Many thanks for posting, that's exactly the kind of inside info we can benefit from. That's an amazingly detailed report:

1. On p. 31 three pages worth of aircraft variables and control inputs from the DFR. On p.43 there's a chart of what looks like horizontal stabilizer trim over time (simulated vs. actual), with the actual trace hitting what I presume whould be the nose-down stop several times (and staying there.)
2. On p. 46 there's a very detailed chart of displayed KIAS vs. time, Left vs. Right PFDs, and ADIRU selection.
3. On p. 47-48 there's an ECAM message timeline. (Trying to wrap their heads around these messages during turbulence in the middle of the night + inconsistent KIAS readings must have been quite something!)
4. On p.89 a most detailed timeline extracted from CVR and FDR (17 pages!).
5. On p. 109 the detaild aircraft variables timeline obtained from the FDR (8 pages.)

Can't wait for the english translation (where is alainneedle1 when we need him? ) since my french goes into deep stall when reading an aviation accident report. Cheers, - jahman.

Stab trim hit full nose up and stayed there. As mentioned previously around 11 seconds after the a/p disconnected the aircraft went to alternate law and lost autotrim, among the many alerts on the ECAM they should also have seen USE MAN PITCH TRIM on the PFD (alert may only be displayed in direct law)With full nose up trim the crews fate was pretty much sealed.I should add that manual pitch trim can only be adjusted through the trim wheel, no buttons on the sidestick itself.

Hi all ! Last week, I was talking about the confusing stall warning. It worked when the pilot was pushing the stick and reduced the angle of attack, it stopped working when the pilot was increasing the angle of attack. I didn't understand why the BEA didn't make any recommendation about this stall warning system last week:http://www.bea.aero/...llet2011.en.pdf In fact, they did, but this recommendation was removed in the published document. Is it because France is a EADS/Airbus shareholder ? La Tribune published a very interesting note about this. You can read the Google translation here.

Is this based on what a source said or is there any other evidence for it?

For the confusing stall warning, the source is the CVR and FDR. You can find it in the BEA report. But I don't know the reason why the BEA didn't publish a recommendation about the stall warning. La Tribune said there was a recommendation, but this recommendation has been removed. We'll have to wait for the next BEA report. Rob is right, and this is also interesting, the full nose up trim did not help. But before that, just look at the pilot inputs and the results on the elevator (page 114 of the BEA report). When the pilot made pitch down inputs during 4 seconds and it didn't really change the elevator position...

So there is no evidence that it was ever included and then removed?

So there is no evidence that it was ever included and then removed?

Confirmed by Le Point this morning. (Google translation here)

Confirmed by Le Point this morning. (Google translation here)

That's not inedendent confirmation or evidence - it's a rehash of the previois claim. The link in the article points to a previous article published by Le Point!

Well for a start the THS was stuck at full nose up, when in alternate law you lose autotrim. The flightcrew never used manual pitch trim and no amount of forward sidestick would have got the nose down far enough to get the aircraft flying again.

Stab trim hit full nose up and stayed there. As mentioned previously around 11 seconds after the a/p disconnected the aircraft went to alternate law and lost autotrim, among the many alerts on the ECAM they should also have seen USE MAN PITCH TRIM on the PFD (alert may only be displayed in direct law) With full nose up trim the crews fate was pretty much sealed. I should add that manual pitch trim can only be adjusted through the trim wheel, no buttons on the sidestick itself.

You _don't_ lose autotrim in alternate law. From the report (emphasis is mine): "Malgré quelques actions à piquer, le PF maintient globalement une action à cabrer. L’assiette oscille entre 11° et 18° environ et l’incidence entre 11° et 23°. Le PHR débute un mouvement cohérent avec les actions du PF et atteindra la valeur de 13° à cabrer environ une minute plus tard. Il convient de rappeler qu’en loi alternate, l’auto trim est toujours actif. Par contre, il est difficile pour l’équipage de connaître la position du trim et aucune alarme n’avertit l’équipage qu’il déroule."

No, but a quick glance at a separate gauge driven by an independent AoA vane indicating an AoA in the "red zone" would. Cheers, - jahman.

What makes you think they'd heed the AoA gauge?

@mgh: You didn't read the link:

This oversight also creates a malaise within the team of investigators from the BEA, which tries to justify himself by explaining the deletion of the recommendation by the report of the technical study.

Even the BEA does not deny there was a draft with a recommendation about the stall warning. They also try to explain why they removed it. As I said, wait for the next BEA report. But now controversy is everywhere.

@mgh: You didn't read the link: Even the BEA does not deny there was a draft with a recommendation about the stall warning. They also try to explain why they removed it. As I said, wait for the next BEA report. But now controversy is everywhere.

I did read the link - but an news organisation linking to itesek isn't conformation. neither is your latest link wich merely repeats what Le Point said. It's all getting circular! I repeat, at the moment there is no evidence what was in the draft and certainly not what was actually written.

I mentioned that loss of autotrim may actually only be in direct law. However the fact is the aircraft was trimmed full nose up, they needed to apply manual trim down to at least have a fighting chance.Here is a slightly clearer picture of what was going on. I zoomed in on my iPhone, not sure how it will look on a pchttp://www.globalsim.web.id/publicservice/AF447/AF447TimelinePlotJuly2011v10.jpg

I repeat, at the moment there is no evidence what was in the draft and certainly not what was actually written.

OK, if you want to believe nothing was written in a draft about the stall warning, it's your freedom. Please understand that I can't give you a link from bea.aero because they decided not to publish the recommendation. I said, wait until the next BEA report. For now, in France, you'll find several sources saying the same. Some did ask the BEA for an explanation, some websites did only copy and paste what they found at La Tribune and Le Point.

OK, if you want to believe nothing was written in a draft about the stall warning, it's your freedom. Please understand that I can't give you a link from bea.aero because they decided not to publish the recommendation. I said, wait until the next BEA report. For now, in France, you'll find several sources saying the same. Some did ask the BEA for an explanation, some websites did only copy and paste what they found at La Tribune and Le Point.

I'm not prepared to believe anything in a nespaper which begins "Reportedly,..." Also, I written enough reports which have been changed between final draft and publication. If the BEA report has been similarly changed it's essential to know what the draft actually said before criticising it - it may have been incorrect.

Confirmed now by the BEA:http://www.bea.aero/...aout2011.fr.php

Ce document de travail contenait un projet de recommandation relative au fonctionnement de l'alarme de décrochage. Ce projet a été retiré car il est apparu aux enquêteurs du BEA que cette recommandation était prématurée à ce stade de l'enquête.

The working paper contained a draft recommendation concerning the operation of the stall warning. This project has been removed because it appeared to investigators from the BEA that this recommendation was premature at this stage of the investigation.

Please remember, it's mandatory (legal obligation) for the BEA to publish immediately any recommendation that could help to avoid another crash. Why they decided to wait here, is still unanswered. I think it can't be "premature" to warn all Airbus crews that the stall warning stops working in some circumstances and can be triggered again when the pilot reduces the angle of attack.

Confirmed now by the BEA:http://www.bea.aero/...aout2011.fr.php Please remember, it's mandatory (legal obligation) for the BEA to publish immediately any recommendation that could help to avoid another crash. Why they decided to wait here, is still unanswered. I think it can't be "premature" to warn all Airbus crews that the stall warning stops working in some circumstances and can be triggered again when the pilot reduces the angle of attack.

BEA has no obligation to publish premature safety recommendations. Also what matters is what the investigators, with full access to the data, think.

The loss of pitot static system is a devil of confusions. Pilots HAVE to overcome the confusion before they can get a grip of the situation and react correctly. Last month I suffered a static port blockage when flying through broken clouds in day time. And my reactions as PIC were all inaccurate until I came to understand what had happened. Luckily nothing worse than altitude deviation happened as the result. When confused by a pitot static failure what a pilot does has a 50/50 chance of making the situation better or worse. There is seemingly zero chance that these confused reactions can solve problem and restore normal operation. In complete darkness and without direct force feedback on the controls it must have been very hard for this crew to gain situational awareness. I just wish they had looked at the trim wheel. Airbus trim is fully automatic, and in the AF case I can only imagine it being in an extremely nose up trim to be able to carryout the pilot flying's commanded attitude.