I'm sure we both share a great admiration for people working at NASA. But an investigation on a state of the art aeroplane is a bit different from looking at stuck pedals on a car.

 

Your kidding right? You don't think the rocket scientists at NASA are qualified to investigate problems with batteries on an airplane? Battery type , which I'm sure they have probably used, or at least tested with in any other of the myriad of projects they are involved with?

No, not kidding. Just referring to what NASA investigated on your example case.

 

You are right when stating that NASA surely incorporates a lot of expertise. I agree on that. But I was wondering about this being the right one to actually help on the 787 case. :mellow:

 

I actually fear that you are applying something to the 'NASA' term in general. As if it was a homogeneous mass and setup, unable to fail, free of management errors and the magic bullet on every investigation. That the case? Challenger investigation? Details? Besides, I wouldn't use the term 'rocket scientist' to describe something being superior to aviation folks. I would actually call it aerospace engineering in both cases. Perhaps you are bound to the colloquial term usage ('rocket science') then. No problem.

 

Two fields of work. And designing systems for passenger planes running across the planet, in every condition it holds and in numbers of 100 and more may not be the easiest way to earn money. Even in regard to space vehicles. I won't tell lies when saying that commercial passenger transport is more regulated than space flight. Fun fact, the ISS batteries are from the same supplier (GS Yuasa) as the ones on the 787. And Thales (electrical systems) also offers solutions for e.g. satellites.

 

I guess I'm just repeating myself when saying that the experts on the 787 systems are already working hard on the problem. With an investigation being led by officials and with the NTSB adding to the pool, that's as good as you can get. Anything more would require to stir up the whole certification and authority system. Doubts.

 

Still, I wouldn't be surprised if there already were experts involved which also work on NASA projects or at least did in the past. As mentioned, the pool of personnel to pick locks pretty small. A lot smaller than on the Toyota case, hence the note. Maybe it didn't come in the right way. :blush:

All I'm saying is I think the public would have more confidence that the problem is actually certified fixed by a competent independent 3rd party in this case. The FAA has always been the political arm for the airlines/aircraft manufacturers. How many times in the past has the FAA not implement or delayed action on NTSB safety recommendations, because the industry claimed they would cost to much to implement? I always thought that when it comes to safety issues, the NTSB should have overriding authority rather than the FAA!

Well NTSB has reported finding the origin of the JAL fire. http://www.aviatime....87-battery-fire

 

Important detail: they have found the origin, but not the cause. I.e. they now know where the fire started, but not why.

 

No, not kidding. Just referring to what NASA investigated on your example case.

 

You are right when stating that NASA surely incorporates a lot of expertise. I agree on that. But I was wondering about this being the right one to actually help on the 787 case. :mellow:

 

I actually fear that you are applying something to the 'NASA' term in general. As if it was a homogeneous mass and setup, unable to fail, free of management errors and the magic bullet on every investigation. That the case? Challenger investigation? Details? Besides, I wouldn't use the term 'rocket scientist' to describe something being superior to aviation folks. I would actually call it aerospace engineering in both cases. Perhaps you are bound to the colloquial term usage ('rocket science') then. No problem.

 

Two fields of work. And designing systems for passenger planes running across the planet, in every condition it holds and in numbers of 100 and more may not be the easiest way to earn money. Even in regard to space vehicles. I won't tell lies when saying that commercial passenger transport is more regulated than space flight. Fun fact, the ISS batteries are from the same supplier (GS Yuasa) as the ones on the 787. And Thales (electrical systems) also offers solutions for e.g. satellites.

 

I guess I'm just repeating myself when saying that the experts on the 787 systems are already working hard on the problem. With an investigation being led by officials and with the NTSB adding to the pool, that's as good as you can get. Anything more would require to stir up the whole certification and authority system. Doubts.

 

Still, I wouldn't be surprised if there already were experts involved which also work on NASA projects or at least did in the past. As mentioned, the pool of personnel to pick locks pretty small. A lot smaller than on the Toyota case, hence the note. Maybe it didn't come in the right way. :blush:

 

Trivia question of the week: what does the first 'A' in NASA stand for . You're right though, the engineers at Boeing and NASA will have completed the same kind of degree: aerospace engineering (or mechanical or electrical engineering, depending on the area they work on). The only difference between becoming a 'rocket scientist' or a plane designer is which subjects you pick for you specialisation. Even then there are only very few things that are specific to only satellites or aeroplanes, the same laws of physics apply.

That said, the experts who know all the details of the 787s electrical system are the ones that built it, i.e. the ones working for Boeing, Thales and GS Yuasa, plus all the other companies involved in that system.

 

All I'm saying is I think the public would have more confidence that the problem is actually certified fixed by a competent independent 3rd party in this case. The FAA has always been the political arm for the airlines/aircraft manufacturers. How many times in the past has the FAA not implement or delayed action on NTSB safety recommendations, because the industry claimed they would cost to much to implement? I always thought that when it comes to safety issues, the NTSB should have overriding authority rather than the FAA!

 

The problem is, there is no such thing as 100% safe (and if I've learned anything during my engineering degree, it's that anyone who states otherwise is lying to you). In addition though you can always throw more money at something and make it more safe. The question is though how much extra safety are you getting in exchange for how much more money.

The NTSB has the 'easy' option of just pointing out what things would make flying more safe. The FAA has to answer the tough question of how much more safety you will be getting and when does that no longer weigh up to how much more money that would cost.

If all ticket prices were raised by $1000,- we could make flying a lot more safe, if only because far fewer people could afford to fly, making the skies less busy. Would that be worth the cost though?

Tom, I get your point. And I see you are aiming at safety first too.

I always thought that when it comes to safety issues, the NTSB should have overriding authority rather than the FAA!

Lets assume this was the case. We would be writing about the lack of confidence in the NTSB then. Switched roles. :mellow: It's the system.

 

Back to the current situation, I think John-Alan has added some good points. I wouldn't want to be in that chair defining what the real safety happening is about. Go too far and the lobbyist will wield their swords, going not far enough and people will die in or around planes you have cleared. Reality has it that the brochure texts on safety first (and environmental protection ^_^ ) describe a fictional building. We are always talking about a business model in the first place.

 

I could think of more than one engineer presenting his very safe solution, then getting asked how much it'll cost and then being told that there has to be another way. At some point, the question may well transform into 'do you want to keep your job?' and I think that's where you are coming from. Not an aviation business special.

 

Now what I was trying to point out is that the pressure on the costs works both ways. The guys can't cut the corners too much since you not only sell planes but also an image. If that image looks unsafe to the public and airlines, nobody will buy it. Roughly spoken, their aim now is to not only fulfil the certification needs and counteract the worldwide grounding, but to also make sure that the thing is safe enough to fly.. and get sold. Especially on the mid and long terms This usually leads to planes being regarded as safe in the coll. meaning. Well, means no pilot will run away and passengers only complain about the temps or drinks. :lol:

 

And, as history shows, the Boeing folks can handle that. It's not different for other parties.

 

Important detail: they have found the origin, but not the cause.

Vital point that is.

NTSB should have overriding authority rather than the FAA!

 

Unfortunately that would defeat the purpose of the NTSB. NTSB was created to be non-regulatory in an effort to keep the investigators impartial. That is why they can only recommend changes and not enact them.

 

If they could override the FAA then imagine the lobby groups that would be all over the NTSB. It would completely destroy the principles the NTSB was founded on.

Know nothing about this specific case, but in general I think there can be a problem of system engineering not receiving the same degree of support as afforded to "real" engineering.

 

scott s.

.

Scott, I don't think I understand your sentence. :unsure: Can you explain it to me?

I think there can be a problem of system engineering not receiving the same degree of support as afforded to "real" engineering.

 

And I guess John has a point. Not saying that the authorities are free from any lobby influence though.

Scott, I don't think I understand your sentence. :unsure: Can you explain it to me?

 

 

And I guess John has a point. Not saying that the authorities are free from any lobby influence though.

 

System engineers are the people who are in the abstract business of designing the overall architecture of a system and of defining how different components and different systems will talk to each other and otherwise interact. Scott is saying that since this is rather abstract, system engineers often receive less support than the engineers who are designing and building the physical components. Their job is vitally important though. E.g. It's all well and good to have a perfectly working charge controller and a perfectly working battery, but if the interface between the two is not well thought out you can still get all kinds of unexpected behaviour.

Back to the current situation, I think John-Alan has added some good points. I wouldn't want to be in that chair defining what the real safety happening is about. Go too far and the lobbyist will wield their swords, going not far enough and people will die in or around planes you have cleared

 

I was with you right up until the "lobbyist" part. While it's simple to put "safety" on one side and "industry/lobbyist" on the other, part of what John-Alan was pointing out was there is a price for additional degrees of safety and at some point it becomes a price that's simply impractical. It's about more than just "the industry doesn't want to pay the price for (more) safety". At some point, no one does - or no one can.

 

Scott

Scott is saying..

I see. Seems rather specific then. I must admit that I really had difficulties grabbing the meaning. I think I've actually read it totally wrong then. :blush:

 

Scott (the other one), you are pointing out that I was drawing a black and white picture. From reading it again, it may indeed come in like that. Having witnessed how an industry tried to push away regulations on e.g. mandatory rest periods or how much the 'green' business really cares for environmental issues when no press is around, may have turned me into a non believer, so to speak. So I may actually be biased.

 

Lets just say that, at least sometimes, the amount of money being called 'impractical' differs a lot among people running a business, the ones engineering (the reasonable part) and the ones just using their products and services (being the naive part at times). So I think I get your point, but I also agree to the concerns from others about companies cutting corners or mainly focusing on the public image plus PR instead of actual product qualities.

 

Back on the 787 case though, the factors explained do establish a pressure which actually works for the (average) people in my eyes. Neither the FAA nor Boeing itself can afford to remain in that grounded state forever or coming out of it too soon. So I think we are looking at a, under the circumstances, healthy competition of different interests. If they want to get closer to the causes with now test flying again, it makes sense since the issue seems to be a tricky one. Well, at least not something catching the eye from looking at the blueprints.

I think it is a mistake at this stage to allow Boeing to do the testing of them, they clearly have a conflict of interest here. Testing should be done, but by an independent entity, say NASA! They used NASA when they had the problem with Toyota' unintended acceleration problem, so the precedent is set. I think the public would have more confidence too if the problem was certified fixed, by a uninterested competent 3rd party, especially one like NASA!

 

Who do you think knows the plane better? FAA or Boeing?

Boeing does... They designed, built and test flown her under the oversight and with approval of the FAA. They are the ones who do have the knowledge and expertise to figure this out.

Does the FDA do the testing for the new drugs being brought to market to cure illness? No, the drug companies do that and submit their findings to the FDA for approval, just like the FAA does...

 

FAA also has a conflict too. It's their job to regulate and ensure the safety of the airline industry AND at the very same time, promote the airline industry as a safe and reliable way to travel to we, the public at large. This dual role has it's own pitfalls built in to the system.

 

NASA??? Two words here, Challenger and Columbia.

Both were NASA management made diasasters. Morton Thiokol told NASA managers not to launch in '86, but NASA management over rode their safety of flight concerns, and over rode their own engineers on duty that day at the Cape. The result was seven needless deaths.

As for Columbia, there was loads of evidence that the foam was a problem, but NASA management said it was "just part of the risk of manned space flight". In other words, they didn't want to spend the money to fix the foam issue, they were too busy spending it on the ISS, to be bothered. They had known of it for years and sat on their hands and did nothing...

Now, you want me to turn over a aircraft battery issue to that team???

I don't think so...

NASA can't even figure out where in space it wants to go... Let's go to the Moon, Ummm, No,Let's go to Mars, ummm, maybe to an asteriod... Oh, heck, we'll just go rent seats on a rocket from the Russians and go back to the ISS...

This is your idea of a "competent 3rd party, especially one like NASA!" ???

Toyota settled without there ever being a smoking gun in the unintended acceleration case.

Sounds alot like the case against Audi in the seventies. Nothing was ever found in that unintended acceleration case either.

 

The NTSB would be a better choice here, due to lack of conflict in the matter.

One look at the NTSB website would show how many NTSB recommendations have been implimented by the FAA, as a result of NTSB crash investigations in the past. That number is very low.

Give the NTSB better and stronger recommendation powers that the FAA has to do something with and we will all be safer. As the rules stand now, the FAA doesn't have to do a thing with what is recommended to it...

 

 

And test flying by Boeing with the FAA present is the only way to replacate the problem at all...

Raptor

System engineers are the people who are in the abstract business of designing the overall architecture of a system and of defining how different components and different systems will talk to each other and otherwise interact. Scott is saying that since this is rather abstract, system engineers often receive less support than the engineers who are designing and building the physical components. Their job is vitally important though. E.g. It's all well and good to have a perfectly working charge controller and a perfectly working battery, but if the interface between the two is not well thought out you can still get all kinds of unexpected behaviour.

 

Good points japascoe.

You are talking about what in the industry are known as Unk-Unks. (Unknown-Unknowns) Things that one cannot foresee as being or becoming problems or issues in a program.

Comet had them, in the form of explosive decompression. The Electra with the #1 or #4 engine mounts becoming unstable, no wind tunnel data showed that one either. Some things don't show up until you get planes into real world in-service conditions. All the computer modeling in the world can't replace real world experience.

 

Engineering, as well as production ops are very compartmentalized in a program as big as this. One dept doesn't always communicate effectivly with another.

Powerplant people work on the powerplants, Electrical people work on the electrical system, Avionic people work on Avionics. Every Craft has it's area of expertise to work on.

 

"SpiritFlyer: 'It is incredible that something so fundamental as the base electrical design is so flawed that two potentially catastrophic events in a two week period has led to the decertification and grounding worldwide of the entire 787 fleet."

This plane relies on electrical systems for more than any plane before it.

Wheel Brakes are electric, not hydraulic.

Engine starting is by electric starter/generator, not bleed air from the APU. APU is started via starter motor as well.

Cabin pressurization is by electrically driven compressor, not bleed air from the engines, as there is no engine bleed air.

The generators are 250Kva, two per engine, for a total of four. The APU has two 225Kva generators itself. Alot more is being asked of this planes electrical system than ever before. And all driven by a FBW system driven by software.

A 777 has 125Kva Engine driven generators for some perspective. And it is FBW too.

 

Add a Composite airframe and you have a not so simple electrical system anymore.

Composite is largely an insulator, not a conductor. This has influences on the design of electrical system and electrical components located around the airframe. It also influences the design of the airframe too.

Lights, batteries, generators, motors, sensors, hydraulic actuators, control surfaces, all have to be electrically grounded back to the airframe in some way. Some of these are static grounds, some are current returns, but all are necessary none the less.

If I need to ground a system or component in a metal airframe, It's easy to sand to bare metal and attach my grounding lug to provide a path to ground. The metal airframe inheriently provided this pathway by its metallic nature. Like your car batteries negative cable is run to the metal frame to ground your cars electrical system.

To do this in Composite, those pathways have to be engineered and manufactured into the structure of the airframe itself. They add a metallic strip imbedded into the composite when layed up, to provide this pathway, then attach that one to another one in the next part or assembly at a specific point and so on... Complicates the build process as it makes it even more critical to ground properly and in the right places to achieve the grounding pathways necessary.

 

Raptor

Good points japascoe.

You are talking about what in the industry are known as Unk-Unks. (Unknown-Unknowns) Things that one cannot foresee as being or becoming problems or issues in a program.

Comet had them, in the form of explosive decompression. The Electra with the #1 or #4 engine mounts becoming unstable, no wind tunnel data showed that one either. Some things don't show up until you get planes into real world in-service conditions. All the computer modeling in the world can't replace real world experience.

 

Can't resist, since fatigue damage is my specialisation: historical essay time!

 

The unknown-unknown in the Comet case was not explosive decompression per sé, but a lack of understanding of the effect of very high loads on fatigue crack growth. We know now that if you apply one or a few loads (usually called an overload) that are much higher than the other loads in your fatigue spectrum this will have the effect of slowing down fatigue crack growth [look up 'plasticity induced crack closure' if you have an engineering background].

 

Unfortunately the Comet engineers did not yet know this, so in what at the time was a sensible idea, they performed the fatigue testing on the same airframe that had been used to test the static strength of the fuselage. During that previous test the fuselage had been pressurised up to twice the maximum pressure differential expected in service, which had introduced high loads into the structure. As a result during the fatigue tests the cracks grew much slower than in real life, and thus the fatigue life predicted by the test was much longer than the actual fatigue life. Having square windows with sharp corners also didn't help, but had the fatigue testing been done on a 'virgin' airframe this problem would have been caught in the testing stage.

 

On a side-note, in response to Raptor's criticism on NASA's indecision, a lot of it comes from the guy being in charge of NASA's budget changing every 4 to 8 years and each new guy (and perhaps in future girl?) having different ideas of what should be achieved by space flight and how much money that's worth.

I don't see NASA in any state of indecision, but in the one of running a tight budget in regard to other branches and looking for at least some useful science output. And none of the possible space ops involves cheap tech. Not to forget that you can really ruin long term planning, being in need of a sequence of missions, spreading over years or even decades, to achieve a final goal, when you bring in short term budget cuts. But that's not a special NASA problem, that's one of science in general. It doesn't have the (public) value it may deserve and politicians aim for quick public value in the first place. Conflict of aims.

 

The last time NASA had a high amount of funding to handle was back in the days of the Moon program. Over four decades ago and not primarily driven by noble science interests as we know.

 

It would be nice to see some change on the political fronts, from heavy military funding (where NASA is involved in research of course) to a scientific focus. Even more so when this involves other nations joining in. Big tasks require big money and expertise. And working together is different to building up arms.

 

The perception of the science budget is way different from the actual situation where most countries spend only a tiny fraction while their people seem to relate to fictional high values. Magnitudes. So it's vital to keep science and education alive and interesting, to be honest about how much money is really spent on them and why this is a good investment.

 

Can they help on the 787? I guess not. Can they contribute to global goals and breakthroughs? I really think so.