"My question is, without knowing the full extent to what was causing the problem, is it reasonable to fly nearly half way accross the country and hope that you can make a safe landing? I realize that SLC is a major Delta hub and should have the same maintenace capabilities as ATL but is this putting the passengers to a higher degree of risk?"Well, I think if we used THAT logic we'd never push from the gate or even get out of bed. No one knows the FULL EXTENT of anything. What we have to do is use our education, training, resources, knowledge and instinct to evaluate each and every moment of flight or in life for that matter.In this scenrio of the KSLC./.KATL segment we really don't have a true picture of what the crew indications are or their reasoning to continue the trip. And the last thing I think any crew wants to do is an extended Q&A with a passenger(s) in the gate area when we are trying to go home or catch another trip. Same holds true for the 727 ride to KIND. Sometimes we have to just trust.Look at the F-100 coming outta KMSP to KORD last week, had a main gear depart the aircraft on takeoff....yet they continued to KORD and of course landed safely because the crew used their resources, evaluated the situation and made a decision.A professional flight crew would never knowingly hazard an aircraft. The one real hard core fact is the pilot is the first one to the scene of the accident, closely followed by the passengers.Timothy

Trust yes, die for some Captain's over inflated ego, NO. Those were the days when CRM was not part of the cockpit crews vocabulary and training. The Captain was God and the F/O and F/E were there to make sure he looked good. As for the Q & A at the gate, the F/O was just standing there waiting for the jet to be fixed. He was not flight planning, preflighting, or talking to the agents or F/As and was more than glad to talk shop with a fellow pilot. I am glad the F-100 crew was able in this case to continue on to their destination and land safely. You are right in that "a professional crew would not knowingly hazard an aircraft". They have been known though to do various actions that when added together over a period of time will put them and their passengers at that accident scene. Terry

TerryI must have missed the part where the Captain is no longer the ultimate authority when the aircraft is in flight. When did that change? (Didn't see a pay-reduction)As far as your statement "Those were the days when CRM was not part of the cockpit crews vocabulary and training. The Captain was God and the F/O and F/E were there to make sure he looked good." Actually that describes effective CRM as it exists now. They ARE there to make Captains "look good" and keep the Captain alive.Through listening to the "Resources" (not just hearing, but listening-there is a difference) then the god makes his/her selection of best possible course of action. Palm 90 being a prime example. The FO kept telling the Captain that "...that it isn't right.." Had the F/O said the fuel-flow and N2 indications the captain would have concrete information to make his evaluation. The FO could not break the captain's fixation on the IAS indicator and EPR gauge with the term "...that it's...". The F/O, F/E (the few that are left), jump-seaters, dispatchers, maintenance, ATC specialists are all resources managed by the Captain. When a "committee" on the flightdeck breaks out with no clear authority and responsible crews are allowed to wander from their assignments during an unusual event you end up parking an L1011 in the Everglades. CRM is not JUST to ensure the Captain listens, It also has a vital component of delegation, communications, interpersonal-relationship(s) and on-going evaluation.One of the great tools is the sim session is its video-taped, so during the de-brief the crew can see themselves as the other crew members see them. It is always an eye-opening experience. And at the end, the tape is erased.Where does confidence, experience, knowledge and training end and what appears to be ego begin?It is a fine line between being autocratic and a true leader.As far as crew actions causing accidents, no arguement from me-but that is why human factors and root-cause analysis is a part of the investigation. It is that "chain" that builds up link-by-link that puts the plane in harm's way. It is also why we break that chain by using our skills, resources and experience.Timothy(Boy have we wandered far-afield on the ol'PIC767 forum with this...apologies to those who struggled through this)

>So do you think my explanation is reasonable? Because going >around with flaps 30 isn't very good, is it? Another possibility, which one of my fellow engineers came up with, is the absence of Flap Asymmetry protection and Flap Load Relief (when using Alternate Flaps). I guess with so much flap hanging out on one side, an asymmetry might make control a little difficult... and if the pilot is having trouble controlling speed for some other related/unrelated reason, the flaps might rip off if he/she is going too fast :-oCheers.Ian.