An A340 Emirates jet in Melbourne had this when the wrong weight was entered into the FMC.http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/pilot-error-behind-many-mid-air-scares/story-e6frg12c-1225994537758Daniel

The article mentions: "seven air crew were killed in 2004 when their MK Airlines Boeing 747 cargo jet departing from Halifax, Canada, struggled to get airborne and hit a runway embankment."I remember that one as I was living in Halifax at the time. It was a huge mess. Halifax Airport is located north of the city and that aircraft crashed in the forest at the edge of the airport. A local photographer with the Halifax Herald got some incredible images of the fire.

In Australian the most common mistakes involved pilots and crew entering the wrong takeoff speed, followed by the incorrect aircraft weight and wrong temperature

All take-off parameters that require pilot input could be checked by the FMC against appropriate gauges (even gross weight and c.g. via landing gear hydraulic pressure sensors and/or laser oleo extension sensors). Even the altimeter reading can be set automatically (deduced via runway known altitude). Then if the FMC senses a gross mismatch of pilot inputted parameters vs. the data it receives from sensors, or any other condition guaranteeing fatalities during take-off such as failure to extend flaps, spoilers extended or elevator trim out of limits, all known as the "killer items"), then the FMC could automatically and progressively:

1. Post a warning to the EICAS and gong for crew attention,
2. Sound a horn with audio warning "Wrong Take-Off Data!",
3. Retard throttles and actuade the brakes as in auto-land rollout,
4. Move the pilot and co-pilot seats all the way back so crew can't reach the controls,
5. Automatically notify airline operations HQ of the pilot error(s) via ACARS, and
6. Replace pilot and co-pilot PFD graphics with a game of Tetris,
7. Use in cockpit printer to print a prepaid taxi cab voucher to take crew home/to nearest hotel.

There are thousands of great pilots out there, but then there are others who never cease to amaze, like the bozos (two, actually: Pilot and Co-Pilot) of LAPA Flight 3142 who on a 737 applied take-off thrust with flaps retracted, and as the killer items horn immediately went off (a really, really loud alarm while the engines were still spooling up), said "What the hell is that?" and kept pondering the answer all the way to their (and their passengers) deaths as the aircraft went past V1, Vr, V2 and failed to take-off at the end of the runway. Listen to the audio, pretty scary stuff! And all the crew had to do was stop (the aircraft was barely moving!), get their heads back in the cockpit, apply flaps and resume.I mean, so they both forgot to set the flaps: This is serious, but it can happen, so that's why they have a take-off checklist. So they skipped the checklist (or ran down the checklist incorrectly), that's even more serious and should ground them. Now the "killer items" horn sounds and as pilots their reaction is: "What the hell is that?"? Well, if they don't know, maybe they should get out of the cockpit.Other "flaps not set for take-off" accidents, all due to a failure to adhere to the take-Off checklist:

• NorthWest 255,
• SpanAir 5022,
• Delta 1141,
• Mandala 091.

So yes, I'm all for automating as many checks as possible (including pilot inputs). Actually I'm amazed the checklists themselves aren't automated, as they very well could be: Have the pilots do the checklists as usual, with the FMC as a third set of eyes and then warn for any checklist item that is amiss, including the crew's forgetting to do a checklist.Cheers,- jahman.