I don't suppose we could ever know what difference an AoA indicator or alarm could have made in this event, but I wonder if a stall alarm sounds and you don't react to it why you would react to an AoA indicator? It seems to go to the training (or lack of) issue.

I think they reacted to the stall alarm, at least for a few seconds:

At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning was triggered again.

Source: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/note29juillet2011.en.pdf The stall warning only works when the computer thinks values (IAS and AOA) are "valid". That must have been very confusing for the pilot. During the only moments where he made the pitch-down inputs that may help to recover from a stall, the AOA decreased, the speed increased, and the alarm said, "hey stop doing that, stall !".

I think they reacted to the stall alarm, at least for a few seconds: Source: http://www.bea.aero/...llet2011.en.pdf The stall warning only works when the computer thinks values (IAS and AOA) are "valid". That must have been very confusing for the pilot. During the only moments where he made the pitch-down inputs that may help to recover from a stall, the AOA decreased, the speed increased, and the alarm said, "hey stop doing that, stall !".

Exactly! Which is why they ought to have a separate AoA indicator that the PF can rely on inspite of any mayhem going on in the cockpit. Cheers, -jahman.

There are similarities to G-ARPI the Trident that crashed shortly after take-off from Heathrow in 1972. They were flying substantially slower than they should have been and someone retracted the slats putting the a/c instantly into a deep stall. The stall alarm and stick shaker went off three times and what did they do? They turned it off!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!It was this accident that prompted the installation of Cockpit voice recorders. However in the case of Air France we need mind recorders!! To find out why they never identified the stall. Stall configurations are something so basic for a pilot to learn and yet they all three of them seemed to forget their basic training!

The following link is helpful http://www.faa.gov/o...ators/training/ especially the presentation Presentation: Appendix 3-B, Industry Solutions for Large Swept-Wing Turbofan Airplanes (More than 100 Passengers) They suggests it is a universal problem. It must not be forgotten a Trident (together with imilar aircraft) could not be recovered from a fully delevloped deep-stall. That was why stick-pusher were fitted. Is it not possible, that it may the Air France Airbus could not have been recoverable given its high angle of attack. 60^O is fairly unknown territory.

The Trident was commonly known as "The Ground Hugger" meaning it was underpowered. Also it required separate operations to retract the slats and then the flaps. Had they gone with even the third stick shaker and push they would have recovered. Who retracted the slats will never be known.But it was also a case of innexperienced crew with only Captain Key having the hours.Both the Trident and 1-11 suffered deep stalls. Whereas the VC10 never did. In fact they couldn't get it to deep stall due to its huge tail plane in comparison to the others.vololiberista

The following link is helpful http://www.faa.gov/o...ators/training/ especially the presentation Presentation: Appendix 3-B, Industry Solutions for Large Swept-Wing Turbofan Airplanes (More than 100 Passengers) They suggests it is a universal problem. It must not be forgotten a Trident (together with imilar aircraft) could not be recovered from a fully delevloped deep-stall. That was why stick-pusher were fitted. Is it not possible, that it may the Air France Airbus could not have been recoverable given its high angle of attack. 60^O is fairly unknown territory.

Do Airbus have sidestick pushers? Or even shakers? Cheers, - jahman.

Nope.Something that is really confusing me, why did the pnf put the adirs in att? and why was the captain talking about using the standby attitude indicator?The only reason I would want to put the adirs in att is if my pitch reference on the PFD was incorrect. From what I know both PFD's were working correctly.Edit- nevermind I figured it out

...The only reason I would want to put the adirs in att is if my pitch reference on the PFD was incorrect...

Or if you thought the pitch references were incorrect, which would explain why they never realized they were in deep stall because they never believed their attitude indications ("that can't be right!") Extricating yourself out of a confused state of mind while your VS = - 10Kfpm can be extraordinarily difficult. That's why a stick shaker and especially a stick pusher would have been so helpful! Thanks, but I think for now I'll just stick to flying (and simming) in Boeings... Cheers, - jahman.

And those Boeing stick shakers did no good with the Birgenair Flight 301, and Aero Peru because their air data sources were corrupt.

The Birgenair Flight 301 you mentioned seems to also have suffered from fatal cockpit confusion as to airspeed (one blocked pitot tube suspected). The Aeroperu Flight 603 (taped-over static ports) also had bad air data, as you said. Not sure what procedures (pre-takeoff, in-flight) could be improved to mitigate this problem. Seems Cheers, - jahman.

The Airbus Normal Law provides AoA protection so the aircraft can't be stalled which serves the same purpose as a stick-pusher. As I said earlier, the unanswered question is, can the aircraft be recovered from and AoA of 60^O+?. It might be near to impossible in any similar aircraft. I doublt Airbus, Boeing or any other manufacturer have ever tried to find out.

A key conclusion from the latest report (still in French) seems to be:il y a eu incohérence entre les vitesses mesurées, vraisemblablement à la suite del’obstruction des sondes Pitot en environnement de cristaux de glaceTranslationthere was inconsistency between the measured speeds, presumably as a result ofobstruction of Pitot probes by of ice crystals

From section 3-4-2 of the VC10 Flying Manual 3. ERRONEOUS INSTRUMENT INDICATIONSWhen questionable information is indicated on instruments dependent on thepitot/static system, suspect icing or contamination in the system andFLY ATTITUDE whilst assessing the situation. It couldn't be clearer really.I concur with the report's findings so far.vololiberista

Did you read the article I included in my post?

Yes, it appears to be written from the point of view of a Naval Aviator whose training and experience was all based on AoA indication being available. If that's what you know, I imagine you will find it good if not imperative. It could well be that training all pilots on use of AoA could be an improvement over current philosophy. I just don't think it is simply a matter of putting in another gauge. I should add that regardless of whether you have an AoA gauge, or a stall alarm that is derived from AoA, if AoA is unreliable when IAS is < 60 Kt you still have that issue. scott s..

...It could well be that training all pilots on use of AoA could be an improvement over current philosophy. I just don't think it is simply a matter of putting in another gauge.

Agreed. A separate gauge does have an advantage if powered by a separate vane so it's a separate system that can't be contaminated (perceived or actual) by another unreliable system (the ADIRUs in this case).

I should add that regardless of whether you have an AoA gauge, or a stall alarm that is derived from AoA, if AoA is unreliable when IAS is < 60 Kt you still have that issue. scott s.

OK, but consider AAF447 registered 107 KIAS at impact.

The Airbus Normal Law provides AoA protection so the aircraft can't be stalled which serves the same purpose as a stick-pusher.

Except in the case of AAF447, which is exactly why perhaps an independent A0A gauge with an audible alarm could have been of help.

As I said earlier, the unanswered question is, can the aircraft be recovered from and AoA of 60^O+?. It might be near to impossible in any similar aircraft. I doublt Airbus, Boeing or any other manufacturer have ever tried to find out.

Quite, but perhaps AAF447 would not have reached deep stall, and perhaps could have even recovered. Cheers, - jahman.