Another thing i don't understand is that they where at FL350 when the first stall alarm triggers, and at some point they climb to FL380 and then the STALL alarm again, so at some point they were climbing, with aircraft recovered?

Another thing i don't understand is that they where at FL350 when the first stall alarm triggers, and at some point they climb to FL380 and then the STALL alarm again, so at some point they were climbing, with aircraft recovered?

The initial STALL warning I think was precipitated by turbulence and the loss of airspeed indication (though the actual STALL warning is the result of high alpha).The initial climb is interesting - there is an indication that in response to the reducing airspeed the AP was pitching up, then hit its nose-up authority and dropped out, followed shortly afterwards by the auto-throttle due to the fact it could no longer maintain speed (or so it thought due to the blocked pitots). It is unclear if during the initial AP induced pitch-up whether this caused a climb, as the pilot initially recovered the 7000 ft/min climb by pitching over, but then he failed to apply the stall warning memory items when the STALL alert went off at FL375. After that moment it seems he constantly applied aft side-stick input, stalling the aircraft.WHY TRY AND PITCH UP IN RESPONSE TO A STALL WARNING? This is the part that is literally giving me a headache.Best regards,Robin.

The initial STALL warning I think was precipitated by turbulence and the loss of airspeed indication (though the actual STALL warning is the result of high alpha).The initial climb is interesting - there is an indication that in response to the reducing airspeed the AP was pitching up, then hit its nose-up authority and dropped out, followed shortly afterwards by the auto-throttle due to the fact it could no longer maintain speed (or so it thought due to the blocked pitots). It is unclear if during the initial AP induced pitch-up whether this caused a climb, as the pilot initially recovered the 7000 ft/min climb by pitching over, but then he failed to apply the stall warning memory items when the STALL alert went off at FL375. After that moment it seems he constantly applied aft side-stick input, stalling the aircraft.WHY TRY AND PITCH UP IN RESPONSE TO A STALL WARNING? This is the part that is literally giving me a headache.Best regards,Robin.

I thought that the response of the AP to reduce speed is throttling down the engines... or is that when it cross over the red line it also pitch up? i mean 35000 was set on the MCP so the AP can climb beyond that in this case?

Main things:- pitch up after AP and AT release, and a climb of 3000ft nearing the "coffin corner" => safe speed margin extremely narrow- after the plane entered a real stall (as opposed to the "stall" that the pilot probably thought he was trying to recover from, initially), recovery action was totally opposite of what should've happened- keeping full nose-up stick deflection for 30 seconds in a fully stalled condition => why?- did the pilot think that in alternate law he'd have AoA and/or pitch protection still in place. => hence pitch up to sidestick stop and TOGA (would work out in "normal law"). Too bad the protections were gone in alternate law.- Fully stalled flight into sea. Why no proper recovery actions, why the constant pitch up? Where did the initial 3000ft climb and 10deg ANU pitch attitude come from? (note that the translation was in error, it was not 10deg AoA, but 10deg pitch)We need more information to really evaluate what happened. The note from BEA was revealing but at the same time left too many important things out. Some critical questions can't be answered with data from the today's note.Tero

- did the pilot think that in alternate law he'd have AoA and/or pitch protection still in place. => hence pitch up to sidestick stop and TOGA (would work out in "normal law").

I did wonder if this was going through their minds. Thought they had AoA prot when in reality they didn't... Surely the altimeter would have given a very big hint?Best regards,Robin.

Yeah well there sure seem to have done the opposite as what I've done too, though it is hard to really ascertain what happen. It is easy to take conclusion, but there is not so much available, it was really just to give something real to the press so that they would stop giving out of context and even wrong informations. One thing that is sure is that from the next they did not seemed in panic, though it might have been something else in audio.We'll just have to wait the end of summer for the first real report on the accident, that should then really bring some light on what happened, with the real details, graphs and everything.