The last two minutes of AF447 Cockpit Chaos that AF and the french government don't want you to hear! (and I'm quoting CNN's Richard Quest here: "Air France and the BEA investigating authority are roundly condemning the publication of these last two minutes" at 0:56 of the video). See: http://www.cnn.com/v...-france-447.cnn

Transcript: Pierre-Cedric Bonin (Pilot, PF): What the... How is it we are going down like this? David Robert (Co-Pilot, PNF): See what you can do with the commands up there, the primaries and so on... Climb, climb, climb. PF: But I have been pulling back on the stick all the way for a while. Marc Dubois (CAPtain): No, no, no, don't climb. PNF: OK, give me control, give me control. CAP: Watch out, you are pulling up. PF: Am I? PNF: Go back up! Go back up! Go back up! Go back up! PF: But I've been going down at maximum level for a while. CAP: No, no, no! Don't go up! No, no! PF: Go down, then! PNF: Damn it! We're going to crash! It can't be true! PF: But what's happening? (End of recording) Richard Quest (2:50): What this is going to turn out to be, besides the confusion and chaos that was in that cockpit, this crash along with many others now is starting to turn into an investigation into how flyable modern airliners are in the heat of the moment when so much information, if you like a battle between man and machine, and that's what Air France says is where this is going to be looked at in the future.

My thoughts exactly. - jahman.

So the thing was stalled - clearly - since the altimeter was unwinding at 15,000 feet per minute, but the guy has the sidestick all the way back? Sounds like they really need to initiate some basic flying skill instruction at AF. Al

I hear Air France will be the Launch Customer for Microsoft Fright! <-- mis-spelling intentional. My non-pilot grandma would be tempted to ask: If holding the stick all the way back for quite a while doesn't seem to work, shouldn't you try pushing the stick all the way forward instead? I can only begin to imagine how hard it is to wrap your head around different laws and directives in the middle of a crisis, and before you know it you're no longer flying the airplane but mentally debugging the FBW system until your brain's just grinds to a halt. Cheers, - jahman.

So the thing was stalled - clearly - since the altimeter was unwinding at 15,000 feet per minute, but the guy has the sidestick all the way back? Sounds like they really need to initiate some basic flying skill instruction at AF. Al

I for one would have serious problems drawing any useful information from such erratic and unreliable data pouring through the instruments. The real issue was the decision to penetrate a thunderstorm (in my mind). Chilling words from the crew.

that's

The real issue was the decision to penetrate a thunderstorm (in my mind).

I'd agree with that, like most accidents, it would seem that it is a cascade of events as opposed to one thing which has gone wrong, and the first one of those events being flying into that storm in the first place. There may of course be things we don't yet know, but one thing we do know is that hauling back on the stick and seeing there is no recovery being effected yet watching the VSI drop you out of the sky for a considerable length of time and doing nothing other than to say you don't understand what is happening seems like such a fundamentally wrong thing for a pilot to do that I would certainly question crew training. It's apparent that the PF was placing way to much faith in the notion that you can haul the stick back on an Airbus and it will always get you out of trouble, and that there will never be a circumstance where that is the wrong thing to do in spite of the instrumental evidence to the contrary. Worse, it's not the first time AF pilots have done exactly that and crashed an Airbus either. Always assuming that what is coming out is not a 'blame the crew' cover up of other evidence. Have pilots forgotten the mantra ''fly the airplane'' and more importantly, have airlines forgotten to teach their pilots to do that? Al

It's apparent that the PF was placing way to much faith in the notion that you can haul the stick back on an Airbus and it will always get you out of trouble,

Now that is a very valid point in this accident, I believe. I hope it becomes the focus of the investigation. Unfortunately I believe AF will not play nicely, as so far they seem not to have. I fear AF and Airbuses' relationships are far too tied up in government, or rather the government's interest are too tied up in AF/AB...

I just wonder what the radar screen looked like for the pilots. As I've said in my posts about this AF accident before, it is very easy for some cells to be hidden by other fairly strong returns and by the time you see the cell you are already in it. Yes they knew about the weather ahead of time but they were crossing the ITC so storms are a regularity and they were most likely picking there way through it all.

I just wonder what the radar screen looked like for the pilots. As I've said in my posts about this AF accident before, it is very easy for some cells to be hidden by other fairly strong returns and by the time you see the cell you are already in it. Yes they knew about the weather ahead of time but they were crossing the ITC so storms are a regularity and they were most likely picking there way through it all.

Yeah. But having crossed the ITC so many times, you have to wonder how they screwed this one up so bad. There's a great Nova documentary that mentions that.

Yeah. But having crossed the ITC so many times, you have to wonder how they screwed this one up so bad. There's a great Nova documentary that mentions that.

That's what I wonder. Is there any transcripts from earlier segments of the flight where you can figure out how they were dealing with the weather?

that's I'd agree with that, like most accidents, it would seem that it is a cascade of events as opposed to one thing which has gone wrong, and the first one of those events being flying into that storm in the first place. There may of course be things we don't yet know, but one thing we do know is that hauling back on the stick and seeing there is no recovery being effected yet watching the VSI drop you out of the sky for a considerable length of time and doing nothing other than to say you don't understand what is happening seems like such a fundamentally wrong thing for a pilot to do that I would certainly question crew training. It's apparent that the PF was placing way to much faith in the notion that you can haul the stick back on an Airbus and it will always get you out of trouble, and that there will never be a circumstance where that is the wrong thing to do in spite of the instrumental evidence to the contrary. Worse, it's not the first time AF pilots have done exactly that and crashed an Airbus either. Always assuming that what is coming out is not a 'blame the crew' cover up of other evidence. Have pilots forgotten the mantra ''fly the airplane'' and more importantly, have airlines forgotten to teach their pilots to do that? Al

You raise some great points. Perhaps these "truths" were even drilled into the pilots during training, establishing a hidden assumption that the FBW was infallible (and it very well might be, provided it gets accurate air data). As an aside, sometimes sophisticated technology can breed "blind faith" in its adopters: Witness Germany during WW2 apparently never suspected their Enigma-encoded messages were being read on a daily basis because they figured the Engima codes were unbreakable. Cheers, - jahman.

So the thing was stalled - clearly - since the altimeter was unwinding at 15,000 feet per minute, but the guy has the sidestick all the way back? Sounds like they really need to initiate some basic flying skill instruction at AF. Al

It's a dreadful thought given the end result, but it sounds like they had Curly Larry & Moe in the cockpit there The captain appears to have been the only one who had any idea of how to recover the situation.

It's disappointing how a few members in this forum think about airline pilots and their abilities.Why some RW pilots in this forum pilots have such a low opinion about those AF guys I don't understand.It's common knowledge that that the automation and envelope protection in an FBW Airbus can be troublesome.Even in my old rather basic 767 it happens sometimes that you question yourself 'what's the AP doing now and why is he doing that?'Here's just a thought concering the 'inability' of the AF pilots to realize they are 'stalled' and why they were applying full up elevator. If you read the accident report you see that at one point the Airbus became so slow that the computers considered that speed wrong and hence there was no speed displayed at all. When the pilots pushed the stick forward they just gained enough speed to trigger the Airbus to display the (way too low) speed again together with the stall warning. When they released the forward pressure the speed reduced again and the stall warning stopped.Just releasing the forward pressure wouldn't result in a pitch up if the Airbus wouldn't have had trimmed the stabilizer fully nose up in the meantime by itself!The effect of full forward stick with a full nose up trimmed stabilizer is very weak.Pulling the side stick back doesn't do much and pushing it forward triggers the stall warning, That's quite some confusing information which doesn't make much sense either.This 'weird' Airbus behaviour coupled with turbulence and thunderstorms all around plus the knowledge that the Airbus isn't always predictable makes it IMO almost impossible to make the correct decision within a short time span given the additional 'none', 'wrong' and 'conflicting' information from the computers.I would really appreciate if some 'pilots' think before posting something like 'they really need to initiate some basic flying skill instruction at AF' . BTW, calling the AF crew Curly Larry & Moe is simply disgusting.

It's disappointing how a few members in this forum think about airline pilots and their abilities.Why some RW pilots in this forum pilots have such a low opinion about those AF guys I don't understand.It's common knowledge that that the automation and envelope protection in an FBW Airbus can be troublesome.Even in my old rather basic 767 it happens sometimes that you question yourself 'what's the AP doing now and why is he doing that?'Here's just a thought concering the 'inability' of the AF pilots to realize they are 'stalled' and why they were applying full up elevator. If you read the accident report you see that at one point the Airbus became so slow that the computers considered that speed wrong and hence there was no speed displayed at all. When the pilots pushed the stick forward they just gained enough speed to trigger the Airbus to display the (way too low) speed again together with the stall warning. When they released the forward pressure the speed reduced again and the stall warning stopped.Just releasing the forward pressure wouldn't result in a pitch up if the Airbus wouldn't have had trimmed the stabilizer fully nose up in the meantime by itself!The effect of full forward stick with a full nose up trimmed stabilizer is very weak.Pulling the side stick back doesn't do much and pushing it forward triggers the stall warning, That's quite some confusing information which doesn't make much sense either.This 'weird' Airbus behaviour coupled with turbulence and thunderstorms all around plus the knowledge that the Airbus isn't always predictable makes it IMO almost impossible to make the correct decision within a short time span given the additional 'none', 'wrong' and 'conflicting' information from the computers.I would really appreciate if some 'pilots' think before posting something like 'they really need to initiate some basic flying skill instruction at AF' . BTW, calling the AF crew Curly Larry & Moe is simply disgusting.

Brent - +1

I agree that one ought to think carefully about 'blaming the dead' where air crashes are concerned, but that does not mean that the crew's actions should be above suspicion, and if you know anything about the Annexes which list the responsibilities of Air Accident Investigators, then you will know that they support that view as well, where the stated aim of an AAI is not to apportion blame, but to find out what happened from the facts, present a report, and then leave the blame game up to others. But in finding out what happened, it would seem from the CVR that a co-pilot was holding the stick back, whilst the plane dropped all the way from cruise altitude at 15,000 feet per minute, all the while saying that he did not understand what was happening, whilst the captain was repeatedly telling him not to hold the stick back. And you can make of that what you like, but it sounds to me very much like either a lack of understanding of stall recovery techniques, or the inability to asses a situation and take positive corrective action when some systems have failed. As unpalatable as it is to suggest that one of our cadre is not a competent pilot, if that is the cause, then we should not be afraid to say it, because we have more of a duty to the safety of passengers we carry and people over whom we are flying, than we have to protecting our pilot clique. And if more pilot training is the solution, then covering stuff up to protect the sensibilities of the crew is only going to lead to more of the same instead of leading to a situation where crews will in future be equipped with the skills necessary to prevent something like that from occurring again. This is ultimately the point of an AAI. Al

Well the reason is because most of the time it is the pilot's who crash the airplane, not the airplane itself. This is the case which most are talking about which is why did they get themselves in this storm in the first place and why did they react like they did when it began hitting the fan. Again, I myself wonder what was on their radar before all this happened and did they know that they were getting into that bad of a storm.