Hello,

Please don't try to "pull rank" on me regarding your experience as a passenger ... I've been flying since I was four years old, which was in 1948. I have flown in more different aircraft more times than you would believe possible because I too flew on business -- from 1964 through 1989, in addition to flying frequently as an ordinary traveler from 1948 through 1954.

LOL .. I think any here have the right to speak about his experiences .. and not be seen as "pull rank".Anyways ... many peoples are interested by the aviation world and have some different opinions (BTW .. same for the professionals) on many concerns ...Some even write books about or own some web pages ... for publish their opinions.At the end of the day .. still .. the decisions are taken by FAA .. NTSB like and economics matters ...It's unfortunate .. but accidents and lost of life must happend .. for decisions be taken.BTW .. you and me are privilieged to be able to choice the airlines or eventually the planes we want .. regarding of our feelings.Many in the world (I think here on third world countries people) have not this privilege...And BTW .. with the globalisation and the little number of aircrafts main constructors and the airlines join ventures ... our choice will be less and less ...Regards.Gus.

LOL .. I think any here have the right to speak about his experiences .. and not be seen as "pull rank".Regards.Gus.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxYour exact words in the post that I was referring to were ... "Anyways I flyied as pax twice or three a month during 30 years and had no choice (employer choice prevailed :) )in any kind of planes-choppers and with any airlines and in any continents within the limit of availability.I still there ... lucky one certainly :) "You didn't put in those smilies to show how humble you are, did you? And you didn't put them in to convince the readers that you think you're really lucky to be alive, did you? (Perhaps I shouldn't have said "pull rank". Perhaps I should have said "condescending".)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxAt any rate, you're still alive and so am I ... and the Airbus crashes will continue.Oh ... I forgot to say something. Let me repeat these words of yours ... Lol smilie smilie.

The crash in Queens is ultimately attributable to a software rudder control law design error. Per unit travel of the rudder pedals the rudder effectiveness INCREASED with increasing airspeed, allowing an agressive copilot to turn what should have been simply turbulence discomfort for the passengers into a loss of the vertical stabilizer, which in my opinion should never have been able to snap off at the attachment lugs in the first place.

The NTSB report http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf doesn't really support your arguments. It states:The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.Two members of the Board registered a dissenting judgement say that they supported the probable cause but believed that the elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program were more significant than characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design.Also, regarding the structure, the Board concluded that: ... flight 587's vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope. Because these aerodynamic loads were caused by the first officer's rudder pedal inputs, the analysis of these rudder pedal inputs is of central importance to this investigation.On a wider view point, http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf gives an interesting analysis of aircraft accidents.

Believe what you like. As for me, I pay attention to the news about major aviation accidents.

Perhaps instead of reading news you should actually grab some good updated sources on aircraft accident statistics.Reading papers is a very strange way of trying to access who is safer or less safe. In fact there is no statistical differencebetween the latest generation of Boeing and Airbus products and this report (compiled by Boeing) fully reflects it. This is excellent source for anyone who is trying to discuss aircraft crashes beyond anecdotal newspaper stories.http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdfEDIT: I realized that someone above also pointed out the same document. This is the document without which any discussion on comparitiveanalysis of aircraft accidents is pointless.

Perhaps instead of reading news you should actually grab some good updated sources on aircraft accident statistics.Reading papers is a very strange way of trying to access who is safer or less safe. In fact there is no statistical differencebetween the latest generation of Boeing and Airbus products and this report (compiled by Boeing) fully reflects it. This is excellent source for anyone who is trying to discuss aircraft crashes beyond anecdotal newspaper stories.http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdfEDIT: I realized that someone above also pointed out the same document. This is the document without which any discussion on comparitiveanalysis of aircraft accidents is pointless.

I guess you missed my post #9 above regarding accident reports.

The NTSB report http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf doesn't really support your arguments. It states ..."flight 587's vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope. Because these aerodynamic loads were caused by the first officer's rudder pedal inputs, the analysis of these rudder pedal inputs is of central importance to this investigation."

My point precisely. As I said earlier, the aircraft design performed as certificated -- and the design clearly was inadequate.

I guess you missed my post #9 above regarding accident reports.

So what did it miss there? Your broad unsubstantiated claims that there are some deep design flaws with the Airbus fleet. Sorry, but there are no statistical data to support your claim, no single serious aviation magazine that I am aware of arrived at such a conclusion, no government aviation safety board (NTSB/FAA included) grounded Airbus fleet because of those "flaws". So in short you are your own expert, OK, but there are 1 mln such "experts" like you on the streets every moment. No, you are not partisan you are just singing in the rain ...

So what did it miss there? Your broad unsubstantiated claims that there are some deep design flaws with the Airbus fleet. Sorry, but there are no statistical data to support your claim, no single serious aviation magazine that I am aware of arrived at such a conclusion, no government aviation safety board (NTSB/FAA included) grounded Airbus fleet because of those "flaws". So in short you are your own expert, OK, but there are 1 mln such "experts" like you on the streets every moment. No, you are not partisan you are just singing in the rain ...

Yours is a wonderful example of setting up a straw man and then knocking it down. I never said that I rely on newspaper accounts for accident analysis. I said that I pay attention to reports of accidents, by which I meant the reported aircraft types. The main thing I said and elaborated upon was that I rely on my own interpretation of official accident reports, which I read in detail.Do you read official accident reports? And if you do, do you believe that government investigators are infallible? If so, why would board members ever dissent given that they are in the loop regarding investigations?As for FAA not grounding the Airbus fleet, their Congressional charter quite literally is to promote commercial aviation, not to inhibit its growth. Accordingly they're very slow to react to design issues. If you're not familiar with the history of the Lockheed Electra, read up on it. You will see a well-meaning FAA refusing to ground an aircraft that in fact had a fatal design flaw. The design flaw was corrected later -- but the aircraft was not grounded even though it was obvious that there was a fatal design flaw.Over time government agencies often become hostages of the groups they're supposed to regulate. And even when they don't they develop blinders that often prevent them from seeing the obvious and therefore from taking obviously necessary steps. I'm not saying that the people involved are evil, I'm saying that bureaucracies inherently have a narrow and often wildly inaccurate worldview, and that this is especially true of government agencies.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxEDIT: As for your insistence that only comparative statistics may be considered if rigor is to be maintained, I agree. So please tell us the accident rate per number of aircraft movements for the latest Airbus and Boeing designs. After all, the only statistic that counts is, "If this aircraft takes off, what is the probability that this movement will result in a fatal accident?"In other words, you would have to take into account the number of aircraft that are in the field along with the frequency with which they are operated. So simply counting accidents is irrelevant if aircraft A is flown over very long distances (smaller number of movements) while aircraft B is flown over medium or short haul routs (large number of movements).

I also said that I rely on my own interpretation of accident reports, which I read in detail.

OK, thanks, I rest my case :(

OK, thanks, I rest my case :(

That party animation says a lot about your approach to ... ... well, perhaps it speaks to your intellectual age.So ... Tell us all this: How many official accident reports have you read? Kindly don't answer the question with a question, and kindly don't tap-dance around the answer. Just give us the actual number, okay? After that say anything you like, but kindly give us the number first.

My point precisely. As I said earlier, the aircraft design performed as certificated -- and the design clearly was inadequate.

I suggest you read the report again and not re-phrase it to suit your own arguments. The precise words are:...performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certificationCertification standards are set not by the manufacturer but by the safety authorities. The manufacturers design to meet the certification standards. The design was adequate - it meet the standards set by the certifying authorities. There is no aircraft flying today that can't be broken by bad handling.You also ignore the main finding that the accident was caused:...as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.That is pilot error in anyone's book.

I suggest you read the report again and not re-phrase it to suit your own arguments. The precise words are:...performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certificationCertification standards are set not by the manufacturer but by the safety authorities. The manufacturers design to meet the certification standards. The design was adequate - it meet the standards set by the certifying authorities. There is no aircraft flying today that can't be broken by bad handling.You also ignore the main finding that the accident was caused:...as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.That is pilot error in anyone's book.

Before I respond to mgh's points, let the record show that while he and I have been locking horns for years at several different sites, he would never resort to LOL or :( or any of that juvenile kind of attempted "debating" tactics. My problem in replying to this post of his is the same one as always -- his debating arguments are grounded in facts and reasoning. That said I must now respond to my worthy opponent ...xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxCarbon fiber technology is new -- in a very real sense untested in the commercial aviation field before the latest Airbus designs. So the fact that the certification authorities certified the design means very little -- there was no carbon fiber experience base on which to build. The same is true for the engineers -- they had little experience to guide them. As a result they came up with an inadequate design.Surely, Gerry, you're not going to argue that the aircraft is safe simply because it met the certification requirements?The proximate cause of the Queens accident was indeed the copilot's mistreatment of the airframe. But I'll say it again ... His mistreatment would not have resulted in an accident if the rudder control law software had been redesigned before the accident instead of after, and it would not have resulted in an accident if the fin had been able to remain attached to the fuselage. The fin was unable to remain attached because it resonated, thanks to the copilot's mistreatment of the airframe. But this kind of low frequency resonance would not have happened with a metal structure. Now you can say "But Mike, but Mike, none of this could have been known beforehand. And things will be done differently in the future."That's true. However, the aircraft design is what it is, and it's being built to the INADEQUATE design. I'm not suggesting that the fleet be grounded, I'm simply saying that the various design errors in the aircraft make it less safe than the fourth generation Boeing designs.No aircraft design is perfect, but some are safer than others, yes? I'll repeat my prediction: Bizarre Airbus crashes will continue.

Carbon fiber technology is new -- in a very real sense untested in the commercial aviation field before the latest Airbus designs. So the fact that the certification authorities certified the design means very little -- there was no carbon fiber experience base on which to build. The same is true for the engineers -- they had little experience to guide them. As a result they came up with an inadequate design.

The strength of the vertical stabilser was tested to destruction during the certification procedure. The type of material or experience with it was irrelevant. The vertical stabiliser was tested in exactly the same way as one made from any other material. (All quotes from the NSTB report.) The structural analysis included an assessment of Airbus' full-scale certification test, which was conducted during the design and certification process to demonstrate that the vertical stabilizer could withstand limit and ultimate loads. During the test, the vertical stabilizer was loaded to about two times the design limit load for the lateral gust condition condition before the left rear main attachment lug fractured because of a tensile static overloadIn the eventThe vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.

Surely, Gerry, you're not going to argue that the aircraft is safe simply because it met the certification requirements?

How else do you establish the safety of anything other than by ensuring that is complies with independently established certification requirements?

The proximate cause of the Queens accident was indeed the copilot's mistreatment of the airframe. But I'll say it again ... His mistreatment would not have resulted in an accident if the rudder control law software had been redesigned before the accident instead of after, and it would not have resulted in an accident if the fin had been able to remain attached to the fuselage.

Where is your evidence for that claim - the NTSB report doesn't make it?After the first officer made his initial rudder pedal input, he made a series of alternating full rudder inputs. The Safety Board's airplane performance study revealed that the resulting motion of the airplane, including the hazardous buildup in sideslip angle that eventually led to the high loads that resulted in separation of the vertical stabilizer, was solely the result of these rudder pedal inputs and was not associated with the effects of wake turbulence. In fact, if the first officer had stopped making these inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer separation, the natural stability of the airplane would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx“… if the first officer had stopped making these inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer separation, the natural stability of the airplane would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0

Hello,Methink you will be scared to fly in the next boeing generation planehttp://www.boeing.com/commercial/787family/programfacts.htmlRegards.Gus.