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AF447 black box recovered

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I've seen this in the news quite a bit, as I'm actually in France though it was eclipsed by the other big actuallity of the day. That being said according to experts the black box looks in pretty good condition, and that is amazing that they've recovered it so we can get a new insight on the accident. According to the news it should be brought back to France in the next 10 days, and then they will be able to start recovering the data. Meanwhile they are still searching for the CVR black box which is still missing. But should probably be close as they were both in the aft section of the aircraft.It sure will be great to know what really happened to this tragic flight, and I hope it'll help also the families who have lost their relatives in the accident. I really want to believe that it'll finally be more certain of what happened than the only few things we know so far, that the plane did not dislocate in flight, and crashed level into the see, and that obviously htere were something wrong according to the ACARS, but that can mean manythings that happened. I'm sure it'll work out and it'll help increase further the safety of all airplanes as any accident does.

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But whats the chances of the data still being readable after all this time at the bottom of the ocean ???
Depending on how far they wanted to go with it, they could use electron-microscopy to read the circuits and recover the data. AFAIK it uses a flash memory technology, so the data is physically recorded into the ICs, so even if they can't get the unit to work, they should eventually be able to put the data back together.Let's hope the FDR/CVR exceed spec and are in good condition inside.Best regards,Robin.

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What was the thinking on that flight deck that night that caused them to not deviate around those cells,when everybody else did? I think the CVR is going to be more important in that key issue. Was the radar inop,(oh well,lets just go for it), or improper gain/tilt settings used? Or attenuation?


Jim Driscoll, MSI Raider GE76 12UHS-607 17.3" Gaming Laptop Computer - Blue Intel Core i9 12th Gen 12900HK 1.8GHz Processor; NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3080 Ti 16GB GDDR6; 64GB DDR5-4800 RAM; Dual M2 2TB Solid State Drives.Driving a Sony KD-50X75, and KDL-48R470B @ 4k 3724x2094,MSFS 2020, 30 FPS on Ultra Settings.

Jorg/Asobo: “Weather is a core part of our simulator, and we will strive to make it as accurate as possible.”Also Jorg/Asobo: “We are going to limit the weather API to rain intensity only.”


 

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What was the thinking on that flight deck that night that caused them to not deviate around those cells,when everybody else did?
Lets not armchair quarterback now...

FAA: ATP-ME

Matt kubanda

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What was the thinking on that flight deck that night that caused them to not deviate around those cells,when everybody else did? I think the CVR is going to be more important in that key issue. Was the radar inop,(oh well,lets just go for it), or improper gain/tilt settings used? Or attenuation?
...or just plain old pilot error. :( If you watched a lot of "Air Crash Investigation" or read the official reports into aircraft accidents and incidents, it should be abundantly clear that a crash is NEVER just one thing, and usually comprises of a whole chain of bad decisions, bad situations, equipment failure, and just plain bad luck to be experiencing that chain in the first place.A bigger factor than the points you raised is: the crew had been sat in the cruise for some 3 hours. The AP was flying. Next the flight crew are hit with multiple alerts at once, and multiple failure flags. At night, in crap weather.There is a phenomenon known as "automation blindness" - you are out of the loop, watching the systems instead of flying them then suddenly being thrown control as the computers choke. You are so busy trying to figure out all the alerts and reasons why you are faced with failure flags on everything that you forget to do the most basic thing: fly the aircraft. The period of confusion created by mis-leading and bad data could be the difference between life and death. If faced with alerts the first thing to do is check the aircraft is still heading in the right direction, and not for the big rock we call Earth. Only once that is under control can you get to the business of why you are faced with alert hell. As long as you have control, the engines are running and you've got fuel, everything else is a distant second. Be sure you know how to fly your aircraft in abnormal conditions, and know the unreliable airspeed power and pitch settings off by heart - you can't go far wrong after that.Anyone who flies in the real world (and regardless of aircraft type) should be reading all these reports and taking note, in the hope that it helps prevent the "holes in the swiss cheese" lining up on that dark, crappy night when everything is failing/going wrong.A couple of accidents of note that you want to go study the reports of:* ATR 72 - ditched in the sea after running out of fuel. Wrong fuel gauge fitted by maint. Both pilots recently sentenced to 14 years in jail. On a side-note, had they maintained proper best-glide speed, they could have made an airfield they were offered by ATC. Correct and accurate speed management is everything (if I recall correctly, the speed was a bit wild at first, but when they did fly best-glide they were 3 kts slow, making them 23 nm short as a result).* Boeing 757 - crashed into mountains at night after loss of situational awareness whilst on approach. Nav beacon failure and no (ATC) RADAR. I didn't realize it at the time I read and dug into this report that it has been used worldwide as a major example of when CRM is non-existent, and is a major wake-up call for "KEEP FLYING THE AIRCRAFT ABOVE ALL ELSE". If you don't know where you are - IMMEDIATELY CLIMB TO MSA!* Kegworth 737 crash. The reason for the crash was in-flight shutdown of the wrong engine.If there is one common theme among accidents it is this: people do things (or not) that you could never imagine in such situations.Best regards,Robin.

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please respect this,Im sorry to those who say its irrelevant but I thought you like to know. Anyway its nice to talk about the real world, this especially is number two highlights on the news after Osama binladens death. This is a really good thing that they found it, lets hope that the black box arrives to paris safely. Cross our fingers that the cockpit voice recorders are recovered (and the ngx releases soon...)
Agreed... and NON moderators trying to be moderators is highly annoying.

Mike Avallone

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Matt, What I asked and stated is not arm chair QBing.How much time in the industry do you have? I remember as a student pilot being instructed to stay out of TX's, A-330's are not exempt from these laws.I have seen the depiction of all the aircraft flight tracks thru that area,and AF was the only one to stay on the airway,hence my other questions.http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/trajectoires/trajectoires010609.htmlhttp://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/ Honeywell: Better wx training neededRadar manufacturers should consider making equipment easier to use and displays easier to interpret, Honeywell safety specialist Dr. Ratan Khatwa told attendees at this year’s Flight Safety Foundation European Aviation Safety Seminar, held in Bucharest.He added that better weather-radar training can improve pilots’ awareness and decision-making skills and help them avoid penetrating severe meteorological conditions.NTSB studies show weather to be a factor in about 25 percent of all U.S. flying accidents between 1994 and 2003. Khatwa said initial and recurrent flight crew training should cover fundamental concepts in six areas of weather-radar operation: beam coverage, Earth-curvature effects, antenna stabilization, tilt and gain management, calibrated weather and range. System limitations, such as attenuation and the significance of green radar “echoes” at high altitude, also should be covered.These recommendations arise from analysis of pilots’ difficulties and concerns uncovered while Honeywell was developing its RDR-4000 radar. Khatwa’s study included a human-factors evaluation of flight-crew radar use, a global survey to assess pilots’ fundamental understanding and perceptions of training, and analyses of weather radar-related incidents and accidents. He concluded pilots did not understand fundamental weather-radar concepts; typical equipment use precluded detection of severe weather; and dedicated training was not standard practice.Khatwa pointed out that current radars are concerned primarily with weather analysis and avoidance, proper interpretation of which depends on pilots’ adequate understanding.Honeywell’s RDR-4000 human- factors research showed that almost 70 percent of pilots were dissatisfied with weather-radar training. From the survey, Khatwa concluded most operators do not provide initial or recurrent weather-radar training; most available training takes place on the job; there is little incentive for operators to provide training since regulators do not require it; many pilots do not understand weather radar, including its limitations; fundamental concepts of weather radar are “poorly understood”; and pilots want recurrent training.To understand pilots’ weather-radar use and any difficulties, Honeywell conducted a comparative evaluation of independent flight-crew groups using current equipment or new radar-display modes. The PC-based exercise observed the behavior of 13 pilots during several scenarios involving weather-radar use. Overall, “significant weather” events were detected on almost 82 percent of occasions, with pilots correctly deciding on action necessary to avoid penetration 70 percent of the time.Incorrect pilot action involved improper management of weather-radar tilt, gain or range, continued flight toward significant weather and imprudent weather-avoidance decisions. All pilots failed to recognize the vertical position of each of two weather cells. Khatwa emphasized the need for pilots to be cautious about green radar echoes at high altitude, since these indicate “potentially hazardous” conditions.Analysis of actual flight-crew radar operation and interpretation was ultimately restricted because the study could not include “many other critical factors, such as provision of timely weather information, accuracy of such data, role of ATC and regulator” and other considerations. This part of Khatwa’s study drew on data covering fatal and nonfatal accidents and incidents (fixed- and rotary-wing) that involved global single- and dual-pilot business, public transport and cargo aircraft operations reported by nine different worldwide safety agencies between 1987 and 2007.Excluding occurrences involving training flights, sabotage, terrorism, military action or insufficient weather-radar information, Honeywell researchers found just 14 relevant events. A quarter of these instances were fatal, and half of the aircraft involved were substantially damaged or destroyed. Some 57 percent of the accidents or incidents took place in instrument meteorological conditions, 50 percent occurred during cruise, the same proportion was in daylight and another 35 percent occurred between top-of-descent and destination.Switching off the radar, despite forecast weather and prevailing conditions, or pressing on in the face of adverse conditions were cited as examples of poor planning. Other examples of poor decision making included making landing decisions based on the experiences of preceding aircraft that successfully penetrated convective weather; flying through gaps between closely spaced storm cells, rather than around the thunderstorm; and flying close to squall lines.In addition, the operation of weather radar or radar-display interpretation were “not necessarily optimal” in two thirds of occur-rences, said Khatwa, who cited five problem areas: improper tilt operation or management; improper use of gain control; misinterpretation of ground returns; weather radar “off,” despite known cumulo-nimbus cloud; and insufficient appreciation of radar limitations and their impact on displayed images.The Honeywell study shows that crew weather-radar training had not been provided in half of the accidents/incidents. Pilots talked about “trial-and-error experience” and “information [obtained] from other pilots,” an approach that Khatwa concluded can “lead to improper radar operating procedures and techniques.”Honeywell Aerospace Pilot Survey FindingsIn conducting a survey about the RDR-4000 weather radar, Honeywell safety specialist Dr. Ratan Khatwa asked more than 50 ATP-rated pilots about their experience with weather radar. The average age of the respondents was 52 years; the average flight time was 12,500 hours. The answers these experienced pilots provided were illuminating.• 62 percent of the pilots surveyed answered correctly that a straight radar beam is not aligned with an aircraft’s current flight level (because of Earth curvature)• 15 percent mistakenly thought that antenna down-tilt was required to offset a nose-up pitch angle. (That is offset by antenna stabilization.)• 63 percent did not appreciate the need for weather-radar antennas to be set to compensate for earth curvature, which blocks weather targets beyond, say, 150 nm ahead for nominal cruise altitudes. “Curvature [effects] become noticeable at ranges above 40 nm, and if ignored can lead to weather-image interpretation errors,” said Khatwa.• 55 percent of pilots did not realize that a weather target falling inside the radar beam will not necessarily be shown in its true color on the display. “The color selected for display is a direct function of the power returned to the receiver. Where the beam is partially filled, the total power returned may not represent the calibrated value associated with the target cell,” he said.• Five in every eight pilots incorrectly thought green (short-range) radar targets shown near to cruise levels above FL310 need not be avoided. “Typically, at these altitudes, targets are less reflective. At high altitudes, there is a possibility of unstable air and hail above the storm cell. It is therefore not advisable to penetrate the less-reflective part of the storm top,” Khatwa explained.• 73 percent of flight crew understood that antenna tilt angle does not need to match a climb (or descent) angle to detect weather on their flight path. “The antenna should be pointed at the base of convective weather during climb. Generally, the lower 18,000 feet is the most reflective part of the storm.” Radar can be used to analyze weather characteristics (such as vertical extent of cells) and to avoid strong convective activity. “Returns along the flight-path angle may not provide full indication of storm intensity and turbulence levels [to be encountered within the cell].”• Almost 90 percent of pilots did not know the range at which their current weather radar was no longer calibrated and did not show returns at their true levels. Radar beams broaden with distance, so a smaller proportion is filled with moisture. “At shorter ranges, returned power is more representative of the target cell, and it is more likely to be displayed at its true calibrated value. Typically, returns are calibrated within a range of 60 to 80 nm.”Quote,"At high altitudes, there is a possibility of unstable air and hail above the storm cell. It is therefore not advisable to penetrate the less-reflective part of the storm top,” Khatwa explained."You are taught this as a private pilot,But commercial pressures prevail.http://www.gapan.org/ruth-documents/study-papers/Weather%20Radar.pdf


Jim Driscoll, MSI Raider GE76 12UHS-607 17.3" Gaming Laptop Computer - Blue Intel Core i9 12th Gen 12900HK 1.8GHz Processor; NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3080 Ti 16GB GDDR6; 64GB DDR5-4800 RAM; Dual M2 2TB Solid State Drives.Driving a Sony KD-50X75, and KDL-48R470B @ 4k 3724x2094,MSFS 2020, 30 FPS on Ultra Settings.

Jorg/Asobo: “Weather is a core part of our simulator, and we will strive to make it as accurate as possible.”Also Jorg/Asobo: “We are going to limit the weather API to rain intensity only.”


 

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Of course we don't know that the crew of AF447 used the radar incorrectly or interpreted what they did pick up in a less than ideal way, hopefully a CVR will be able to clarify if that was the case. Sometimes it is convenient to blame the pilots when the business of selling aeroplanes could be affected by doubts about an aircraft or systems on board, or the reputation of an airline's training procedures is called into question, and there can be little doubt that this has happened on occasion.But whilst we are on the subject, I suspect that another factor in the lack of knowledge and familiarity with radar is that many airline pilots come from an experience route that is very different from how it was a few years ago. It used to be the case that a large proportion of airline pilots were ex military, where of course the use of radars by pilots is commonplace. With the end of the cold war and the downsizing of most air forces around the world, there simply isn't the pool of ex military pilots going into the airlines that there used to be, and instead what you have is relatively low time pilots filtering into the cockpits of airliners. Ask a military pilot what PRF is, and they'll snap the answer back instantly, ask someone who went to an airline after flying a Cessna and they probably wouldn't know, and you can't really blame them for that, because how should they know?That's not to say that anyone who wasn't taught to fly by the army or air force is necessarily going to be a poor pilot, but when you couple factors such as these with the ever-larger reliance on flipping on an autopilot and assuming everything is fine whilst your tailplane is merrily icing up or whatever, it probably doesn't help. Everyone knows that if you pay peanuts, you get monkeys, and the airlines are paying peanuts to their aircrews these days, so one assumes that training is on a similar shoestring, and even if it isn't, it is unlikely to compare with the millions that used to be spent on training a fighter pilot or bomber pilot, where no expense was spared in getting them to the required standard.So what we really need is that CVR, because whether the pilots on AF447 did all the right things (and they may indeed have done all the right things), or maybe some of the wrong things, that will be the way to hopefully tell. And if it does instead turn out to be something wrong with the aeroplane design, or the training the crews received, we can only hope that it comes out in the investigation. It won't bring those people back who were on AF447, but it may at least mean that their deaths were not a complete travesty.Al


Alan Bradbury

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Matt, What I asked and stated is not arm chair QBing.How much time in the industry do you have? I remember as a student pilot being instructed to stay out of TX's, A-330's are not exempt from these laws.I have seen the depiction of all the aircraft flight tracks thru that area,and AF was the only one to stay on the airway,hence my other questions.http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/trajectoires/trajectoires010609.htmlhttp://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/ Honeywell: Better wx training neededRadar manufacturers should consider making equipment easier to use and displays easier to interpret, Honeywell safety specialist Dr. Ratan Khatwa told attendees at this year’s Flight Safety Foundation European Aviation Safety Seminar, held in Bucharest.He added that better weather-radar training can improve pilots’ awareness and decision-making skills and help them avoid penetrating severe meteorological conditions.NTSB studies show weather to be a factor in about 25 percent of all U.S. flying accidents between 1994 and 2003. Khatwa said initial and recurrent flight crew training should cover fundamental concepts in six areas of weather-radar operation: beam coverage, Earth-curvature effects, antenna stabilization, tilt and gain management, calibrated weather and range. System limitations, such as attenuation and the significance of green radar “echoes” at high altitude, also should be covered.These recommendations arise from analysis of pilots’ difficulties and concerns uncovered while Honeywell was developing its RDR-4000 radar. Khatwa’s study included a human-factors evaluation of flight-crew radar use, a global survey to assess pilots’ fundamental understanding and perceptions of training, and analyses of weather radar-related incidents and accidents. He concluded pilots did not understand fundamental weather-radar concepts; typical equipment use precluded detection of severe weather; and dedicated training was not standard practice.Khatwa pointed out that current radars are concerned primarily with weather analysis and avoidance, proper interpretation of which depends on pilots’ adequate understanding.Honeywell’s RDR-4000 human- factors research showed that almost 70 percent of pilots were dissatisfied with weather-radar training. From the survey, Khatwa concluded most operators do not provide initial or recurrent weather-radar training; most available training takes place on the job; there is little incentive for operators to provide training since regulators do not require it; many pilots do not understand weather radar, including its limitations; fundamental concepts of weather radar are “poorly understood”; and pilots want recurrent training.To understand pilots’ weather-radar use and any difficulties, Honeywell conducted a comparative evaluation of independent flight-crew groups using current equipment or new radar-display modes. The PC-based exercise observed the behavior of 13 pilots during several scenarios involving weather-radar use. Overall, “significant weather” events were detected on almost 82 percent of occasions, with pilots correctly deciding on action necessary to avoid penetration 70 percent of the time.Incorrect pilot action involved improper management of weather-radar tilt, gain or range, continued flight toward significant weather and imprudent weather-avoidance decisions. All pilots failed to recognize the vertical position of each of two weather cells. Khatwa emphasized the need for pilots to be cautious about green radar echoes at high altitude, since these indicate “potentially hazardous” conditions.Analysis of actual flight-crew radar operation and interpretation was ultimately restricted because the study could not include “many other critical factors, such as provision of timely weather information, accuracy of such data, role of ATC and regulator” and other considerations. This part of Khatwa’s study drew on data covering fatal and nonfatal accidents and incidents (fixed- and rotary-wing) that involved global single- and dual-pilot business, public transport and cargo aircraft operations reported by nine different worldwide safety agencies between 1987 and 2007.Excluding occurrences involving training flights, sabotage, terrorism, military action or insufficient weather-radar information, Honeywell researchers found just 14 relevant events. A quarter of these instances were fatal, and half of the aircraft involved were substantially damaged or destroyed. Some 57 percent of the accidents or incidents took place in instrument meteorological conditions, 50 percent occurred during cruise, the same proportion was in daylight and another 35 percent occurred between top-of-descent and destination.Switching off the radar, despite forecast weather and prevailing conditions, or pressing on in the face of adverse conditions were cited as examples of poor planning. Other examples of poor decision making included making landing decisions based on the experiences of preceding aircraft that successfully penetrated convective weather; flying through gaps between closely spaced storm cells, rather than around the thunderstorm; and flying close to squall lines.In addition, the operation of weather radar or radar-display interpretation were “not necessarily optimal” in two thirds of occur-rences, said Khatwa, who cited five problem areas: improper tilt operation or management; improper use of gain control; misinterpretation of ground returns; weather radar “off,” despite known cumulo-nimbus cloud; and insufficient appreciation of radar limitations and their impact on displayed images.The Honeywell study shows that crew weather-radar training had not been provided in half of the accidents/incidents. Pilots talked about “trial-and-error experience” and “information [obtained] from other pilots,” an approach that Khatwa concluded can “lead to improper radar operating procedures and techniques.”Honeywell Aerospace Pilot Survey FindingsIn conducting a survey about the RDR-4000 weather radar, Honeywell safety specialist Dr. Ratan Khatwa asked more than 50 ATP-rated pilots about their experience with weather radar. The average age of the respondents was 52 years; the average flight time was 12,500 hours. The answers these experienced pilots provided were illuminating.• 62 percent of the pilots surveyed answered correctly that a straight radar beam is not aligned with an aircraft’s current flight level (because of Earth curvature)• 15 percent mistakenly thought that antenna down-tilt was required to offset a nose-up pitch angle. (That is offset by antenna stabilization.)• 63 percent did not appreciate the need for weather-radar antennas to be set to compensate for earth curvature, which blocks weather targets beyond, say, 150 nm ahead for nominal cruise altitudes. “Curvature [effects] become noticeable at ranges above 40 nm, and if ignored can lead to weather-image interpretation errors,” said Khatwa.• 55 percent of pilots did not realize that a weather target falling inside the radar beam will not necessarily be shown in its true color on the display. “The color selected for display is a direct function of the power returned to the receiver. Where the beam is partially filled, the total power returned may not represent the calibrated value associated with the target cell,” he said.• Five in every eight pilots incorrectly thought green (short-range) radar targets shown near to cruise levels above FL310 need not be avoided. “Typically, at these altitudes, targets are less reflective. At high altitudes, there is a possibility of unstable air and hail above the storm cell. It is therefore not advisable to penetrate the less-reflective part of the storm top,” Khatwa explained.• 73 percent of flight crew understood that antenna tilt angle does not need to match a climb (or descent) angle to detect weather on their flight path. “The antenna should be pointed at the base of convective weather during climb. Generally, the lower 18,000 feet is the most reflective part of the storm.” Radar can be used to analyze weather characteristics (such as vertical extent of cells) and to avoid strong convective activity. “Returns along the flight-path angle may not provide full indication of storm intensity and turbulence levels [to be encountered within the cell].”• Almost 90 percent of pilots did not know the range at which their current weather radar was no longer calibrated and did not show returns at their true levels. Radar beams broaden with distance, so a smaller proportion is filled with moisture. “At shorter ranges, returned power is more representative of the target cell, and it is more likely to be displayed at its true calibrated value. Typically, returns are calibrated within a range of 60 to 80 nm.”Quote,"At high altitudes, there is a possibility of unstable air and hail above the storm cell. It is therefore not advisable to penetrate the less-reflective part of the storm top,” Khatwa explained."You are taught this as a private pilot,But commercial pressures prevail.http://www.gapan.org/ruth-documents/study-papers/Weather%20Radar.pdf
Im not disagreeing with your hypothesis about their use of the weather radar. However, the statement that I quoted was in a sense, armchair qbing... I personally just think its rude to ask questions like since the crew is not here to defend themselves. Whether the pilot is a newly minted private pilot or a CA with over 20000 hrs., asking a question like that implies that they should have never been in the front office to begin with. Thats just me personally. My attitude arose from the colgan 3407 incident when everyone and their mother was asking the exact same question yet the crew could defend themselves. My statement wasn't intended to be flaming or abusive in nature. I said it to bring to light that we shouldn't ask a question like that since the crew can not defend themselves. Going back to your hypothesis, I can say that that is one of the better ones I have heard since the accident. I also dont think that someone time in the industry has anything to do with the question at hand. A newly IFR rated PP would feel the exact same way in the airplane in a situation where it hit the fan just as the AF crew did. Weird things happen to crews who get stressed or get thrown everything at once. No matter the aircraft or experience level, we all have a threshold until we break. The more experiecne we have, the larger the threshold.

FAA: ATP-ME

Matt kubanda

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I never would of thought in a million years that a forum about Flight Simulation would have so many haters.... It's like the World of Warcraft forums, lol.Pete Walsh.


Running i5-9600K @ 4.8ghz - 32GB DDR4 3200mhz - GTX 3070.

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I guess when you sign the flight release as a captain,you accept full responsibility for the safety of the flight,and have a moral responsibility to stand up to dispatch,and the company,when they conflict with said safety of flight. And your decisions will be questioned,and the paying public has a right to question those decisions. To me this looks like a typical weather related event,with faulty decision making. I would like to know what the captains mindset was, if he was even on the flight deck at this critical portion of the flight,crossing of the tropical convergence zone.


Jim Driscoll, MSI Raider GE76 12UHS-607 17.3" Gaming Laptop Computer - Blue Intel Core i9 12th Gen 12900HK 1.8GHz Processor; NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3080 Ti 16GB GDDR6; 64GB DDR5-4800 RAM; Dual M2 2TB Solid State Drives.Driving a Sony KD-50X75, and KDL-48R470B @ 4k 3724x2094,MSFS 2020, 30 FPS on Ultra Settings.

Jorg/Asobo: “Weather is a core part of our simulator, and we will strive to make it as accurate as possible.”Also Jorg/Asobo: “We are going to limit the weather API to rain intensity only.”


 

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Didn't top Gear UK try and destroy a black box once? ["Which is actually orange :Hypnotized: :Hypnotized: ]Those things are pretty tough, I really hope it survived getting a little wet


Alex Ridge

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Ok.. Let's take this easy. There are hundreds of threads all over the net about AF447 and pretty much all to them end up in futile arguments and all of those have the same background: Careless handling of the information.Please, do not get confused between facts and opinions. We must be able to discern between proper information based on facts and intentional misguiding. There are plenty of interests behind something like this the most bothering of which is the media thirst of blood for higher ratings, better sales, etc.. I am still to find an unbiased information source and I include among those all youtube (and other) videos.I must say however that the French bureau of investigations is (to my judgement) handling this investigation with excellence. The downside of that is when like in this case the information DOES NOT OFFER ANY CONCLUSSIONS and most people can't handle that, specially when journalists wont accept that there are no news on a subject so juicy as a airliner crash. Have you ever heard any journalist say about AF447 that the news are that there are no news? Never! They use AF447 as a headline for the hook and the rest is garbage, most of which includes scenes of the grieving families with some emotional background music. They wont state the facts even when given to them if they can find another perspective that would make better headlines and therefore more profit to them.Some people are not prepared to understand the lack of information in a matter like this. They feel it as a hole which they feel powerfully compelled to fill as if theirs lives depended on it. They will gather bits and pieces from all the sources available and mentally build the explanation that would fill the gap in the hole as it is portrayed in their minds. While many of us may have our personal theories there is a difference: We are not obsessed with telling everyone that ours is the only and true!But in aviation this "not knowing" thing happens from time to time, events unfold in such a way that no amount of information will provide the answer wanted yet we must remain true and no easy and satisfying explanations can be accepted. We have to learn to live with "the hole" of knowledge until new evidence comes forward, generally in the wake of someone experiencing the same events and surviving to them. If you have difficulties understanding what I mean please research about the recent 737 rudder issue (Was it USAIR 423? Not sure in this moment) and the time the investigation took and how it was finally solved. Or for a better example research the De Havilland Comet history and how we learned about material stress in pressurized cabins.Grieving relatives feel compelled to do anything to gather attention from the media because for them "the hole" has another dimension. They will approach any journalist willing to listen to them because they fear that the incident may be forgotten. They feel helpless against the huge interests of major companies like airlines, insurance companies, aircraft builders, etc.. And more often than not they don't trust goverment agencies in their appointed tasks of investigation authorities because they feel it would be too easy for them to cover the truth if it would hurt major interests. So their hope is to make their quest for truth as widely known as possible so the pressure of the public opinion becomes unbearable to a level where somebody somewhere won't be able to hold anymore and tell the truth. For the relatives the pain they feel is good enough justification thus becoming sitting ducks (easy preys) to unethical journalism..I feel sorry for them because they need to know in order to bring closure to a bleeding wound in their souls. But at the same time we all know that the truth and only the truth will help them, however some time it takes a long time to figure what really happened. My point to all this being : Let's slowly recap what is known for fact so far, can we?While it is very good news that the FDR has been recovered I do not have high expectations as to what is it to produce in the form of new evidence. In fact based on what we have so far it may not yield anything new at all. Let's hope for the best though... I'm inclined to think that the CVR will be more representative from what the pilots knew or lack knowledge of. That's of course if there is anything recorded at all since it looks like all elec power was lost shortly after the events unfolded.Joss M Garcia

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I guess when you sign the flight release as a captain,you accept full responsibility for the safety of the flight,and have a moral responsibility to stand up to dispatch,and the company,when they conflict with said safety of flight. And your decisions will be questioned,and the paying public has a right to question those decisions. To me this looks like a typical weather related event,with faulty decision making. I would like to know what the captains mindset was, if he was even on the flight deck at this critical portion of the flight,crossing of the tropical convergence zone.
While weather was a factor in the flight there is no evidence that it was the main factor. Other flights followed the same route within minutes both ahead and behind and while they reported significant weather they never confronted anything out of the ordinary. Not that I'm saying it could not be the case, but the signs are not there to blame the weather on its own. I think we were all biased into thinking weather was the blame when news of the icing in one of the pitot tubes was reported to have been detected by the computers and then messaged to base for further maintenance. Also shortly after the accident an american meteorologist published on the net pictures of the weather returns on top of which the assumed trajectory of the flight was outlined, his conclusions being that the trajectory was coincident with the most active cell at that particular time. What he fails to point out is that when you watch several hours of traffic on the same area you see that the trajectories of the flights and the weather returns do not make sense together most of the times, so either all the pilots are crazy and want to kill themselves or the resolution those images provide and the actual picture the pilots see in their scopes are quite different and they follow paths that to us are invisible. Ironically the worst weather was not reported by those flights closer to the path of AF447 but by others that deviated to avoid the same weather they flew. I spoke to a jumbo captain who used to fly that route often and his best guess to match what was known at the time was that an ascending current brought the airplane above its service ceiling and as the plane flew out of the current stalled, but the same captain pointed out that a deep stall would not be possible in that situation since not enough lift would be available from the tail plus Airbus computers would have detected the situation and pushed the nose forward. On the other hand if we rely on the automated reporting system (and nothing points that we should not) we have a general but good idea about what happened before impact and probably why it happened, problem is no scenario known so far to bring down an airplane fits 100%.. As an investigator said: Based on previous experience it looks like even if we knew all the details we might fail to understand why it came down.. I might add that therefore we can imply several factors concurring in a fatal chain of events.. Yes, I know, same old story once again! How is that saying Churchill made so famous? Its a mystery inside another mistery..

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What I don't understand, in this time and age, why planes are not using Wireless data recorders. Why are we still limited to using black boxes that are physically inside the plane? Why can't the plane wirelessly transmit live data to the dispatchers of their airline, and also wirelessly transmit the cockpit voice recorder data to a database? This would save millions of dollars in investment and time, and would help speed up the investigation ten fold.

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