Well that's an interesting thing to bring up, the indication was only wrong for a short time due the icing of the pitot tube and the a/p dropping out due to airspeed inconsistencies..it was the what happened afterwards that resulted in the very sad outcome.

 

Though this along with other high profile incidents (737-8 at EHAM, the 777 at SFO etc) should be pointing out the huge issue of humans & machines working together. Work needs to be done to guard people from these kind of events happening again.

 

No - people don't need guarding from these mistakes. They happened because people stopped doing the basic thing of FLYING THE F***ING AIRCRAFT.

 

LESS emphasis on automation, MORE emphasis on manual flying skills.

 

AF447 happened because they didn't recognize a stall, and worse, didn't appreciate that when the altimeter is winding backwards at 10000 ft/min YOU DO NOT KEEP PULLING BACK ON THE STICK! I find it quite disturbing that people don't appreciate that through the problems AF447 was experiencing, the altimeters were operating correctly! In case people don't know their systems well enough, it was severe pitot icing that killed the ASI, and caused the downgrade in the FBW system when the ADIRUs threw a fit over mismatched IAS. The static ports were unaffected, and the altimeters and VSI were operating correctly.

 

The avionics didn't kill them - their own lack of basic flying skills did. PITCH + POWER = PERFORMANCE.

 

They totally forgot how to fly that night.

 

Other indicators to the stall: pitch trim had auto-wound all the way back, different sound on the flight deck from normal, difficulty maintaining a wings level attitude (wing drop and ineffective ailerons requiring greater than normal control inputs).

 

All of this was ignored. Even if they were in a severe downdraft, other parameters would be normal if the aircraft was fundamentally flying, albeit in a very fast, vertically moving column of air.

 

Regarding the OPs question, the reason you still need to use VOR/DME and occasionally NDBs, is backup/redundancy. They are the lowest in the tree because they are fixed, ground-based stations with known positions that can't change. Everything else is reliant upon an airborne inertial system that can drift in unexpected ways. It is not possible to catch every error in such systems, so there is always the possibility that the computed position has a gross error that can't be detected by self-monitoring systems.

 

GPS can not be used for primary navigation alone; it must be backed up by dual INS/IRS (triple in the case of oceanic).

 

INS/IRS can not be used for primary navigation without being backed up by dual VOR and/or DME. Most installations have at least two INS/IRS, with oceanic requiring three.

 

Whether you use INS/IRS or GPS for nav reference, you always end up with the hierarchy of:

 

INS/IRS

VOR/DME

 

or

 

GPS

INS/IRS

VOR/DME

 

GPS is particularly vulnerable to outages in service, not least because of "space weather". Most systems are actually GNS (the aircraft position is INS/IRS derived position with GPS position updates). GPS itself is not used directly in the navigation.

 

Best regards,

Robin.

Robin, I don't disagree with you but my point is what has led the aviation community down this track and that is automation and the failure to realise the impact it has on us humans. You said it yourself: Less emphasis on automation and more emphasis on flying. That is the key and sadly that is what is not happening.

 

Some companies own SOPs seem to favour the machine over the human. I know of one big company out there that instructs their pilots to engage the a/p at about 500' AGL and if they'd don't they better had a good reason for doing so. The company concerned sees that it is the most efficient way to run their aircraft but do they realise what it is doing to the guys in charge of the thing the moment the machine spits its dummy out.

 

If it's not addressed correctly then I can see this becoming the number 1 risk factor (if it's not already) and hence why I am referencing the incidents. Airbus have had this battle almost from the get-go with the A320 series, the air show crash.

 

Though "LESS emphasis on automation, MORE emphasis on manual flying skills" does not appear to be the way the future is going.

Thing is NDB and VORs still exist because not all aircraft have FMCs. Furthermore, it is not cost effective to install ILS approaches to every runway and so available instrument approaches are dependent on the volume of commercial traffic to that particular airfield. After all, user pays. Also re VORs and TACANs, not sure if current systems do it but they did use VORs etc as a check to confirm the accuracy of the IRS.

Robin- I um unable to selective quote on my ipad, also really don't want to thread drift and send this thread down the drain however.....

 

"Other indicators to the stall: pitch trim had auto-wound all the way back, different sound on the flight deck from normal, difficulty maintaining a wings level attitude (wing drop and ineffective ailerons requiring greater than normal control inputs)"

 

You make the whole incident sound like they where flying in a Cessna in cruise/CAVOK and in broad daylight then just lost the plot, I am pretty sure if you we're RHS or LHS on A447 that night without your Sunday quarterback knowledge and comfort of your home you would have s*** yourself and panicked, maybe not pulled like a madman but still panicked.

 

Trim didnt go full nose up because of a stall, it went full nose up because pitch was in Alt B and the pilot commanded it, the sound on the flight deck was confusing, they dropped like a brick, airflow was coming from beneath them, nobody alive that operates passenger aircraft can say they have heard that sound for real, nothing do with a stall.

 

Difficulty maintaining roll - The aircrafts roll mode was in direct law, the crew knew this hence why they focused on roll over pitch initially. Again nothing to do with a stall, in fact investigators and Airbus where surprised at how docile and stable the aircraft behaved.

 

They had less then 3 minutes to figure it out after Bonins initial screw up

 

Whilst I do not condone the crews actions at all, (yes pitch and power is a memory item for UAS) once The PF overreacted in Pitch they found themselves in a unique and slowly developing situation that is a killer at night with no visual clues, just like descending in an elevator it becomes hard to tell if you are actually moving, if the aircraft had fully stalled immediately and a wing dropped the outcome most likely would have been differant.

 

To everyone onboard it would have felt like leval flight with some buffet in a storm, Not falling at 10000fpm into the ocean. Take a look at somotagraphic illusion, it is a deadly killer.

High power NDBs are still very common in Russia, The Russians (especially their air force) couldn't manage the transition to GLONASS (Russian equivalent of GPS) before the old Soviet Union collapsed and they ran out of money. GPS in Russia (As a service provided courtesy of the US military) is limited to western-built aircraft, New Russian-built civilian aircraft with Western avionics e.g. Sukhoi Superjet, a few non-certified retrofit units like the Bendix KLN-90B, and hand-helds.

Robin, I don't disagree with you but my point is what has led the aviation community down this track and that is automation and the failure to realise the impact it has on us humans. You said it yourself: Less emphasis on automation and more emphasis on flying. That is the key and sadly that is what is not happening.

 

Some companies own SOPs seem to favour the machine over the human. I know of one big company out there that instructs their pilots to engage the a/p at about 500' AGL and if they'd don't they better had a good reason for doing so. The company concerned sees that it is the most efficient way to run their aircraft but do they realise what it is doing to the guys in charge of the thing the moment the machine spits its dummy out.

 

If it's not addressed correctly then I can see this becoming the number 1 risk factor (if it's not already) and hence why I am referencing the incidents. Airbus have had this battle almost from the get-go with the A320 series, the air show crash.

 

Though "LESS emphasis on automation, MORE emphasis on manual flying skills" does not appear to be the way the future is going.

 

Yes, and to be honest, the industry should find the idea of its pilots being unable to fly the aircraft scary, considering that is what they are paid to do!

 

Air France seems to have suffered little in the way of negative passenger reaction after both Concorde and AF447 crashes, which is equally scary.

 

As for the A320 crash at the Paris Airshow, I do *NOT* believe the official version of events.

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21823506

 

Coincidence? I don't think so. In 2012 they found Continental Airlines clear on ALL counts relating to the Concorde crash. That raises serious questions about the alleged strip of metal, and still leaves unanswered questions about the role of the Concorde crew and their actions significantly contributing to the crash.

 

Best regards,

Robin.

 

 

Take a look at somotagraphic illusion, it is a deadly killer.

 

No joke.  I departed a coastal airport one night and turned towards the sea in the pattern, lost all visual cues because it's pitch black out there, and relied too much on vestibular cues.  Those vestibular cues got weird real quickly because I overcompensated in some way (over-rolled, I think), and I luckily remembered the "trust your gauges" thing that was always hammered into my head for when you lose visual cues.  I've never been disoriented when IFR.  A severe clear VFR night is what almost got me.

 

...and they didn't even have the advantage of trusty instruments in their situation.

 

Granted, I have my criticisms of what happened, but like you said, it was a tough situation.

Robin, I don't disagree with you but my point is what has led the aviation community down this track and that is automation and the failure to realise the impact it has on us humans. You said it yourself: Less emphasis on automation and more emphasis on flying. That is the key and sadly that is what is not happening.

 

Some companies own SOPs seem to favour the machine over the human. I know of one big company out there that instructs their pilots to engage the a/p at about 500' AGL and if they'd don't they better had a good reason for doing so. The company concerned sees that it is the most efficient way to run their aircraft but do they realise what it is doing to the guys in charge of the thing the moment the machine spits its dummy out.

 

If it's not addressed correctly then I can see this becoming the number 1 risk factor (if it's not already) and hence why I am referencing the incidents. Airbus have had this battle almost from the get-go with the A320 series, the air show crash.

 

Though "LESS emphasis on automation, MORE emphasis on manual flying skills" does not appear to be the way the future is going.

I agree with above sentiments but here's more food for thought. In the late 90's and early 2000's it was possible to go from initial pilot training to a commercial pilot's license with 250-400 hours of total flying time straight into the right seat of an RJ at a regional airline. There is no way someone can master advanced stick and rudder skills in that time frame. Regarding previous posts regarding AF 447. Stall margins are far less forgiving in cruise flight above 35,000 ft than they are at less ambitious altitudes requiring a greater adherence to basics like instrument scanning. Regards

 

 

...and they didn't even have the advantage of trusty instruments in their situation.

Actually they had everything they needed. ADI. They had the added advantage of a working altimeter and VSI, which they chose to ignore.

 

Best regards,

Robin.

 

 

There is no way someone can master basic stick and rudder fundamentals in that time frame.

 

Respectfully:

That's not quite accurate, and really only serves to further the widespread misconception that 250 hours isn't a lot of time (which is one of the reasons Congress forced the ATP rule on us).  Granted, a 250 hour pilot isn't going to have a lot of the experience-based knowledge of thousand hour pilots, it doesn't mean they're lacking fundamentals.  If you're lacking stick and rudder skills, you shouldn't have made it past PPL.

 

Provided your instructor ensures that you know what flying the wing is really all about, it's something that you should have a good understanding of by your PPL, and a basic mastery of soon thereafter.  Granted, with each airframe it'll take some time to get used to it, but I can fly the heck out of the wing of the DA40 (not that it's incredibly difficult - it's a very forgiving wing - won't even really break in a stall) and I only have 7.1 hours in it.

 

The DPE on my PPL checkride complimented my stick and rudder coordination (and she's a tough DPE in the DC area).  Having gotten my PPL at something like 41 hours, I'd attribute that to my instructor's constant reminders of "trust the instruments, but fly the wing."

Respectfully:

That's not quite accurate, and really only serves to further the widespread misconception that 250 hours isn't a lot of time (which is one of the reasons Congress forced the ATP rule on us).  Granted, a 250 hour pilot isn't going to have a lot of the experience-based knowledge of thousand hour pilots, it doesn't mean they're lacking fundamentals.  If you're lacking stick and rudder skills, you shouldn't have made it past PPL.

 

Provided your instructor ensures that you know what flying the wing is really all about, it's something that you should have a good understanding of by your PPL, and a basic mastery of soon thereafter.  Granted, with each airframe it'll take some time to get used to it, but I can fly the heck out of the wing of the DA40 (not that it's incredibly difficult - it's a very forgiving wing - won't even really break in a stall) and I only have 7.1 hours in it.

 

The DPE on my PPL checkride complimented my stick and rudder coordination (and she's a tough DPE in the DC area).  Having gotten my PPL at something like 41 hours, I'd attribute that to my instructor's constant reminders of "trust the instruments, but fly the wing."

Agreed, I edited my initial post to "advanced stick and rudder skills" immediately after posting original. Regards

 

 

Agreed, I edited my initial post to "advanced stick and rudder skills" immediately after posting original.

 

Gotcha - even so, I'd almost argue that increased time in larger jets only serves to erode your stick and rudder skills because you're mostly watching the plane do the flying, according to the SOPs of many majors.

It's like anything - "use it or lose it".

 

In the case of AF447, raise your hand if the first thing to cross your mind was "SELECT GS ON THE ADIRU". Yes, it is GS, and so will be something silly like 450 kts, BUT that magic box of tricks also tells you the sensed winds, so if you know a good airspeed is equivalent of 450 kts +/- wind, the nyou have a speed target to aim for. As it was, the GS readout would be about 150 kts (if they bothered to look).

 

It is an inertial speed not requiring air data. It's also on the POS page of the FMGC for easier reading.

 

Another one: you're flying a pressurized aircraft, and you determine have blocked static ports, rendering all the altimeters useless. They won't unblock. It's night time and you're in cloud. MSA for 100 nm around your destination is 8000 ft. What do you do?

 

Best regards,

Robin.

Once again, Monday Morning quarterback.... Well done

Gotcha - even so, I'd almost argue that increased time in larger jets only serves to erode your stick and rudder skills because you're mostly watching the plane do the flying, according to the SOPs of many majors.

Yep! I personally don't believe the AP should  be engaged until the aircraft is cleaned up after takeoff  or below around 1500 ft AGL unless prevailing minimums dictates its use. I believe one of the factors regarding how SOP's are written relate to today's fuel costs and the belief that crews waste fuel hand flying the aircraft. I've had flight crews tell me exactly that. I don't believe this trend does anything to enhance safety IMHO. Regards