Dozens of UAS incidents have occurred worldwide over the years on complex highly automated modern jets, this is not the first time an A330 has lost air data.

 

Your logic is partly what is responsible for the level of complacency that exists in some pilots in this day and age. if you have had the "correct training" and are still unable to hand fly in cruise then you have no business being in the pointy end of any airliner with 100+ souls in the back.

 

Instead of adding more automation to the equation, how about sorting out training to make sure the most powerful computer on the flightdeck is able to handle the situation?

I thought the airbuses had an aural advisory that the control of the sidesticks had passed from one pilot to the other.  Apparently not, If airbus had something like this might it not have saved the aircraft?  It seems to me part of the loss of the aircraft was a failure to understand who was really in control of the aircraft.

Ok, let's say no feedback from the sidestick.... WHAT ABOUT THE 75 STALL ALERTS FOR 4:30 MINUTES THEN?

 

 

Instead of adding more automation to the equation, how about sorting out training to make sure the most powerful computer on the flightdeck is able to handle the situation?

 

I agree with you that training was clearly inadequate, and that this was likely the result of complacency about the reliability of the automated systems.   It is evident in the accident report that the pilots had no training in handling high altitude approaches to stalls or actual stalls, or in "flight with unreliable IAS."   One point it made is that a symptom of approach to stall - buffeting -- was taught to the pilots also to be a symptom of over speeding (which apparently it is not in an A330). 

 

Rather than an either/or approach, I would like to see improvements on both sides: better pilot training and better software and instrument displays (one item mentioned in the report is the lack of direct display of angle of attack, which might have alerted the pilots sooner to the fact that they were in a stall).  I don't see how these are in any way mutually exclusive.  Software improvements don't automatically imply complacency in pilot training.  All I meant to do was pose the question of why the relatively simple  "pitch and power" response to unreliable air speed could not be built into the autopilot's logic.

 

Mike

I thought the airbuses had an aural advisory that the control of the sidesticks had passed from one pilot to the other.  Apparently not, If airbus had something like this might it not have saved the aircraft?  It seems to me part of the loss of the aircraft was a failure to understand who was really in control of the aircraft.

They do have a priority left/right & dual input aural and visual cues. The dual input cue is picked up on the FDR & CVR, from memory I don't think the priority cues are heard because neither pilot used the takeover button on the Sidestick.

It is a scary thought when people start suggesting that more automation is the answer to prevent screw ups. All they had to do is follow a simple UAS procedure.

 

In the case of 447 many claim that if they simply did not touch anything they would have likely survived..

 

AP/FD.......................................................... ................... OFF

A/THR......................................................... .................... OFF

PITCH/THRUST:

Below THRUST RED ALT...............................................15° / TOGA

Above THRUST RED ALT and Below FL 100......................................................... ....10° / CLB

Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100......................................................... ......5° / CLB

 

The above is a "Memory item"

 

The Af447 crew went TOGA, then to IDLE, back to TOGA.. they pulled like mad, extended the speed brakes, left the FD on.. Swapped controls without stating "I have control" causing Dual input to sound & flash..

 

In other words chaos.

 

Sorry Bob, I wasn't suggesting that more automation was the cure.

 

I was merely thinking out aloud that an emergency alternative input for loss of pitot input may have saved the day in this incident. I've got to agree that according to many, flightdecks are 'losing the plot' so to speak, and pilots are not 'flying the plane' as they should do - automation is proving to be a case of 'data overload' in many accidents....

 

Your post reminds me of the Russian accident where the commander's son was at the controls. In that instance, IIRC, allowing the AP to take back the aircraft would have saved the flight.

 

Regards

Bill