Wink207

Back in row 6, I also have felt that way. Looking to you guys in row 0 to prevent them from succeeding.

Everyone involved wishes they had gone to KJAX, especially the poor dogs.

Well, CNN is known for their "Fake News".

Dunno. But there is no way the shorter runway would have been legal for this aircraft.

From the information leaking out, it was definitely RW 10 that was attempted. 15 kt tail wind. Looks like they landed "high and hot", touched down way past the LZ, bounced a few times, and couldn't stop within the runway left. I have read that one reverse thruster was unavailable and they attempted to land flaps 30 on a wet runway. And as was posted earlier, no ILS. don't know what the WX was at the time except for the tail wind. It is looking like just a terrible bit of flying. It will be tough to blame this one on Boeing. Thank God no passengers dead or badly hurt, just 4 dogs. We have dogs, love dogs, but would never trust them to any airline, much less this pseudo airline. Heart breaking.

This is the best post I have seen on this subject for at least 3 months. https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa-207.html#post10450681

Without insight into the engineering and program management organizations within Boeing, you can't really say "....Boeing have let themselves be driven too much by the pressure to keep up and, as a result, cut corners...." I suggest there is at least one alternative scenario. First of all, a company such as Boeing (or Airbus) does not create another baseline like the 737 Max, or the 320 NEO, without extensive analysis, calculations, trade studies, model testing, simulation, and flight testing. Each company has their own process they follow. Engineers (I am one) follow a structured design process which is specific to their company. An alternative scenario for the existence of MAX MCAS could well be that the nonlinear aerodynamic lifting effect of the LEAP cowl in the location forward of the wing was not initially recognized conceptually, predicted computationally, or witnessed in wind tunnel testing, and was not experienced before the first full scale (flight) testing. Computational fluid dynamics is used throughout the industry in design and has been a primary enabler for today's wing and lifting body design. But the solutions are computational, not closed form, and at the end of the day, approximations of reality. So, late in the MAX program, full scale prototype, the nose up tendency caused by the LEAP cowls was discovered, and a solution was needed to counter this effect. The system engineering process would then have been followed to develop alternate concepts for the solution, including FMECA analysis. Each concept would have been studied with respect to predicted technical success in countering the effect, risk, cost, and schedule. Alternative solutions would have been studied, evaluated for risk, and tested or modeled computationally when possible. There would have been a down-select, in this case, MCAS was chosen. Recently I became aware that MCAS-type algorithms exist in other aircraft, including Boeing 767 mid air refueling tankers for the USAF. So it may have been considered a reduced risk technical solution for the MAX, since there was experience with this type of software algorithm. However, and this is a key point, my understanding is that the MCAS type algorithm in the 767 tankers uses input from two AoA sensors, not one AoA sensor, as does 737 MAX MCAS. But the decision was obviously made to go forward with the as is one AoA MCAS solution. Why was that decision made? Only those inside Boeing really know. But it would be a mistake to think that Boeing made that decision only to sell aircraft, meet schedule, save money, or some such programmatic factor. My 30+years in aerospace (not Boeing) tells me quite the opposite.

Hi Ramon: I vote for white values. I find them easier to read. Rick

I'm sure it would be. Ethiopean has quite a large fleet of Boeing aircraft, including 737s, 767s, 777s, & 787s. Good customer.

My goodness. It can't be much plainer than that. In light of the Lion crash, I think they might have briefed this before each trip, if not each flight.

Yes. Sadly, I believe the Capt lost situational awareness. From the report it seemed that he lost control of the airspeed and didn't really seem to understand that although IAS is good, too much IAS quickly becomes bad from a maneuvering perspective. I know he had an alert on unreliable IAS but the FO's side was good. And I believe the runaway trim MI list calls for A/P and A/T off. One last point also, although I dislike criticizing these guys, when the stick shaker started on his side and they could see the FOs side was still good, they did not discuss turning PF over to the FO. Maybe the Capt didn't feel comfortable turning it over to a very junior pilot? The FO really seemed to have pretty good SA.

Wikipedia claims the first Max was delivered in May of 2017. I just have trouble imagining that MCAS had not reared its ugly head prior to the two accidents. Or were there other incidents which were not reported as such because Boeing hadn't really emphasized MCAS in the minimal training that was given.

Thanks for the info. I'm finding 2 thoughts very hard to wrap my head around, as they say: 1.Prior to the grounding there were 350 some odd Max aircraft in service having safely completed thousands of flights with no apparent AoA related incidents. This is a statistically significant number. Also, there are more thousands of transport aircraft flying around with the same or similar AoA sensors. Yet I have failed in efforts to find any data or reports on failed AoA sensors. There must be some, but it is just strange if indeed Lion Air had a failed AoA sensor, and then Indonesia has a failed AoA sensor, and they both occur on or before the TO roll. It is just too coincidental. 2. I find it hard to believe that the Boeing systems engineers did not complete a FMECA analysis during the MCAS development that included failed AoA on TO as a critical failure mode, with drastic effects. It just seems so obviously a critical case for MCAS. There is a tremendous amount of "smoke" in the air right now and I'm not confident that we, the informed traveling public, will know the truth of all this until years from now. Rick

Me too. If you find out, please post. Also I wonder how many 737 pilots have ever heard the stick shaker in normal ops outside the sim? It's like the question of how many transport pilots have ever seen the low fuel warning outside the sim? How many pilots have ever seen "IAS Disagree" due to a failed AoA sensor? I'll bet someone knows these answers, or their is a database somewhere.

I only wish there had been a divorce.cfg when I had mine. Maybe someone could have suggested some tweaks.

The captain had the stick shaker on his side. Might have been a clue?

Whatever Boeing says in their press releases now can be quite different from the defense their lawyers will advance in the inevitable law suits to follow. Their defense may emphasize the maintenance actions perhaps not taken prior to the Lion accident, and the crew adherence to the guidelines and checklists in the Ethiopian accident. It seems to me that these two terrible accidents are not akin to the catastrophic hardware failures such as United 232 in Sioux City or USAir 427 in Pittsburgh. The 737 Max accidents are, sadly, primarily procedural shortcomings by Boeing, the airlines, and the flight crews. At the end of the day there will be plenty of fault to go around.

It may well be my hardware. But I don't see it on other aircraft. NBD, just takes a second to cycle it. Would be more pleasant if there were a nice "clunk" on the handle movement though 🙂

For some reason, I saw this enough that I added to my cklst to cycle the spoilers when I turn on the landing lights after taking the runway.....don't understand why it happens...it just does

It helps to study and understand the approach plate. GTN has them.

You think Mark could spring for the sheep skin and high end harness hardware? 🙂

Of course the approach must have vertical guidance, which is shown in the GTN. Occasionally I have seen that happen if I tried to intercept the glide slope above the FAF altitude. I generally see the GTN switch modes at the FAF, assuming the altitude of the aircraft is at or slightly below the FAF altitude. I always make sure on the approach that I am at the FAF altitude when engaging APPR.

I was more than that 🙂 But I swore there would be no "FSX mid air refueling...."

I made it from MBGT to KSAF ok but landed with only 500 lb in the tank. Probably would have gotten myself fired in RW. 😞