Finally got a zero on the bum test!Vertical landing speed is zero feet per minute.Does anybody know if FS9 realistically measures Vertical Speed on landing and/or what VS is considered a

Finally got a zero on the bum test!Vertical landing speed is zero feet per minute.Does anybody know if FS9 realistically measures Vertical Speed on landing and/or what VS is considered a

Finally got a zero on the bum test!Vertical landing speed is zero feet per minute.Does anybody know if FS9 realistically measures Vertical Speed on landing and/or what VS is considered a "soft" landing? Is there such a thing as a soft landing in FS9 or is it like toilet paper and only your "bum" can tell how soft it is?I presume Vertical landing speed is not recorded on real aircraft.Any comments?

A normal landing is about 200 ft/m just before touchdown, anything between 10-100 is soft.350-500 ft/min is hard. Depending on the aircraft the limit is about 600 ft/min.Above that, the gear has to be checked.And yes, VS is recorded during landing.

Hello,In FS2004 the maximum impact speed before damage to the landing gear is easy to see ..EG for the default Cessna 172[contact_points]point.0 = 1, 0.90, 0.00, -4.09, 1500, 0, 0.5, 22.0, 0.25,2.5, 0.7, 0.0, 0.0, 0point.1 = 1, -4.70, -4.50, -4.01, 3500, 1, 0.5, 0.0, 0.3, 2.5, 0.7, 0.0, 0.0, 2point.2 = 1, -4.70, 4.50, -4.01, 3500, 2, 0.5, 0.0, 0.3, 2.5, 0.7, 0.0, 0.0, 3Noze wheel = 1500 feet/min !!Main gear = 3500 feet/min !!Regards.Gus.

As I was told by a CFI once, "Your VSI is good for telling you what you did yesterday".......meaning they are not instantaneous.

That's certainly true for the variometer in gliders, which typically have a four second lag on reporting climb or descent rates LOL.With regard to real aircraft and what is recorded, not all aircraft record the same parameters. It is true that there are certain flight parameters which commercial aircraft have to have tracked by their Flight Data Recorders if they are to meet certain ICAO and FAA standards, but these standards actually changed significantly in 2002. Prior to that date, an FDR only needed to record a minimum of 28 specific flight parameters to meet FAA standards for example, but the most recent standard in the US now requires 88 specific flight parameters as a minimum. Given that there are a large number of aircraft flying which are considerably older than eight years of age, it means there are some aircraft kicking around which adhere to older standards.Historically, the amount and fidelity of the data recorded by 'black boxes' has tended to go up over the years, chiefly because digital controls have made this easier to do, but also because there have been occasions where air accident investigators in the past have been unable to determine the cause of some accidents due to limited parameter data being available to them. The recent renewed efforts to recover the FDRs from Air France Airbus Flight 447, which was lost over the Atlantic last year, shows just how much modern accident investigations have come to depend on such data, and one suspects that in future, aircraft may actually send burst transmissions from their FDRs to ground recording stations, to get around that potential problem.Two examples where the limited record of recorded flight parameters have hindered an investigation, and led to calls for better standards are: The fatal crash of a British European Airways Hawker-Siddeley Trident crash at Staines in Essex in 1972, and an in-flight loss of elevator control due to tailplane icing on board BAe Jetstream 41 G-MAJV whilst en-route from Aberdeen to the Faroe Islands, in 2008.In the case of the Trident Crash, there was no Cockpit Voice Recorder at all (CVR) and only a limited 'ticker tape' style recording of a few bits of flight data (which sounds pretty poor these days, but this was the common FDR standard on most commercial airliners at the time). During the subsequent accident investigation, there was speculation that the P1 pilot had suffered some kind of heart attack, and also speculation that the P2 pilot and the Flight Engineer were lacking in experience and respect for the chain of command on a flight deck. It was known that the P1 pilot (who was vastly experienced, with about 15,000 hours, including over 4,000 on the Trident) could be something of a tyrant towards younger crew members, and so his crew resource management (CRM) abilities were called into question during the investigation, not least because, immediately prior to his departure on the fatal flight, he had been witnessed having an extremely violent argument with two younger BEA crew members. The actual crash itself was caused by the Trident's leading edge high-lift devices being retracted prematurely whilst the throttles were backed off in adherence to departure noise abatement regulations whilst on its initial climb out from London Heathrow, but without a CVR, and with limited data on control surface deflections, it was impossible for accident investigators to say for sure whether those droops on the Trident were accidentally retracted by a crew member, or knocked off, or even who was in control of the aircraft. This despite there having been two major inquiries into the incident in addition to the AAIB's investigation. As a result of this, the crash was a catalyst that prompted calls for CVRs and better FDRs on airliners.The incident on the J41 over Scotland again called into question crew competence and CRM, but again the available flight parameters from the FDR were too limited to be conclusive with regard to some aspects of the investigation. The J41 in question had not been de-iced prior to departure, and when getting up near to cruise altitude, the crew found that the tailplane was iced up and the elevators totally jammed. The co-pilot had actually commented that he thought the elevators felt a bit off when they were taxying for departure, but the captain had tested the controls and found them responsive. At this point, since other aircraft were being de-iced, it should probably have been a warning sign to a prudent crew, but the captain was actually very close to being out of hours, and hadn't had much sleep either. As a result of this, he had actually mentioned to the co-pilot that his decisions ought to be closely monitored. Upon discovering the problem the crew diverted and fortunately the tailplane freed up as the aircraft descended into warmer air whilst the crew worked on trying to free it up. Actually their handling of the situation was pretty good, with them smart enough to perform a precautionary flap deployment test test at altitude since they were obviously aware of the potential for a tail stall when the horizontal stabiliser is iced up and flaps are deployed, and they did in fact not use full flaps on the landing for that reason, even though they had been found to be okay, which was a wise choice. Nevertheless, the J41's FDR, and the parameters it records, meant that not all aspects of the crew's statements, and the CVR recording, could be perfectly matched up with what the FDR recorded, since the J41 actually only records the elevator's position once every second.Al