More babbling, and still no answers to the questions asked.

 

No one has refused to answer any question you've posed. We've all said that every single thing we do in an airplane degrades the level of safety over sitting on the ground. The issue is, is it enough to be problematic?

 

I've personally answered your question time and again - no, an intersection departure performed to prevent intersecting runway ops is NOT less safe. It does NOT degrade the safety margin. It enhances it. That is not my opinion. That is backed by the data. You are free to disagree, but not to assert that you are right when all available data contradicts you.

 

All you've done is continue the sarcasm and personal attacks, without ever attempting to answer the only question you've actually been posed - how is leaving fuel behind any safer than leaving runway behind (excepting takeoff performance issues which rarely apply)? At this point, you've been asked that question enough times by enough different people that the only logical assumption is that you're intentionally avoiding it.

 

Using the actions of one individual in a company of 10,000+ pilots (post-merger)... is not evidence for anything. Every company has a few irrational individuals. And no, I'm not saying he's irrational because he disagrees with me. I'm saying he's irrational because apparently he holds a view that is contradicted by the available data, and yet he is unwilling to reconsider.

 

The 737 accident in the Potomac had nothing to do with an intersection departure. It was a crew failure to properly apply engine anti-ice in winter weather. So I have absolutely no idea where you thought you were going with that one.

 

You keep telling me to read safety data, after I keep telling you I DO read the 121 safety data, and not as a hobby. The 121 safety data does not indicate there's any significant threats associated with a properly calculated intersection departure. I'd be interested to hear the 121 data that you think indicates otherwise.

 

I'm glad to hear your 135/91 level of safety is getting closer to ours. But considering there's still quite a gap, I'm not sure that automatically disparaging the way we do things makes a lot of sense.

 

 

Just read all of my posts to assimulate what I support mine with, to start with.  

 

That's just the thing, though...reading your posts provides nearly zero actual supporting evidence other than "we don't do it, because" and then continuing into a bunch of opinion based on the - sorry to say it - company Kool Aid.

 

 

 

The LAX accident seems to come to mind as one element of support.

 

Which LAX accident? USA1493/SKW5569? If so, that is a better case for changes to phraseology, taxiway nomenclature (which was changed as a result of this), line up and wait (position and hold) procedures, and facility upkeep. While not being in the position it was in would've helped it avoid any issues, keep in mind that the threshold crossing height is only 59, a Metroliner's tail height is 17, and the 737's wheels trail and hang below the TCH dependent on the GP flown, and the deck angle. Additionally, with the Metro not being right at the threshold (you taxi forward of the threshold in the process of lining up), the Metro could have very easily still been hit.

 

 

 

Unfortunately and tragically, there are way too many other additional incidents and accidents with which support is derived.

 

So far, you have referenced 0 with any actual, concrete success. Not even the NTSB gives any mention of the intersection departure being the cause.

 

 

 

You know, don't degrade my margin of safety doing things that will degrade my margin of safety.

 

So what you're saying is that you always fly with your gear down, and with full tanks then, yes?

 

 

The 737 in the Potomac kind of comes into mind here. You know .... adherence to Company Approved Standard Operating Procedures.....  Even as a Captain, I might get into trouble if I "think outside the box"! And, say.....ADD MORE POWER IF IT'S AVAILABLE!   Like the co-pilot was hinting at!

 

Except the gauges were showing that the engines were producing the rated thrust. If you really do fly, then you should know that you do occasionally get the *something isn't right* feeling, but then you check the gauges and it usually subsides if the instruments show that things are normal. From there, it's simply a gut feeling versus the idea that the gauges may be lying to you. Unfortunately, in their case, they didn't have a lot of time to evaluate that - even from the end of the runway. The discussion there is more human factors than intersection departure.

 

Quote:  “A lie told often enough becomes the truth”. - V.I. Lenin

 

Kinda like your idea that intersection departures are unsafe. Your continued use of "we" instead of "I" when you discuss this points more to groupthink and a repeated - and false - safety message becoming a mental "truth."

 

Again - using data here and not just writing pages upon pages of opinion-based "proof:"

 

EWR had 413,000 movements in 2013. Going back, they saw 414,000; 410,000, and 409,000. That comes out to a grand total of about 1.6M movements, which means that over the course of 4 years, 0.8M departures at EWR alone made it out without being hindered by their standard use of 22R at W. Even if you pull that number back to accommodate 04 and 11/29 departures, you're still likely to get over 0.5M (conservatively - my bet is that it would be 0.7M; the numbers for non-22 departures aren't available publicly, but 22 is the heavily dominant configuration). So, from one airport alone, we're seeing 0.5M departures using 22R at W without incident. In this same time period, we see 0 incidents caused by the use of intersection departures. That's statistically significant. Now, when you add in the other airports worldwide that also use intersection departures, that number is significantly higher, and again, I can't recall a single one being caused by that factor.

 

 

 

The more you post here, the less I think you're actually the pilot you're claiming to be, to be honest. Right now, it's coming across more like the standard PPL-masked-as-CPC/ATP posts we inevitably get here.

 

I'm not saying that to be mean, but you're not providing any evidence, you're vaguely alluding to a random group of "we," and intersection departure - if anywhere - are usually an issue in GA because the pilots there don't really have SOPs to follow (the only intersection takeoff incidents I can even think of are from GA accidents, and not 121/135). This, combined with the vague references, and lack of understanding of the incidents/accidents you've cited, lead me to believe this. While I'm not asking you to provide your credentials here in the forum (which could get you in trouble with your operator), but we do have multiple verified pilots disagreeing with you here.

 

The world is bigger than the op you work for. If you haven't flown for any others, then you're more prone to simply drinking what they're serving, instead of using a heaping dose of judgment to determine that they are, in fact, wrong. They can still require full length departures, but the issue there isn't safety. The issue there is that they regard notional safety over actual safety.

As you are the expert in all things why don't you explain why I am wrong.

 

Preferably not in essay form. I'm not stupid and I'm not impressed by verbosity.

 

Why do you feel you need to start a post with a comment like this. You posted a statement and I responded using less words. Except, I asked you a question.

 

I'm answering your question, but I don't see an answer to my question from you. You could have responded answering my question and asked me to explain why I thought you were wrong in one post.

 

I never thought you were stupid, in spite of the fact that I don't know you.

 

Two things you can take to the bank. I certainly am not trying too, nor do I care, if I impress you or anyone else.

 

My answer will be the way I wish to present it. If you think it is full of "verbosity", don't read it. If you wish to read what I have to say, then, by all means, read it.

 

 

                                      ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

I am FAR from being an expert. As far as the East is from the West.

 

My experience and a quarter to call someone who gives a darn doesn't mean squat.

 

Safety, though, does. My passengers would never expect me to "cut corners" and subject them to a less safe method of transportation by reducing our margin of safety.

 

We have an obligation to make sure we maintain the highest margin of safety available. We don't have too, nor do we consider it good operating practice, to expose our passengers to a degraded margin of safety.

 

It only takes one horrific accident to reinforce the way I operate. Like the intersection departure accident at LAX. Totally unavoidable....in hindsight of course. But, those folks are dead nevertheless. I'm sorry, but, if they were is such a hurry to accomodate ATC or their schedules, what the HECK were they doing sitting on the runway long enough to have an aircraft land on top of them? What goes through people's minds? What was their margin of safety?

 

Nobody was paying attention to anything prior to that accident.

 

As you know, that is how it all starts.

 

Using the intersection departure conversation as an example, and just an intersection departure:

 

What would be safer should you encounter an emergency during takeoff? 300 meters of runway remaining during takeoff or 650 meters of runway remaining during takeoff? Especially should something occur to compound the stopping of the aircraft in the 300 or 650 meters of remaining runway. You left yourself with an approved 300 meters of remaining runway, but following an emergency you need more runway to stop. Could this situation ever occur?

 

A very large number of 91, 121, and 135 pilots agree (even some who perform intersection departures) that you reduce your margin of safety in the performance of the intersection departure. If you perform an intersection departure, no other factors included, you have degraded your margin of safety because you no longer have the runway "left behind" to augment and enhance the margin of safety in an emergency.

 

That is why a good number of 91, 121, and 135 pilots with way more experience than me won't perform intersection departures. The numbers and exposure (especially at night) don't justify the risk.

 

How much runway is enough?

 

The overweight takeoff of a Bonanza on a hot summer afternoon from KCOS used more than 3,000 meters of runway for the takeoff roll and went off the end of the runway. Killing everyone on board. They didn't have enough runway using the full length of the runway for takeoff that afternoon for their circumstances. How would an intersection departure improve their takeoff margin of safety?

 

If you perform a full runway length departure, all things being equal, when an emergency occurs, you have left yourself with a higher margin of safety. More runway off of the nose of the aircraft following an emergency gives you more runway to work with. Not "just" what runway is available to you to work with performing an intersection departure.

 

When you perform an intersection departure, regardless of where your position on the runway puts you, you have elected operationally to no longer have available the runway "behind the aircraft". In doing so, that amount of runway, which may or may not be beneficial, is certainly one thing. Not available.

 

Preforming operations conducted at an airport with approximately 2,500 meters of runway available:

 

Using the full length of the runway for departure, with 1,150 meters required for a dry runway takeoff roll, leaves 1,350 meters of runway to handle an emergency at Decision Speed. That is a lot of runway remaining as long as everything concerning an emergency is performed timely and correctly. And, if the systems required to assist in the handling of that emergency are working. Which we hope will occur. Can that be guaranteed?

 

Factor in variables, and you are left with less than 1,350 meters of remaining available runway.

 

You taxi with numerous brake applications from a departure point at the airport. You didn't realize that the brakes weren't fully releasing following each brake application and they got hot. You are cleared for an immediate departure and at Decision Speed, you abort takeoff because of an emergency. Your stopping distance takes the condition of your brakes into consideration. And, your emergency procedures require "Maximum Braking".

 

The Takeoff Performance Data, used by the majority of 91 and 135 operations, is derived from data established by test pilots during production test flights using new equipment.

 

Should a 91, 121, or 135 operation not use the original Factory Established Takeoff Performance Data and modify the original Takeoff Performance Data for their operations, before use, the modified data has to be approved. It is the responsibility of that operation to produce verification of that modified data before it can be used.

 

Are you going to respond to an emergency like the test pilots, who KNOW not only when, but what type of emergency is going to be performed to obtain their numbers?

 

Every flight you perform, is the aircraft maintained to "LIKE NEW" condition? Even new aircraft have system failures. There was this Airbus at an airshow.

 

 

Jim,

 

I'm not longwinded. It is not safer to use more runway than you need to either takeoff or stop at a failure before V1. For a given weight and the prevailing conditions that runway length is known.

 

 

History has proven that a large number of pilots will not immediately recognize that an emergency is taking place. They should, though, quickly preceive something isn't right, but precious time is lost before the realization and initiation of response kicks in. How much runway is used before emergency response takes place?

 

And, to compound the problem, why isn't the aircraft stopping!!? I'm using Maximum Braking as per the emergency memory items? Could this ever happen?

 

Why are we required to have our aircraft sit, unmoved, for no less than 20 minutes after shutting down before we can perform a quick turn in some of our jets?

 

Our emergency procedures following an aborted takeoff require cool brakes. Does everyone comply with that 20 minute limitation?

 

We are addressing pilots trained every six months in a simulator. The occurence of an emergency in real life can bring about a difference from what we train for in the simulator. It shouldn't make a difference, and it shouldn't catch anyone off guard, but for a large number of us, it could happen. The loss of response time in combination with the loss of any critical system incorporated into the emergency procedures combined with the remaining amount of runway available could severely impact the outcome of that emergency. Even if we have the numbers.

 

If everything went like clockwork, everytime, then this conversation could be a mute. And, your statement could be considered correct. Does everything always go as planned?

 

This is not an opinion I just grabbed from thin air. Our instructors harp on this and incident / accident reports support these findings. An individual should read everything available to draw their own conclusions.

 

The reduction in the margin of safety performing an intersection departure is why there are so many of us who would never consider performing such an operation.

 

So, "It is not safer to use more runway than you need to either takeoff or stop at a failure before V1. For a given weight and the prevailing conditions that runway length is known."

 

Your statement tells me that all animals with four legs, floppy ears, and a tail are dogs.

 

Meaning everything is always the same, nothing ever changes, and nothing will ever affect your numbers.

 

No system failures, patches of ice or water on an otherwise dry runway, no alcohol soaked tires following de-icing operations, nothing ...... will ever happen to affect the numbers.

 

Those numbers guarantee success everytime you operate using the numbers.

 

If you use your numbers, everytime, you will never go off the end of the runway following the "need to either takeoff or stop at a failure before V1."

 

Concluding with the thought that you being more unsafe to have more runway to work with than the numbers say you have to have.

 

Please ...... explain why your statement is correct.

 

Someone, justifiably so, came up with the adage of "runway behind you". Using my imagination, I could speculate that it came about following an accident where someone decided they didn't need to use all of the runway.

 

 

Quote:  "Better to have, and not need, than to need, and not have."  -  Franz Kafka

 

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

Jim, you're STILL referencing the supposed "test pilot" response to an emergency. I've explained to you at least 4 times that our profiles and our data were developed to take into account the startle/response time of an individual in a stressful situation. If your data is different, well... I'd be demanding better data, and in lieu of that I'd probably be more hesitant to conduct intersection departures too. But you can't project your threats on our operation and assume they're the same. That's what I meant about differences in our operations being the root of some of this. But I'll say it again, and please try to process it this time: our data does NOT assume a test pilot response to an emergency, nor does it assume all stopping systems functional. It. Does. Not.

It only takes one horrific accident to reinforce the way I operate. Like the intersection departure accident at LAX. Totally unavoidable....in hindsight of course. But, those folks are dead nevertheless. I'm sorry, but, if they were is such a hurry to accomodate ATC or their schedules, what the HECK were they doing sitting on the runway long enough to have an aircraft land on top of them? What goes through people's minds? What was their margin of safety?

 

As we've told you quite a few times, this had nothing to do with the intersection departure, and as I mentioned in my last post, there's evidence that the Metroliner could have still been hit back at the full length. Granted it wouldn't have been as bad for the Metro (in theory), but it would've still been pretty bad for the 73.

 

There was no hurry to accommodate ATC. ATC simply gave the pilots a quicker departure because they knew the Metro didn't require anywhere near full length. If you'd bother to actually read the accident instead of falsely citing it to your manipulated convenience, you'd see that they were instructed to taxi into position and hold, and the controller got distracted before actually giving them a takeoff clearance.

 

 

 

The overweight takeoff of a Bonanza on a hot summer afternoon from KCOS used more than 3,000 meters of runway for the takeoff roll and went off the end of the runway. Killing everyone on board. They didn't have enough runway using the full length of the runway for takeoff that afternoon for their circumstances. How would an intersection departure improve their takeoff margin of safety?

 

It obviously wouldn't have. In fact, this stat only really serves to detract from your own points, as you chose a flight that couldn't have even been flown using your "safer" margin as an example to illustrate a point. This would, however, strengthen the point that I've used several times in this thread: safety is a conscious decision-making process, and the pilot should be intimately involved in it, instead of simply re-stating some random "safety mantra" that the company drilled into them in black and white terms. If the pilot had used his brain to calculate his takeoff performance on that runway, it would have required also checking weight, and that would have likely prompted them to reconsider the departure. Instead, using your own (and the prevalent GA) safety mantra of "full length is always safer" the truth is "this takeoff is a calculated risk no matter how long the runway is, and thus requires calculation of our risk exposure."

 

 

 

If you perform a full runway length departure, all things being equal, when an emergency occurs, you have left yourself with a higher margin of safety. More runway off of the nose of the aircraft following an emergency gives you more runway to work with. Not "just" what runway is available to you to work with performing an intersection departure.

 

You keep vaguely referring to an emergency, but I don't think you've actually thought any of them through. What kind of emergency are we talking about here? Based on this continued commentary, I'm not too sure you fully understand the handling of emergencies during the takeoff roll.

 

If you have some sort of failure before 80 knots (or whatever SOP value for the aircraft), you're stopping.

If you have some sort of must-stop failure before V1, you're stopping.

If you have some sort of failure after V1, then you're going. No ifs ands or buts about it.

 

If your margin is too low, or your V1 is reduced too much, then you should start thinking about your safety.

 

If you're on a 16,000 foot runway and your aircraft can safely hit V1 in 1,000 feet, then there is literally no extra safety margin in departing on the first 8,000 feet, or in the latter 8,000 feet. Even if you have an engine explode on you, you should take the time to assess the situation and not simply point the aircraft down at the runway in an effort to force it down prior to coming to a decision about what actions should be taken.

 

Again - this is something you seem to be willfully ignoring - safety is a conscious decision making process. You need to be equipped to handle these events by being actively involved at all times in the safety mindset. Following rote directions because someone tells you that it's always safer gets you nowhere, and actually makes you less safe because you're removed from decision making processes and simply reacting without thought.

 

 

 

Unless you can come back with hard evidence, cited in an NTSB report with the specific note that the pilot took off at an intersection, which was a causal factor in the crash, you commentary has no legs to stand on, and I will consider this discussion closed.

 

For the record, more words does not mean more true.

 

 

Jim, you're STILL referencing the supposed "test pilot" response to an emergency. I've explained to you at least 4 times that our profiles and our data were developed to take into account the startle/response time of an individual in a stressful situation.

And after that, it's factored, further increasing margin. As is EO climb data. Any pilot worth their salt should be able to beat the data 121/135 operations are planned with. 

Hi, Kyle,

As we've told you quite a few times, this had nothing to do with the intersection departure, and as I mentioned in my last post, there's evidence that the Metroliner could have still been hit back at the full length. Granted it wouldn't have been as bad for the Metro (in theory), but it would've still been pretty bad for the 73.

 

There was no hurry to accommodate ATC. ATC simply gave the pilots a quicker departure because they knew the Metro didn't require anywhere near full length. If you'd bother to actually read the accident instead of falsely citing it to your manipulated convenience, you'd see that they were instructed to taxi into position and hold, and the controller got distracted before actually giving them a takeoff clearance.

 

It absolutely has everything to do with not only an intersection departure, but with an unnecessary addition of subsequent factors. This accident started before ATC got distracted.

 

But, you conveniently choose to leave off the important aspect of this accident. They were performing an intersection departure.

 

And, nobody was paying attention in the cockpit. Noone heard the controller give the arriving aircraft permission to land on the runway they were sitting on. To avoid the collision, if either crew member listened to the radio, they might have recognized the situation and taken action to avoid the collision. (MY GUESS)

 

Accepting the intersection departure (relevant and the first link in the chain), sitting on the runway a measurable distance from the departure end of the runway (relevant and an additional link in the chain), sitting on the runway waiting in an area where an aircraft would normally touchdown (relevant and an additional lind in the chain), noone proactively monitoring the radio (relevant and an additional link in the chain), exposure to arrival aircraft (relevant and an additional link in the chain), night operations (relevant and an additional link in the chain), All links relevant enough to result in the accident. A multitude of additional other links existed that night. If you would have read the official NTSB accident report, you would know what those additional factors were.

 

So, what part of this aircraft performing an intersection departure, and the impending element of risk don't you understand? What element of the chain of events taking place subsequent to the aircraft stopping on and holding on the runway is difficult for you to comprehend as contributing factors resulting in the collision and loss of life?

 

1. Sitting on the runway a measurable distance from the departure end of the runway instead of sitting at the departure end of the runway increased their risk factor.

2. Sitting on the runway in proximity to where aircraft normally touchdown increased their risk factor.

3. Neither crew member, per the transcripts of the OFFICIAL NTSB report, communicated with each other to maintain additional vigilance while sitting on the runway increased their risk factor.

4. Noone in the cockpit was listening to the tower frequency for landing aircraft. They were waiting to hear their flight number and permission for takeoff. This increased their risk factor.

5. Factors beyond the control of the flight crew sitting on the runway concerning ATC placed their aircraft into a higher risk factor.

6. The runway they were sitting on was performing arrivals which increased their risk factor.

7. They were performing a night intersection departure which increased their risk factor.

8. Having the aircraft sitting on the runway at night and blending in with the surrounding lights increased their risk factor.

9. The flight crew of the landing aircraft failed to see them sitting on the runway prior to the collision which increased their risk factor.

 

How many more factors would have to be present to put this aircraft at a higher risk factor while performing this intersection departure? I listed 9 factors that we know of.

 

Just sitting down the runway in proximity to where an aircraft on landing can land on top of you should raise a red flag. How far from the threshold will this put them distance wise?

 

Now, how many other factors were present to make not only the decision to perform just an intersection departure more dangerous than a full length departure, but actually made this particular intersection departure more dangerous?

 

So, just exactly how am I using this intersection departure senario "falsely citing it to your manipulated convenience..."? Please, I am curious!

 

Was I wrong stating that the decision that night to perform an intersection departure was placing the crew and passengers into a higher risk factor, thereby degrading their margin of safety? In view of the fact that from the very beginning, I suggested that performing an intersection departure was not as safe as performing a full length departure.

 

How high are you when you cross the threshold while flying the vertical approach slope to touchdown? How far from the threshold are you when you touchdown using the vertical approach slope? What is the highest measurement of the departing aircraft? I kind of would suggest that if a collision occurred at the threshold, someone probably wasn't flying the required vertical approach slope during landing.

 

I would suggest that you sit down with a little geometry and a piece of paper and try to derive how high the landing aircraft, while on the visual approach slope, would be crossing the threshold.

 

To help you, the height of the departing aircraft was 5.08 meters, give or take a little for tire inflation, strut inflation, etc.

 

You can also get a good idea by going to your local jet served airport and watch jets during landing. Watch and try to gauge approximately what their threshold crossing altitude might be. My guess is that, unless a particular operator isn't flying the required vertical approach slope, that the threshold crossing will be the same, give or take for diameter of the fuselage.

 

Do you think that the landing aircraft would cross the threshold at an altitude that would allow a collision with the departing aircraft sitting near the threshold? How about if the departing aircraft were sitting 30 meters from the threshold?

 

If the aircraft landing was on it's vertical approach slope to touchdown, as required by CCARs, there existed a greater chance of a near miss instead of a collision if the departing aircraft had of been sitting at the departure end of the runway.

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

 

It obviously wouldn't have. In fact, this stat only really serves to detract from your own points, as you chose a flight that couldn't have even been flown using your "safer" margin as an example to illustrate a point. This would, however, strengthen the point that I've used several times in this thread: safety is a conscious decision-making process, and the pilot should be intimately involved in it, instead of simply re-stating some random "safety mantra" that the company drilled into them in black and white terms. If the pilot had used his brain to calculate his takeoff performance on that runway, it would have required also checking weight, and that would have likely prompted them to reconsider the departure. Instead, using your own (and the prevalent GA) safety mantra of "full length is always safer" the truth is "this takeoff is a calculated risk no matter how long the runway is, and thus requires calculation of our risk exposure."

 

You are totally wrong! Totally out of the ballpark! You didn't even get the picture on this one (must have forgotten to put film in the camera)!

 

"How would an intersection departure improve their takeoff margin of safety?" - my comment

 

This example verifies that it took so much time using the full runway for departure to go off the end of the runway resulting in a higher ground speed. (Lowest survivability risk factor)

 

And, if an intersection departure had of been performed, it would have taken less time to go off the end of the runway resulting in a lower ground speed. (Highest survivability risk factor)

 

This was just an example of using poor common sense in the first place, in regard to everything I was talking about in context.

 

This shows that you are skimming my posts instead of reading them. Or, Heaven forbid, you as as ignorant about issues concerning real world aviation as you seem to be proving.

 

How about that!!

 

Kyle, just these two topics alone, and your flawed arguments, leave me feeling like you are not experienced enough to understand what I have been saying. I have held these conversations with student pilots who show a much greater understanding than you have exhibited. Specifically with how to discern a topic and it's context. These two examples show that you are willing to make untrue accusations and that you misunderstand the context of the topic.

 

Sometimes its hard to know how knowledgable someone is using communication like we are. As such, until such time as you have acquired real world aviation experience enough to discuss and comprehend even just a couple of my feeable meanderings, maybe you might spend your time more productively concentrating on "FAA Flight Technologies and Procedures Division /// PMDG Support"

 

From what I have read, you do have a really nice comprehension with that particular subject.

That's just the thing, though...reading your posts provides nearly zero actual supporting evidence other than "we don't do it, because" and then continuing into a bunch of opinion based on the - sorry to say it - company Kool Aid.

 

"...reading your posts provides nearly zero actual supporting evidence other than "we don't do it, because" - (your comment)

 

You have proven over and over that you are not reading my case points.

 

Take a deep breath, relax, and as I suggested to you, go back and read, with intent, my points. If you don't take away anything the second time around, you just aren't going to.

 

If a student pilot or a 20,000 hour pilot can understand what I am saying, you should be able to as well.

 

Seriously, Kyle, take a moment and go back over your posts to me. If you do so, you might see where you have either missed the point, or not understood the point at all.

 

Such as the Potomac crash.

 

"Except the gauges were showing that the engines were producing the rated thrust." - (your comment)

 

Good Catch! Very Very True!

 

There was, however, a difference on takeoff power application. Do you know what that difference was?

 

The throttle levers were not in a position (throttle lever position angle or throttle lever angle position) where they should of been positionally with regard to the thrust setting found any other flight. Something the co-pilot mentioned that the Captain didn't respond too. And, as the co-pilot very properly pointed out, there weren't accelerating down the runway like they should have.

 

When you fly specific equipment often enough, particularly aircraft without throttle lever detents, you get a feel for where things should be. By repetition, an individual gets to know that something isn't performing correctly or that something isn't where it should be in comparison to past events. Some flight crews mark their throttle quadrants somehow to have a visual backup to what they have found to be a correct throttle lever position. Most pilots with any kind of experience know about this and work with it.

 

Wait a minute....hold on. There's more.

 

"You keep vaguely referring to an emergency, but I don't think you've actually thought any of them through. What kind of emergency are we talking about here? Based on this continued commentary, I'm not too sure you fully understand the handling of emergencies during the takeoff roll." - your comment

 

But, I would suggest with the handling of any emergency.

 

If you were flying that aircraft that day would you have maintained the power setting that the company didn't want you to go over? Stall warning blaring and not able to maintain altitude?

 

More importantly, if you were flying that aircraft that day, would you attempt to advance the power levers in an attempt to add more power to see what might happen? Especially as the stall warning was going off? After all, the co-pilot realized quite soon and tried to influence the Captain that something wasn't working right.

 

If advancing the power levers and the stall warning quit sounding, and you are level, and accelerating, not decending towards the Potomac, would you think that something else was wrong? Like, oh, I don't know....the engine indications were wrong? What would you prefer to explain? Using power higher than company procedures allowed or crashing into the Potomac?

 

You very honestly totally misunderstood the context of this example. Something that an interested or experienced individual would not have missed. Just like the previous examples.

 

"If your margin is too low, or your V1 is reduced too much, then you should start thinking about your safety." - your comment

 

Hummmmm. Did you really intend to make this comment?

 

Being no doubt the professional pilot that you are, you don't start thinking about safety long before you get the the airport?

 

So, being a professional pilot, you mean to tell me that when you attend recurrent simulator training at a professional flight simulator facility that you haven't been taught to anticipate a failure and be prepared for an emergency. On runway lineup, you don't tell yourself that you might have to contend with an ermergency? You have (seriously?) been taught to only worry about handling the situation when it occurs? Sorry Kyle, I hope I never train where you train!

 

"If you're on a 16,000 foot runway and your aircraft can safely hit V1 in 1,000 feet, then there is literally no extra safety margin in departing on the first 8,000 feet, or in the latter 8,000 feet. Even if you have an engine explode on you, you should take the time to assess the situation and not simply point the aircraft down at the runway in an effort to force it down prior to coming to a decision about what actions should be taken." - your comment

 

Well, we train at a professional flight training facility that trains pilots from around the world. One of the highest rated flight training facilities performing these services the world has to offer.

 

We train for the possible loss of all electrical power during takeoff, to include the "never will happen loss of the emergency standby equipment". Typically from an airport such as DEN or EHAM that has long runways.

 

With your professional aviation experience, what would you do?

 

Would you perform a full length runway departure, have the total electrical power failure at Decision Speed, and use the balance of however many meters remaining of a 4,875 meter runway to stop the aircraft? Would you consider that the anti-skid might have failed and think about the affect on the use of braking?

 

Would you perform an intersection departure and take the aircraft airborne with a total loss of electrical power and no standby backup instruments? You may have taken away the option of not having to take the aircraft airborne because of your decision to perform an intersection departure.

 

Never can happen you say? Tell that to the flight crews who have had it happen. To the exclusion of course of the ones who died. Especially the crew, whose accident resulting in the loss of life of everyone on board somewhere near White Plains, NY, brought us standby backup instruments. I'm 99% sure they would disagree with you.

 

Do you know how much runway is required, for each flight, to bring the aircraft to a stop following an abort at Decision Speed following total system failure? Oh, wait a minute here! Our Takeoff Performance Data takes into account a lot of things, but not total system failures, such as....let's see.....BRAKES! We train for and have procedures to follow for the total loss of hydraulic braking, but, is this failure accounted for in your required runway takeoff distance as computed for departure? I'll ask Andrew. I'll bet theirs does!

 

If your aircraft requires 1,000 meters to stop following an abort at Decision Speed, you have 2,450 meters of runway available, you would take a DC10 airborne following a catastrophic engine failure that just caused a total hydraulic failure? No flight controls, no gear, no flaps?

 

You are travelling at 150 knots across the pavement and have this event. You take it airborne and are able to bring the aircraft back successfully to the airport with the 4,875 meter runway. What will be your touchdown speed without any hydraulics? Just an example because "something like this could never happen".

 

And, because nothing ever happens, you continue to operate like everyone else is and with methods that degrade your margin of safety?

 

Kyle, you might have some element of intention, but your replies are mucking up the water by not having the slightest comprehension of this discussion.

 

How could someone of your years of professional pilot background miss nearly everything I say? I could understand misunderstanding a few things.

 

Much less come up with the things you say in rebuttal? I could also understand if you have to use a translation software program to translate if English wasn't your native language.

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

 

 

"Again - this is something you seem to be willfully ignoring - safety is a conscious decision making process. You need to be equipped to handle these events by being actively involved at all times in the safety mindset. Following rote directions because someone tells you that it's always safer gets you nowhere, and actually makes you less safe because you're removed from decision making processes and simply reacting without thought." - your comment

 

As I mentioned earlier, you might want to go back and re-read some things. This one is .... well, I kind of think that you might have drawn some kind of conclusion from the following statement in addition to a couple of previous statements.

 

"If you perform a full runway length departure, all things being equal, when an emergency occurs, you have left yourself with a higher margin of safety. More runway off of the nose of the aircraft following an emergency gives you more runway to work with. Not "just" what runway is available to you to work with performing an intersection departure." - my comment

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________

 

 

From your first post, for whatever reason, you have wanted some kind of confrontation instead of dialog. Unfortunately for me, I have knowlingly reciprocated and participated. Or stopped responding altogether.

 

If you are indeed a real world pilot and believe what you have posted, or worse, can't make heads or tails of my diatribe as you obviously exhibit, please .... ! Well, I'll just leave it at that.

 

What is safer during departure, Kyle? Having runway off the nose or having runway behind you, should an emergency occur?

 

Is this too difficult of a question?

 

Don't you know the answer to this question?

 

Do you even understand the question?

 

Sometimes I am guilty of asking some VERY difficult questions! Neither you or Andrew has answered this yet.

 

Even a student pilot, who has a lot to learn, knows that having more runway off the nose in an emergency is safer.

 

A student pilot will know you don't have all available runway for takeoff as a safety factor if you perform an intersection departure.

 

Any responsible instructor would have taught them that.

 

I LOVE my Kool-aid! Especially Black Cherry!

 

Bbuuuutttt ....... could you .............. PLEASE ..............give me the number of your supplier? Man! It must be GOOD!!!!

 

Oh, by the way, nice uniform. Cool glasses.

 

Military officer/pilot, commercial pilot, corporate pilot uniform? Kind of would like to know.

 

Cheers,

 

Jim Wilkerson

This is truly getting humorous. I'd have bowed out long ago, but at this point I'm looking forward to my nightly chuckle from this thread.

 

First, regarding your continued citing of a completely irrelevant accident, let's look at the actual NTSB-cited primary and contributing factors of USAir 1493:

 

"

• THE FAILURE OF THE LOS ANGELES AIR TRAFFIC FACILITY MANAGEMENT TO IMPLEMENT PROCEDURES THAT PROVIDED REDUNDANCY COMPARABLE TO THE REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NATIONAL OPERATIONAL POSITION STANDARDS AND THE FAILURE OF THE FAA AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE POLICY DIRECTION AND OVERSIGHT TO ITS AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FACILITY MANAGERS. THESE FAILURES CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT IN THE LOS ANGELES AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER THAT ULTIMATELY LED TO THE FAILURE OF THE LOCAL CONTROLLER 2 (LC2) TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF THE TRAFFIC SITUATION, CULMINATING IN THE INAPPROPRIATE CLEARANCES AND THE SUBSEQUENT COLLISION OF THE USAIR AND SKYWEST AIRCRAFT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF THE FAA TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE ATC SYSTEM. (NTSB REPORT AAR-91/08)"

Found here (I believe this link is inaccessible from mobile devices): http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20001212X16433&key=1&queryId=a629144d-5f8e-41b5-9d3a-8f12848faba8&pgno=3&pgsize=50

 

The NTSB cites nothing causal for this accident except a series of errors - caused by procedural deficiencies - at the local facility, which in this case was LAX Tower. Jim, are we to believe that you have some powers of accident investigation exceeding those of the NTSB professionals, to come up your own unrelated factor and present it as causal? That seems to be what you're claiming.

 

I can take literally any collision accident there's ever been, and say "if only X had done Y a bit differently, they'd have missed each other" and it would be true... but it doesn't in any way mean that X's performance of Y that day actually caused or contributed to the accident. It just means that it was X's bad luck to perform Y exactly that way at exactly that moment. I'm quite certain if I search world aviation accident databases I can find an accident where aircraft A lands short, loses control and slides laterally to the threshold of a parallel runway where aircraft B is holding in position, resulting in a collision. Can I thus argue that aircraft B's decision to accept a full length departure rather than an intersection departure was a causal factor? That's obviously just silly, but is the same thing you're doing. Enough with USAir 1493.

 

Everything else you're saying is purely hypothetical. You talk about cascading systems failures that, as far as I know, have never happened in commercial operation on takeoff, at least not in 121. There's a reason these aircraft are designed with these levels of redundancy. In most of these cascading failure scenarios you're inventing, the truth is that a full-length takeoff wouldn't be enough to avoid an accident anyway. Look at American 191, which still wasn't a full systems failure. I mean, I could ask you "well, what happens if a wing falls off in cruise? There's nothing you can do. So, clearly, the only safe thing is to not fly at all." and I would not be wrong, would I? ANYTHING is hypothetically possible, including the loss of a wing in cruise. As a matter of fact, that HAS happened, unlike most of your scenarios. Remember the DeHavilland Comet?

 

So the question is (still): are you better off insisting on full length to guard against a scenario that will almost certainly never happen, even when it exposes you to very quantifiable and very real threats associated with forcing an intersecting-runway operation when there did not need to be one?

What is safer during departure, Kyle? Having runway off the nose or having runway behind you, should an emergency occur?

Is this too difficult of a question?

Don't you know the answer to this question?

Do you even understand the question?

Sometimes I am guilty of asking some VERY difficult questions! Neither you or Andrew has answered this yet.

 

I've answered this question at least 4 times now, Jim. Shall we make it 5? The answer (again), is that in the circumstances we're discussing (airports that run intersection takeoffs as SOP to mitigate threats like intersecting-runway ops), it's safer to have the runway behind you. Because you aren't going to take the departure unless you know that you still have plenty of room to either stop or fly in the event of said emergency, and you ALSO know that by insisting on a full-length departure (that there's no reason you need) you would be intentionally exposing yourself to a much higher threat situation than an emergency on takeoff, when you know you can either stop or fly. It's that simple. You're suggesting exposing yourself to a threat you KNOW you will face, in order to mitigate a threat you might POSSIBLY face, and that you've already mitigated anyway by properly calculating the takeoff. That's a foolish and illogical decision. All evidence indicates that. I'm sorry if it contradicts a beloved nugget of wisdom from your early days in aviation or something, but facts are facts. I understand cognitive dissonance can be difficult to overcome, but seriously - would you really rather face a 100% KNOWN threat, instead of a POSSIBLE (but highly unlikely) one that you've already mitigated anyway?

 

Speaking of questions not being answered, can we talk about the matter of a question that actually HASN'T been answered yet? Several of us have asked you this with no response: Excepting the infrequent issue of takeoff performance, can you tell me why it's safer and more acceptable to leave fuel behind than it is to leave runway behind?

 

I do have to wonder about the reason you've lapsed into such a condescending tone, and the reason you feel obligated to levy unwarranted personal attacks against the folks on this thread. I hate to say it, but I would want someone to tell me - it really paints you in an unprofessional light. There's simply no reason a few pilots (and even aspiring pilots) can't have an operational discussion and keep it civil. To my mind (and apparently to the majority here), your cited evidence and hypotheticals are misapplied and unrealistic, but that's simply my opinion. There's no reason you can't make your points without insulting people. I see people questioning your logic and debating your statements, but I haven't seen anyone attack you.

EDIT:

 

All,

 

If you have not recently familiarized yourself with the forum guidelines, please take a moment to do so. As noted in that pinned thread, disagreements can be healthy (Point 10 in that post), and questioning the norm in an effort to bring awareness to an issue can occasionally be a good thing. Attempts to make a point with reckless disregard for actual facts will get you in trouble (Point 7), as will doing so while being disrespectful (Point 2).

 

In the wise words of Dalton:

"I want you to be nice. Ask him to walk. Be nice. If he won't walk, walk him. But be nice. If you can't walk him, one of the others will help you, and you'll both be nice. I want you to remember that it's a job. It's nothing personal."

 

Disagreements don't need to get personal. If anything, making them personal detracts from your own points more than it makes your argument stronger. This was a worthwhile discussion - both of them (position updates and the safety discussion) - but posts have to be factual.

 

If you're a real world pilot, you owe it to the community to avoid leading the impressionable astray, to the best of your ability. Not only is it a forum rule, it should be a personal rule, too. Those who are less knowledgeable are very impressionable. Those who are impressionable should not have to suffer through those who are thought to be knowledgeable providing them false information simply to win an argument. Additionally, it's not fair to the community members who later have to "correct the course" of those who have been fed false information - knowingly or otherwise. 

 

 

 

Let it be known that every pilot has a responsibility to his or her passengers to operate the aircraft in a safe manner (FAR 91.3 a)). To that end, I think we all agree with Jim's sentiments here. Where there is a disagreement is the obvious attempts to stretch unrelated events into a defense of a black and white opinion on safe operation. While not always overtly false, a stretched truth is not wholly factual, and that is not fair to those who are not equipped with the knowledge to form their own opinions.