...as I have explained earlier I am of the opinion that the crash was a result of pilot error.

Agreed, but inasmuch as the pilot error was due to lack of flight information resulting from inoperative instruments resultant from an electrical failure, as well as the pilots having little to no visual reference to the horizon. I up my ante to $50. Not to be combative; I agree largely with vololiberista, but still feel spatial disorientation is largely to blame, resulting in pilot error.

Hello,AFP:Originalhttp://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2009/07/...redit-paris.phpGoogle translation:Cause the lost of airspeed indication start a chain of events in the computerised systems.See the link(s) under.Also a other analyse very interesting to read.Unfortunately it's in french so Google translation can be not accurate at 100%http://www.eurocockpit.com/archives/indiv/E009454.phpGoogle translation in english:http://translate.google.be/translate?u=htt...fr&ie=UTF-8Regards.Gus.

A newspaper reports that an anonymous source in the Brazilian Federal Police says they haven't communicated the results of the autopsies to the French because the French haven't sought them.The named French investiagator is quoted as saying that the French have submitted applications.I Know who I prefer to believe on that evidence.Anyway, why should the Brazilians not have offered the information? One might think they have something to hide!International investigations are covered by Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which envisages full and free cooperation.

Do I have to presume of course that the BEA will also conduct the Moroni (Yemenia Airline A310) crash at the Comoros Islands???"French and U.S. divers are helping to search for debris and bodies. The French military has detected a rescue beacon, but rescue workers say the wreckage is difficult to reach in deep waters."Again???MAB

Agreed, but inasmuch as the pilot error was due to lack of flight information resulting from inoperative instruments resultant from an electrical failure, as well as the pilots having little to no visual reference to the horizon. I up my ante to $50. Not to be combative; I agree largely with vololiberista, but still feel spatial disorientation is largely to blame, resulting in pilot error.

The pilot error was not due to spatial disorientation I think. On or other of two errors were made. The first: Ok there's a storm let'd go through it ( no other a/c did that and even a/c minutes either side of "Air Chance" in both direction elected to divert!Second: They didn't see it because either they weren't looking for it or their equipment was malfunctioning. In either case a no go for take off!Vololiberista

As the preliminary BEA report stated, a Dossier for that flight by AF was handed over and signed for it by one member of the cockpit crew. That cast the responsibility to all those that took that plane to the air that night. Nobody left behind on land can be be blame for what happened. That airplane wasn't born in Brazil. It came from Paris 115 (give or take) minutes before and there is nothing left behind accusing of any reason not to fly it back.Maybe the problem was those less than 4 hours of an uneventful flight. Maybe that gave a false sense of security and let's no worry about the weather tonight. Who knows???MAB

Do I have to presume of course that the BEA will also conduct the Moroni (Yemenia Airline A310) crash at the Comoros Islands???"French and U.S. divers are helping to search for debris and bodies. The French military has detected a rescue beacon, but rescue workers say the wreckage is difficult to reach in deep waters."Again???MAB

The primary authority for invstigating an accident is with the country in which it occured. Neither France nor the USA would have responsibility for investigating the Yemenia accident.

They will probably call the French.MAB

http://www.france24.com/en/20090702-air-fr...h-inquiry-causehttp://www.france24.com/en/20090702-plane-...ident-bea-crashSomething just doesn't quite add up.MAB

The pilot error was not due to spatial disorientation I think. On or other of two errors were made. The first: Ok there's a storm let'd go through it ( no other a/c did that and even a/c minutes either side of "Air Chance" in both direction elected to divert!Second: They didn't see it because either they weren't looking for it or their equipment was malfunctioning. In either case a no go for take off!Vololiberista

Regarding the "no-go for takeoff": I agree, but the plane was already airborne over the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, hundreds of miles from anything. We know that everything was working on the plane before the electrical failure and at the time they saw no reason to divert because other planes were not reporting any adverse circumstances that couldn't be coped with, i.e. no CAT (Clear Air Turbulence), etc. One question that arises in my mind: at what point did the electrical fail? Rio Center received the automated electrical fail notice from the plane, we know that much. Were they in the weather system, on its outskirts, did they even have a chance to turn around? These, of course, are moot questions now.I'd imagine that whether you're on top of cloud or weaving through gaps in the top cover, spatial disorientation is a very real possibility. When at 35,000+ feet and perhaps threading through cloud towers (If such was the instance here), a visible cloud-canopy profile line is no substitute for one solid glimpse of the horizon. I sure wouldn't want to be hand-flying an A330 in that instance! Spatial disorientation, regardless of the circumstances that lead to it, holds a prominent spot in air crash history. Seems that every time you turn around, that's listed as a factor in most general aviation accidents, but bearing in mind that this is commercial aviation, it'd be no surprise to see if a conclusion is eventually arrived at that lists such circumstances in thie matter, based on what little we know of the flight and crash at this point.

http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archiv..._af_447-sty.phpBut the decision making always rest with a human. All the latest and greatest won't do if someone doesn't take the time to read them correctly.MAB

http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archiv...9/07/post_3.php :( MAB

http://jamesfallows.theatlantic.com/archiv...9/07/post_3.php :( MAB

Interesting, but remember that within the tropical convergence storm that downed Air Chance temperatures went a low as -90c. Not something any pitot tube is calibrated to withstand. Secondly in a storm of that category the turbulence is SO violent that it would be virtually impossible to fly the a/c. Any kind of control input would exceed the designed gust limit and therefore risk bits coming off making it progressively more and more difficult to control.(aka the tailfin). Therefore I return to my original premis and to my pilot's training to avoid thunderstorms at all costs. Whilst every other a/c took steps to make large diversions this Air Chance crew "did not" and so put themselves their a/c and their passengers at risk. The pilot error therefore is the decision to fly through the storm or not to have known of it's existence (especially in a zone where one would be expected on a daily basis)!!!Vololiberista

Hello,

Whilst every other a/c took steps to make large diversions this Air Chance crew "did not" and so put themselves their a/c and their passengers at risk.The pilot error therefore is the decision to fly through the storm or not to have known of it's existence (especially in a zone where one would be expected on a daily basis)!!!Vololiberista

A other opinion on the same subject:http://www.eurocockpit.com/archives/indiv/E009465.phpRegards.Gus.

I think we should be very careful in bandying flippant monikers such as 'Air Chance' around, or suggesting the pilots made a big mistake, before we are in full possession of the facts, and of course, we may never be in that position.We do not for example, know if the pilots were in a position to actually be able to steer around the storm - what if they had lost some control authority and could not steer around it? I don't know if that is the case, but since nobody else does either, to accuse the pilots of making a poor decision is, at best, an educated guess. And it could possibly be a guess which maligns a crew that, for all we know, may have been trying to do everything they could to avert disaster.Much has been made of the supposedly 'weak tailplane' on the Airbus, but there are in fact a good many aircraft on which the tailplane will fail if given too much lateral force. The suggestion in the linked article above, is that the only means of protection against over-controlling is the automated limiter, but that is of course not true at all, since there is also the pilot, who should know that he ought to be wary of applying a bootfull of rudder in certain flight regimes. I can remember being strongly admonished by an instructor some years ago when I gave a composite aircraft a bit too much rudder whilst we were at high speed, and I was told in no uncertain terms that it was a 'no no' (and that aircraft was stressed for +7 and -4), so one would assume an airline pilot with thousands of hours would be aware of it too. Of course that wouldn't help if the thing was overstressed by turbulence or gusts, but it is again the creeping suggestion of 'blame the pilot' which is an all too easy 'get out clause' for investigators when all the facts are not in, or if there is pressure from 'higher up' to come to specific conclusions.Al

I think it is interesting that body of the captain was found floating which leads me to believe that he was not strapped to his chair. So who was flying??? :( MAB