The Airbus 320 family represented a significant departure in design philosophy when it came out. Namely, it attempted to remove the pilot as the ultimate decision maker as to how the aircraft behaves. Pilots complained that the cockpit design and function deprived the pilot of important tactile and visual queues present in more conventional aircraft. This led to numerous "mode confusion" incidents and accidents with the aircraft when it first debuted. Even with the autopilot disengaged, the actions of the pilot can be countermanded by the AFCS if it doesn't agree with his or her actions. It didn't help that the French authorities went into complete denial over the issues raised and finally changed their thinking after Airbus chief pilot Nick Warner was killed on a test flight involving the A330 where mode confusion was cited as a primary cause. The 320 and the later 330/340 have gone on to become fine aircraft in subsequent years. Eastern Airlines 401 stands as the quintessential example of the adage " No matter what happens, fly the damn aircraft"

Regards

 

 

Not necessarily....people continue to forget the way the Airbus Fly By Wire philosophy is, required you to operate the aircraft differently, and people who have issues with it either dont understand it or have resistance to change. Recently I sat down and counted how many people I knew who flew the Bus and what their feedback said. of 14 I knew, 3 didnt like them. Of the 3, 2 had failed the course and one got rejected for transition to the Airbus fleet.

 

Put it this way, last year I went with my father in law to a car dealership...while I was talking to the car dealer, I heard my father in law cursing because the Volvo SUV didnt have a "normal" key for ignition, the wipers and indicators were on the opposite side to his trusty old Ford wagon, and the gear had one of those "fancy sticks"...he hated driving it because he expected it to be his Ford, but he was in a Volvo. Same occurs with pilots.

 

The Airbus philosophy doesnt remove the pilot as the ultimate decision maker, it adds a protection layer that tells the pilot his commanded maneuvre will result in a dangerous aerodynamic move and restricts it, by this, I mean it will perform th emaneuver up to the aerodynamic limits of the aircraft for that given time, provided you are in full Normal Law. But c'mon, why would you want the ability to roll over 90 degrees or pitch up when in a stall when full of passengers??? A pilot I asked this to simply said: Because I want to be in control.....so really, it is not operational, it is ego.

 

An Airbus aircraft is not "flown", it is "managed"...you command the Fly By Wire software to give you a pitch and roll value and the Fly By Wire will move the surfaces to achieve what you want. Does it remove the "tactile Feedback"?...no more than when pilots cried foul when Hydraulic powered surfaces were introduced....no more "direct" feel of the wind on the ailerons, rudder, etc....so what? You dont get that in a power steering car either!

 

When the A320 was released, a Boeing statement said Fly By Wire in a commercial airliner was unnecessary.....they said the same when the B737-300 was released...you did not need EFIS in a Domestic aeroplane...it is the way of the future, and pilots need to learn the way the new machines operate.

 

The Nick Warner incident didnt really have much "mode confusion"....Nick was the "pin up boy" for Airbus, and was used for customer presentations, demonstration flights, sales presentations, test flights, etc....in the days leading up to the accident he had flown every single day.

 

The particular day he made 2 Sales presentations and a demonstration flight in an A321.

 

Then he raced off to the test flight of the A330. The test flight was to set FLEX power, rotate, and pull the circuit breaker on one engine and monitor autopilot recovery. Nick performed the first take off and it went flawlessly.

 

The aircraft landed, taxied back to the end of the runway, not a word was said in the cockpit, no briefing, nothing, the First Officer then took command to repeat the test on the opposite engine. This time, instead of FLEX, for some reason the First Officer applied MAX power.

 

On rotation, the circuit breaker was pulled and the tremendous amount of excess thrust lifted one wing up. Nick advised the telemetry station of this and he would allow the autopilot more time to see if it would recover. The wing nearly went through the vertical when Nick disengaged the autopilot and fought to bring the wings level....by then he had lost lift and the aircraft crashed just as he got the wings back to level.

 

The report was critical of the workload of Nick Warner, and critical of Airbus conducting the test in real conditions, when no other manufacturer does it.

Showing my national pride here but it's Qantas, NOT Quantas. lol

 

Anyone interested in this should seriously take a look at the book by the pilot of this flight "QF32" By Richard De Crespigny.

 

It was a really good read and fascinating what they had to deal with and just how many systems were actually impacted by the explosion.

 

Sorry for the misspelling!   LOL.  To many Chinese Kung-Fu movies in my life time!    I shall have to look into this book.

Sorry for the misspelling!   LOL.  To many Chinese Kung-Fu movies in my life time!    I shall have to look into this book.

 

No problems! lol

 

You won't be dissappointed with the book if you can get your hands on it. I knew of the incident obviously, but until I read the book I really had no idea just how many issues they crew had to deal with on that flight.