Antonio Lapa Gomes

Hi Thanks all for the feedbackI finally got the V1.5. I had to uninstall the original version, reinstall it again and finally installed the V1.5 updateRegardsALG

Hi Rob,Thank you for your kind reply. I have done as suggested, uninstalled previous installed and after making the download of the installer I have in my simMarket account I reinstalled it. Now I have a question, where in FSX or in the installer Can I verify that the latest version installed is the 1.5 ? because the size of my installer has not changed since the original.regardsALG

Hi,Could someone help meI bought the RealAir Duke B60 at simMarket sometime ago before SP1 and installed it. Recently I received an e-mail from simMarket telling me that the 1.5 update was available for download at my account. I downloaded the update and runned it and received the following message: "Setup can not create the following folder: \RealAir\duke09\AutoPlay\Audio" with the option to Repeat or Cancel. Repeat does nothing and Cancel is obvious, the update is not installed on either options.I thought in downloading the original installer and reinstall from scratch since the installer may already be updated to version 1.5 but I'm not sure of that since otherwise I would be advised to use it instead of the update.Please someone advise?Thanks n regardsALG

Hi,Small correction; Not TAM but a GOL B737-800 and a private Embraer Legacy 600Rgds,ALG

Hi,Another interesting article from Popular Mechanics web site concerning the recovery of the AF447's FDR and CVR from the bottom of the Atlantic;http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/ro...cs/4320244.htmlTime is becoming short now for listening to the devices with only 11 days left.Let's hope that things have a positive development on these coming daysRegardsALG

Hi everybody,This topic is turning into a personal dispute between some folks here!!Let's get back into the subject that matters, that is the AF447 acident and listen to some other interesting people with interesting opinions, for exemple;http://planetalking.com/content/niki-lauda...d-flight-af-447Regards, Antonio Lapa Gomes

Hi Ed,I think i found the yoke you are looking for, " AFCS III Yoke (USB) AETI ", but the site where it is for sale, it's damned by most flightsimmers and developers, I'm talking about: http://www.fsplanet.com/store.htmIf you care to go there and have a look, scroll down and look in the 'Hardware | Yoke' section. I think I've seen it there among others, although the price is a bit high. Please note that I'm not in anyway related or simpathetic to above mentioned site! Just trying to be of any help to you only!BTW I also go for the FS9 and have a lot of money spent on addons for it, since it come up for the first time in 2002, I think, if I'm not wrong, which is, if the date is correct?? already 7 years ago, being so the longest living Flight Simulator edition up until today?? But I also have FSX although only now a couple of days ago I installed and tried it for the first time since I bought it almost 2 years ago.But I'm reluctant in go definitly to it!! I'm still much in love with FS9!! I have all PMDG aircraft for both FS's as well as from other editors and developers like Flight1, Level-D, EaglesoftDG, Dreamfleet, Carenado, Aerosoft, AeroSim, PSS, Wilco-Feelthere and so on... either for A/C and for Sceneries. Lots of money spent and still spending since FS2002 and even before. Hard to let them go even the older editions. Starting now to buy for FSX also.Oh well, I also have bought, but have not installed or used yet, two X-Plane versions, the 8 and the last one the 9.x something. This FS thing is a very addictive 'vice'Long live MS FS9 aka: FS2004 'A Century of Flight' !!!I even I have a baseball cap from Microsoft/games celebrating itRegardsAntonio Lapa GomesLPPT - LPCS

Yep! This definitly LPMA and plane is moving on RWY 23! You can see 1 Portugalia plane either E-145 or F-100, 2 SATA Air A

Hi there,These are all quoted info concerning further investigations and are up to date;* Dutch Safety Safety Board: Safety Alert to Boeing: *** Recommend to review Fligth Manual B737: if radio altimeters are inop, autothrottles and autopilot must not be engaged; * 9 casualties; * 80 wounded, 28 still in hospital; * TK 1951 ETA 10.40 * No problems until last moment; * 3 qualified pilots in cockpit; * 1st officer flying the aircraft; * TK1951 received landing clearance, no delay in approach, direct approach; * Autopliot engaged during approach; * DFDR and CVR in good condition; * at 1950 ft, LH radio altimeter step change read out from 1950 ft to -8ft; * this faulty altitude was also reported to autothrottle; * CVR: crew saw altimeter discrepancy; * Crew did not see this discrepancy as problem, and lowered gear as gear warning was activated due to -8 ft radio alt; * As a result, autothrottle went into retard mode at 1950 ft rather than 50 ft due to faulty radio altimeter read out; * Aircraft slowed to stall speed; * Aircraft flight controls [autothrottles] thought airplane was above runway and went into "flare mode"; * At 450 ft stall warning /stick shaher activated; * power was increased immediately [!] [TOGA?], but power increase was too late to continue flight; * identical problem with LH radio altimeter happened twice before on this airplane in last eight flights; * that data was still on DFDR, as it had 25 hrs upto crach of recorded information; * Landing gear and engines broke off at impact as designed; * due to high power setting engines flew forward by 250m at impact separation; * investigation will now focus on radio altimeter, and relation/logic with autothrottle system; * runway was not [very well] visable to crew; * Dutch Safety Board will lead investigation; * Several other parties will support investigation [NTSB, Boeing, CFM internaional, Turkish authorities, ; * Good words for justice department, especially in isolating area around airplane; * Safety Board and Jutice Department back on same frequency; * Main objective of investigation is fact finding and improve safety; * Justice department will limited access to data, to protect "whistleblowers"; * radio altimeter fault is only technical fault found so far; * No indications of ATC faults; * No indications of [wake-]turbulence; * Too early to tell if crew made mistakes; * All members of invetsigation team are on same line of thinking * Not yet known where the 2 previous occurances of LH radio Alt happened * LH radio Alt not considered flight critical component, as function can be taken over manually by crew; * No conclusions on TK maintenance activities and procedures; * Aircraft will be recovered this week; Flight Global has some additional information, that was not read out during the press conference: * Crew actions under review; * engines responded normal to pilots' inputs; * unlcear LH radio alt faulure played significant role in the accident; * Boeing is expected to issue safety bulleting today; * aircraft entered approach fast and high; * after LH radio alt failure, thottles remained in idle for 100 seconds, all this time throttles were in retard mode, except for the last couple of seconds; * aircraft airpseed slowed 40kt below reference speed; * Aicraft descended through glideslope; * Captain was "coaching" First Officer in conducting the before-landing checklist; * at 400 ft stall warning and stick shaker activated; * first officer [pilot flying] immediately advanced throttles, however throttles were still in retard-mode; * Captain took control, First Officer then released throttle levers; * throttles automatically rolled back to idle, as they were still in retard-mode; * six seconds later throttles were advanced again; * too late to prevent contact with ground. Today <4 March 2009>, the Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning for airline manufacturer Boeing and presents its initial findings regarding the terrible accident involving the Boeing 737/800, Turkish Airlines flight. This accident claimed the lives on nine people (5 passengers and 4 crew) and 80 passengers were injured. Twenty eight of those injured are still hospitalised. The Boeing was en route from Istanbul to Schiphol (on Wednesday 25 February 2009) and was due to land at Schiphol at 10.40. The Boeing had had a regular flight and no problems had been experienced until just before the approach. There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit. The crew made contact with air traffic control (Amsterdam Radar) at 10.04 and was transferred to the tower at Schiphol - for the landing at 10.14. The tower then gave the Boeing permission to land on the Polderbaan 18R. The Polderbaan was approached according to fixed procedures, without any delay, and the Boeing was then given permission to decrease its altitude to 2000 feet (about 700 meters) and begin its descent to the Polderbaan. This descent takes place with the help of the automatic pilot, as is normal with Turkish Airlines (this method can be utilised by everybody, as can a manual landing). The voice recorder and the black box, both of which are in the hands of the Safety Board, show that an irregularity occurred during the descent, at 1950 feet. At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude from 1950 feet to - 8 feet - and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power. The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing. A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one. The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter. The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not working correctly (via the warning signal landing gear must go down). Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem. In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced. It seems that the automatic system with its engines at reduced power assumed it was in the final stages of the flight. As a result, the aircraft lost speed. Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand. 2 As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft's speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were given. The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately. However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway. The black box which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights - showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing. The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed. The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact. An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing. The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up of boggy clay. The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off and the aircrafts hull ruptured at business class. The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design. This also applied to the two engines. The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further 250 meters. Most of the fatally wounded victims were located near the rupture, in business class, and the three crew members in the cockpit died as a result of the enormous braking forces, partially caused by the embedded nose-wheel and the forward movement of the aircraft. The section that remained most intact was situated around the wings. On board the plane there were 127 passengers and 7 crew, of whom 28 are still hospitalised. The Boards investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system). Weather conditions, particularly visibility through the low cloud base and the mist, probably meant that the Polderbaan was not yet visible at the height at which the descent was commenced. The Safety Board board will be assisted in its investigation and its attempts to ensure lessons are learnt by the following organisations: the National Transportation Safety Board Bureau dEnquetes et dAnalyse (BEA) Aviation Accident Investigation Branche (AAIB) Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkse Rijksluchtvaartdienst, DGCA) Boeing Turkish Airlines The engine manufacturer, CFM 3 Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW) [Traffic and Waterways Inspectorate] Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, American Civil Aviation Authority) Vereniging van Nederlandse verkeersvliegers [Association of Dutch Commercial Pilots] Nederlandse vereniging voor cabinepersoneel [Dutch Association for Cabin Personnel] Internationally, both the ICAO and the EU stipulate that involved parties may take part in the Boards investigation (party system). The investigation itself, however, is supervised by and remains the Boards responsibility. The Board has also received a great deal of data from the Public Prosecutor for its investigation. Furthermore, there have been content-based contributions from a great many police organisations. The National Police Force, particularly all staff from the National Team of Forensic Investigation who are responsible for the forensic work at the location itself, the Aviation Police, who took all the aviation photographs, and the National Traffic Assistance team who helped the Board to measure the location of the accident. The Public Prosecutor took possession of the aircraft and, as a result, responsibility for guarding it lay entirely with them. Police officers from all over the country were drafted in for this purpose. We are extremely grateful for their outstanding and meticulous work and for guarding the aircraft. There was a misunderstanding regarding the use of the data from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight recorder (black box). It is established, in Dutch law, that the Public Prosecutor may only have access to this data if there is a question of abduction, terrorism, murder or manslaughter. In such a situation, the Safety Board is also legally obliged to hand over this data to the Public Prosecutor. In principle, there are two investigations being carried out into the accident. The judicial investigation. The search for punishable facts and the use of these to hold those responsible to account. The independent investigation. This investigation focuses fully on finding out what happened so that lessons can be learnt. There is always some tension between the two investigations. Within criminal law you may be silent. Nobody needs to contribute to his or her sentence. With the independent investigation, however, you want to ensure that everything is said. For this reason, the reports from the Board may not be used as evidence in lawsuits. From today onwards, the investigation by the Board will concentrate on two subjects: The technical investigation will focus on the role of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle system and the connection to the radio altimeter. <This will take place with the same involved parties>. 4 Alongside the aforementioned technical investigation, the focus will also be on the management of the crisis. How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from this. This investigation will also focus on the passenger list. The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week. The aircraft will be taken to another location for possible further investigation. The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight. With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities. http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporte..._4_maart_GB.pdfTurkish Airlines pilots ignored faulty altimeter before Amsterdam crash A faulty altimeter plus apparent inattention by the pilots caused the Turkish Boeing 737 to hit the ground a mile short of the Amsterdam runway, the accident investigation showed today. The investigators' preliminary report confirmed the widespread theory that the pilots let the automatic systems slow their plane to a dangerously low speed as it approached Schiphol airport. At 450ft, as the pilots scrambled to speed up, it stopped flying and flopped onto the ground, killing the all three flight deck crew and six others on board. What was revealed today was the event that led to the pilots' inattention. Normally, pilots are expected intensely to monitor the performance of the automated approach system when an airliner descends towards the runway, electronically locked onto the radio beam that defines the descending flight path, known as the glideslope. In the Turkish Boeing, however, the radio altimeter "told" the flight system that the plane was actually eight feet below the surface when it was still nearly 2,000 feet in the air. This caused the "autothrottle" to pull back the power to idle, as if the plane was touching down. According to conversation recorded between the plane's captain, first officer and an extra first officer on the flight, the pilots noticed the faulty altimeter earlier but did not consider it a problem and did not react, the chief accident investigator said. The co-pilot, or first officer, was at the controls for the landing, watched from behind by an instructing third pilot. With power almost non-existent, the automatic pilot attempted to keep the aircraft on the profile of the glide-slope and may have started "flaring", or pulling the nose up for landing. The plane then slowed to the edge of stalling speed while still relatively far from the ground. The emergency warning systems came into action, sounding an aural warning and shaking the control columns to alert the pilots to the impending stall. They applied maximum power, but, since it takes seconds for jet engines to react to power commands and make an airliner to accelerate it was too late for the Boeing to regain flying speed and recover from the stall. The plane hit the ground with engines under full power, struggling to climb back into the air. The pilots' awareness of their predicament was dimmed because low cloud and mist prevented them from seeing the runway below and ahead of them as they began their descent from 2,000ft. However, the pilots would normally have been expected to react immediately to the auto-throttle command to cut power, especially since they were aware that the radio altimeter was playing up. The radio altimeter is used in large aircraft as a supplement to the less accurate traditional barometric altimeters that take their reading from the pressure of the atmosphere. The instrument panel in front of the pilots would have been displaying their correct altitude, taken from the main altimeters, while the usually more accurate radio altimeter was feeding into the flight system. The description of the fatal final moments of the Turkish airliner contrasts with the accounts from Turkey and some passengers of "hero pilots" who managed to save a crippled aircraft from worse destruction. If confirmed, the failures by the pilots would make the Amsterdam at least the fourth in 13 months in which pilot error has caused an airliner to stall and crash. The others were at Madrid last August, off the French city of Perpignand in November and near Buffalo, New York, last month. The initial accident findings are certain to intensify debate in the flying world over the dangers of pilots losing their basic flying skills as a result of relying on the sophisticated electronics that control airliners through most of their flights.Cues should alert 737 pilots to altimeter fault: Boeing Boeing has highlighted to 737 operators the symptoms of a malfunctioning radio altimeter, after investigations into the Turkish Airlines approach crash at Amsterdam found evidence that a faulty altimeter prompted the autothrottle to reduce thrust. The airframer points out that such symptoms might warrant crew intervention and it is reiterating the importance of monitoring flight instruments. Boeing says the autothrottle uses data from the left-hand altimeter which, in the Turkish jet, suddenly switched to an incorrect reading while still at nearly 2,000ft. This reading apparently prompted the autothrottle to transition to landing-flare mode, retarding the thrust levers to the idle stop, where they remained for about 1min 40s, bleeding off the airspeed. The 737 lost altitude and the crew failed to recover the aircraft before it struck the ground. Boeing has pointed out that an erroneous radio altimeter reading - even without a direct fault flag - will typically generate a number of possible effects on the flight deck, requiring crew action. Apart from differences in the displayed radio altitudes, these effects include unexpected configuration warnings, premature annunciation of authrottle retard, removal of flight-director command bars, and movement of the throttle levers towards the idle position. "Crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments and the flight-mode annunciation for autoflight modes," says Boeing. It states that the Turkish aircraft and its engines responded properly to flight-control and throttle inputs, and adds that the investigation into the 25 February crash has produced no evidence of wake turbulence, windshear, icing, bird strike or fuel exhaustion. http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/...ult-boeing.htmlBoeing issues immediate warning to all B737 operators Reference /A/ provides Boeing's previous fleet communication on the subject event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety Board's (DSB) investigation of this accident. The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has approved the release of the following information. While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from work completed thus far: - To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear. - There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire flight. - Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire flight. - The airplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout the flight. The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed. The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include: - Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in flight. - Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach) mode - Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach - Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff - Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop. Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles have reached the idle stop Boeing Recommended Action - Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual. Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review 737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500. Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737 models.also this OpenATC url: http://www.openatc.com/THY1951/Regards ALG

Hi,For Catholics Christmas Eve is on the 24th and Christmas Day on the 25th Dec. Usualy we open the gifts/presents early morning of 25th when we wake up. Some people open the gifts just after midnight from 24 to 25th. they do not go sleep before opening gifts.I'm also from Europe my country is Portugal.Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to All!!Antonio Lapa Gomes

Hi DC-8 Jet Trader,Perhaps this search on google might help you?http://www.google.pt/search?q=Cd%3A+drag+c...lient=firefox-aJust check the link for the 1st pdf it looks interestingand also check other links, you might find something that will help youBest regardsAntonio Lapa Gomes

Hi folks,For those that don't know the site and are interested in further knowleadge about the A380follow the links and download the pdf'shttp://www.smartcockpit.com/site/pdf/downl..._For_Pilots.pdfhttp://www.smartcockpit.com/site/pdf/downl...ts_Part%202.pdfregardsALG

Hi KJ,Caribbean Defense Force pack? What pack is that and where can it be found?Thks & rgds ALG

Hi,Yes there is! actually the avsim link you are mentioning makes reference to it. Its the payware Pilot's Boeing 314 Clipper available from b314clipper.com.RegardsAntonio Lapa Gomes

Hi Thank you for your reply! I think that is what I'm going to do and then go by eliminationI suspect that is one of my installed object libraries that is doing it RYW12 perhaps or a scenery using it.I will check a follow your suggestion!Thanks againRegardsALG

These are some pics of what is happening!any suggestions on how to cure this?RegardsAntonio Lapa gomes

Hi!Could someone help me with this?Referring to below mentioned thread on the MAAM-SIM forumhttp://forums.avsim.net/dcboard.php?az=sho...=3389&mode=fullI have exactly the same problem and have tried everything mentioned to solve it with no success unfortunately:-(The symptoms are absolutely the same!My BF B25 is sitting on top of a monstrous Jetway instead of USS Hornet, I see also the carrier Enterprise on starboard side along with two jetways and at bombord I see another vessel and a couple of more jetways where it sould be the remaininfg vessels of the TF16.Unlike mentioned on the linked thread I do not have the problem with the KSTL, St Lambert Intl at St Louis!Please somebody help I'm unable to find the and correct the problem :(Thanks and regards in advance for any help given for solving my problem!Antonio Lapa Gomes

BumpAntonio

Hi there,I'm really looking forward to see that too!!!Not only TCR Lesson 5, but also...6,....7,...and so on...until the very last.Any news concerning its continuity?RegardsAntonio Lapa Gomes(LPPT)

>>And your point is? :-hmmm >>You understand my point. You are a intelligent person.>:-smile12 Which is something that you are not! Besides being unpolite and persistant in using capital letters which means that you are shouting instead of talking with good manners.Be ashamed and behave yourself!ALG

Please be polite!Politeness is another rewarded virtue!Don't shoutAvoid using capital letters.greet'sALG

JP and Jeff,Appreciated your promp information regarding my enquiry.Thank you very much to bothAntonio

Hi,What happened to simufly.com and the CIVA INS?Does someone know about it?RegardsAntonio Lapa gomes

Be patient guys!Let the Wizards work without pressure and stop the constant requests for pictures! Things take and need time to be done properly and without pressure. I do not see the point in asking for pictures of a work in progress at least for now. I'm sure they will be shown in due time.Patience is a virtue! And usually it brings rewards at a later timeIf you want pictures from a MD-11 cockpit go to Airliners.net and do a search you will have plenty of them to have an idea and dream of the coming PMDG's MD-11 cockpit and plane!RegardsAntonio Lapa Gomes

Looking goooood! :( I'm speechlessDon't stop! :-yellow1Antoniohttp://www.precisionmanuals.com/images/forum/supporter.jpg