FAA grounding 787 fleet

[WR269 367]

NTSB released interim report..

http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2013/130307.html

 

A good report from Crikey.com

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2013/03/08/ntsb-gives-graphic-account-of-jal-787-battery-fire/

 

From Seattle Times...

Boston airport firefighters encountered sizzling liquid and a hissing, “exploding” battery when they entered the 787 at the center of a two-month-long National Transportation Safety Board investigation, according to documents released Thursday.

The NTSB said Thursday it plans two public hearings next month, one to explore lithium-ion battery technology in general and another to discuss the design and certification of the Boeing 787 battery system.

The safety agency announced the hearings as it released an interim factual report and 499 pages of related documents on its investigation of the Japan Airlines 787 fire at the Boston airport on January 7.

Among the findings in the documents released Thursday:

• Boeing outsourced both the analysis and testing of the battery system’s safety, performed to get Federal Aviation Adminstration (FAA) certification, to its battery system subcontractor, Thales of France, and to the battery maker, GS Yuasa of Japan.

“Theses analyses and tests were performed by Thales/GS-Yuasa and reviewed by Boeing,” the NTSB states.

• The safety analysis by Thales and GS Yuasa determined that “overcharging was the only known failure mode” that could result in fire. Boeing therefore built safeguards into the system to “to ensure that the likelihood of occurrence of an overcharge event” was less than one in a billion — which is the usual FAA standard in providing for potentially catastrophic events.

However, there is no indication in the NTSB documents that the battery that caught fire was overcharged.

Investigators inspected a hefty electrical contactor — a relay switch — that is part of the battery management system and was designed to open the electrical points and disconnect the cells in the event of an overcharge.

The heavily blackened contactor was found to be “in the de-energized closed orientation,” meaning that no overcharge had registered with the system and the contactor had not disconnected the cells.

• The NTSB a month ago established that the fire instead started with an internal short circuit of a single cell in the eight-cell battery.

Boeing’s pre-certification testing did try to evaluate the effect of an internal short circuit. It chose to do so with a test that punctured a cell with a nail to induce a short circuit.

“This test resulted in venting with smoke but no fire,” the NTSB reported.

Boeing also consulted with other companies about their experience with the use of similar lithium battery cells and “based on this information, Boeing assessed that the likelihood of occurrence of cell venting would be about one in ten million flight hours.”

The 787 that caught fire in Boston had logged just 169 flight hours, the report states.

And the entire operational fleet of 787s had logged a total of 51,662 in-service hours, plus about 6,000 flight test hours.

• On the day of the Boston fire, the battery did not behave as Boeing or subcontractor Thales predicted.

The battery’s power discharge was “not at the constant rate described by the Boeing or Thales documents and included large changes and reversals of power within short periods of time,” according to the NTSB’s preliminary report.

• Sitting on a rack above the battery that burned was a smaller lithium ion battery, also supplied by Japanese manufacturer GS Yuasa, that is used to provide emergency power for the jet’s flight controls “for a minimum of 10 minutes when no other electrical power is available.”

Investigators found the exterior of this battery had been “lightly scorched” by the fire below and noted that its case had openings at the corners.

• No heat damage was found to any primary airplane structure.

However, the floor panel and carbon fiber floor support material, which are considered to be secondary structure, “were found to be heat damaged beneath where the APU battery had been installed.”

• The firefighters who were called to put out the fire did not know they were dealing with a lithium-ion battery, and had great difficulty putting out the intense fire.

When Capt. Mark Munroe of the airport’s aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) unit entered the plane, he “saw heavy white smoke billowing through the floor” of the passenger cabin.

After locating the fire inside the electronics bay in the belly of the airplane, firefighters entered the compartment through dense smoke and applied shots of Halotron fire extinguisher to the battery.

Lt. David Hoadley of the ARFF unit reported that “It seemed like the fire did not want to go out, it kept rekindling.”

Then the battery “exploded,” according to Capt. Monroe.

“Capt. Munroe heard the battery hissing still and pushing white smoke or steam. There was liquid sizzling over the sides of the battery and still heavy smoke conditions. ... The battery continued to hiss before exploding.”

Monroe related that “he felt something hit him in the neck while he was in the airplane,” and he was sent out for medical treatment. “Something had burned his neck.”

Firefighters attempted to remove the battery from the jet, but found that the “quick disconnect” mechanism Boeing had included to allow mechanics to take out the battery for maintenance was “melted and un-recognizable” and a metal plate was preventing access.

The battery had to be cut out from the rack where it sat.

“With a hot battery and a gloved hand (Lt. Hoadley) could not access the bolts on the lower rails with tools. They attempted with pliers to remove the bolts for maybe 20 minutes. What looked like Teflon slides were burnt away and the battery would not move. There were 3 more screws that could not be removed.”

Firefighters cut away the metal plate, severed the battery wire, then “pried the battery loose with hydraulic spreaders and removed it.”

The battery was passed down to a firefighter and placed on the tarmac about 50 feet from the airplane.

The fire was declared under control an hour and forty minutes after the initial notification.

Boeing’s entire fleet of 787s has been grounded since a second battery incident during a flight in Japan, a week after the Boeing fire.

The company’s proposed fix for its battery system is currently under review by the FAA.
 

[vololiberista 205]

Who's idea was it to allow Boeing to "Self-Certify" i.e. to award themselves an airworthiness certificate!!!

My guess is that these a/c will not be allowed to fly again with Lion batteries installed.

[Raptor 5]

 

You make it sound as if Boeing did this out if the goodness of their heart.

 

The test failed after the 787 had del animation problems. Boeing did not take their time on this, they were already heavily delayed, and what they did was insert rods in the joint as an interim fix to get past certification whilst promising a permanent fix for later. I believe the redesigned joint and bonding were applied eventually.

 

The A380 frame failed at 1.45 and the cutoff was 1.5

 

The airframe tested had the original wing which was not applied to flight test or production aircraft, and it was significantly stronger than the certification test wing.

 

But still, the original design in itself was not the issue. Like I said before, Boeing has put a lot of innovation on this program, I just don't think the product is mature enough to be out there. Maybe a case of too many " world firsts?"

 

 It's still a design change. Engineers changed the material, therefore they changed the specifications of the wings blueprint.

 To those on the factory floor, IT is a design change to be incorporated into the production line for the next applicable plane that engineering tells them to apply it to. If you change anything in the plane, you have to generate a design change to tell them to do something different from the last plane. One doesn't diviate from the blueprint without engineering approval. It requires a Drawing Change Notice, which changes the blueprint.

 

 And No, Boeing didn't do it out of the goodness of their hearts.

 They did it for the same reasons as Airbus did. They did it to bring the plane up to the design specifications they told their customers the plane would meet, AKA: the specified number of flight cycles the airfame would fly. AIrbus is modifying the existing fleet to meet that same promise.

 In other words, Airbus is doing the exact same thing as Boeing did...  Modifiy the aircraft to meet the number of cycles promised. The composite issues for Boeing was largely due to Alenia not being familiar with composite layup and fabrication technics, in fact they were very new to the material.

Boeings' problem was a lack of oversight of their subcontractor (Alenia). They would have been better off to subcontract that work to Northrop-Grumman with their vast expertise in the field of large airframe composite structures.

 

 The electrical system is the one area where Boeing overstreched the technology. Everything else has been done in other aircraft before, just not brought into the same airframe as Boeing has done in the 787.

 

Raptor

[Raptor 5]

Who's idea was it to allow Boeing to "Self-Certify" i.e. to award themselves an airworthiness certificate!!!

My guess is that these a/c will not be allowed to fly again with Lion batteries installed.

 They didn't self certify the "airworthiness certificate".

 

 They are allowed to "Self-Certify" certain build operations as does evey airframer in the business. It's called self inspection.

 You, the mechanic are inspecting your work as meeting the requirements of the airframe builder AND the FAA specifications. You are also held accountable if something breaks too.

 If it is found that you certified an operation that doesn't meet the criteria, then your self inspection capability is revoked. You are now required to get a company inspector to inspect your work as being acceptable.

 

 Boeing is licensed thru the FAA to build the aircraft, and Boeing certifies that it's workers are working to FAA regulations to build the airplane as the airframe builder. There are certifications and classes required for the production guys at Boeing to do the work. Anything that has "Safety of Flight" type of operations involved will have a Company inspectors buyoff requirement as well.

  AKA: There are not enough FAA inspectors to inspect every single operation to build an aircraft.

 

 Raptor

[vololiberista 205]

There may not be enough FAA inspectors but there should be! The whole idea of an Airworthiness Certification is that it's done by someone other than the manufacturer. Consider this analogy: A top brand food manufacturer sells "Best Quality Beef Lasagne" for example. Another body happens to test this product only to find that not only does it not contain any beef at all as advertised but it is made with 100% horse meat masquerading as beef.

Because the 787 is years behind schedule Boeing have had plenty of time to rectify any faults.

If any 787 falls out of the sky due to a battery fire Boeing are finished!"

[JBZ 13]

 

Kudos for being the last governing agency to do so? The FAA is wholly reactionary and does very little to be proactive.

 

(couldn't quote properly for some reason)

 

LOL so true!

 

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SGH-I747 using Tapatalk 2

 

[vololiberista 205]

 Sent from my SAMSUNG-SGH-I747 using Tapatalk 2

Really?? Gosh how exiting!!!

[3Green 80]

FAA Approves Boeing 787 Certification Plan

 

For those interested, Boeing will hold a live technical  briefing on how they plan to improve the battery system.

 
Webcast scheduled for March 14th at 6:00 p.m. PDT / 9:00 p.m. EDT

RJ

[3Green 80]

Here is the battery solution that was shown in the webcast.  

Boeing indicated that they may never find the exact cause to the battery failure, but with the new comprehensive battery solution, failure should not re-occur.

They also shared that there were no explosions or large fires as reported. They explained that the cells vented which produced vaporized electrolyte, a substance that looks like smoke, but it was not a product of combustion.  Boeing was hinting or hoping that within a couple of weeks the 787 maybe flying again.

RJ

[vololiberista 205]

Here is the battery solution that was shown in the webcast.  

 

Boeing indicated that they may never find the exact cause to the battery failure, but with the new comprehensive battery solution, failure should not re-occur.

 

They also shared that there were no explosions or large fires as reported. They explained that the cells vented which produced vaporized electrolyte, a substance that looks like smoke, but it was not a product of combustion.  Boeing was hinting or hoping that within a couple of weeks the 787 maybe flying again.

 

RJ

I hope the FAA etc do their own tests and don't just take Boeing's word for it!

[tf51d 284]

Sorry, but I think I'll take the Logan airport Fire Chief's word (Who was there) for it that it was a fire over Boeing in this case!! Especially after seeing the charred pictures of the battery casing.

[vololiberista 205]

Resolving a problem by simply hiding it in a box is not a proper resolution in my opinion. And, as has been said there "was" a real fire, so boeing are fibbing again. This kind of "self" certification must be brought to an end!

 

Now, in future the battery won't "just" overheat and catch fire. It will instead do it in a confined space i.e. the box. An explosion waiting to happen methinks.

[TechguyMaxC 516]

Resolving a problem by simply hiding it in a box is not a proper resolution in my opinion. And, as has been said there "was" a real fire, so boeing are fibbing again. This kind of "self" certification must be brought to an end!

 

Now, in future the battery won't "just" overheat and catch fire. It will instead do it in a confined space i.e. the box. An explosion waiting to happen methinks.

 

Did you read the solution as presented? The box is not the solution, it's a failsafe that's been put in place in addition to the solution.

[vololiberista 205]

I feel much more comfortable with the "A350" "Solution" than that of Boeing's!

[TechguyMaxC 516]

I feel much more comfortable with the "A350" "Solution" than that of Boeing's!

 

So the answer is you did not read the solution. They've redesigned the battery and the charger as well as refined the production and QA processes. The box, which you turn your nose up at, actually makes fire IMPOSSIBLE because oxygen is not present in the enclosure and it is vented.

 

You seem to have a pretty strong bias, I'm not sure why I'm bothering explaining this...