Maintenance costs, training made by differences and not based on a totally new machine, a well known old system that still works, all means that less projects, less $$$ will be spent on the plane, this reducing also final costs for the users (more airlines will buy a cheaper plane) all the above are sufficient.

The TO warn is the same of the cabin altitude? Where is the problem if you are trained for it? Why spending money for having a girl voice wich tells the same as the beeps?

Hypoxia can impair people differently form others, its one thing to be fully alert when trying to deal with an emergency its another when your brain is starved for oxygen which is what largely contributed to the flight crew in Helios making their fatal mistake.

Loren, the Classic and the NG have a common type rating, as will the MAX. The Jurassic does not.

You do of course need to take a course to discuss and learn the differences between both, but under EU-OPS at least, they share their typerating.

Hypoxia is a very strange and silent killer, and it creeps up on you, fortunatly we are sitting in a sim at a very comfortable altitude so we should never experience it.

Judgement is also impaired so once hypoxia has set in, you are only responding to commands, which saved a crew around Ypsilante when the ATC ordered the pilot firmly to descend to 10000.

Clip in question:

Its also probably why the FA who took over couldn't land the aircraft even though he was a licensed commercial pilot and on track to be a Helios pilot.

If you are trained on the sim a lot of time with that problem in the air, it will be instinctive to associate it to the cabin altitude.

At 10000ft the hypoxia is not too strong. If you fail to understand what warning it is it is completely a pilot failure and not an hypoxia effect.

If you are trained correctly in the few seconds after the warning the crew already checked all the switches, gauges and at least leveled the plane if not already descending.

And this must be instinctive. It is not an item that you have time to manage with handbooks or with ground help.

If you are trained on the sim a lot of time with that problem in the air, it will be instinctive to associate it to the cabin altitude.

At 10000ft the hypoxia is not too strong. If you fail to understand what warning it is it is completely a pilot failure and not an hypoxia effect.

If you are trained correctly in the few seconds after the warning the crew already checked all the switches, gauges and at least leveled the plane if not already descending.

And this must be instinctive. It is not an item that you have time to manage with handbooks or with ground help.

 

It really doesn't take much training to understand that the TOCW warning (in the tocw sense) goes off "only on the ground" during a high speed taxi, too much thrust or during the take-off roll. If I take-off without the warning then clearly the take-off was ok! If then later during the flight the horn goes off again, it can only mean one thing (as I have already taken-off!!). There are two clearly defined situations. On the ground or in the air. Pilots need the training to know what it sounds like and how to react but that's all.

As for depressurisation, there are effectively three scenarios, 1. Explosive depressurisation 2. Rapid 3. Slow.

IN ALL CASES when the horn goes off it is "mandatory" to don your mask first before you do "anything" else!

Aircraft in which the horn is strident, loud and intrusive are the best equipped. The pilots have to react immediately. A little light flashing in the corner with bright sunlight shinning on it isn't going to get noticed nor is a sexy female voice. A depressurisation scenario is one in which the pilots need a proverbial kick up the backside! There are some scenarios where the case for "voice" warnings is lost. Principally depressurisation or stall. AF447 is a good example. Unless the cockpit is super quiet voice warnings in an emergency will almost certainly be overlooked and ignored.

Again the Airbus and Douglas voices are strong and intrusive in addition to warning you to the specific problem, I have sat through dozens of cockpit tests. Apparently the shared warning horns were not good enough to alert two hypoxinated pilots to the problem and hypoxia is a very dangerous killer some people may realizes the symptoms when its already too late. All other Boeings and all Airbus have more than one way to alert the pilots to the issue but the 737 took time to catch up. If you read the Greek report you will see that the alarm has confused other 737 pilots in decompression events and a few pilots have pretty much called the setup unwise in the report.