This will drag on a little...

 

FAA accepts statistics showing past events mark a device or event as safe, and thus does not need to demonstrate or address these issues.

 

NTSB states that Boeing's documentation to the FAA showed the probability of battery causing smoke was less than once in 10 Million hours of flight (you read that right). Former Safety Board member John Goglia states the FAA lowered the statistical standard for Boeing, and still Boeing failed to meet the standard.

 

NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman states "assumptions used to certify the battery must be reconsidered".

 

From the Seattle Times: http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020307773_ntsb787xml.html

What might give you a warm fuzzy feeling is to know who is paying the salaries of the FAA inspectors?! That aside, I have every confidence that Boeing will eventually solve these problems and will unlikely expose themselves to another folly of similar nature in future products.

 

There will be some reparations to the airlines, but not to the nature that has been suggested. These kinds of contingencies and delays have already been specified in the sales contracts and unless these problems can't be resolved short of a complete redesign, the break-even point will merely be further extended which is routine for new design deliveries. None of these details are likely to be made public in our lifetimes, but there will be unofficial speculations I'm sure.

 

I still say, "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going!"

We could say the battery fire issue is just hot air? :smile:

Got to say I agree, the TRansport Workers Union here is about to start industrial action ( ie they are threatening strikes) because they want their members ( truck and tug drivers) that work for small regional and charter operators to have the same entitlements as those who work for international carriers such as Qantas... "It's about a level playing field"....

 

This is how Ansett Airlines died... The only airline in the world to demand their 767s came with a flight engineer console because the union demanded job security for the flight engineers.

Then they demanded 7 people per Boeing 727 turn around, which meant 2 of the crew could have a sleep while five of them worked. And I can assure you, their baggage handlers got paid more than a small management job in the city.

 

I believe unions have a place, but they forget who they are and act as who they are not.

Scott, I don't think I understand your sentence. :unsure: Can you explain it to me?

 

 

And I guess John has a point. Not saying that the authorities are free from any lobby influence though.

 

Sorry for not getting back sooner.

 

Within "system engineering" (at least as I practiced it) there are some over-arching responsibilities (such as requirements engineering) but there are also some specific areas of expertise, for example safety engineering and reliability engineering. These fields are often considered "soft" compared to the more established fields of mechanical or electrical engineering, and in some cases not considered "real" engineering, hence considered good candidates for cuts when budget gets tight. I'm not saying Boeing necessarily went "cheap" on safety, but here we have the need to develop criteria to evaluate the acceptability of a new technology from a safety standpoint. All I can say is from personal experience, it is very hard to quantify what it means to be "safe enough" and there is a lot of judgement involved. Judgement calls are not the easiest to defend. As far as the regulator, without an experience base, it is hard to put forth a standard that meets legal requirements.

 

As follow on to NACA, this is an area where I think NASA should develop expertise (if it doesn't have it). Unfortunately I think "space" has been the tail that wags the dog.

 

scott s.

.

Thanks for explaining, Scott.

All I can say is from personal experience, it is very hard to quantify what it means to be "safe enough" and there is a lot of judgement involved. Judgement calls are not the easiest to defend. As far as the regulator, without an experience base, it is hard to put forth a standard that meets legal requirements.

I guess you have a point there. Still, this would be the case on every new design, right?

 

What troubles me on the 787 case is that, other than on the DC-10 grounding, they are still searching for the actual causes. Telling where the trouble started is one thing, the why and the connected circumstances are at least equally important. While I don't doubt that there'll be tons of articles coming up explaining 'exactly' what went wrong and why everybody saw it coming, the current situation still is dominated by looking for a whole bunch of possibilities.

 

I read about a (proposed) interim fix here an there, but I actually don't wanna read that. I don't think it would do the business and the authorities any good when the word interim enters the sphere of safety regarding fires. Well, just a feeling. Maybe just one looking at how the word affects the PR value. You currently can't sell any interim to worried folks in my eyes.

Thanks for explaining, Scott.

 

I guess you have a point there. Still, this would be the case on every new design, right?

 

What troubles me on the 787 case is that, other than on the DC-10 grounding, they are still searching for the actual causes. Telling where the trouble started is one thing, the why and the connected circumstances are at least equally important. While I don't doubt that there'll be tons of articles coming up explaining 'exactly' what went wrong and why everybody saw it coming, the current situation still is dominated by looking for a whole bunch of possibilities.

 

I read about a (proposed) interim fix here an there, but I actually don't wanna read that. I don't think it would do the business and the authorities any good when the word interim enters the sphere of safety regarding fires. Well, just a feeling. Maybe just one looking at how the word affects the PR value. You currently can't sell any interim to worried folks in my eyes.

 

You're right that every time you introduce some new design that has no operational experience base, you have to make predictions, and that relies on assumptions which may or may not be valid, and in any case are probably difficult to validate. I had a situation where a certain flying weapon failed to hit a target during a test. Top management requested an investigation. It took about 6 months. I think we pretty much knew what caused the problem after a month or so, but then you gt into why it wasn't found in testing, and if the process was flawed so that there could be other failure modes that simply hadn't been triggered yet. As it turned out a problem was in an interface between system A and system B, and much of the testing was done using a sim for system A which turned out to work OK in the test environment, but the sim didn't reflect all the variables in the actual operational environment.

 

scott s.

.

Thanks for explaining, Scott.

 

I guess you have a point there. Still, this would be the case on every new design, right?

 

What troubles me on the 787 case is that, other than on the DC-10 grounding, they are still searching for the actual causes. Telling where the trouble started is one thing, the why and the connected circumstances are at least equally important. While I don't doubt that there'll be tons of articles coming up explaining 'exactly' what went wrong and why everybody saw it coming, the current situation still is dominated by looking for a whole bunch of possibilities.

 

I read about a (proposed) interim fix here an there, but I actually don't wanna read that. I don't think it would do the business and the authorities any good when the word interim enters the sphere of safety regarding fires. Well, just a feeling. Maybe just one looking at how the word affects the PR value. You currently can't sell any interim to worried folks in my eyes.

 

Interim fix = perfectly safe to fly, but a lot heavier / more expensive to operate than a proper fix.

Your words in the press' ears, John-Alan. :lol: Mind the PR values, as stated above. Markets aren't necessarily dominated by the ones selling the best products but the ones.. selling products.

 

For example, I have yet to see 'green' engines, if you know what I mean. I'm sure they are just around the corner though, the brochures mention them a lot. ^_^

 

Interim fix = perfectly safe to fly, but a lot heavier / more expensive to operate than a proper fix.

You know I appreciate your input a lot, but the devil's advocate in me points out that 'perfectly safe to fly' when not knowing about the causes is a rather vague term. Are you in PR by any chance? Just kidding.

Airbus has decided to drop the Lithium-Ion batteries from their A350's and use Ni-Cads instead. They still claim to stand by the technology though!!

Wow, nice info. Sounds reasonable concerning the schedule they aim at. Uncertainty traded for some extra weight.

You currently can't sell any interim to worried folks in my eyes.

 

I have not been keeping up on the latest status of the grounding.

 

Does it appear that they have an interim solution or remedy that will see the 787 flying anytime soon, or are things as murky as before?

 

Kind regards,

Good you ask, Stephen. It was just rumoured and so I can't even give a link. Wait, some others heard it too. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432004578302560751227522.html I just felt the need to express that the word interim alone isn't able to solve the current issue and silence e.g. the press on doubts regarding the plane/systems. Even the doubts of future passengers.

 

There can only be one fortunate outcome, a manufacturer speaking and knowing about the clear causes and explaining how he fixed the problem. Think of the Pentium bug in PC spheres. That event lost a lot of money, but was able to establish even more trust into the company affected. They make mistakes, they acknowledge them, they rule them out.

 

So there's a chance to even win through making mistakes. And that's where the manufactures may aim at. Or not. I don't know. Interim solutions to just get planes into the air and hoping for the FAA to accept such things after they've used elevated phrases like '1000% save' is.. difficult in my eyes. Imagine something happening again, after the fix. PR disaster, lost trust for B and the FAA and not to mention the lifes in danger.

 

You can have a safe enough plane but if nobody perceives it like that, you don't sell it that much. A DC-10, which was regarded safe after the modifications, can tell that story.

Good you ask, Stephen. It was just rumoured and so I can't even give a link. Wait, some others heard it too. http://online.wsj.co...0751227522.html I just felt the need to express that the word interim alone isn't able to solve the current issue and silence e.g. the press on doubts regarding the plane/systems. Even the doubts of future passengers.

 

There can only be one fortunate outcome, a manufacturer speaking and knowing about the clear causes and explaining how he fixed the problem. Think of the Pentium bug in PC spheres. That event lost a lot of money, but was able to establish even more trust into the company affected. They make mistakes, they acknowledge them, they rule them out.

 

So there's a chance to even win through making mistakes. And that's where the manufactures may aim at. Or not. I don't know. Interim solutions to just get planes into the air and hoping for the FAA to accept such things after they've used elevated phrases like '1000% save' is.. difficult in my eyes. Imagine something happening again, after the fix. PR disaster, lost trust for B and the FAA and not to mention the lifes in danger.

 

You can have a safe enough plane but if nobody perceives it like that, you don't sell it that much. A DC-10, which was regarded safe after the modifications, can tell that story.

 

This is why I said a qualified 3rd party like NASA should have been doing the investigation and coming up with a solution. Boeing has a conflict of interest by wanting to get the plane back in the air, anyway they can.

I don't know, Tom. We are repeating ourselves. :(