John_Cillis

Ethiopia crash

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33 minutes ago, Jim Young said:

You may not think this is an issue between Boeing/Airbus but reading many comments in this topic say otherwise.  We just have to keep the topic on track.  The fact that Lion Air and Ethiopia Airlines did not buy AOA safety features for the aircraft says a lot.

The fact that Boeing is charging for that feature as an extra says something about Boeing. Even if it’s buried in the price of the aircraft, charging extra for features designed to help prevent pilots not crash the plane seems...a poor choice. Especially with a system that literally drove the plane into the ground. That knife cuts both ways

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45 minutes ago, Jim Young said:

You may not think this is an issue between Boeing/Airbus but reading many comments in this topic say otherwise.  We just have to keep the topic on track.  The fact that Lion Air and Ethiopia Airlines did not buy AOA safety features for the aircraft says a lot.

The Fact that Boeing made a safety feature optional that resulted in 300 dead people because of it's cost, says alot about Boeing and their business model. What's the next "option", engine fire extinguishers? If Boeing felt that this was an important safety feature, it should have been standard equipment. Of course now, after two crashes, and Boeing looking pretty bad, it is. 

Edited by Bobsk8
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12 minutes ago, IUBrian said:

That’s the thing. We fans of Boeing don’t want good enough to pass certification. We want the best. No investigation is going to change the fact that we know they aren’t giving it. 

In that case, there's no way Boeing will survive the investigation and countries that have ordered the Max8 and Max9 will immediately cancel any orders so that the countries can instead order similar aircraft from Airbus.  No reason to waste time when we already know Boeing is guilty (or should be even if the investigation exonerates them).  Let Airbus take the billion dollar contracts instead.  Even if this happens, heard the US pilots have no issues with this aircraft so suspect airlines in the USA will continue to buy this aircraft and fly it.

26 minutes ago, irishsooner said:

why is a warning light costing $80,000 per aircraft?

I agree, especially when it is considered a safety feature.

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6 minutes ago, Bobsk8 said:

Boeing made a safety feature optional

I agree with your premise but I read the FAA made it optional too.  Boeing, like Airbus, was just trying to save their customers some money.  I do not think both aircraft crashed because it was missing two optional features that saved them money.  The countries and airlines involved also had the option to buy the optional safety features.

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1 minute ago, Jim Young said:

I agree with your premise but I read the FAA made it optional too.  Boeing, like Airbus, was just trying to save their customers some money.  I do not think both aircraft crashed because it was missing two optional features that saved them money.  The countries and airlines involved also had the option to buy the optional safety features.

The FAA let Boeing certify their own product. The Fox guarding the hen house. 

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22 hours ago, DellyPilot said:

And yes the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed.

Can you clarify this statement? I see a lot of comments like this one (mostly elsewhere). It isn't the design of the aircraft itself which is flawed. What's full of flaws here is the MCAS. Suppose the whole scope of an erroneous MCAS kick-in as we've had to witness had been analysed as such during testing and certification and the upcoming software fix had been implemented from the start. No accidents would have occurred (supposing the Ethiopian one was caused by the MCAS, too). No one right now would be talking about an 'unstable', 'out-of-balance' or, or you say, 'fatally flawed' aircraft, but merely about different flight characteristics in an extreme flight situation (stall, or close to a stall) that have a new software to help with this. While Boeing have made clear mistakes by not telling about MCAS and thus not providing adequate training for the pilots (apart from a far from adequate software design), this whole situation around the MAX is often subject to exaggeration. If the aircraft itself was flawed it wouldn't be Boeing's fastest selling jet in history with more than 5000 orders.

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This published today in the Guardian:

Indonesian airline Garuda cancels order for 49 Boeing 737 Max jets

Company blames loss of passenger trust after Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air disasters involving the aircraft

 

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1 hour ago, Bobsk8 said:

The FAA let Boeing certify their own product. The Fox guarding the hen house. 

And because of this, both Canada and Europe will be doing their own review of the updates, rather than rely on the FAA. This case has the potential to seriously erode people's trust in the entire certification process between Boeing and the FAA, which is not good for anyone.

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1 hour ago, threegreen said:

And yes the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed.

Can you clarify this statement? .... 
While Boeing have made clear mistakes by not telling about MCAS and thus not providing adequate training for the pilots (apart from a far from adequate software design), this whole situation around the MAX is often subject to exaggeration. If the aircraft itself was flawed it wouldn't be Boeing's fastest selling jet in history with more than 5000 orders.

Ok well at the risk of enraging Jim Young who is on "Team Boeing" I will try to list the design flaws as I see them, please take a peek at my previous post on the misleading warnings the MAX gives when an AoA vane is INOP. The Lion 601 report is illuminating especially the useless checklists the pilots went through before they got to the right one (with help from a 3rd pilot in jump seat).

Design flaw 1 - Misleading warnings + 80K extra to get the right warning
AoA failure = constant stick shaker on one side (which is uncancellable) and NEW to the 737 MAX you get 3 misleading messages IAS DISAGREE / ALT DISAGREE / FEEL DIFF PRESS. These warnings do not appear on previous 737 models.  Not sure why AoA failure now causes this message but it resulted in the crew (correctly) following spurious checklists such as UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED. Agree this is partly training but its also a design flaw to present misleading messages and not present MCAS ACTIVE and AoA DISAGREE with a clear new checklist including STAB TRIM to CUTOUT.  The Lion 610 crew were reading a useless checklist as they hit the water https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/20/lion-air-pilots-were-looking-at-handbook-when-plane-crashed

Design flaw 2 - MCAS works off only 1 AoA vane and is active even when 2 AoA inputs disagree
As a crucial certification required system its amazing that it doesnt perform any validation of input data between AoA sensors or indeed a plethora of other inputs that could help it determine which vane is working, N2,IAS,TAS,GPS SPEED, GPS ALT, ALT, RADIO ALT could all be used to switch to the correct input. There should also be 3 AoA vanes.

Design flaw 3 - Applying 2.5 degrees pitch forward every 10 seconds
In a high workload situation with klaxons, warnings flashing, stick shaker going MCAS can silently move the trim wheel forward 2.5 degrees as it reads from a dead AoA vane. Ok so Captain trims the plane as MCAS is activating the first time, it cancels. Both crew haven't realised MCAS is triggering, how would they, didn't know it existed and there is no warning.. becayse SRS moves the trim wheel during pilot control column input pilot is used to hearing the wheel whir so again he has zero way to know this failure is happening. All he is seeing is IAS DISAGREE / ALT DISAGREE / FEEL DIFF PRESS + STICK SHAKER. He is now running the through the QRH Checlist for Unreliable airspeed and boom 2.5 more degrees gets dialed in with the FO now complaining he cannot keep the nose up.. captain applies more power, thinking we might be stalling (heavy nose), the Stabiliser now has even more effect as the speed increases, then the final 2.5 degrees gets dialed in and its game over. It would take a good 10 seconds to even unwind the stabiliser if you realised at that point!  

 

Jim and others who are saying wait for the report and airbus are just as dangerous, sorry guys but what in the...? If you can't see this is a design flaw then what is?

In an Airbus (booo) for all its faults the computer can directly control the elevators not just the stabiliser so this scenario could be avoided because the pilot moving the elevator back would simply cancel the MCAS automation. This is partly why patching a 50 year old design with a complex automation system AND then not training crew about it is in my view is criminal. There will be court cases.

But even with the current implementation its crazy not to have input validation/correlation checks for such a key system, how the FAA agreed to no ECAM Messages is incredible.. there should be audible warnings too MCAS ACTIVE! MCAS TRIM!

Boeing's job is to think all this stuff through and design for failure and ensure crew are aware. They failed horribly. 

Finally to address your last point.. orders were made long before the design flaws were realised.

Edited by DellyPilot
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2 hours ago, Jim Young said:

In that case, there's no way Boeing will survive the investigation and countries that have ordered the Max8 and Max9 will immediately cancel any orders so that the countries can instead order similar aircraft from Airbus.  No reason to waste time when we already know Boeing is guilty (or should be even if the investigation exonerates them).  Let Airbus take the billion dollar contracts instead.  Even if this happens, heard the US pilots have no issues with this aircraft so suspect airlines in the USA will continue to buy this aircraft and fly it.

I agree, especially when it is considered a safety feature.

I posted several pages ago what I think Boeing needs to do from a business perspective, I won’t rewrite it. I don’t know you but I have no doubt you’re not only extremely intelligent but highly successful at your job. And I am sure when you make a mistake (we all do) you own it and make sure it won’t happen again. Where people lose trust is when someone screws up and they pretend everyone else is too dumb to know you made a mistake. Boeing can screw up in the short term ONLY because there is no one else currently who can fulfill existing needs. That’s not a long term strategy for success. 

I want Boeing to succeed. Pretending they don’t have issues doesn’t facilitate that goal. 

Edited by IUBrian
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2 hours ago, IUBrian said:

I posted several pages ago what I think Boeing needs to do from a business perspective, I won’t rewrite it. I don’t know you but I have no doubt you’re not only extremely intelligent but highly successful at your job. And I am sure when you make a mistake (we all do) you own it and make sure it won’t happen again. Where people lose trust is when someone screws up and they pretend everyone else is too dumb to know you made a mistake. Boeing can screw up in the short term ONLY because there is no one else currently who can fulfill existing needs. That’s not a long term strategy for success. 

I want Boeing to succeed. Pretending they don’t have issues doesn’t facilitate that goal. 

Agreed,

I have learned a lot in this thread, especially how new aerodynamic design can cause issues.  One would think the nacelle challenge would have come out in wind tunnel tests, it probably did, hence the MCAS.  I still do not understand why only two crashes, but given the Max fleet's small size, that is a pretty big percentage and I do not like those odds.  We know the problem can and will be fixed, but will public confidence be restored?  I say yes because few, except for aviation enthusiasts, check out equipment before they fly or book a flight.  I check out equipment and seating charts so I can select the best view when I fly, except for future ocean crossings because I learned an aisle is better since I have lost a tad of mobility since I was hit and run over three weeks ago. 

Flying has its risks but now feeling unsafe on the ground, having been hit in my car, in one bus brake failure going down a long grade in California almost five decades ago, and hit on foot, I still prefer my flying odds only having been in three risky incidents, a blown engine on startup with a flash, bang and cabin filling of kerosene fumes, getting hit by a ground vehicle, and nearly running out of fuel in a Beech going into Pellston Michigan after three missed approaches when west and central Michigan suddenly fogged in on a night with high humidity and embedded thunderstorms.  Good odds given the nearly one thousand airline flights and countless GA flights I have been on.

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I haven’t had much of substance to add to this topic but there are a couple of points I would be remiss if I didn’t make. One, immediately after the crash, as I think i mentioned near the beginning, I told my daughter I’ll hop over to Avsim and pretty quickly get a pretty fair assessment of what likely went wrong because there are a lot of really really smart people there. And I have not been disappointed - as a non-pilot the wealth of knowledge, even from differing opinions, has been incredible. 

The second point is that in this day and age it seems unfortunately rare that people can disagree without the disagreement devolving into personal attacks. I think it’s a credit to this forum generally and the moderators that we can express opinions and even strongly disagree without the conversation disintegrating into personal attacks. I feel with everyone, regardless of where we fall on this topic, if we met in person we’d all quaff a few beers together. 

 

 

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27 minutes ago, IUBrian said:

I haven’t had much of substance to add to this topic but there are a couple of points I would be remiss if I didn’t make. One, immediately after the crash, as I think i mentioned near the beginning, I told my daughter I’ll hop over to Avsim and pretty quickly get a pretty fair assessment of what likely went wrong because there are a lot of really really smart people there. And I have not been disappointed - as a non-pilot the wealth of knowledge, even from differing opinions, has been incredible. 

The second point is that in this day and age it seems unfortunately rare that people can disagree without the disagreement devolving into personal attacks. I think it’s a credit to this forum generally and the moderators that we can express opinions and even strongly disagree without the conversation disintegrating into personal attacks. I feel with everyone, regardless of where we fall on this topic, if we met in person we’d all quaff a few beers together. 

 

 

Yes, very true.  Sadly the "safety" of forums allows some to stretch the envelope and use fighting words all the while knowing that in real life they'd get decked for using them, given the other person with moral high ground usually wins in physical fights but is defenseless when some just have to get the last written word in.  I will not say anything I would not be willing to defend myself if physically attacked by a flamer, but at the same time I have also stretched the limits at time and felt deserved to be decked were it not for the mods who put me on a few days time out to become myself again.

Forums also bring us aboard with other challenges, physical, work challenges and sometimes that causes us to vent a lot of steam or "shotgun" the forums which we realize, most of us, in retrospect is a mistake.  I see that in all forms of social media and Avsim at its basic is social media, but unlike Facebook and Twitter and so on, at least it is moderated and not a winner take all type of forum.

John

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and the most famous the series of unexplained Rudder Hard Over crashes due to a flaw in its rudder actuator which caused it to suddenly apply full rudder

I will always state that they should have grounded the entire 737 fleet over this one.

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16 minutes ago, Christopher Low said:

I will always state that they should have grounded the entire 737 fleet over this one.

I remember those crashes quite well, and I agree.  The 737's rudder was its Achilles heel, it must have been fixed though given the handful of crashes out of tens of thousands of flights.  I remember the US Airways crash but oddly I was never nervous because I always flew on such aircraft after such crashes knowing the pilots would have learned coping skills just in case. 

I still laugh that my most severe crash came in the form of my recent pedestrian accident just shy of three weeks ago.  I got to at least enjoy the high of pain killers, lol, but that high was bought at a high price.  I have been in several car crashes, bicycle crashes, oddly never a scooter crash, my friend had one in the late 70's and we would scooter to the city fair in 1978 I believe in Napa.  I have been in one airline ground crash and only slightly hurt my hip, happened in Jackson Hole as I have previously mentioned.

Crashes and mistakes happen, as Thomas Edison put it, it took many mistakes to make the lightbulb.  The airliner is still evolving.  We mourn those lost in crashes, but we must remember, death will meet us anyway, naturally or by accident.  It is how we prepare for it that is important, and how those who have gone before us somehow serve as angels making for a safer aviation and safer world, I swear the world is getting safer because I survived a most horrific impact and accident recently, and the good Samaritans whether right wingers or left wingers, I did not care about their creed, I simply accepted the help that saved my life on March 3rd, on the ground, I was not simming or flying then.

In other words I feel we learn from these accidents and those souls involved are in some type of afterlife helping us learn and create a better future for our world.

John

 

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I haven’t seen anything that convinces me the Max is itself fatally flawed or inherently unsafe, just that its flight characteristics are different than the previous generation. And people saying they’ve stretched a 50 year old design too far, I haven’t seen compelling evidence that a clean sheet design would be significantly different than the existing plane - yes, maybe the wings would be shaped and placed differently, maybe the land gear would be longer, for example, but I don’t know that would necessarily make it a better plane, or even a safer plane, in particular because with the Max you incorporate a large number of known components with known reliability. A clean sheet design may be more fuel efficient, and would certainly (without software adjustments) fly differently than existing 737’s, but would it necessarily be a safer plane? If anything, the implementation of MCAS demonstrates the fallibility of humans in contemplating all of the consequences of their design decisions - think MCAS was a disaster - what happens when instead of one change you introduce tens of thousands of changes? Obviously we can look at the 777 and 787 as examples of safe aircraft (although not without their own issues), but simply saying “50 years is too old, need to start from scratch” is no guarantee of a better plane, nor does the fact that the Max is based upon a 50 year-old design mean it’s not capable of being a great plane.

 

That said, I do think Boeing has become complacent, and there needs to be significant management changes and more than a software fix to restore faith in the Max and the company. Like I said earlier, while I think there has been some discussion of Airbus versus Boeing, I don’t get the impression that the comments of those who are most critical of Boeing are coming from Airbus fans, it’s the opposite - it’s the fans of Boeing who are being critical.

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Aircraft might be deemed inherently unsafe if one is not trained in their proper use. .. I would hazard a guess than anyone involved in aviation (professional or layman) knows not to walk close to the intake of a running jet engine... Yet there is NOTHING to actually prevent someone from doing just that.. Only "common sense" and self-preservation prevent sane people form getting killed.

Similarly once the flight envelope is exceeded in some way, then you may die, so do not do that.

As I (yes, a mere layman) understand things now:-

The MAX's LEAP engine nacelles caused an undesirable flight characteristic at high AOA, namely an increase in lift forward of the wing which increases pitch up, thus compounding a stall, or an entry into a stall,  and perhaps making a deep stall unrecoverable, especially at low altitudes. The fatal design flaw was IMHO not redesigning the nacelles to eliminate the lift component at high AOA. notwithstanding the accommodation of the weight and balance changes from re-positioning new engines on the old baby Boeing. After all, it has to be said that it appears the MAX does actually fly quite well.. under normal circumstances - it was quite a popular airliner...

Another flaw, but not a design flaw IMHO was not making it common knowledge to ALL MAX crews that MCAS was installed and how it operated.Was that Boeing's fault? Was that the airline's fault? I do not know and cannot say.

I wold hope that professional aircrew are trained in the flight characteristics of their aircraft, including training along the lines of "Do NOT let the plane do this or else it is game over" - a "dead man's curve" as it were on the flight envelope diagram.

Any aircraft has such an area of it's flight envelope. Example, if you get into a deep stall, you need X amount of altitude to recover. If you are closer than X to the ground then you are dead.

Of course steps are taken to try and prevent aircraft from ever getting to that part of their envelope, but it can and does happen: Aircrew presented with wrong data, computers presented with wrong data, both doing the job as they are trained and programmed to do respectively.Yet because the data was wrong it leads to a crash. Given enough time, the aircrew may save the day by thinking outside of the box, but sometimes there is not enough time... and the computer never thinks outside its box.

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3 hours ago, HighBypass said:

As I (yes, a mere layman) understand things now:-

The MAX's LEAP engine nacelles caused an undesirable flight characteristic at high AOA, namely an increase in lift forward of the wing which increases pitch up, thus compounding a stall, or an entry into a stall,  and perhaps making a deep stall unrecoverable, especially at low altitudes. The fatal design flaw was IMHO not redesigning the nacelles to eliminate the lift component at high AOA. notwithstanding the accommodation of the weight and balance changes from re-positioning new engines on the old baby Boeing. After all, it has to be said that it appears the MAX does actually fly quite well.. under normal circumstances - it was quite a popular airliner...

Actually, that is completely speculative on the part of a user on pprune. The only reasons so far in industry literature (aw&st) and airline bulletins (swa) that I have seen cite difficulty in stall recovery due to engine position and thrust. Not a new longitudinal instability issue as posited on pprune by fceng84. As such, difficulty in maintaining attitude control during stall recovery and even go arounds, is inherent and anticipated in this class of aircraft. This was an issue on the NGs and the greater thrust of the max engines exacerbated it to the extend that some sort of mitigation, such as a stick pusher, had to be introduced. Per the Southwest Airlines’ recent bulletin to pilots on the upcoming changes to  mcas, in lieu of installing the stick pusher, which would have required sim training, mcas was implemented to run in the background, in order to make sim training unnecessary.

Edited by KevinAu
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21 hours ago, DellyPilot said:

Design flaw 1 - Misleading warnings + 80K extra to get the right warning
...

Design flaw 2 - MCAS works off only 1 AoA vane and is active even when 2 AoA inputs disagree
...

Design flaw 3 - Applying 2.5 degrees pitch forward every 10 seconds
...

Jim and others who are saying wait for the report and airbus are just as dangerous, sorry guys but what in the...? If you can't see this is a design flaw then what is?

This is partly why patching a 50 year old design with a complex automation system AND then not training crew about it is in my view is criminal. There will be court cases.

But even with the current implementation its crazy not to have input validation/correlation checks for such a key system, how the FAA agreed to no ECAM Messages is incredible.. there should be audible warnings too MCAS ACTIVE! MCAS TRIM!

Finally to address your last point.. orders were made long before the design flaws were realised.

I agree with you on the flaws you list here. However, these flaws are MCAS specific design flaws, not flaws in the overall design of the aircraft, as you said initially in your post that I replied to. Implement the software update to make MCAS behave as it should have from the start and you have a perfectly safe, modern and efficient aircraft that, given it's orders, will play a crucial role in narrowbody service in decades to come. This is my point, apart from MCAS where Boeing obviously have failed to develop an adequate design from the get-go there's nothing that would suggest this aircraft is flawed as an overall design. Still, people seem to commonly take the MCAS design issue as evidence for just this.

To weigh in on some of the more detailed points you make:
- New checklist for MCAS emergencies: I doubt anyone, that includes Boeing, was aware before the Lion Air crash how horribly wrong an erroneous MCAS activation could go, therefore, no new checklist for this emergency was developed (which should be done now)
- Small correction: On stall recovery, you only carefully add thrust once the aircraft is in a nose down attitude to build speed, not immediately as the increase of thrust pitches the nose up which makes things even worse
- The amount of times that MCAS kicked in and was responded to by the pilots on the Lion Air flight was over 21 times

As for the orders, an overall design flaw of the aircraft as a whole would certainly be obvious and have made certification close to impossible (yes, the certification process seems to have been fishy) and carriers such as United Airlines or Southwest, among others, would not make this aircraft a large part of their narrowbody plans. Hence, 5000+ orders (or slightly less than that, given what Garuda are up to) and the pace at which the order book was filled do not speak for a fundamentally flawed aircraft design.

On a side note, I'm not sure if Garuda are making much of a right decision by scrapping their order of 50. Passenger trust has been lost, obviously. However, I'm fairly certain the general public will forget about this sooner rather than later. Once the software fix is mandated and installed, the fleet will go back into service and be perfectly safe and while I, personally, wouldn't at this time (if I could), I would happily board a MAX after the grounding is over. Plus, changing your order of which you already received an airframe will only put you at the end of a backlog of a load of orders.

 

 

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10 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

... mcas was implemented to run in the background, in order to make sim training unnecessary...

Does anyone else find this a slightly disturbing idea? No sim training is necessary - you don't need to know about a system which IF it goes wrong might confuse you just long enough to crash before you can save the plane. The word "insidious" comes to mind, however I feel that would be too strong - I believe MCAS in and of itself is not evil or harmful, nor was it ever meant to be. It will help alleviate the onset of a (really) bad situation IF it is operating on good data..... IF.

Kevin: I did say in a previous post that I found the pprune thread made for interesting reading. I thought it had increased my understanding of the situation, perhaps it hasn't.

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4 minutes ago, HighBypass said:

Does anyone else find this a slightly disturbing idea? No sim training is necessary - you don't need to know about a system which IF it goes wrong might confuse you just long enough to crash before you can save the plane. The word "insidious" comes to mind, however I feel that would be too strong - I believe MCAS in and of itself is not evil or harmful, nor was it ever meant to be. It will help alleviate the onset of a (really) bad situation IF it is operating on good data..... IF.

I think there is no one who would try and argue with you on this - the fact that Boeing didn't think it was necessary to tell pilots about MCAS and the changed behaviour of the aircraft close to a stall is negligence and a threat to safety. It's not exactly much of an effort to bring MCAS to the pilot's attention through the flight manual.

I don't see an issue with the fact that MCAS has been implemented to help with the stall recovery. The design of the software is the issue which is rightfully getting a much needed overhaul. That, however, comes too late for the souls lost.

Keep in mind that the reason why MCAS exists is not only to counteract the increased pitch up close to stalls. Without MCAS, the MAX would exhibit flight characteristics in said situation that don't conform with the certification requirements. No MCAS, no MAX, regardless of whether there is pilot training or not.

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50 minutes ago, HighBypass said:

Does anyone else find this a slightly disturbing idea? No sim training is necessary - you don't need to know about a system which IF it goes wrong might confuse you just long enough to crash before you can save the plane. The word "insidious" comes to mind, however I feel that would be too strong - I believe MCAS in and of itself is not evil or harmful, nor was it ever meant to be. It will help alleviate the onset of a (really) bad situation IF it is operating on good data..... IF.

Kevin: I did say in a previous post that I found the pprune thread made for interesting reading. I thought it had increased my understanding of the situation, perhaps it hasn't.

It is an interesting thread over there, but I wouldn’t take it as The Reason. I don’t doubt that the nacelle body provides some lift, but my non-engineer, just a pilot bet is that of the XXlbs of arm force I’m using to push over from a go around or stall recovery, XXlbs is fighting where the trim is, XXlbs is fighting the max thrust, and xlbs is fighting the nacelle body lift.

That you are actually pushing forward to keep the plane from stalling is not new or unique to the max. That part is clear to me from the stall maneuvers we did in the E190 during recurrent this year.

Not requiring sim training is not inherently evil as this plane was meant from the beginningto be similar to the previous versions. But not having a proper explanation for an antistall function and not having procedures people work out a qrh procedure for it’s malfunction is concerning. That whole bit about just going back to the trim runaway procedure was negligent at best, and at worse, dictated by lawyers in an attempt to mitigate liability from the lion air crash.

Edited by KevinAu

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2 hours ago, threegreen said:

 

On a side note, I'm not sure if Garuda are making much of a right decision by scrapping their order of 50. Passenger trust has been lost, obviously. However, I'm fairly certain the general public will forget about this sooner rather than later. Once the software fix is mandated and installed, the fleet will go back into service and be perfectly safe and while I, personally, wouldn't at this time (if I could), I would happily board a MAX after the grounding is over. Plus, changing your order of which you already received an airframe will only put you at the end of a backlog of a load of orders.

 

 

This may have nothing to do with the Max, per se. A story I read said there are some smaller airlines with financial issues that may be looking for an excuse to get out their orders. This provides them a potential excuse that avoids the financial implications of being sued for breach of contract.    

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