written in the AD to bring the aircraft back into trim before using the cutout switches.

Although I believe the original intent of the video previously posted was to show just how impossibly difficult it would have been for the crew to control the aircraft, conversely it also proved just how critically vital it was to bring the aircraft back into the pre MCAS trim level before using those cutout switches. There was nothing wrong with the electric trim system so is it not inexcusable that this most basic flying skill was not applied by the pilot in command of a commercial airliner? Although MCAS is undeniably a key factor,  I ask the question of how any pilot of your training and experience can be pointing the finger solely at Boeing when this whole accident most likely would have been avoided with aprox 7 seconds of nose up trim 

Edited April 12, 2019 by Garys

[188AHC 2,138]

Gentlemen  please keep your comments civil.  We've had a good discussion so far but personal attacks are a violation of the Avsim TOS  and will result in sanctions and the thread possibly being locked. 

Thank you. 

[threexgreen 3,133]

22 hours ago, KevinAu said:

...

I just read the newest article on the MAX on AW&ST. To get back on the discussion whether it's a stick shaker/anti stall system or a flight control enhancement, the article states the following:

"However, the system is only needed to enhance stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center of gravity (CG). The aircraft exhibits sufficient natural longitudinal stability in all other parts of the flight envelope without the MCAS to meet the rules. Boeing emphasizes that the MCAS is not an anti-stall or stall-prevention system, as it often has been portrayed in news reports."

I highly recommend reading this article which talks about the demonstration of the new MCAS software in a MAX simulator: 
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/pilots-say-max-mcas-software-updates-prove-effective-simulator-demo
(an AW&ST account is required for access...)

[KevinAu 441]

If they allowed mcas to be considered an antistall function, it would probably trigger a training requirement. They have to avoid that at all cost. As there are practically no sims available for the max, a requirement for stall training in a max sim may make it years before the the fleet can be fully flying. Perhaps they should consider restricting the cg envelope so as to avoid the problematic stall region to get the fleet back up into the air. Then once enough sims and crews have qualified on the new stall characteristics, do they expand the cg envelope again. No idea how feasible this is though, could make the economics of the plane untenable. Or they could just insist that there is no antistall device on the plane.

Edited April 12, 2019 by KevinAu

[cowpatz 243]

19 hours ago, Garys said:

cowpatz - As a pilot with 31 years experience flying Boeing aircraft, I would like to ask why you are so easily able to dismiss the blatant lack of airmanship displayed by the captain when he gave permission to the first officer to cutout the stabilizer before unloading the flight controls. This is fundamentally the reason that they were unable to control the aircraft thereafter and clearly written in the AD to bring the aircraft back into trim before using the cutout switches.

Although I believe the original intent of the video previously posted was to show just how impossibly difficult it would have been for the crew to control the aircraft, conversely it also proved just how critically vital it was to bring the aircraft back into the pre MCAS trim level before using those cutout switches. There was nothing wrong with the electric trim system so is it not inexcusable that this most basic flying skill was not applied by the pilot in command of a commercial airliner? Although MCAS is undeniably a key factor,  I ask the question of how any pilot of your training and experience can be pointing the finger solely at Boeing when this whole accident most likely would have been avoided with aprox 7 seconds of nose up trim 

Well I guess in those years and the previous 11 years spent flying other aircraft types, as well as aircraft engineering, I have witnessed a wee bit.
I have seen some of the sharpest pilots make fundamental and basic errors. I have made a few myself but luckily that none lead to an adverse outcome. Fatigue, 6 sectors flown in difficult weather, Target fixation, poor communication/language, tricky MEL items, Quick decisive...and wrong are all but a few. Even the legendary Sully and his efforts on the Hudson where criticised by some. I am sure that he will be the first to admit that if the same event had happened on a different day, with a different F/O the outcome could have been completely different.
There are many aspects to aircraft accident investigation and the FDR and CVR readouts tell only one part of the story. The focus is yet to centre on the Human Factors aspect, and this is where most posters here have given little thought to, and the reason for my posts in response. It is for this very reason that most Pilot associations do not want this sort of data released into the public domain. Gary's comment above: "...the blatant lack of airmanship displayed by the captain.....". . this lack of understanding continues with "There was nothing wrong with the electric trim system so is it not inexcusable that this most basic flying skill was not applied by the pilot in command of a commercial airliner? ". If there was nothing wrong with the electric trim system then why run a checklist called "Runaway Stabilizer" ?? Before we start bagging the Captain (who was flying with a F/O with less than 300 hours total time) let's at least show some respect and wait for more information to surface.

"I ask the question of how any pilot of your training and experience can be pointing the finger solely at Boeing when this whole accident most likely would have been avoided with aprox 7 seconds of nose up trim"
I have not flown the MAX but it is my understanding that ANU trim will only stop the AND trim. It may not do this initially and so allow some ANU trim...I can't say. Stabilizer miss-trimming has been an area of focused training with many airlines recently. Generally this is associated with high level jet upset training, but the logic can be applied at any level/phase of flight. The Stabilizer is very powerful and miss-trimming can, and has, caused serious control issues. Focus is on establishing pitch attitude and power setting, initially leaving the stab where it is. Basic Attitude, Power, Trim. This would most likely have been the primary thought process. With all the other distractions going on (and at a busy, and critical stage of the flight) this would have been complete sensory overload. Flying in this condition would take a huge amount of brain resource with little remaining for deduction. Coupled with an inexperienced F/O it would be doubly difficult. All the wholes in the cheese are lining up and the first few were already lined up with the aircraft design.

Any aircraft system that can control the aircraft flight controls directly, and without pilot input, needs to have a very high degree of redundancy and fault monitoring. Certainly more than just 2 inputs. Take a look at the Pitot Static systems, Autopilots, Autoland redundancy, control actuators etc etc
MCAS had neither. This is not an anti stall system, so it can operate at any time the AoA is high (other than with flap extended). This lack of redundancy and fault monitoring and a fault that directly moves that powerful stab, is the design flaw.

The 737 MAX is short range aircraft that does many cycles. Lots of TO's and landings and probably many visual manoeuvring type approaches. Arguably, given those factors, the chances of this "protective" system operating is higher than other longer range a/c types   The 737 is eagerly sold to many airlines around the world. Airlines with varying degrees of piloting skills and safety standards. Modern aircraft, especially those with integrated flight management systems, need to be able to be safely flown by an average pilot and not a Chuck Yeager clone.

The fact that Boeing could introduce this system, with no FCOM information, or pilot training is gobsmacking.
Having any manufacturer "self certify" is never a good idea.

 

 

 

[cowpatz 243]

1 hour ago, KevinAu said:

If they allowed mcas to be considered an antistall function, it would probably trigger a training requirement. They have to avoid that at all cost. As there are practically no sims available for the max, a requirement for stall training in a max sim may make it years before the the fleet can be fully flying. Perhaps they should consider restricting the cg envelope so as to avoid the problematic stall region to get the fleet back up into the air. Then once enough sims and crews have qualified on the new stall characteristics, do they expand the cg envelope again. No idea how feasible this is though, could make the economics of the plane untenable. Or they could just insist that there is no antistall device on the plane.

Not a bad idea but not one that I think the airlines/public would go for. The fact that Boeing is working on a MCAS 3.0 software fix suggests that it is not an easy fix, or at least one that is acceptable to the world's State regulators.

[Garys 209]

Thanks Cowpatz for the excellent reply. This was exactly the insight I was seeking when posing those questions. 

[DellyPilot 109]

On 4/10/2019 at 4:11 AM, Garys said:

I'm sorry but the crew is equally culpable for the end result and that is what we as the flying public expect skilled flight crews not to do.

Sorry but that is ridiculous, a quick recap 

To save on having to provide sim training time for existing 737NG crews Boeing

• intentionally hid + provided no MCAS training 
• did not mandate AoA DISAGREE warning message
• changed IAS DISAGREE / ALT DISAGREE to be triggered by an AoA failure (no sim training)
• provided no MCAS failure scenario sim training 
• provided no training about the dangers of speed + manual wheel binding
• did not declare AoA failure as a 'catastrophic hazard' (apparently this would have required crew sim time)
• failed to identify or warn crews on the danger of AoA failure + MCAS and produce a simple memory item (all requires sim time)
• kept the same STAB CUTOUT switch layout but silenlty changed how they work (MCAS disable kills ELEC TRIM motors too 🤦‍♂️) and did not just have a new switch for MCAS cutout (again more sim time costs).

And whistle blowers now say they were

• under pressure to not change or change anything that would require crew retraining (grandfathering)
• skip over in flight testing of new systems like MCAS
• produce design diagrams at twice the speed they normally do 

You nod your head, "yes yes we know all this but I still hold the crews equally culpable". Unbelievable.

Having never flown a 737 MAX and with perfect hindsight knowledge of MCAS / speed manual trim wheel danger you equate their efforts to save the plane with the gross negligence of Boeing and the FAA!? 

I think the flying public expect well designed, tested and certified planes and properly trained crews and safety systems not to be optional. 

They expect warning systems to identify a clear course of action for the crew to take in standard failure scenarios. Is it UAS/Stall/RUNAWAY TRIM? Oh wait in hindsight its actually parts of all 3. What the..?  

They do not expect under trained crews under high workload (hot and high airfield + high ground after T/O) with misleading warnings, stick shaker + clacker blaring, to somehow compute all of this while physically battling the plane from diving into the ground.

Could you please type replies one handed while driving on a freeway at 5:40am preferably over 7000ft + this full volume 👇

 

Edited April 13, 2019 by DellyPilot

[DellyPilot 109]

22 hours ago, cowpatz said:

Modern aircraft, especially those with integrated flight management systems, need to be able to be safely flown by an average pilot and not a Chuck Yeager clone.

Wonderfully put, but perhaps we could go further and say "below average" pilots after all 50% are below average by definition.