53 minutes ago, sd_flyer said:

I have two friends who flew 737MAX prior infamous crashes. My understanding the problem was not in design problem but rather in inadequate training/understanding new technology implemented in MAX due engine mount. So previously 737NG type rated pilots were found themself in shady area no understanding proper procedures. 

A little of both, with other factors mixed in.  The system design was poor from a human-factors standpoint, in that the system would be overridden by a pilot-input trim command opposite the MCAS.  It would stop then, and the pilot input would take over, and then the pilot would release his trim switch and - after a certain time, not immediately - the MCAS would reactivate.  Several cycles of this would drive the aircraft into a progressively more severely mistrimmed state.  

The design issues were that there did not used to be a limit to the number of times this cycle could repeat, and the delay before each subsequent activation made it a very insidious problem to recognize; especially in the accident aircraft flight decks, with multiple conflicting visual and aural alerts simultaneously triggered.  The system design was exactly wrong, from a human-factors standpoint. 

Training was deficient in the sense that the engineers assumed existing trim runaway training would encapsulate an MCAS malfunction - which it did, if the crew recognized it.  Because of the above design issues, erroneous MCAS activation did not manifest as a "normal" trim runaway that a crew was trained to recognize. 

Then, yes, there were airmanship errors on top of it, but understandable given the confusion in those cockpits. 

Basically, anyone who says it was a design issue is wrong. Anyone who says it was a training issue is wrong. Anyone who says it was an airmanship issue is wrong. It was the combination of ALL those things. 

Edited February 9, 20224 yr by Stearmandriver

Will all this discutions on the Max, one thing I am wondering. On the ND or other screens is there any takeoff - landing important items, with automatic confirmation, autobrake, flaps, landing gear and also automatically display emergency procedures, etc...?

Like what you can find on the A320ceo, or maybe the A310, not sure about this one.

 

Edited February 9, 20224 yr by bendead

56 minutes ago, bendead said:

On the ND or other screens is there any takeoff - landing important items, with automatic confirmation, autobrake, flaps, landing gear and also automatically display emergency procedures, etc...?

Like what you can find on the A320ceo, or maybe the A310, not sure about this one.

Not really; it's a 737 cockpit for the most part.  Flap position is shown on the engine display on one of the DUs now, but gear, autobrake and spoiler indications are mostly the same as the NG (the spoilers have a few new tricks and new lights to match.)  No auto pop-up checklists; no real CAS.  It's specifically intended to share type commonality with the NG.

4 hours ago, Stearmandriver said:

 No auto pop-up checklists; no real CAS.

I find the auto checklists on the CRJ and FBW 320 make me lazy and I don't bother to do the actual checklists.

Having no prior experience with the 737 is going to be interesting. 😅

11 hours ago, threegreen said:

The statement isn't true. The trim wheel couldn't be moved due to the excessive aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer which solely resulted from the crew entirely forgetting about speed and letting it go way past V_mo. The sensor didn't cause a blockage of the trim wheel at all.

I know all of that. The failing sensor did not cause it directly and in all cases. But it did cause it causally and at least once with pax on board. But never on the NG. That's what I wanted to say. Also, the other pilots, who landed safely after MCAS triggered, did not face the stuck trim wheel at all, because they cut off the trim early enough.

9 hours ago, Stearmandriver said:

But... they're demonstrably not.

yes,...

- if the crews knew how MCAS worked prior the flight.
- and if no other mistakes (overspeed) happened in addition.

But, recreating the situation in simulator with multiple US crews, the roller coaster was required (see my link).

11 hours ago, Stearmandriver said:

You would never be able to remotely approximate the startle factor and confusion in those flight decks, of multiple conflicting warnings combined with subtle, intermittent trim actuations, combined with the crews' unawareness of the system's operation. 

About that I fully agree.

 

9 hours ago, Stearmandriver said:

Not really; it's a 737 cockpit for the most part.  Flap position is shown on the engine display on one of the DUs now, but gear, autobrake and spoiler indications are mostly the same as the NG (the spoilers have a few new tricks and new lights to match.)  No auto pop-up checklists; no real CAS.  It's specifically intended to share type commonality with the NG.

That's really weird on such a new aircraft, but since no new training was required, it's was not possible to install such system.

On 2/5/2022 at 11:36 PM, espent said:

Talking about airliners. iniBuild posted a screenshot of the A310 and said this month would be great for MSFS fliers. 

What did they mean by this I wonder? 😕

"This Month" now being over since Monday