This is turning into an odd conversation, Jim.  Perhaps I'm reading your post wrong, but you seem to veer between respectful and condescending almost at random, and I'm not sure what I've done to provoke that, other than point out that intersection departures are a reality of airline operations at some airports.  Which they are.  

 

As far as my private pilot comment, I'm not sure what that remark may have "revealed'?  Other than you're trying to suggest that I was being arrogant or condescending towards private pilots.  Which I most definitely was not.  I do see how it could be read that way and I apologize if it was taken that way by anyone.  The expanded version of what I meant by that was:  first, in the small aircraft GA world, you likely don't have specific performance information for a given intersection departure that you can use to determine its safety; therefore, use the whole runway.  Secondly, what takeoff perf data you DO have was, as you point out, developed in a brand new aircraft by test pilots and there's not much of a margin factored in; therefore, use the whole runway.  Thirdly, you are likely operating from a less-busy airport than ORD or EWR, so use the whole runway because why not?  

 

These circumstances are often different in the airline world.  Please understand, I'm not just talking about requesting an intersection departure solely to save yourself a few thousand feet of taxi.  I'm talking about busy airports that issue clearances for these operations as a matter of course, because it's the safest and most efficient way they've found to flow their departures, while eliminating or reducing crossing runway operations and other threats.

 

 

 

Whether 91, 121, or 135, no matter the specific procedures and allocations, physics are what they are. It takes a certain amount of distance to bring an object to a stop following a specific amount of acceleration. As I said earlier, sure, your numbers show you can do it, but why reduce the safety equation by meters or hundreds of meters and take away or minimize your options?
 
Oh, sorry. Because you can, because you have gotten away with it, and because it can save time.

 

No, no, and no.  "Because you've gotten away with it" is outcome-based safety, and we haven't done that in 25 years.  I'm thinking you probably know this.  Without getting into the whole Threat and Error Management lecture, the emphasis in aviation safety over the last couple decades has shifted from technical knowledge to the non-technical human factors that can either increase or mitigate/eliminate any risks inherent to the operation.  There's a reason psychologists study our industry for techniques that can be applied to other disciplines (like medicine) where they're starting to understand the enormous impact human factors can have on safety.  Let me put it this way - you're much more likely to hear an airline captain refuse an intersection departure that only shortens a 16,000ft runway by 200 ft because he doesn't have the data proving it's safe, than you are to hear him accept the departure because "we've done it before."  Even when he HAS done it before.

 

 

 

JFK, DCA, IAD, ERW, ORD, LAX, LAS, SEA, SLC, PHOG, PAJN just to name a few, not to mention our regular International destinations throughout our realm of operations. All on a routine basis. And, not once has ATC expressed agitation with us for declining an intersection departure. No penalty box assigned as to this date.

 

I didn't mean you'd be going to the penalty box because you annoyed a controller.  I mean honestly, I'm not out to annoy anyone, but I couldn't care less if I annoy a controller.  I'll tell them what I need in the interest of safety, and they'll have to accommodate it.  No, you'd be going to the penalty box - or at least sitting at the full-length hold short for quite a while - because in the middle of a big departure bank, the outliers are the ones who wait until there's a hole in the normal flow to accommodate them.  But hey, if that's what the situation demands in the name of safety, than so be it.  I'll be the first to jump out of line when I don't like weather that others are departing into.  I'll return to the back of the line and wait as long as it takes.  

 

As far as you not running into this situation, well, I've obviously not been there so I can't say exactly why it may be.  But a couple guesses are:  you're operating on your own schedule, and so likely are not pushing off a gate at the same time as 30 or 40 of your other company aircraft, and all taxiing at once.  Airline bank schedules push the hub airports to capacity during peak pushes.  Other times, those airports can be very quiet and much more able to accommodate special requests.  Also, the GA ramps you're coming off of are typically across the airport from the terminals where said push is occurring, so these airports have a separate flow for GA departures.  For instance in EWR, you'd be assigned either 11/29, or full length 22R, as a matter of course, based purely on where GA parking is.  Conversely, in the decade and a half I flew for an airline hubbed in EWR, I never once saw ANY narrowbody airliner depart full length 22R.  22R/W is standard, because it eliminates the need to taxi across 11/29, then cross it again on your departure roll.  The intersection departure is obviously safer.

 

 

 

And, if the 20 to 90 minutes wait causes that much fatigue in the cockpit...!  :-(

Not to mention the lack of preflight planning that didnt take into account fuel for the departure delay that, if you regularily operate from from that airport....!  :-(

 

Many airlines schedule crews right to the limit as standard practice.  Even on a day that wasn't scheduled to be long, things change due to wx, mx etc.  Yes, that length of a wait can most certainly have fatigue ramifications.  I'd agree with the sad face, but that doesn't change the fact that it's reality.  As far as the lack of fuel planning... if the historical taxi times are X at an airport that routinely uses intersection departures, the dispatcher has planned the fuel load for that.  Why would he assume more was needed?  The CA could throw on more of course if he knew in advance that intersection ops were in use and he'd refuse... but you don't always know in advance, do you?  It's a dynamic environment.

 

 

 

A Mad Dog aborted their departure out of Las Vegas due to a flight control failure discovered at 138 KTS. I'm curious where they were at 138 KTS with respect to V1, VR, V2.
But, more importantly, it makes me wonder just what the outcome would have been had they initiated their departure from an intersection.

 

A friend who used to fly 80s estimates right around V1.  I'm not sure why you wonder what the outcome would be if they'd initiated at an intersection though.  It would have been the same, or they WOULDN'T have initiated at an intersection.  You still seem to be operating under the assumption that our takeoff data is predicated on less-than-realistic assumptions (test pilot, new airplane etc) with no margins, like small airplane GA.  I would hope that your data in the bizjets is better than that, but regardless, ours is.  As you said in the quote above, physics are what they are.  It takes a set amount of distance to stop an object weighing a certain amount, after a certain amount of acceleration, in a certain type of environment, on a certain type of runway surface.  ALL of these variables are knowable.  Which means it's just simple math.  No unrealistic assumptions are made.  Every step of the computation is rounded conservatively, certain stopping tools are not even taken into consideration, and then a nice margin is applied at the end.  This isn't a WAG by some guy in a cubicle tracing curved lines on a performance chart that's been photocopied too many times, and then shrugging and saying "yeah, that looks good".  This is good, usable data, or it wouldn't have been certified by the FAA for use in 121 passenger operations.  What's more, in the 50-odd years the 737 has been around, there have been enough incidents to prove it's good data.  The times I'd choose to insist on full length wouldn't be because I didn't trust the data, they'd be because I didn't trust the conditions.  I think the runway looks more contaminated than reported?  I'm going full length and full thrust, or not at all.  I suspect windshear in the area?  Full length and max blast or not at all.  Etc.

 

 

 

But, what you can't say is that they are a safe form of operation.

 

Well, see, I disagree... and to me, THIS is where the conversation gets interesting.  Personal risk analysis.  Everything I've talked about above is simply fact, not opinion.  But here's where we get into the subjective stuff, and I like this stuff.  I wonder why you think I can't say they're safe?  What is "safe", exactly?  Is blasting along 41,000ft above the earth at eight tenths the speed of sound in a thin aluminum tube "safe"?  Let's face it, there are plenty of intelligent people in the world who would tell us ANY form of flying is unsafe, no matter how much you or I might think that it is, or at least can be.  It comes down to a conservative determination of safety by the PIC, using all available information and good judgement and experience.  I do hear what you're saying about not intentionally eroding your margin of safety, but in reality, we all do this to some extent don't we?

 

Clearly, topping the fuel tanks all the way is the safest course of action (assuming adequate takeoff performance).  Do you ever fly with your fuel tanks less than topped off?

 

Clearly, landing for fuel when your tanks reach 1/2 empty is safer than pressing on and landing with a legal reserve plus a comfort margin, even in clear weather.  Do you land and top your tanks when they reach half empty?

 

Clearly, using full rated thrust for every single takeoff is safest, even though it drastically shortens the life of your engines and there's hardly ever a need to do so.  Do you perform every takeoff at full thrust, or do you ever derate/reduce?  (assuming your aircraft is certified for that).

 

And finally... like I said before, we operate routinely off 6,000 ft strips.  I'm sure you've done that and shorter.  Most of the standard intersection departures I'm talking about here leave you quite a bit more runway than that.  Now, I wouldn't take off of a 6,000ft strip unless I had 100% confidence that I could safely either abort or continue at V1.  I'm sure you wouldn't either.  So... if it's safe taking off from that length of runway, how is it NOT safe to take off from a greater length, just because there's concrete instead of water behind you?  You either believe your data, or you don't.  If you don't, why would you EVER take off?

 

And lastly, I can prove relevance to the OP with this final point:  sometimes you don't have a choice.  Sometimes, a runway is shortened for construction and the intersection departure is the only option.  So, if a position correction were required for intersection departures, just saying "don't do that" isn't a solution.  Occasionally you'll be forced to.  ;-)

 

Look, I hope you don't take this as an argument or even a debate.  I'm just finding it an interesting discussion, I'm not trying to "win".  I'd be interested in hearing your responses to my points.

Hi, Andrew,

 

The following discussion is based on the accepted fact that probability is still factored into our operations. Probability is a proven factor and is an ongoing method of analysis in our field.

 

Probability:

 

1. the quality or fact of being probable.

2. a probable event, circumstance, etc.

3. Statistics.

     a. the relative possibility that an event will occur, as expressed by the ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the total number of possible occurrences.

     b. the relative frequency with which an event occurs or is likely to occur.

 

There was a time when it was the Captain's position to make all of the decisions in the cockpit. Obviously some of those decisions weren't very good or communicated well to encourage active participation by other crew members.

 

There never has been a time when it was okay to line up on the runway and exclude the runway heading verification. Regardless, it was a common practice as an extensive investigation proved.

 

Both, though, were done for a long time until accidents changed doing business as usual. Now, both are mandatory and must be included in Standard Operations Procedures.

 

Any takeoff that starts at a point on a runway other than the beginning point of the runway causes safety to degrade.

 

Anytime a person has accepted to not use the full length of the runway for departure has created a higher probability of unintended consequences during response to an emergency.

 

Anytime we leave out a substantial safety factor in our departures, we increase our risk factor, thereby reducing our safety factor.

 

Those who need the additional runway to stop their aircraft on the runway and not in a gas station parking lot will appreciate not wasting available usable runway by accepting an intersection departure.

 

There isn't a single person that can prove leaving "runway behind you", is following the safest standards of operation. Regardless of what the numbers say. Having more runway for departure off of the nose is always safer than just "having enough" to meet the numbers requirements. You are meeting your operational requirements, but minimizing your safety options.

 

Hence, "you are getting away with it" when you reduce your safety options. You just don't realize it because up until now, nothing has happened. But, you have boxed yourself into a corner by cutting corners. Instead of having the combined safety of required runway and all additional available runway, your operational practices leave you with required runway with what may be left of additional runway.

 

For every departure, in my viewpoint, it is safer to operate where more runway is available should the need arise. The following is an example:

 

Using full length of the runway for departure:

 

8,000' of runway

3,450' of runway required for this specific departure

Leaving approximately 4,550' of runway under optimum conditions

Having approximately 8,000' of usable runway for departure

 

Using an Intersection Departure:

 

8,000' of runway

3,450' of runway required for this specific departure

Less 1,200' of runway not used due to the intersection departure (Just for this example)

Leaving approximately 3,350' of runway under optimum conditions

Having approximately 6,800' of usable runway of a 8,000' runway for departure

 

It is my contention that safety is enhanced in an emergency with approximately 4,550' of runway remaining than with approximately 3,350' of runway remaining.

 

In the real world, with emergencies, aircraft systems have been known to fail causing situations to change. Having saved your options for departure by using the full length of the runway would give you additional options to work with. Therefore, enhancing your safety factor.

 

It took an accident or two to implement CRM and verifying heading on runway lineup. I don't even have to mention which operation (91, 121, or 135) brought about these mandatory changes. I can say that they believed their operations were being conducted, by their own statements during pre-regulation implementation, in a safe and responsible manner. In spite of how safe they claimed their operational procedures were, we had to implement SOP changes as an end result of those operational procedures.

 

Any operation that is operating in such a manner as to minimize safety should re-evaluate how they conduct business. And, there is no specific operation such as 91, 121, or 135 that would be immune to this re-evaluation as intersection departures are performed by all.

 

"As far as you not running into this situation, well, I've obviously not been there so I can't say exactly why it may be.  But a couple guesses are:  you're operating on your own schedule, and so likely are not pushing off a gate at the same time as 30 or 40 of your other company aircraft, and all taxiing at once."

 

Our schedules can coincide all too often with heavy inbound and outbound 121 operations. Thats just the nature of our business. Through the years, we have a reasonable amount of experience utilizing major airports. And, with how to deal with most operational circumstances as they arise.

 

As for duty time, we will shut down a flight. Our flight will not depart if our duty time will be exceeded. It's that simple. Our passengers know this well before making the first flight from home base.

 

"As far as the lack of fuel planning... if the historical taxi times are X at an airport that routinely uses intersection departures, the dispatcher has planned the fuel load for that.  Why would he assume more was needed?  The CA could throw on more of course if he knew in advance that intersection ops were in use and he'd refuse... but you don't always know in advance, do you?  It's a dynamic environment."

 

I have never understood comparable statements such as this. And, in a good number of years, I have heard this many times. This seems to be the mantra as it certainly is repeated frequently.

 

I personally have access to information about airport delays (as do a lot of professional pilots).

 

If you fly out of specific locations, you should have a pretty good idea of whether or not there will be delays. We have learned over the years when rush hour operations take place for example. As part of our preflight procedures, which starts long before we arrive at the airport, we try to keep a heads up on factors that will bring about additional delays such as weather. Combined, we now have something to work with well ahead of time with regards to fuel.

 

You are correct about one aspect in particular. It is definitely a dynamic environment.

 

That is why we are paid to be an integral part of our operations. As such, we should know what is happening with our environment. Something akin to no last minute surprises. Unless, of course, you are operating out of an airport like KEGE or KASE and an aircraft has balled up the only runway available for operations. No sweat. You know you are flying into an airport with a high probability of having the only runway taken out and allocated reserves for that operation ahead of time.

 

Whenever a runway in undergoing maintenance of any kind that modifies the usable length, the new length available is the runway length. Makes sense, doesn't it. Therefore, for our

operations, the length available that is specified by our GOM, and having the Takeoff Performance numbers for that runway makes that runway usable. If the new runway length doesn't negate safety, if we can perform an airport departure analysis, and appropriate operations can be conducted, we would use that runway. And, we would start our takeoff roll from the beginning of the new runway length.

 

"No, no, and no.  "Because you've gotten away with it" is outcome-based safety, and we haven't done that in 25 years."

 

At the risk of repeating myself:

 

Whether 91, 121, or 135, no matter the specific procedures and allocations, physics are what they are. It takes a certain amount of distance to bring an object to a stop following a specific amount of acceleration. As I said earlier, sure, your numbers show you can do it, but why reduce the safety equation by meters or hundreds of meters and take away or minimize your options?

 

"Because you've gotten away with it" is probability based. Pre and/or Post SMS reports are proof of this statement. That is what the derivative is based on from the SMS input.

 

When filling out your SMS report, how many points are deducted for an intersection departure as you have degraded your safety factor?

 

Flying is only as dangerous as we make it. We have access to tools to minimize our exposure to unsafe risks. What undeniably makes our jobs more dangerous is to cut corners and throw out our options. With the inherent nature of our jobs, we should, and for no other reason than for our passengers, be keeping all of our options available to us. It is irresponsible to do otherwise.

 

This isn't about who "wins or losses" a conversation. This is about the probability of who "wins or losses" by operationally leaving "runway behind you"; by failing to acknowledge an old adage of "Excellent private pilot level advice". This advice applies to every pilot, student pilot all the way to ATP Jetjocks.

 

But, ask the someone who "nothing will ever happen to", after going off the end of the runway following an intersection takeoff, if they will ever do an intersection takeoff again.

 

Quote:  "There is an old saying in flying: There is nothing more worthless than the runway behind you, or the altitude above you. Use all available runway for every departure."

 

There aren't many who can claim that this adage is incorrect. And it is sure an adage to "LIVE and FLY" by.

 

Cheers,

 

Jim

Jim

 

Thanks for the response. I just still don't think you're understanding the circumstances I'm describing regarding the nature of our takeoff data, or the regularity of intersection departures at certain airports, or the reasons for these operations (it's actually safer). You refer to it as "cutting corners" when it's the opposite.

 

As far as planning and delays, you missed my point. These airports regularly running intersection departure ops AREN'T running delays, because everyone's accepting the normal flow. If you choose not to and create a delay for yourself, well, the airport status information didn't account for that, did it?

 

As far as your probability discussion, I do understand your point about eroding safety margins, but again, we all do this to a certain extent every time we fly. We rely on SOPs, good data, and good conservative judgment to do it safely.

 

So I'd ask again: have you, in your career, ever taken off with less than full fuel tanks? I'm going to assume yes because we all do. I'd also assume we agree that more fuel in the tanks equals more options, just like more available runway would. And yes, in certain circumstances it's safer to take off with less fuel (for increased performance) just like it's sometimes safer to take an intersection departure (to avoid intersecting runway ops). But forget the special situations for now.

 

What I'm interested in is knowing why you'd think it's safe "enough" to take off with less than full tanks, still knowing you've left yourself "enough" options to be comfortable.... but you'd not think it's safe "enough" to take an intersection departure, knowing you've still got plenty "enough" margin to be comfortable?

 

I don't see any difference between runway behind me or empty space in my fuel tanks.

 

You are, after all, intentionally omitting that part of the old mantra you keep quoting:

"Nothing's more useless then altitude above you, runway behind you, or FUEL IN THE TRUCK."

 

;-)

Hi, Andrew,

 

As with CRM and runway lineup heading confirmation, intersection departures are being modified as a result of accidents involving intersection departures. Such as the restriction imposed prohibiting night intersection departures. To date, the liability losses haven't caught up with accidents involving intersection departures like they did when CRM didn't exist and inappropriate lineup practices were commonplace.

 

"I just still don't think you're understanding the circumstances I'm describing regarding the nature of our takeoff data, or the regularity of intersection departures at certain airports, or the reasons for these operations (it's actually safer)."

 

I believe you to the exclusion of the "safer" part, that you don't think I understand. As with the "safer" part, this statement is untrue.

 

My understanding goes beyond just understanding of the utilization of power reductions (deration) for your departure operations. Your operations are electing to derate the maximum takeoff thrust during takeoff to save money on maintenance. And, a lower thrust setting reduces the cost of powerplant maintenance over a given time frame. Proportionally, lower thrust settings equate to longer takeoff performance requirements. Saving money, after all, promotes "safety".

 

We use the takeoff thrust established by our Takeoff Performance Data. Just one more method of safety enhancement. Push the power levers up to the takeoff detent and go from there.

 

We don't have to allow additional precious response time to think about applying additional thrust from the remaining good engine(s) following an engine / system failure. We just have to concentrate on the emergency at hand. We eliminate one less factor that degrades safety, eliminate one additional step to have to contend with, and deal with the situation at hand.

 

You are accommodating ATC, your duty time, weather incurred delays, make-up time for delayed gate push back, etc. to accept and perform intersection departures. Instead of waiting in "Q" for departure, thereby causing pilots in the line who have been waiting for departure to either fully dismiss the individual(s) who have cut "Q" or to become agitated by those who cut "Q". In spite of their decision to opt out of an intersection departure.

 

As I await my departure and watch operators perform intersection departures, I think to myself how the folks in the back of those aircraft have just been exposed to an operation that has degraded the safety of their being on that aircraft. Most folks in back would never know the difference.

 

Sure, you have the numbers and have taken into account your variables. But, what you don't have is the runway you left behind. What you have accepted is the premise that everything will go just fine and should something go wrong, you will deal with it.

 

Many professionals have learned that not everyone responds immediately regarding failure recognition where a delay in immediate corrective action develops. Those precious moments of "Failure Recognition" can make the difference between staying on the runway or going off the end of the runway. There is a measurable difference between simulator training response time and real world response time during an actual real world emergency. Too many accident reports substantiate this.

 

Your exposure is every bit as high performing an intersection departure (as LAX and other intersection accidents prove) as waiting in line, crossing an intersection, etc. Exposure occurs as a matter of being on any part of the surface of the airport. You can stand and watch an aircraft on departure or arrival from the hangar doors only to have that aircraft lose an engine and slam into where you are standing. Or at an airshow, say like at Reno, sitting and watching the beauty that is aviation.

 

"As far as planning and delays, you missed my point. These airports regularly running intersection departure ops AREN'T running delays, because everyone's accepting the normal flow. If you choose not to and create a delay for yourself, well, the airport status information didn't account for that, did it?"

 

These airports aren't running delays because they find people willing to compromise the safety of their operations.

 

They find those who are willing to use less than the amount of available runway resulting in the exclusion of all available safety options. All the while saying "it is safe because nothing has ever happened and we have the numbers." Oh, and we can because our Company has approved it.

 

You and others have said it best that "aviation is inherently dangerous". To which I ask; "so why add an aspect of operation to make the risk higher?"

 

While you are explaining your "safe" and "acceptable" method of operation to the FAA, NTSB, and your company, and after kicking yourself for having gone off the end of the runway, you will find that it wasn't the best choice to make after all. And, I want it made perfectly clear right now. I never want this to happen to anyone! 

 

Unfortunately, though, it has .... and it will.

 

You are wrong by your statement "... the airport status information didn't account for that, did it?".

 

Quite the contrary. The pre-departure flight planning takes into account factors, such as delays, affecting our point of departure. As a significant factor, derived from the airport status information obtained prior to conducting operations, we assimilate the data necessary to compensate for trip fuel and confirm duty time requirements.

 

" ....... but again, we all do this to a certain extent every time we fly. We rely on SOPs, good data, and good conservative judgment to do it safely."

 

No, Andrew, not everyone degrades safety margins or is willing to operate in a manner that reduces safety options. There are a lot of 91, 121, and 135 Captains worldwide that won't compromise safety and won't accept an intersection departure.

 

SOPs, good data, and good conservative judgment to do it safely still brought about CRM and runway heading verification on runway lineup.

 

Your statement reflects: "I am an absolute advocate of safety, but....."

 

But knowingly willing to operate in a manner, with the blessing of the Company SOPs and the way other operators do it, that will degrade available safety margins .... knowingly.

 

We voice our disapproval of an approved Company Procedure that will degrade the highest standard of Operational Safety. Saving time, saving money, etc. does not justify degrading safety.

 

"So I'd ask again: have you, in your career, ever taken off with less than full fuel tanks?"

 

"What I'm interested in is knowing why you'd think it's safe "enough" to take off with less than full tanks, still knowing you've left yourself "enough" options to be comfortable.... but you'd not think it's safe "enough" to take an intersection departure, knowing you've still got plenty "enough" margin to be comfortable?"

I takeoff with fuel in compliance with the requirements mandated by the FARs and our SOPs (which are, ironically, one and the same).

 

Following an evaluation of pre-planning factors, my fuel load is increased accordingly. My specific fuel requirements meet required fuel plus fuel added for factors that could affect that flight. And, on many occasions, additional fuel for my "gut feeling".

 

Factors account for departure airport operations, enroute operations, and arrival operations.

 

The factors include things such as rush hour delays, passenger delays, weather delays, arrival airport runway considerations (one runway or multible runways), diversion to an alternate airport, etc.

 

"I don't see any difference between runway behind me or empty space in my fuel tanks."

 

At the risk of sounding sarcastic  ;-) , I believe you.

 

"You are, after all, intentionally omitting that part of the old mantra you keep quoting:"

"Nothing's more useless then altitude above you, runway behind you, or FUEL IN THE TRUCK."

 

"Combined, we now have something to work with well ahead of time with regards to fuel." from my previous reply

 

Even though I addressed fuel requirements in my previous replies.

 

I hope to High Heaven's that this has been addressed more than once. So far as I see, none of my previous replies have been deleted.

 

If you wish to, go back and re-read my previous replies.

 

"When filling out your SMS report, how many points are deducted for an intersection departure as you have degraded your safety factor?" ... my question

 

This has been asked twice. And, both times it has been ignored. Your operation has a Safety Management System, or a system by a comparable name.

 

But, Andrew, I know why this has been unanswered. I will not press you for an answer.

 

"As far as your probability discussion, I do understand your point about eroding safety margins....."

 

This is a great statement to make!

 

A seed has been planted.

 

And, from a Flight Sim Forum. (No sarcasm intended .... hopefully none taken!)    

 

 

Quote:  "Just wanting something to be right and believing that something is right doesn't necessarily make it right."  -  Unknown

 

 

Cheers

 

Jim

I'll keep this reply shorter, to address specific points:

 

1. "When filling out your SMS report, how many points are deducted for an intersection departure as you have degraded your safety factor?" None. I wasn't avoiding answering it because I didn't want to, but because it's not relevant. Our industry uses a reporting system called ASAP, a collaboration between the company, the union and the FAA, as our SMS reporting system. ASAP reports are not "scored", with points assigned and deducted for various factors, and that's frankly a bizarre notion to me. But whatever works for you.

 

2. Your comments on your determination of an appropriate fuel load are quite relevant. What it boils down to is, you start with the minimum amount you'll legally need and use your judgment to increase as necessary... but you're typically comfortable using less than the maximum available. Now, apply that same statement to runway length for takeoff and tell me how they are any different, please. You chose to throw in an unwarranted and unprofessional dose of sarcasm while managing to avoid actually answering the question last time.

 

3. You're STILL not understanding that at the airports I'm talking about, intersection ops are the norm. You consistently talk about ATC "finding people who will do it" as if they're the outliers. You said you didn't need to listen to online ATC but I really think listening in to EWR tower on a SW flow day would be eye-opening for you. You will hear hundreds of departures from 22R/W, you will hear no departures at all from full length excepting the odd GA aircraft (starting on the north side of the field) or the occasional heavy that doesn't have valid numbers from W. Really. Even at night. There's no restriction on intersection departures based on time of day, wx, runway conditions, or anything else I know of. It is the norm. That's... not debatable. You certainly can't argue that EVERY professional pilot departing EWR on a given day is unsafe!

 

4. "A seed has been planted"... what seed is that? I stated early on that I'd been an instructor and 121 check airman for years. One does not obtain or excel at those positions without a very solid and conservative understanding of human factors as they relate to aviation safety. As I said, I'm always willing to learn, but I'm standing on a pretty solid foundation ;-).

 

I do look forward to hearing your thoughts about the difference between limiting options by leaving fuel behind vs limiting options by leaving runway behind. I think we're drilling down to the nitty gritty here, with that point.

Ok, one more: "As with the "safer" part, this statement is untrue."

 

You've said this a few times as if my assertion that intersection departures are safer than intersecting-runway ops is just my opinion. It is not. It is borne out by a couple decades of data relevant to my industry, and is a consensus shared by the airlines and the FAA. That's WHY these operations are SOP at places like EWR. I'm sure you're as familiar with the the FAA-identified top areas of concern as I am. Runway incursions / near-miss events top the list. Intersection departures conducted with accurately calculated, conservative takeoff data are not identified as a significant threat. So if performing the low-risk event negates the possibility of the high-risk one, well... that's not a matter of opinion and therefore probably not debatable either. Intersection departures ARE safer than intersecting-runway ops. The safety data proves it.

 

 

As I await my departure and watch operators perform intersection departures, I think to myself how the folks in the back of those aircraft have just been exposed to an operation that has degraded the safety of their being on that aircraft. Most folks in back would never know the difference.

 

Jim (full names to your posts, please),

 

This is the type of blind adherence to safety in the industry that borders on insanity. It's too black and white. Safety, despite what many in the industry might claim, is actually very, very, very grey. Hyperfocusing on a single aspect, without viewing it in the larger picture, is one of the many ways we cut the legs out from under pilots, compromising the overall safety of the flight by setting a standard of making calls for them.

 

Routine Degraded Areas of Safety That We Routinely Ignore:

• The very fact that you have put people in aluminum/composite tubes and intend to hurtle them through the air means that their safety has been degraded. It would be safer to leave them in their houses in bubble wrap. Ignored because people like to move around.
• The fact that you put the gear up means their safety is degraded. It would be safer to have assured, fixed position landing gear that cannot fail to extend. Ignored because the drag penalty is high, which burns more fuel and costs us time/money.
• The fact that you allow them to unfasten their safety belts at altitude means their safety is degraded (even if you tell them to put the belt back on when they sit - there is an option of less safety available to them). It would be safer to fasten them down like cargo. Ignored because [see point 1].
• The fact that you're departing with less than full fuel in the tanks means their safety has been degraded. It would be safer (at least notionally) to operate with full tanks at all times. Ignored because we balance risk against known performance.

 

...and that last one is the kicker, and the ultimate demise of your points here.

The very fact that you're taking an aircraft, loading less than max fuel (as I'm 99% sure your operator does), and flying a flight based on known conditions against the probability of error in those numbers is exactly comparable to accepting and performing an intersection departure. In one case, you are taking a known value that is less than full, and operating an aircraft based on calculated risk; in the other, again, you are taking a known value that is less than full, and operating an aircraft based on calculated risk.

 

So, sure, people can talk around and around about safety, but the core issue here isn't safety. It's notional safety. Just because it seems safe does not mean that it is safe. Again, you need only look at the fact that operators routinely fly around with less than full tanks to see that. Similarly, pointing to just about any other compromise we make in aviation - retractable gear, adding more weight to an aircraft, flying longer routes, flying in less than perfect weather - one can see that we've been operating safely for decades, even when safety is degraded, and consciously choose to do so.

 

It is inherently unsafe to move. People do move, however, and they move with relative safety, based on using conscious decisions that evaluate the relative safety. Sure, the margin of safe operation is degraded, but this isn't as cut and dry as the hard line stance against intersection departures as it seems you're trying to convey. If it were, then how would one justify operating on a 5500 foot runway versus an airport SOP of operating intersection departures on an 8000 foot runway, with 5500 feet remaining? In a similar vein, if you're at a light that offers both a green arrow and a conditional left (no arrow - just a green, usually after the arrow drops), do you take the left even when you don't have an arrow? If so, you're making a conscious decision to operate on a lower standard of safety in order to be more timely (and also to not unnecessarily impede the flow of traffic behind you, perhaps).

 

I get that you have an idea of what safe is, and what safe isn't. That's fine. When you're up front, it's your plane. You're responsible for it, and I'm not one to tell you what decisions to make. At the same time, that notion goes both ways. Just because you believe that an intersection departure is an unsafe operation does not give you the right to make that call for anyone else. Interestingly enough, the numbers are stacked in favor of those who use intersection departures. If you don't believe me, have a look at EWR, JFK, and any other major airport that routinely uses them. It's routine, and in that routine, there is inherent safety. In fact, looking at human factors, persisting and forcing the operation to accommodate a full length departure actually degrades safety for not only you, but everyone around you.

Hi, Andrew,

 

First time using Selective Quote, so I don't know what this is going to look like until I actually post this. One thing is for sure, I'll know what it looks like after it has been posted. As most can tell, while having registered for these forums some time ago, I don't post very often. This has surely been the exception.

 

Forum Moderators, such as Kyle, who keep us in line, have a one up on us infrequent posters.

 

So, here goes the post button!

 

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1. "When filling out your SMS report, how many points are deducted for an intersection departure as you have degraded your safety factor?" None. I wasn't avoiding answering it because I didn't want to, but because it's not relevant. Our industry uses a reporting system called ASAP, a collaboration between the company, the union and the FAA, as our SMS reporting system. ASAP reports are not "scored", with points assigned and deducted for various factors, and that's frankly a bizarre notion to me. But whatever works for you.

 

You must like the word "bizarre".

 

Our SMS and your ASAP operate almost identically in context and format, since SMS is an industry standard established for and used by 91, 121, and 135 operations. Modified in degrees to meet Company specifics, of course.

 

 

                                                                 ________________________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

 

2. Your comments on your determination of an appropriate fuel load are quite relevant. What it boils down to is, you start with the minimum amount you'll legally need and use your judgment to increase as necessary... but you're typically comfortable using less than the maximum available. Now, apply that same statement to runway length for takeoff and tell me how they are any different, please. You chose to throw in an unwarranted and unprofessional dose of sarcasm while managing to avoid actually answering the question last time.

 

 

I am very adept at unwarranted and unprofessional sarcasm. Much the same as others.

 

I read one response to someone's question and the responder eluded to the person asking the question as being a "Major-Over doer". When all the person wanted was an answer to a question.

 

And, someone's reply to my reply with "Great Private Pilot Advice". Without having an understanding (like it really matters) of my specific credentials. At one time, I could have given you a quarter to call someone who gave a s....... WHOOPS, not here!   

 

The improperly flight planned fuel load using the full available length of the runway for departure.

 

Takeoff with too much fuel and you present yourself with a similar comparison to performing an intersection departure. Longer takeoff roll than necessary with a subsequent reduction in remaining runway available at Decision Speed.

 

Takeoff with too little fuel for your stage length, and not take into account for operational environmental aspects, would be comparable to performing an intersection departure.

Less takeoff roll, but once airborne, probably not going to make the destination without a fuel stop somewhere along the way. There might be an inane attempt to try to stretch the fuel to get to the destination. The probability of a reduction in the safety of margin is increased.

 

Takeoff with too much fuel and a high density altitude and you have another comparison to performing an intersection departure. Much longer takeoff roll, plus a reduction in powerplant efficiency producing a reduction in available runway remaining at Decision Speed.

 

All three examples compare to performing an intersection departure with the same thing in common: The operator has degraded their margin of safety.

 

Conversely, the properly flight planned fuel load using the full available length of the runway for departure.

 

Takeoff with a properly flight planned fuel load with environmental considerations factored in represents the acceptable safety factor for the flight. Using the full length of the runway allows for all available remaining runway to work with in the event of an emergency. Legal reserves, stage length fuel requirements, plus fuel added for environmental factors and the fuel for the trip is satisfactory.

 

Conversely, the properly flight planned fuel load performing an intersection departure for departure.

 

Now, takeoff with a properly flight planned fuel load with environmental considerations factored in representing an acceptable safety factor for the flight. Performing an intersection departure reduces the amount of runway available in the event of an emergency. With an associated measurable degrade in the margin of safety.

 

With respect to everything above, is it safer to have more runway off of the nose of the aircraft during departure in an emergency, or less?

 

 

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3. You're STILL not understanding that at the airports I'm talking about, intersection ops are the norm. You consistently talk about ATC "finding people who will do it" as if they're the outliers. You said you didn't need to listen to online ATC but I really think listening in to EWR tower on a SW flow day would be eye-opening for you. You will hear hundreds of departures from 22R/W, you will hear no departures at all from full length excepting the odd GA aircraft (starting on the north side of the field) or the occasional heavy that doesn't have valid numbers from W. Really. Even at night. There's no restriction on intersection departures based on time of day, wx, runway conditions, or anything else I know of. It is the norm. That's... not debatable. You certainly can't argue that EVERY professional pilot departing EWR on a given day is unsafe!

 

 

Andrew, it isn't a matter of whether intersection departures are the "norm" or not. It's a matter of degrading the margin of safety as a result of executing an intersection departure. The people who are willing to degrade their margin of safety are the ones who are willing to perform intersection departures. They have opted to degrade their margin of safety by reducing the amount of available runway remaining in the event of an emergency. No amount of data will offset not having ALL AVAILABLE RUNWAY as an option should an emergency occur. The runway that was wasted in order to perform an intersection departure is no longer available as a factor to enhance the margin of safety. The end result is a reduction in the margin of safety.

 

All things considered, is it safer to have more runway off of the nose of the aircraft during departure in an emergency, or less?

 

By the way, what is available remaining runway, anyway? If using a the full length of runway for departure and an emergency occurs, but the aircraft still goes off the end of the runway, what does that say? You had the numbers.

 

What would it say if an intersection departure was performed in lieu using the full runway?

 

And, that odd GA aircraft using full length for departure out of EWR would be me. Coming out of Signature midway between and to the north of RWY 11/29. On more than one occasion out of EWR with a line of aircraft ahead of us waiting for departure for us to sit in. Sitting in the cockpit listening to aircraft performing intersection departures quite frequently, under all kinds of conditions.

 

As I await my departure and watch operators perform intersection departures, I think to myself how the folks in the back of those aircraft have just been exposed to an operation that has degraded the safety of their being on that aircraft. Most folks in back would never know the difference.

 

And, you are correct. I can't argue that the pilots who maintain a higher margin of safety departing not only EWR but any other airport are on any given day unsafe. The pilots I consider unsafe are those willing to sacrifice a higher margin of safety and accept a lower margin of safety.

 

Sitting in the cockpit of my puddle jumper and watching operators perform intersection departures for a runway being used for arrival, when the runway surface is contaminated, at night, and for a multitude of other reasons prove something to me. Those pilots have just proven that they are willing to sacrifice safety for whatever reason they can justify their decision to do so. And, have just operated using a degraded margin of safety.

 

And, these same pilots are willing to sit and expound about how much more dangerous it is to taxi across an active runway while heading for the departure end of a runway to depart from. While they may feel like patting themselves on the back for not crossing a "High Threat" "Hot Spot" location on the field. Not only have they just performed an intersection departure, but at night, on a runway being used for both arrivals and departures, with runway contamination of whatever type, with visibility restrictions, with passengers in the back of the aircraft. And, to add insult to injury, they claim it is safer to perform any kind of intersection departure in comparison to crossing an active runway. Now, that is bizarre.

 

While sitting in the cockpit at DFW the other day, I was watching aircraft depart. A 777 departed and what a beautiful sight it was. Much like watching KLM depart out of IAD in their 747 to reposition back to JFK. You can imagine what that looked like since they were empty for the reposition flight over to JFK?

 

Can you guess what I see a little over 3 minutes later (DFW did away with the 5NM limitation and replaced it with a 3 minute delay for aircraft performing intersection departures following a preceding departure)?

 

I watch an intersection departure being performed by a junglejet, operated by a 121 carrier, where they rotate beyond the liftoff point of the previously departed "Heavy". Now, that's really great decision making in action!

 

You are only as safe as you make it. When you are willing to perform an operation with conditions that will cause your remaining runway to be reduced even more than under ideal conditions (dry, day, etc.), the passengers sitting in the back of the aircraft are put into a lower margin of safety. It is apparent that those pilots willing to degrade safety and undeniably operate in a manner that degrades the margin of safety are less safe than those who won't.

 

 

But, then, like you said. "It's the norm."  Glad you mentioned this.

 

 

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4. "A seed has been planted"... what seed is that? I stated early on that I'd been an instructor and 121 check airman for years. One does not obtain or excel at those positions without a very solid and conservative understanding of human factors as they relate to aviation safety. As I said, I'm always willing to learn, but I'm standing on a pretty solid foundation ;-).

 

 

I was actually quite thrilled by your statement when I read it initially:

 

"As far as your probability discussion, I do understand your point about eroding safety margins....."

 

I apologize for misunderstanding and misapplying your statement, Andrew. There certainly wasn't any intention to question or impugn your qualifications or to cast aspersions.

 

I never thought for a minute that you both obtained and excel at your position without your having a very solid and conservative understanding of human factors as they relate to aviation safety. There are very, very few folks who can hold your position. It takes a certain type of individual to be both an instructor and a check airman at the same time. Of this, you can be proud.

 

There certainly is no question in my mind about your solid foundation.

 

 

 

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Ok, one more: "As with the "safer" part, this statement is untrue."

You've said this a few times as if my assertion that intersection departures are safer than intersecting-runway ops is just my opinion. It is not. It is borne out by a couple decades of data relevant to my industry, and is a consensus shared by the airlines and the FAA. That's WHY these operations are SOP at places like EWR. I'm sure you're as familiar with the the FAA-identified top areas of concern as I am. Runway incursions / near-miss events top the list. Intersection departures conducted with accurately calculated, conservative takeoff data are not identified as a significant threat. So if performing the low-risk event negates the possibility of the high-risk one, well... that's not a matter of opinion and therefore probably not debatable either. Intersection departures ARE safer than intersecting-runway ops. The safety data proves it.

 

 

I'm sorry that you misunderstood me. My response meant that intersection departures are not as safe as using the full length of the runway for departure, to include one or more crossings of any kind, and to include contending with "Hot Spots".

 

If you get the chance, go to the NTSBs website and read the available intersection departure incident / accident reports. There are a bookoo of them. For more reading, you can go to the affiliated International websites and read their intersection departure incident / accident reports. Globally, there have been so many intersection departure incidents and accidents that some time will need to be allocated in order to read them all.

 

When, in the course of watching an aircraft during departure and the pilot loses an engine on an over gross aircraft resulting in that aircraft flying into the exact location that you are standing, all of a sudden it isn't the typical "high risk" spot on the airport. Instead, where you are standing when that aircraft hits you becomes THE high risk spot on the airport.

 

Sitting at an air show at Reno, watching what is the majesty of aviation, and being killed when an aircraft crashes where you are sitting, causes the site of the crash to become the high risk spot.

 

Sitting at an intersection, waiting for a departure to pass, only to have that aircraft on departure lose an engine and it slams into your aircraft and kills you, causes the spot you were sitting at to become the high risk spot.

 

And, yes, I know. We really recognize high risk spots as locations on the airport where repetitive incursions take place. Those "Hot Spots" are briefed between our crew members well before taxi out. We maintain vigilance during taxi, not only for "Hot Spots", but for other unexpected things that could affect us.

 

Additionally, procedures to prevent the highest potential threats at an airport have been required to be included in our Company Standard Operations Procedures Manual. Our six and twelve month training events cover these subjects. We are proactive in attempting to minimize our participation in potential threats. Threat assessment and procedural specifications help to minimize the exposure of this aspect of our operations. Thank Goodness.

 

Kind of like knowing where you are in space and time and keeping you head out your a....... WHOOPS, I just about did it again! :mad:

 

Once again, you have gotten away with using procedures that have reduced your margin of safety. So far, you have not had to rely on "runway behind you", else you would in all likelihood not perform those operations.

 

What is safer during the takeoff roll, Andrew? More or less runway remaining off the nose or the aircraft?

 

The safety data you keep referring to proves only the data for those who haven't either had an incident or accident as a result of using those operations. For those who have, it is a whole different set of data.

 

For the aircraft at LAX sitting on the runway at night, some many meters from the departure end of the runway because the crew elected to perform an intersection departure, when they had an aircraft land on top of them, will probably say that their data no longer substantiates intersection departures as being a safe operational practice.

 

Would you agree that a probability existed that, if they were sitting at the departure end of the runway for departure, the other aircraft potentially might have flown over them? Potentially resulting in a near miss instead of a deadly accident?

 

This assumption is predicated on the aircraft landing being on their vertical approach slope guidance and maintaining that vertical approach slope guidance to at least over the approach end of the arrival runway.

 

Well, we won't know now, will we?

 

We do know that the data they amassed, to support intersection departures as a safe operational practice require an addendum to correct for this intersection departure accident that resulted in the tragic loss of life.

 

The folks sitting in each aircraft.....sitting in the back of the aircraft, were probably counting on their flight crews to make good decisions. They bet their lives on the decision making taking place by their flight crews.

 

Up until that fateful night, there exists a very high probability that the general consensus supported the safety of performing intersection departures for that carrier. I would step out on a limb and suggest that they also had established and current data to substantiate their choice of operations.

 

We do know that it wasn't worth degrading their margin of safety to perform an intersection departure on that fateful and tragic night.

 

Who was monitoring the radio and listening for someone being issued landing instructions to the runway that they were sitting on? If the crew would of heard that an aircraft was given approval to land on the very runway they were sitting on, do you suppose they might have tried to talk ATC out of allowing that landing clearance? Or requested an immediate vacating of the active?

 

This accident prompted the prohibition of night intersection departures for numerous operators globally. For many, the prohibition was required. Some of these companies had already, long before the LAX accident, put in place prohibitions with respect to night intersection departures.

 

Some operations have no regard for the folks sitting in the back of their aircraft and will perform intersection departures regardless of weather, runway operational status (arrivals and departures being performed simultaneously), or runway environmental conditions. That, Andrew, is bizarre.

 

When push comes to shove, and when there is a margin of safety to consider, I want a higher margin of safety working for me. I don't want to perform an operation or procedure that will degrade my safety factor.

 

Others don't feel the same way as I do.

 

Which is fine, as long as I don't have to be an active participant or on unwilling participant of those operations.

 

My hat is off to every 121 flight I have been on where the flight crew performed a departure using the full length of the runway. As I have said, in the hundreds of 121 flights I have been on, spanning decades, not one 121 flight was performed using an intersection departure. To my gratitude. Flying as a passenger on those 121 flights out of airports such as ORD, BOS, SEA, ATL,PHI, LAX, DEN, PHX, JFK, EWR, and on, and on. I have been very, very fortunate.

 

Regarding my flights on 121 aircraft, only once was I worried about the outcome of our arrival when flying into ATL. With thunderstorms everywhere, we encountered a microburst at approximately 90m above the ground. You could feel it. And, there was a fairly good delay by the flight crew in responding to situation. They finally performed a microburst recovery and, in very heavy rain, we were on the go-around. But, it took them a bit of time to recognize what was happening, man.

 

My point being that everyone one of us pilots are so well trained and so proficient at our jobs. There isn't a pilot flying that will ever allow a situation to materialize that they won't instinctively and immediately and appropriately respond too. Everyone of us, following our immediate recognition of and immediate initiation of response too, performing each procedure exactly as our training has taught us to do to handle that problem, will use only the exact and ingrained emergency corrective action that we have trained to use time and time again. Each pilot flying will always be on guard and will always be ready to immediately spring into action at the first sign of trouble without hesitation or error in recognition of and response to whatever might come up. We all believe that.

 

With everything said degrading the safety of margin enhances the old adage of "There are those who have .... and there are those who will.".

 

History and incident / accident reports prove it. And, unfortunately, will continue to as well.

 

 

 

Quote:  "Just wanting something to be right and believing that something is right doesn't necessarily make it right."  -  Unknown

 

 

Man I'm long winded.

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

Jim,

 

I'm not longwinded. It is not safer to use more runway than you need to either takeoff or stop at a failure before V1. For a given weight and the prevailing conditions that runway length is known.

We could both learn something from Kevin ;-).

 

Jim, I'm glad to hear your SMS reports are similar to our ASAP.  It's a great system.  Fact remains, ASAP reports do not "deduct points" for intersection departures.  Yes, I find this concept bizarre.  As, obviously, would the folks who created the system in the first place, since they did not set it up that way.

 

Your entire discussion about the possible dangers of taking off with a full fuel load is referencing takeoff performance concerns, a factor I specifically excepted when I first asked you the question.  Just like there are days when environmental factors diminish my willingness to take an intersection departure (or depart at all), there are times when you simply can't safely haul a full fuel load off of your departure airport.  These times are not the norm.  On most days, on most of your departures, you have plenty of available performance to haul full fuel tanks into the air.  And yet you regularly don't.

 

 

 

They have opted to degrade their margin of safety by reducing the amount of available runway remaining in the event of an emergency. No amount of data will offset not having ALL AVAILABLE RUNWAY as an option should an emergency occur.

 

Let me change a few words, and if so inclined, tell me where the following statement is any different than what you just said (again, EXCEPTING takeoff performance concerns, which are NOT the norm):

"They have opted to degrade their margin of safety by reducing the amount of available fuel remaining in the event of an emergency. No amount of data will offset not having ALL AVAILABLE FUEL as an option should an emergency occur."

 

I obviously was not there so can't prove this - but I find it hard to believe you've never ridden through an intersection departure on an airliner.  Taking just one airport as an example, if you've ever taken off to the SW at EWR in anything smaller than a 767 loaded for transatlantic ops, you've taken off on 22R at W.  I can say that with about 99% certainty.  If you were in a narrowbody aircraft that used full length, your flight was the EXTREME outlier - and I don't mean the one in an hour, or the one in a day... I mean the one in several months.  It simply does not happen, except possibly in an extremely contaminated runway scenario.  So it seems awfully unlikely.  Again, I have no proof for that... but it's much easier to believe that you're mistaken on this one.

 

Jim, you really do seem "hyperfocused" as Kyle put it, on the issue of intersection departures.  It makes me wonder why, when there are so many more significant issues out there.  You lecture me as though I've never performed a high speed abort.  I have, and as a matter of fact I've done one near V1 off of 22R/W in EWR for a fire warning.  The jet stopped where I expected it to, with plenty of margin remaining, just like my data told me it would.  Far from making me less willing to accept intersection departures in the future, this event simply strengthened my faith in our takeoff data.

 

 

 

I'm sorry that you misunderstood me. My response meant that intersection departures are not as safe as using the full length of the runway for departure, to include one or more crossings of any kind, and to include contending with "Hot Spots".
 
If you get the chance, go to the NTSBs website and read the available intersection departure incident / accident reports. There are a bookoo of them. For more reading, you can go to the affiliated International websites and read their intersection departure incident / accident reports. Globally, there have been so many intersection departure incidents and accidents that some time will need to be allocated in order to read them all.

 

But I DIDN'T misunderstand you.  I'm simply telling you that you're wrong.  Intersection departures are not only "as safe", but SAFER, than using full length to include intersecting-runway ops.  Jim, this isn't my opinion.  I'm not qualified to make this determination on my own, just as you aren't.  A couple DECADES of safety data are what make this determination.  Honestly, why do you think the airports like EWR that regularly use these operations, use them at all, if not to mitigate risk?  It's not to save time or increase airport arrival/departure rate.  That may be a secondary benefit but I know of no airport manager that would use that as his primary factor.

 

As far as your suggestion about accident reports, I'm sure there are a lot of them that involve intersection departures.  I'm sure there are a lot more of them that don't.  ;-)  The question is, in how many of them was the intersection departure a factor in the accident?  And more importantly to me, how many of those flights were 121?  Plenty of international operators, as well as 91/135 operators here, aren't using takeoff data calculations of the same precision.  I'm not disparaging them; they often simply don't have the data available.  But I can say with certainty, as someone who DOES monitor 121 safety data in an official capacity, that intersection departures are not "on the radar" as a significant threat to our operations.  Intersecting-runway ops top that list.  Intersection departures don't even show up as a blip in the data that bears monitoring.

 

  I've stated before that our data and profiles recognize the startle/response time necessary for a crew to recognize an emergency at a critical time, and take appropriate action.  This timing is built into the data.  I've told you this.  The data does not assume a "test pilot" response to an emergency.

 

I very much like Kyle's term of "notional safety".  He's exactly right that this is what we do every day, every one of us.  If we insisted on ABSOLUTE safety, as in, 0.0% chance of an aviation accident, we simply could not fly.  This in no way allows for intentional careless or reckless operation; it just realistically allows that every decision we make in an airplane, starting with the decision to strap it on in the first place, comes with a bit of risk.  We use our SOPs and our good judgement to mitigate those risks to an acceptable level.  For instance, we don't take 8 hours of fuel for a 1 hour flight, and then hold safely over the top of our destination airport until burning down to landing weight if necessary, even though more fuel always equals more options.  There's an understanding of "enough".

 

You seem unwilling to debate based on the actual facts, but rather on your opinions.  You seem unwilling to answer questions as asked, but rather meander around them in a way that preserves your stance (ie, your excuse about takeoff performance as a reason to not take full fuel, despite the question specifically excepting that).  I've enjoyed the conversation, but I believe we're reaching the end of our rope here.  It seems we've zeroed in on the concepts of leaving fuel behind vs leaving runway behind as representational of our philosophical debate here; that being the case, unless you can offer some solid explanation of why one is safe when the other isn't (on a normal day, with no environmental or performance issues), I think I'll probably withdraw after this response.

 

I do wonder if one root of the disagreement here is that our different industries face different threats in our somewhat different operations.  I'm not nearly as knowledgeable about the safety data and FAA-identified high threat areas of GA as I am 121... but I'll leave you with this:  I find your sarcasm and sometimes-condescension toward my industry somewhat unprofessional and certainly unwarranted.  You talk about airline guys "cutting corners" etc... but when I compare 121 safety stats with 91/135 safety stats, well...   :wink: .

Jim,

 

I'm not longwinded. It is not safer to use more runway than you need to either takeoff or stop at a failure before V1. For a given weight and the prevailing conditions that runway length is known.

 

Hi, Kevin,

 

I can also not be long winded. You are wrong.

 

What do you support your statement with?

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

 

 

What do you support your statement with?

 

The empirical evidence of every takeoff since we started calculating takeoff performance, specifically the millions out of airports (yes, millions - EWR, which routinely uses 22R at W, had 413,000 alone in 2013 - the predominant flow there is 22R/W, and even if it was only half of that stat, there are several other airports) using intersection departures. Additionally, it's a matter of fact: if V1 is the effective takeoff decision distance, meaning the highest speed at which one can safely reject a takeoff (again, a value based on physics and not some random decision of safe/unsafe), then there's really no point in having an extra 20,000 feet of runway. Of course, the margin here is of concern, but that would be a discretionary item (how much of a margin between the calculated numbers - which are already padded - and the runway length).

 

What do you support yours with?

Hi, Andrew,

 

 

I obviously was not there so can't prove this - but I find it hard to believe you've never ridden through an intersection departure on an airliner. Taking just one airport as an example, if you've ever taken off to the SW at EWR in anything smaller than a 767 loaded for transatlantic ops, you've taken off on 22R at W. I can say that with about 99% certainty. If you were in a narrowbody aircraft that used full length, your flight was the EXTREME outlier - and I don't mean the one in an hour, or the one in a day... I mean the one in several months. It simply does not happen, except possibly in an extremely contaminated runway scenario. So it seems awfully unlikely. Again, I have no proof for that... but it's much easier to believe that you're mistaken on this one.

 

In respect to this statement, I am either a liar or wasn't aware of where we were on departure.

 

Since I'm not a liar, and since I was aware of where we were departing from, in spite of your comment, I would suggest to you that what I said was true. No reason on my part to say otherwise, much less lie about it. That wouldn't do me or anyone else any good. As to whether or not you believe it, well, that your choice. No control over that.

 

Your 99% accuracy left out the 1% element of certainty.

 

A long time friend of mine, a Captain for Continental out of EWR for more years than he would prefer to remember (with the exception allowed for Steve's Steakhouse on 17) never performed an intersection departure departing EWR. 73whatevers up to and including larger aircraft. Not to worry, I won't suggest you and Mark get in touch for confirmation. I'm 99% sure that you wouldn't believe him anyway. Mark was one of the first Diesel X Captains to perform CAT III approaches into London.

 

In context to everything else you have said, I find your willingness, or anyone else's, to feel that degrading your margin of safety by performing intersection departures is a "good decision making" process and safe rather odd. Meaning that, to include Captains who are employed with your Company who won't perform intersection departures, nobody could convince you to the contrary. Those who are honest about performing an intersection departure recognize that they won't have all available remaining runway available should an emergency arise.

 

Not once have you responded to which is safer during departure. Available remaining runway off the nose of the aircraft following a full length departure or what remaining runway is available following an intersection departure?

 

In the many years discussing this topic noone has argued that the margin of safety is degraded by having more available runway in an emergency during a departure.

 

You are leaving out and/or are ignoring several aspects which by themselves or combined with additional factors will produce a reduction in the margin of safety when performing intersection departures. I can't help you with this.

 

This is just the nature of things:

 

Performing Intersection Departures reduce the amount of runway available remaining in comparison to a full length departue, reducing the margin of safety, producing a higher risk factor,

Performing an Intersection Departure at night increases the risk on not being seen on a runway, reducing the margin of safety, producing a higher risk factor,

Performing an Intersection Departure with the departure runway being used for both arrivals and departures results in a reduction in the margin of safety, producing a higher risk factor,

Performing an Intersection Departure with runway contamination reduces the amount of runway available due to the contamination factor, reducing the margin of safety, producing a higher risk factor,

Performing an Intersection using a reduced Takeoff Power Setting, in comparison to using the Takeoff Power that would normally be available, results in an increase in runway required for takeoff in comparison to the length of runway required when using calculated Maximum Takeoff Thrust Setting, resulting in a reduction in the margin of safety, producing a higher risk factor.

 

Using just one of the above produces a reduction of available remaining runway in affiliation of the intersection departure. Using any combination of the above simutaneously results in an additional increase in the takeoff runway required, resulting in a reduction in the margin of safety, and increasing the risk factor porportionally.

 

Per your previous posts, you stated that you frequently perform intersection departures from EWR with any or all of the above pertaining to your operation. And that those operations are the "norm".

 

You revert back to your safety data supporting the use of intersection departures. But, I would again suggest that you take the time to read the incident / accident reports, not only from the U.S., but globally. With the multitude of incidents and accidents resulting from intersection departures, you will spend an awful amount of time reading what is available.

 

"Notational (Imaginative) safety"? How about "real world safety"?

 

There is nothing "notational (imaginative)" with regards to "safety" when you run off the end of the runway for any reason.

 

There is nothing "notational (imaginative)" with regards to "safety" sitting on an active runway, serving both arrivals and departures, at night, and having an aircraft land on top of you because they didn't see you parked some however many meters from the departure end of the runway. In fact, you were sitting approximately where they were to touch down. That's what? Nearly 610 meters from the departure end of the runway where they were sitting?

 

That night, and just guessing, that loss of 610 meters of runway might have had a contributing factor in the collision.

 

Who would expect an aircraft, at LAX of all places, to be sitting on a runway, waiting for an intersection departure, and have another aircraft land on top of them? I ask you again. Who was monitoring the radio?

 

Folks can justify what they do all day long. You can say that it is safer to perform an intersection departure instead of using the full length of the runway all day long. But, it doesn't absolve the question of which is safer during an emergency on departure? Runway behind you or runway in front of you? You've obtained your numbers, you have the operational approval to perform the intersection departure, and to date, your company has been "safe" so far. Your data proves it.

 

The data proved it for the aircraft on the runway at LAX until, following that tragic accident, the data no longer proved it.

 

There are differences between 91 and 121. We make all of the decisions with respect to how we perform our operations as Captains and perform our own flight planning.

 

Month by month, there is less and less difference between 121 and 135. Except, as Captains performing 135 operations, we have made it clear to our regulating agencies that the Captains will be the decision making authority in our flight operations. They want our Base Operations performing crew responsibilities, much as with 121. We assimulate our own flight planning and execute our operations without sacrificing our margin of safety. Long time 121 pilots who perform pilot services for us remark often about the high standards employed by our operations.

 

And .... we are able to enhance our safety of margin and still get to where we are going.

 

Finally!

 

You are only as safe as you operate. When you operate day after day using procedures that degrade your margin of safety, there will come a day where you will "pay the piper". That payment will be payable upon demand in spite of your supportive data.

 

All of what I have said is my opinion for the most part. The balance of "for the most part" comes from "real world" examples of folks who decided to operate and reduce their available margin of safety.

 

I've enjoyed the back and forth, Andrew. Stay "safe" out there. Not to be rude, but if you find me on one of your flights, don't take offense if I get off of your plane. Believe it or not, I try to say "HI" to the flight crew before going to my seat in the back. Even though I have been extended jumpseat access.

 

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

The empirical evidence of every takeoff since we started calculating takeoff performance, specifically the millions out of airports (yes, millions - EWR, which routinely uses 22R at W, had 413,000 alone in 2013 - the predominant flow there is 22R/W, and even if it was only half of that stat, there are several other airports) using intersection departures. Additionally, it's a matter of fact: if V1 is the effective takeoff decision distance, meaning the highest speed at which one can safely reject a takeoff (again, a value based on physics and not some random decision of safe/unsafe), then there's really no point in having an extra 20,000 feet of runway. Of course, the margin here is of concern, but that would be a discretionary item (how much of a margin between the calculated numbers - which are already padded - and the runway length).

 

What do you support yours with?

 

 

Hi, Kyle,

 

Nice uniform.

 

Military officer/pilot? Commercial operations pilot?, Corporate pilot? Undoubtedly a Captain or better of some sort or the other.

 

Millions is a lot. That's a lot more than 10. I'm 99% sure of it.

 

 

.........................What do you support yours with?

 

 

 

Just read all of my posts to assimulate what I support mine with, to start with.  

 

 

The LAX accident seems to come to mind as one element of support. Unfortunately and tragically, there are way too many other additional incidents and accidents with which support is derived.

 

And, operational considerations. We don't reduce our specific takeoff thrust setting during takeoff to save money on maintenance.

 

When you use a lower than specified takeoff thrust for departure, you have to use more runway for departure because of the deration during takeoff. And, you are performing an intersection departure, throwing away additional runway. You can do it by the numbers. The box spit out your numbers and you have confirmed those numbers.

 

Let us assume an example and attempt to keep with your aforementioned "discretion - (the ability to make intelligent decisions especially in everyday matters)":

 

Intersection Departure:

2,150 meters runway available - 100 meters for deration - 200 meters for the intersection departure point of takeoff - 1,200 meters required takeoff runway length.

Required runway for departure = 1,500 meters.

Balance remaining = 650 meters.

 

Full Length Departure:

2,150 meters runway available - 1,200 meters required takeoff runway length.

Required runway for departure - 1,200 meters.

Balance remaining = 950 meters.

 

Furthermore, and only for REAL WORLD emergencies, not "Notational (Imaginative)" emergencies, which of the two examples allows for more recognition and response reaction time should an emergency occur?

 

Especially since my industry (91, 121, and 135 all inclusive) has proven that "normal" pilots confronted with an actual "Real World" emergency, will "naturally" incur a delay in the recognition and response reaction time. This statement excludes the "Super Duper Jetjocks".  

 

It is to be recognized that you and so many others don't fit into the "normal" category of pilots. There is absolutely no doubt that you and so many others will respond to any emergency exactly like you have trained to do! Immediate recognition of and response too, with every letter of the emergency procedures followed flawlessly. Nothing missed, nothing out of proper sequence. You won't even have to call for a backup following your incredible performance in handling your emergency, as you will not have missed a single thing. It will save you time also .... not having to backup your procedures.

 

You guys are my heros!   :im Not Worthy: 

 

I do fit into the "normal" category of pilots. I am in that age group and experience group where it has been found that complacency generally will become a factor for us. As a result, I have to allow for my not being as good, or nearly as sharp, as you folks and factor in an increase of my margin of safety. At a minimum, I have to maintain at least the margin of safety available for my specific flight.

 

You know, don't degrade my margin of safety doing things that will degrade my margin of safety.

 

So, I'll pose to you the same question I've asked Andrew multible times without receiving an answer. What is safer? More runway to work with off the nose during departure, or less available remaining runway due to performing an intersection departure, should you encounter an emergency? You don't have to answer this, though. 

 

To your point. How often do you depart an airport with better than a 3,100 meter runway? We do at least 6 times a month. Wonder if DFW counts? The availability of over 3,100 meters of runway doesn't change our quest for a higher margin of safety. Some call that stupid. So ..... just call me stupid. Words don't hurt.

 

Increasing the risk with an outcome that produces broken bones, torn skin, or being killed does. At the least, damaging or destroying someone else's property will hurt. Especially when it could have been avoided.

 

When you don't have better than 3,100 meters of runway to work with, which will provide a higher margin of safety? My full distance runway departure balance of 600 meters or the balance of 300 meters remaining runway following an intersection departure, in the event of an emergency? Regardless of the situation being a "Notational (Imaginative) Safety" emergency or a "Real World (No-Imagination) Safety" emergency.

 

In my feeble mind, and being "insane" (in spite of the findings of my AME to the contrary), I think it better and safer to have more runway available should a "Notational" or "Real World" emergency occur.

 

We don't throw away good runway just to make someone's job more of a convenience, much less for our own convenience. (Akin to asking ATC for deviations around a thunderstorm and being told deviations are not approved. Sorry, not going into the cell. You only have 1 meter to fall off of your chair (the controller). I have 13,716 meters to fall! Sometimes 15,545 meters to fall!)

 

We definitely won't throw away good runway just to save time...or money!  DUH! 

 

We won't perform an intersection departure and exacerbate the use of that departure using factors that will degrade our margin of safety even more. Such as runway contamination, night impediments, density altitude, reduction of takeoff power to save on the cost of maintenance, etc.

 

You have a given amount of runway to work with. You lessen the amount of runway available during the normal course of departure. Than, you reduce the remaining amount of runway further by performing an intersection departure. Then, you reduce THAT amount of runway available further because of runway contamination, and then, you reduce THAT remaining amount of runway remaining further because of deration..... And, you only have so much runway left to work with. Each thing you have to account for that reduces the amount of remaining runway available reduces your margin of safety. And....I'm the "insane" one!!? 

 

 

Our Takeoff Performance Data is derived from Industry Standards.

 

For example, without getting technical because I don't know your level of knowledge, at a minimum, our box will provide us with V1, VR, and V2. It will provide us with the minimum runway distance required for takeoff. It also will provide us with the N1 setting to be used for takeoff. Not only a visual reference of N1 on our EICAS, but for a FADEC N1 input so that when we apply Takeoff Power (when we take the power levers from Idle position to the Takeoff Detent), the FADECs will limit the Takeoff N1 as calculated by the box to the setting calculated by the box. Leaving us with just having to advance our power levers to the "Takoff" detent of the throttle quadrant following approval to takeoff by the tower controller. We then take an additional step following power application to confirm that the power settings and engine instruments are "NORMAL". This is usually performed somewhere around 60 knots, but definitely before our mandatory "80 Knot" cross-check of the pilot's ASI, co-pilot's ASI, and standby ASI, sorry for my assumption, thats standby (A)ir(S)peed (I)ndicator call out.

 

And, our box was designed to take into account for density altitude, outside air temperature, our departure location and runway specified for departure, and flap setting for departure.

 

Not related, but cool nonetheless, our box also will provide us with not only LNAV (Lateral Navigation), but VNAV (Vertical Navigation) as well. COOL! And, our box can communicate with our autopilot. Our box can tell our autopilot things like crossing restriction altitudes, climb speeds, descent speeds, holding patterns can be set up, or if we are performing RNP1 RNAV operations. I shouldn't say box. We have 3 installed in each aircraft, so I should say boxes. With 2 independent GPS input sources and 2 independent IRS input sources (alas, no AHARs) so with the failure of a positional input, we can continue on when over those large bodies of H2O (water).

 

I know what you mean, Kyle. Way too much redundency. Those boxes add to the weight of the aircraft. That additional weight makes us more unsafe. And, nothing ever happens. They just keep on keepin' on, doing their thing the way they do it. They just plug along, doing what they do, and they keep us GNE free. But, one box can do the job of three. One GPS can do the job of two. And, one IRS can do the job of two. Cotton-pickin' International Regulations!!  Look at how safe we would be with the weight of just one box and one positional input device! Weighing less would make our airplane perform better, especially in an emergency. In fact, screw any of the boxes! I can fly using just dead-reckoning! I just can't spell it! We'll weigh even less and be more safer!!

 

I preceive that some day, a box will perform a taxi to a departure point from the gate, leaving the flight crew to just sit there and monitor the taxi progression. Never ever again having to worry about what we refer to as "Hot Spots" in our industry. "Hot Spots" are places on the surface on an airport where people who had their heads in their ars...... Whoops! Almost did it. And, as a forum moderator, I would very well expect you to chew me out for using profanity in my post! Well, they weren't paying attention is what it boils down to. We refer to that as a "distraction from required airport operations duties" and "knowing where you are in space and time". They had what we call an "incursion". So, the people who make or charts had to show where all of these idiots were frequently doing those "incursions" and highlight those "Hot Spots" on our airport diagrams. All because some "Super Duper Jetjocks" couldn't pay attention to their jobs. Can you believe that!

 

What with the way things are going, someday airplanes will fly themselves. Eliminating the need to have a Captain or Co-Pilot on board, with a thousand passengers in the cabin. And, nothing will ever happen because those machines will be flawless.

 

Like the Airbus that kind of scratched the paint a little when the boxes quit communicating together. No backup available. But, the way the systems were designed, nothing would ever have happen. Not in a million years, which is a long time. I'm 99% sure of it.

 

Like the "practically" unsinkable Titanic. I believe it was a conspiracy.  I think the Titanic is at a ritsy resort being used by the "UBER" rich for personal transportation around the island.

 

Anyways.

 

A quick double check of the box data with the IPad data helps to verify the box data. I doubt, in your many years of professional piloting experience, that you have ever had your box give you wrong data like it has us. But, being "insane" to adhere to "black and white" procedures, we nevertheless take the time to cross-check our Takeoff Performance Data. Kind of nice not to have been surprised during departure. Much the same as performing a position integrity check of our boxes both before taxi out and after parking the aircraft following crossing the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans. One additional procedure to make our "inherently dangerous" occupation a little less dangerous. Not to mention the mandatory position checks at specific Lat/Long points of the NATs, followed 10 minutes after passing those mandatory position checks with another "just in case" position check. Especially if there is a change of heading at the mandatory position check. What a waste of time. We have the data to prove that nothing ever happens and that we always fly our tracks flawlessly.

 

Our V1 is simular too, and different from, V1 used by other operators. If we are departing on a 1,850m runway, and the runway is contaminated, our Decision Speed might come slightly before V1. For whatever reason we deem necessary, we might want just a little more, albeit very little more, time to work with should things turn sour. And, this change becomes a part of our pre-departure briefing. Other operators have Captains who won't clog up the First Officer's mind with this minor detail. They say its "Captain's Prerogative", which it is. But we brief the change. Something like CRM.

 

The difference with which we use the extrapolated data to be used for our departure in comparison to other operations is that we won't perform operations that degrade our margin of safety.

 

 

 

OKAY!     YEAH!    IT'S ABOUT TIME!

 

 

 

With everything said, you have a right to operate however you feel comfortable operating. Not giving permission, just making a point.

 

If you find yourself facing an accident review board, remember; their findings could conclude that the use of "better judgment" and "enhancing approved operational procedures", other than using the "norm", might of helped in avoiding an accident. In spite of Company Approved Standard Operating Procedures. And find that you are responsible for that accident.

 

The 737 in the Potomac kind of comes into mind here. You know .... adherence to Company Approved Standard Operating Procedures.....  Even as a Captain, I might get into trouble if I "think outside the box"! And, say.....ADD MORE POWER IF IT'S AVAILABLE!   Like the co-pilot was hinting at!

 

Let's see....add more power and prevent a stall resulting in going for a deadly swim and get in trouble by the Company because of the additional cost of maintenance.

Or, don't add more power, just sit there and watch and see what happens. That would be an extremely difficult decision to make.

 

Thank God I don't have a Company telling me how I have to operate!

 

What gets me is that even today, there are people who will perform operations that limit them from taking corrective action as the situation requires.....even after the crash into the Potomac. Even after the accident at LAX.

 

That "blind" "insane" adherence to "black and white" you elude too? That "black and white" told them to add more power if they had it! The other "black and white" (Company Policy) told them to not exceed the use of power. After all, power costs money!

 

CRM, runway lineup heading verification......intersection departures......

 

All written in red, because someone elected to throw out a higher margin of safety and decides to operate per the status quo. The "norm".

 

That's sad.  

 

Enjoyed it Kyle. 

 

Fly "safe" out there.  

 

 

Quote:  "Just because everyone else is doing it doesn't always make it right."  -  Unknown  (Would you jump off a bridge just because a friend did?)  

 

Quote:  "Flying is inherently dangerous. Made even more dangerous by how we decide to operate."  -  Unknown

 

Quote:  "If you don't have time to do it right the first time, where are you going to find the time to do it right the second time?"  -  John Wooden

 

Quote:  “A lie told often enough becomes the truth”. - V.I. Lenin

 

Quotes: "Quotes:  Gotta Love "em!"  -  Me    .....   Whoops, sorry ..... Jim Wilkerson

 

 

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson  :p0503:

Hi, Kevin,

 

I can also not be long winded. You are wrong.

 

What do you support your statement with?

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

As you are the expert in all things why don't you explain why I am wrong.

 

Preferably not in essay form. I'm not stupid and I'm not impressed by verbosity.