You're still giving Renslow waaay too much credit. That poor guy wasn't attempting any sort of stall recovery. He wasn't trying to recover from a wing stall or a tail stall. All he was doing was pulling back to try and pitch the nose up. That's why they all died.

As I see it, once the aircraft was upset the situation was unrecoverable. They all died not because of poor recovery technique but because of the consequences of flying into known icing conditions with the autopilot engaged, this because of woefully inadequate crew training.

As I see it, once the aircraft was upset the situation was unrecoverable. They all died not because of poor recovery technique but because of the consequences of flying into known icing conditions with the autopilot engaged, this because of woefully inadequate crew training.

Ice did not cause the stall. He forgot to reapply power after configuring for landing. The plane bleeds off speed quickly once the landing configuration is made and the props are flattened. A Colgan Q400 stalling on approach is nothing new. It has happened many times before. They treat getting a stall shaker as a regular occurence. In the NTSB docket, there is another documented incident of when a Colgan Q400 nearly stalled on an approach. I have also anecdotal evidence from people who have been in Colgan jumpseats when the crew got the shaker and then went about it as if it was no big thing.I don't know if the plane was recoverable from a stall at that altitude, but whichever the case, his control movements once the upset occured were completely inappropriate and showed a complete lack of basic fundamental flying skills. Flying into known icing with autopilot engaged had nothing to do with this. There were no significant aerodyanmic effects on the plane from the icing that night. That has already been stated in the ntsb dockets. The stall occurred at a point consistent with a clean aircraft. However, inadequate crew training would certainly apply. Inadequate training in the approach profiles that often result in Colgan crews coming close to stalling their aircraft. As well as inadequate training in the anti-icing systems that seems to leave the crews often setting off the stall warning as well.

Ice did not cause the stall. He forgot to reapply power after configuring for landing. The plane bleeds off speed quickly once the landing configuration is made and the props are flattened. A Colgan Q400 stalling on approach is nothing new. It has happened many times before. They treat getting a stall shaker as a regular occurence. In the NTSB docket, there is another documented incident of when a Colgan Q400 nearly stalled on an approach. I have also anecdotal evidence from people who have been in Colgan jumpseat when the crew got the shaker and then went about it as if it was no big thing.I don't know if the plane was recoverable from a stall at that altitude, but whichever the case, his control movements once the upset occured were completely inappropriate and showed a complete lack of basic fundamental flying skills. Flying into known icing with autopilot engaged had nothing to do with this. There were no significant aerodyanmic effects on the plane from the icing that night. That has already been stated in the ntsb dockets. The stall occurred at a point consistent with a clean aircraft. However, inadequate crew training would certainly apply. Inadequate training in the approach profiles that often result in Colgan crews coming close to stalling their aircraft. As well as inadequate training in the anti-icing systems that seems to leave the crews often setting off the stall warning as well.

I must defer to your extensive (and in some cases insider) knowledge of this crash and its context. Thanks for the info, I look forward to the NTSB report. They're always fascinating reading.

I must defer to your extensive (and in some cases insider) knowledge of this crash and its context. Thanks for the info, I look forward to the NTSB report. They're always fascinating reading.

I don't have any insider knowledge, just what the NTSB has put out, and a little bit of hearsay from other guys who have to commute on them.The NTSB has already reported much.http://www.ntsb.gov/search/search.asp?Text...tsb%2Fmajor.aspColgan doesn't have FOQA so what happens in the cockpit stays in the cockpit, but this incident prior to the crash made it into the light because there was a checkairman in the jumpseat that reported it. The rest of the stalls that they do on approach will have to be nothing more but hearsay.http://www.ntsb.gov/dockets/aviation/dca09ma027/417450.pdf

I don't have any insider knowledge, just what the NTSB has put out, and a little bit of hearsay from other guys who have to commute on them.The NTSB has already reported much.http://www.ntsb.gov/search/search.asp?Text...tsb%2Fmajor.aspColgan doesn't have FOQA so what happens in the cockpit stays in the cockpit, but this incident prior to the crash made it into the light because there was a checkairman in the jumpseat that reported it. The rest of the stalls that they do on approach will have to be nothing more but hearsay.http://www.ntsb.gov/dockets/aviation/dca09ma027/417450.pdf

Fascinating ... I hadn't realized that accident dockets are online these days. I thought that only the final reports were. Of course the dockets contain the factual specialty reports, plus interviews, and not the later expert interpretations of the facts, but that's as it should be.Regarding the check airman incident, the factual information seems to leave open the possibility that they did in fact encounter unexpected icing -- at least that's how it looked to me when I skimmed the document.

Fascinating ... I hadn't realized that accident dockets are online these days. I thought that only the final reports were. Of course the dockets contain the factual specialty reports, plus interviews, and not the later expert interpretations of the facts, but that's as it should be.Regarding the check airman incident, the factual information seems to leave open the possibility that they did in fact encounter unexpected icing -- at least that's how it looked to me when I skimmed the document.

No, what happened there was that she had left the speed ref switch in an icing position that advanced the stall set point. However, she briefed and planned an approach using normal, lower ref speeds, and then tripped the stall warning during the approach because of the higher stall speed set by the switch.

No, what happened there was that she had left the speed ref switch in an icing position that advanced the stall set point. However, she briefed and planned an approach using normal, lower ref speeds, and then tripped the stall warning during the approach because of the higher stall speed set by the switch.

Would that higher stall speed have activated the stick pusher? (I ask because I was speed reading, and anyway the fine nuances such as you just described would be lost on me.)

Would that higher stall speed have activated the stick pusher? (I ask because I was speed reading, and anyway the fine nuances such as you just described would be lost on me.)

Yes. The shaker and pusher would activate at a higher speed with the switch in the ice position. As she decelerated through that speed towards the non-icing ref speed she thought she was using, she got the shaker.

You're still giving Renslow waaay too much credit. That poor guy wasn't attempting any sort of stall recovery. He wasn't trying to recover from a wing stall or a tail stall. All he was doing was pulling back to try and pitch the nose up. That's why they all died.

I am not giving him credit. I was sarcastic when I said a 'reverse stall recovery', I meant he increased the AoA instead of decreasing it like you are supposed to.I guess it wasn't a good joke when I have to explain it :(