For those of you interested in the human factors of disasters I can really recommend the reading of:Fatal Words (communication clashes and aircraft crashes) by Steven CushingandThe naked pilot (The human factor in Aircraft Accidents) by David BeatyThe first one is full of examples of how misunderstood communication leads to the wrong actions.The second one is more into the process that leads pilots, ATC and management to a track on which you can only make the wrong decision.I've read quite a lot of accident reports in the magazines and often I thought: "well, how could they be so stupid?" I guess that working under the stress of a blaring warning signal is different than reading about it in a chair. No professionally trained captain will say to his first officer: "hey, a serious problem, let's screw this up royally". And yet they do unintentionally. In my younger days I took some flying lessons. The instructor told me: "any idiot can fly, but when the lights are down, that's the time where you can show your professionalism".The moral: we can all learn from accidents, even if we don't fly in reality, but let us be very modest in declaring that we actually could handle such a situation.Kind regards,Stephan Haaswww.lemont.nl/b767flightdeckhttp://www.pic767flyingclub.com/images/sas544.jpg

Remind me to actually read the report before commenting on it.... :( (Just found the time to read it)I don't understand how blocking the static ports on one side of a typical Boeing aircraft would affect the instruments to the extent that they saw in the Peru accident. Either the 757 is quite different from aircraft like the 767 or the accident report above doesn't include all the details.If you blocked all the static ports on one side of a 767, you would only get relatively small errors in all your instruments (irrespective of altitude/speed/time). Only if you blocked all the static ports on both sides would you get what you see in the AeroPeru accident (from the perspective of a 767).I'm very surprised no-one noticed the taped-over ports on the walkaround (especially if the approved tape and techniques were used). I assume both the engineers and flight crew are supposed to do a walkaround prior to departure?A year or two ago I was called to an aircraft which had just made an rejected takeoff for a Captain's airspeed indicator failure. The pitot connection to the Captain's Air Data Computer in the Main Equipment Center had come adrift. However, this is inside the aircraft in an area the pilots would not normally look at during their walkarounds. Specific checks are made in this area by engineers prior to some departures, but checking every single wire/hose connection in the Equipment Center is not one of these checks (It would take weeks to do this). Anyway, there are pieces of the jigsaw puzzle missing here that your average maintenance engineer needs to complete the picture... I'll let the psychics take it from here... :(Cheers.Ian.

Again, the point is that you can safely navigate over a not so "terrainy" area.I just hope they were flying west... Having recently flown by Lima a week or two ago in cyberspace I don't think there are too many non-terrainy areas in that country ;-)Anyway, thanks for the pitch/power tips. Mark :-) I'll take them as foolproof (on the sunny side of the drag curve thingamy)Cheers.Ian.

don't understand how blocking the static ports on one side of a typical Boeing aircraft would affect the instruments to the extent that they saw in the Peru accident. Either the 757 is quite different from aircraft like the 767 or the accident report above doesn't include all the details.Please ignore my previous message.... (too late to edit it). I misread the intro to the CVR transcript... I thought it said only the right side static ports were covered...In this case, the 757 is probably similar to the 767 with regards to pitot-static plumbing.Back to sleep now....

I personally think no one could of done better. Rembember you are flying a 757 in dark with false readings.

Found This In Boeing Aero Newsletter. http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagaz...s_textonly.html

http://forums.avsim.net/user_files/95926.jpghttp://forums.avsim.net/user_files/95927.jpg

According to the diagram I have, It looks like the left and right ports are interconnected.So I think we are not getting all the accident info here.

flyerboy says what I was thinking as soon as I read this post.JimCYWG

Maybe I missed it, but wouldn't the RADALT be a seperate system from the pitot static and thereby give a correct altitude in the case of such a pitot-static induced failure? Perhaps they had this info but just didn't know what data was correct?Remember the days when you first started flying and your flight instructor was telling you to get your eyes out of the cockpit and into the sky? All I am suggesting is that in such a sitution where I still had control of the aircraft, as soon as the lights all come on or I realize I have all sorts of wacko readings, I'm going to take control of the plane and do a rudamentary check of the controls and power, and if that all checked out my eyes go back outside the pit and just fly the plane. I know it was dark that night (full moon or what not?) but you should have been able to pick up the horizon at 13000'and turn around to the city/airport lights and go from there.I'm not saying I could have done this when others couldn't, but that's just my train of thought and thought processes, but I'm not even insturmented rated so what do I know? :)

In response to the aspect of them turning towards the city lights.... well in October, the city is often covered in a low lying coastal fog, so it is very possible that no lights were visable.AeroPeru didn't have many aircraft, routes or pilots by comparison with many airlines so these guys will have been flying the same aircraft on the same routes day in and day out.Psycological stress seems to be an important aspect here, confusing and conflicting situations, i.e. the stickshaker at the same time as the overspeed warning.They wanted some outside reference to help them maintain orientation, so they requested another aircraft. A 707 was being prepared. Lima is not a busy airport so they will have been the only aircraft in the area at that time ( midnight ).I have to agree with flyerboy, no one could have done better..Paul ( SPIM )

"It looks like the left and right ports are interconnected.So I think we are not getting all the accident info here."For more accuracy, they have to be interconnected, Jim. Did you make the same mistake I did? I thought the text said that only one side was blocked off. In the intro, it actually said both sides were blocked off.Without static ports you would have no altitude... and your airspeed would be affected as you climbed.BTW, thanks for the pics.... I wasn't aware that the pitot probes and static sensors on a 757 were separate (as they are on some 737's).Cheers.Ian.

No problem Ian, Yes, I was under the impression that left side only was blocked.

Just a few words I wanted to say in the beginning but couldn't log in... hope I am not repeating someone.1. The tapes used wasn't legal - only orange colored tapes are allowed usually so it will be seen easily if not removed.2. ATC kept on verifying for the crew that they are at safe altitude according to his radar. It was a serious mistake, since the altitude data on scope is taken from the airplane mod C transponder, and thus was unreliable too! in fact ATC just gave the crew the same false reading they had in the cockpit. Some radar systems can query altitude themslves - don't know if this specific one could.3. The only way to help the crew was to send a second airplane to follow him and give correct airspeed and alt readings. It was done a bit too late unfortunately.4. In my opinion, the only reliable instrument in that situation would be the backup artificial horizon. am I right?One final word about accident inquiries: Being an ATC for the last 15 years, I studied closely hundreds and more of accident and incidents reports. This is the aviation way of preventing the next one from happening. When I first met my wife, I learned that she lost her father at young age at one of the saddest plane crashes Israel knew. I was able to tell her exactly what happened, and explained how many lives were saved till today by the new rules this accident dictated. It was some sort of relief to her - it helps with the uneasy feeling that your dear one is gone for nothing. Same can be said for all the families and friends of those who lost their life in this accident - may it be of some comfort to them.

"4. In my opinion, the only reliable instrument in that situation would be the backup artificial horizon. am I right?"The EADI and HSI should still have been working, Ilan. If you lose air data, only the air data-related portions of these instruments would disappear, not the whole instrument.You would have a faulty standby airspeed indicator, no altitude indication, faulty vertical speed indication, faulty main airspeed indication (digital and analogue), a faulty Stall Warning system, faulty Overspeed Warnings, faulty EADI windspeed indications, faulty true airspeed readout, etc...It's hard to believe in this day and age we still rely on "suck and blow" instruments like this.Cheers.Ian.