>I won't ask what regional you work for...lol. I know someone>who also is working for a well known regional flying RJ's from>the, let's say, the Eastern half of the US, but I haven't>spoke with him in quite a while. I have a feeling anything>above 400 is going get nixed pretty quick by air carriers.>>I understand the controllers were also a bit surprised to>receive the request for 410 from the aircraft.>>I think Bombardier also has some issues about the aircraft at>410, if I'm not mistken.>>My theory on that whole situation was that they burned out the>generators giving them no chance for a restart to begin with,>but that's just my opinion. I think they would have needed an>APU assist if I'm not mistaken? and by the time they got lower>the batteries were probably burned out and it was too late to>go for anything but a dead stick.>>From that altitude though I often wondered why they couldn't>even make KC or even STL...lol.jeff,no theory i thought. the airplane stalled and the airflow reduction in the engine flamed them out. they did not maintain adequate speed to keep the core spinning and it "locked" up. at that point they could not get the engine started. from experience, the airplane (CRJ700) has NO problem at FL410, provided you keep the airplane within the deemed envelope (ie take into account weight, speed, SAT, etc). usually what limits us up there is the ozone timing charts in the winter.

Yeah, rgr that. I thought they were in the 200. Speaking of which...on the 700. Could FADEC have helped them by preserving electrical power maybe. I don't have enough knowledge in that area obviousley.I didn't know they locked up either.It's a weird deal that we can all learn from that's for sure.Edit: Sorry for speaking about 300 diff things at once here but I think you're following ok.

>Yeah, rgr that. I thought they were in the 200. >>Speaking of which...on the 700. Could FADEC have helped them>by preserving electrical power maybe. I don't have enough>knowledge in that area obviousley.>>I didn't know they locked up either.>>It's a weird deal that we can all learn from that's for sure.>>Edit: Sorry for speaking about 300 diff things at once here>but I think you're following ok.the accident airplane was a CRJ200. the CRJ series, 2/7/9, has electrical power upon a dual engine failure through an ADG (air driven generator) - known as a RAT (ram air turbine) on some other a/c types. it is a little propeller that falls out of the right nose area into the airstream. the prop turns and generates electricity. obviously, it does not produce as much as the IDG's on the engines so certain noncritical items are "shed". being a prop (ie an airfoil moving through the air) it has a "stall" speed that must be maintained. to my knowledge they were above this speed the entire time down. the APU (at least in the 700, i dunno about the 200) cannot be restarted until FL370. the engines cannot be attempted to restart until the low 20's.FADEC helps by sensing a loss of airflow into the engine and automatically turns on the ignitors. i don't know if the 200 (which does not have FADEC) has this stall protection built into it.

I believe part of the reason the engines "locked up" (core lock) is due to the fact that they never got into the restart envelope which was causing overtemps on the restarts and they basically melted one of them and the other never got enough rpm for start due to the fact that they didnt get nose low enough for the required IAS. Doesnt really matter though in the end, they did EVERYTHING WRONG. It will get you killed.Hornit

That's what I was thinking. I don't think the -200 has it either.

rgr that, Jim. It's not just one thing that does it, it's usually a chain of things.

But the A300 wasn't in a 90 degree angle of bank at the time and from the sounds of what your saying, I don't think you aware of how the rudder was actually used in that case. Airbus were more than happy to demonstrate infront of the video cameras in their simulators how the aircraft should have been recovered, with just the ailerons, but American Airlines training stated that the rudder was to be used to assist the aircraft. American Airlines training for dealing with wake turbulence centered around smaller aircraft of the DC-9 size which are far more vunerable to its effects and the same training was applied to all their aircraft.The tail actually stood up to forces well beyond its maximum design limits and performed well in a situation it was never meant to be put in. A series of full rudder reversals in fairly rapid succession as it was being used in conjunction with the ailerions to counter roll. (the aircraft was not on its side with the rudder being used to try to keep the nose up like an elevator). No airliner is designed to withstand multiple full rudder reversals. Right after the accident all manufacturers of large airlines, especially Boeing, issued a safety bulletin stating as much. No, the A300's tail was not weak, that's a misunderstanding on your part. Airbus' contribution to the disaster was the way the rudder limiter worked ie becoming very sensitive at high speed compared to lower speeds, meaning less input was needed to move the rudder to maximum deflection. That's a terrible bit of design on their part, though they won't admit it. Airbus' responsibility lies in their lack of making sure the airlines and pilots knew how to fly the aircraft properly. Though this lack of responsibility applied to many airline manufacturers.At the end of the day, a B767 in the same situtation and flown the same way was just as likely to have its tail break off.Anyway, I know the point you're making about it not being pilot error, you're quite right there. It wasn't the sole fault of the pilot.But it isn't the sole fault of Airbus either and certainly not the the fault of the aircrafts structural strength.

you, like most pilots, have the ability to control your stress levels. that doesn't mean it isn't there. it just means you have it under control

>But the A300 wasn't in a 90 degree angle of bank at the time>and from the sounds of what your saying, I don't think you>aware of how the rudder was actually used in that case. Airbus>were more than happy to demonstrate infront of the video>cameras in their simulators how the aircraft should have been>recovered, with just the ailerons, but American Airlines>training stated that the rudder was to be used to assist the>aircraft. American Airlines training for dealing with wake>turbulence centered around smaller aircraft of the DC-9 size>which are far more vunerable to its effects and the same>training was applied to all their aircraft.>>The tail actually stood up to forces well beyond its maximum>design limits and performed well in a situation it was never>meant to be put in. A series of full rudder reversals in>fairly rapid succession as it was being used in conjunction>with the ailerions to counter roll. (the aircraft was not on>its side with the rudder being used to try to keep the nose up>like an elevator). >No airliner is designed to withstand multiple full rudder>reversals. Right after the accident all manufacturers of large>airlines, especially Boeing, issued a safety bulletin stating>as much. >No, the A300's tail was not weak, that's a misunderstanding on>your part. >Airbus' contribution to the disaster was the way the rudder>limiter worked ie becoming very sensitive at high speed>compared to lower speeds, meaning less input was needed to>move the rudder to maximum deflection. That's a terrible bit>of design on their part, though they won't admit it. Airbus'>responsibility lies in their lack of making sure the airlines>and pilots knew how to fly the aircraft properly. Though this>lack of responsibility applied to many airline manufacturers.>At the end of the day, a B767 in the same situtation and flown>the same way was just as likely to have its tail break off.>>Anyway, I know the point you're making about it not being>pilot error, you're quite right there. It wasn't the sole>fault of the pilot.>But it isn't the sole fault of Airbus either and certainly not>the the fault of the aircrafts structural strength.i still like blaming the giant euro-subsidized airbus. the 300 is a dog. :-)my bad. just watched the ntsb animation. a/c was dutch rolling due to wake and tail came off.

This is several years old, but probably the best example of lousy CRM I've ever seen:http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR97-01.pdfThe wheels-up landing of Continental 1943 at Houston a while back. Bloody miracle nobody was seriously hurt considering the plane touched down on the runway wheels up at 190 knots and slid 7,000 feet.If you wade through the entire NTSB report, including the CVR transcript, you'll be blown away at all the things that are wrong in there. Sterile cockpit violations, checklist shortcutting, a F/O that was too cowed to speak up to the Captain, a Captain that had a recto-cranial inversion and thought it normal to continue a final approach despite the fact that the gear warning horn was blaring, the flaps were showing 0 degrees, and the plane was doing TWO HUNDRED KNOTS...you get the idea.Then there's the JAL Cargo DC-8 that crashed out of Anchorage many years ago because the Captain was allegedly falling-down drunk...Lewis "Moose" GregoryRichmond, Virginia

You might want to blame Airbus, and they are not my favourite maker, but at the end of the day American Airlines training failed, and no way was America going to blame her national carrier for that. They tried to pin it on Airbus until it was proven that even a Boeing would've done the same under the same conditions. So who to blame? The pilots.

>You might want to blame Airbus, and they are not my favourite>maker, but at the end of the day American Airlines training>failed, and no way was America going to blame her national>carrier for that. They tried to pin it on Airbus until it was>proven that even a Boeing would've done the same under the>same conditions. So who to blame? The pilots.The united states national carrier is the USAF. American Airlines is simply a business started by a cranky, old, mean man named CR Smith in Texas flying the mail. It grew largely under the auspices of Robert Crandall. As a matter of fact, American pilots have quite the reputation as being arrogant (they have been referred to as skynAAzi's with Dallas ). Just ask any former TWA pilots.

I would have to agree with that. A documentary about the incident (where Airbus demonstrated what should have been done) interviewed a number of American pilots who refused to fly the A300 after the accident talking about how composite tails are weaker, how a Boeing Alluminium tail has never broken off (well, actually one did break off a B-52 once but we can ignore that if we want to).The funny thing is, Boeing are now the pioneers of composites with the 787 having the highest percentage of any airliner yet. Including the fuselage. I'd be interested to find out what those pilots interviewed think of the 787. (Plus, the 777 has a composite tail too).Airbus have plenty of arrogance but one thing should be remembered.An A300 is the only airliner to have been hit by a surface to air missile, loose all hydraulics and yet successfully land on engine power alone with a wing on fire. The DC-10 at Siux city was an outstanding effort but led to a very severe crash landing.If ever there was an example that an Airbus can be solidly built, that was it. Much as anyone might hate the A300, you really have to tip your hat to it and the crew that day. http://www.aviationexplorer.com/dhl_strike_pictures/

Not forgetting an Airbus A330 also holds the dead-stick record for distance @89 Miles.

The Korean Air 747 freighter accident at Stansted in 1999 is another example.http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/d..._pdf_023258.pdfAfter takeoff the aircraft climbed to about 2500 ft then entered a turning descent to fly into the ground at 40 deg nose down and 90 deg bank. The conclusions included:"There was no evidence that the commander detected that the aircraft was at an extreme roll and pitch attitude. The firtst officer either did not detect that the aircraft was at an extreme roll and pitch attitude or having identified the abnormal attitude was inhibited from bringing it to the attention of the commander. There was a marked difference in age and experience between the commander and first officer."