AirFrance A330 missing

[vololiberista 205]

The pitot tube heating problem is just a red herring to deflect the media away from what probably really happened thus attempting to avoid catastrophically huge liability claims. The storm that the captain "decided" to fly through would in itself be so destructively dangerous that he should never have been there "period!". It is common knowledge that tropical convergence storms are lethal. Us UK pilots are told time and time again in our training and subsequent practices to avoid any thunderstorm at all costs.Second point: the temperature gradients of tropical convergence storms are ENORMOUS! Typically one sees temperatures as low as minus 100 celcius. I don't think pitot tubes are calibrated to function at such a low temperature (so therein lies my argument). It is more than probable that the whole airframe was subjected to icing (if it hadn't already started to break up). I'm sorry to say that this incident does appear to be yet another typical example of French superbia.Vololibeirsta

[mabe54 17]

The pitot tube heating problem is just a red herring to deflect the media away from what probably really happened thus attempting to avoid catastrophically huge liability claims. The storm that the captain "decided" to fly through would in itself be so destructively dangerous that he should never have been there "period!". It is common knowledge that tropical convergence storms are lethal. Us UK pilots are told time and time again in our training and subsequent practices to avoid any thunderstorm at all costs.Second point: the temperature gradients of tropical convergence storms are ENORMOUS! Typically one sees temperatures as low as minus 100 celcius. I don't think pitot tubes are calibrated to function at such a low temperature (so therein lies my argument). It is more than probable that the whole airframe was subjected to icing (if it hadn't already started to break up). I'm sorry to say that this incident does appear to be yet another typical example of French superbia.Vololibeirsta

In general I agree with you. But I will add AF + Airbus + Thales = AF447 outcome. Just because airplanes are designed to take a lot should not be taken as a free license to challenge Mother Nature's storms. Avoidance must be a must, always.Pitot tubes are not new. Why now??? Since when Thales' Pitot Tubes were started to be installed by Airbus. Follow the money trail.Cheers,MAB

[michal 44]

But I will add AF + Airbus + Thales = AF447 outcome.

I don't see it that way at all. I tend to agree with the poster above - the Pitot tubes could be totally inconsequential to this case but they are the focus of the popular media since nothing else is really known about the progress of that flight.

[palafox 0]

This is simply hogwash. Very often pilots simply pull the circuit-brakers to shut down what they consider annoying sounds (as suspected in the Spanair case). And yes, such alerting system can also be down because of other reasons, it is not a mandatory equipment for aircraft to be ready for flight. By the way - any such "alerting" system is purely advisory in nature and per certification rules doesn't have to be fool-proof. There are no additional systems to alert you that alerting system is down - or however many layers of such alerting systems you might dream of. If pilot needs reminding of extending flaps - he should stop flying long ago, he has no business being in this line of work. There are no aircraft Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, Bombardier, or Cessna that can compensate for pilot's stupidity or gross dereliction of duty. Some designers even argue that too much alerting create false sense of security. What you write is typical newspaper stuff - written by folks who have no clue about aircraft systems and what is supposed to work and why.

You're right: I'm an ignorant, but it's the CIAIAC, not me nor a journalist, who concludes in their interim report (page 62):

The Detroit, Dallas and Barajas accidents show that the TOWS can be disabled on theground by a simple fault in one of its components. The reports for the Detroit and Dallasaccidents called into question the reliability of certain TOWS components in airplaneslike the B727 and the MD-82. The investigation into the Spanair accident has shownthat a fault in one of the TOWS components, the R2-5 relay, can lead to a failure ofthe system. Its classification as a non-essential system is behind these problems. TheTOWS on airplanes of the MD-80 series, B-727 and B737-200 lack redundancy becausethe function of the TOWS is viewed as one of back-up for the crew in its preparationsfor the flight. Experience, however, has shown that the human factor, in conjunctionwith first-generation takeoff warning systems, is not enough of a barrier to preventaccidents resulting from configuration errors.In contrast, the MD-80 series Master Minimum Equipment List does not allow theairplane to be dispatched with the TOWS inoperable.A fault of the TOWS requires that the airplane be grounded until the system is repairedprior to flight, as per the Minimum Equipment List. The same fault can go unnoticed bythe crew since the system does not provide any type of warning to alert it that theTOWS has failed.Another possibility is that a failure of the TOWS could occur after the TOWS is checkedby the crew but before takeoff, thereby leaving the airplane in a non airworthycondition without the crew being aware of the situation.It is inconsistent, therefore, to maintain the “NO GO” nature of the TOWS in the MELwithout modifying its condition as a non-essential system and which exempts it fromhaving additional safety devices such as, among others, a crew warning in case of asystem failure or a redundant design that makes it less vulnerable to a simple fault, aswas the loss of electrical power to the TOWS in the case of the Detroit accident in 1987,or as might be the case of a failed R2-5 relay that supplied the ground-flight signal inthe Barajas accident.

[michal 44]

who concludes in their interim report (page 62):

Where is any conclusion (???), I see nothing of the sort. Usually the final reports are very crisp and there is a section called "primary cause" or something like that. Read for example the NTSB report on the NWA crash, it is very precise. And if this is a design error where do I see appeal to Boeing to redesign the system? Is aircraft being grounded pending the redesign? This what you presented above is an interesting narrative about R2-5 relay and nothing more. ... with first-generation takeoff warning systems, .. of course and some even older aircraft have no such systems at all. Don't tell me that Spain is like your typical 3-rd world country (Egypt, Cameroon) that muddles or suppresses their report to protect their pilots or their personnel.

[Guest belga1]

Hello,

where do I see appeal to Boeing to redesign the system? Is aircraft being grounded pending the redesign?

Just a remind:In USA the NTSB can make only recommandations in his report.It's the duty of the FAA to make those recommandations to come in practise or not.The FAA not follow alway the NTSB final report recommandations.It'ts the same game between th BEA and the DGAC in France.Regards.Gus.

[michal 44]

In USA the NTSB can make only recommandations in his report.

Correct. And there was no such recommendation to modify the hardware in the case discussed above. As to the primary cause it simply states: CHECKLIST..NOT PERFORMED..PILOT IN COMMAND, LOWERING OF FLAPS..NOT PERFORMED..COPILOT/SECOND PILOT

[palafox 0]

Where is any conclusion (???), I see nothing of the sort. Usually the final reports are very crisp and there is a section called "primary cause" or something like that. Read for example the NTSB report on the NWA crash, it is very precise. And if this is a design error where do I see appeal to Boeing to redesign the system? Is aircraft being grounded pending the redesign? This what you presented above is an interesting narrative about R2-5 relay and nothing more. ... with first-generation takeoff warning systems, .. of course and some even older aircraft have no such systems at all. Don't tell me that Spain is like your typical 3-rd world country (Egypt, Cameroon) that muddles or suppresses their report to protect their pilots or their personnel.

As for conclusions and recommendations, you can find some of them in the report, if you're willing to take a look at a paper from a 3rd world country in Europe, according to your conception of the world. And don't worry, they don't ask Mr. Boeing to land all his planes.Vale.

[KevinAu 441]

Design defects like these?* Douglas DC-10: unreliable lock mechanism of cargo doors, plus hydraulic lines running thru the cabin's floor: - American Airlines fligth 96 (06-12-1972, Detroit, Michigan) (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR73-02.pdf) - Turkish Airlines Flight 981 (03-03-1974, Ermenonville, France) (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1974/tc-v740303/pdf/tc-v740303.pdf, in French) * Boeing 737: uncommanded full rudder deflection: - United Airlines Flight 585 (03-03-1991, Colorado Springs, Colorado) (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR92-06.pdf) - USAir Flight 427 (09-08-1994, Hopewell, Pennsylvania) (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/AAR9901.htm) - Eastwind Airlines Flight 517 (Richmond, Virginia, 06-09-1996) * McDonnell-Douglas MD-82: CAWS not alerting flying crew of bad takeoff configuration. Initial cause of malfunciont not yet determined. - Northwest Airlines Flight 255 (08-16-1987, Detroit, Michigan) (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR88-05.pdf) - Spanair Flight 5022 (08-20-2008, Madrid, Spain) (http://www.fomento.es/NR/rdonlyres/9AA08FE0-1151-41A0-9A57-9C5DF8BF6F8E/52877/2008_032_A_INTERINO_01_ENG1.pdf)And so on...Please don't let this thread become a "American/European is good, everyone else is evil" flame war. Every one has his/her share of flawed designs. The real question is to learn from the results of them, fatal or not, and try to get them fixed. As sad as it's the lost of any life, the worst thing about the Air France A330 accident is that probably we'll never know for sure its reason, and we can only speculate. So, if a basic defect is in the root of the accident, you know, most probably it will happen again. We can only hope there will be better luck next time and no one will get hurt.

I don't understand how those relate to this discussion. I don't think I said that this was the first crash due to design or mechanical fault. The other crashes involving pitot-static problems cited have been due to human error. Human error that failed to remove masking tape from the tubes after washing, that failed to see the tape or other obstruction to the tubes during a preflight walkaround, that failed to properly respond to improper instrument indications during the takeoff roll, that failed to properly fly an airplane with partial panel techniques learned during basic pilot training. This is the first possible pitot-static induced crash that is suspected of being a result of a design problem of the tube which means that there is nothing there for a properly performed preflight inspection to catch.Just because there is an ongoing geo-political-economic debate going on, does not mean that there could not be an actual design problem with an airplane....

[KevinAu 441]

@gman - Sorry, I've read pieces and parts of this thread in the hopes of getting caught up on the investigation. How do the three links (AAL961) relate to this crash? ...I don't see the relationship...Also, does the use of composites change your mind about getting on an Airbus aircraft? If so, how do you feel about the 787?@KevinAU - If you were asked to transition to an Airbus, would you do it? (If I recall, you're flying an RJ now, right? I only ask, because if you're currently flying a 767 then your answer may be very different.) I'm not sure how most line pilots today feel about the airplane....my buddy who is an A320 pilot absolutely loves it.

I'm sure I would fly it just like I would any other aircraft. Every plane has its peculiarities and problems. You learn them, you deal with them. I can understand passengers getting nervous since they are not in control of their fate. But as the pilot, one is in control of one's own fate, and I think most of us that belong in the front seat are confident enough in ourselves that we can handle these peculiarities and problems that we can climb in each day without thinking too much.

[Guest belga1]

Hello,

AF 447: EASA confirms ... ... In the AD No.: 2009-0195 of August 31, 2009 that the pitot probe Thales C16195AA may cause inconsistencies in measured velocities, determined in the progress report of the BEA on the accident flight AF 447, and Thus, "a precaution", the probe should not equip more particularly the A330. In July 2002, the ILO SE 999.0068/02/VHR, Airbus had made the observation of defects of the probe Thales (formerly Sextant) C16195AA (probe type equipping the A330 flight AF 447) THE AIM OF ILO THIS IS TO INFORM THE OPERATORS THAT SEVERAL SINGLE AISLE OPERATORS HAVE REPORTED DISCREPANCY AIRSPEED ON AIRCRAFT FITTED WITH THALES PITOT PROBES PN C16195AA. It took 7 years and 228 victims for the precautionary principle be applied !

Source:http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.frRegards.Gus.

[mabe54 17]

I know Thales as of now is the product of company merges. The when these Pitot tubes started to be installed by Airbus would be good to know.Keep digging Gus!!! You are onto something. :( MAB

[mabe54 17]

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/unusual-...0-pitot-tu.htmlNew player, the plot keeps on thickening.Also,http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaki.../breaking23.htmCheers,MAB

[mabe54 17]

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worl...icle6817322.eceCheers,MAB

[vololiberista 205]

"Obfuscation" on "all" sides!!! 1. The pilots flew into a storm of such ferocity that there was very little chance of coming out alive(less than 1%)! 2. The pitot tubes are a side issue. In such a storm they would be giving extremely wild readings iced up or no. 3. No pitot tube that I know is calibrated down to -100c. (the temperature in the storm at the entry cruising altitude).Even if the black boxes were to be found the French BEA will do its best to muddy the waters in order to avoid culpability falling on Airbus or Air Chance.Vololiberista