Q for pilots about Air France report opinion piece

[IUBrian 151]

Saw this comment in an opinion piece at CNN.com that seemed suspect. I wonder of real world pilots agree; is airline training truly as inadequate as the writer makes it sound?

 

"In the early days of aviation, training included how to recover from some of the most commonly-faced emergencies, such as a lost engine during take off. These scenarios are no longer common, yet the training has not changed significantly to recognize this new reality. Automation used to be the pilot's assistant. Now the pilot is expected to back-up the automation. That is a fundamentally new task that the industry hasn't trained for.

 

Regulators around the world need to acknowledge this and work to change the basic requirements in training programs.

 

Pilots need to know what it feels like to stall at high altitudes and train on how to recover. They need to know what to do when an airplane is suddenly handed to them during an abnormal flight situation by the autopilot turning off. They need to learn what to do and perhaps most importantly, what not to do in order to avoid increasing risk."

 

http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/opinion/opinion-voss-why-do-planes-crash/index.html

 

 

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Chock 17,769]

I recall being very vocal (or more correctly, literal) on the subject with numerous official organisations and related magazines some years ago - writing letters and such (yup, actual letters, since it was before email and all that stuff was common) - when this matter cropped up in the early nineties as the JAR pilot training syllabus changed. The change which concerned me, was the newly proposed emphasis on stall avoidance, rather than keeping stall and spin recovery in the PPL syllabus, as had been the case. If you were a reader of any of the GA pilot magazines back then, such as Flying, Pilot etc, you would have seen me showering the letters pages with stuff about that, because quite a few got printed on their letters pages.

 

Not that my efforts did any good, the change was made, and the JAR PPL syllabus now teaches stall avoidance rather than what to do if you get into one, or even worse, what to do in an incipient spin following a stall. They should of course include both stall and spin recovery as part of the syllabus, but unfortunately they don't, and many pilots who learn from that syllabus then go on to become airline pilots, having never done a single spin recovery in their lives.

 

At the time, I recall likening this to WW1, when many pilots were invariably completely unfamiliar with how to do a spin recovery, where literally thousands of them died because of that lack of knowledge - in fact more pilots were killed in Sopwith F1 Camel from accidentally spinning it, than were actually killed in it by being shot down, and that was just one aircraft type - but unlike back in 1917, these days, the phenomenon is well understood, so there is no excuse in not teaching pilots about it, and if you want my opinion, it is insane not to do so, and indeed criminally irresponsible to put someone in the driving seat of an airliner who does not know such fundamentals from an actual experience standpoint.

 

You can of course opt to do some more advanced training after you have your basic pilot licence, but when flight training is expensive, and it is not compulsory to do so, who is going to do that? Well, the airlines could do that, and in my opinion they should; for most of them it would be a drop in the bucket expense-wise to get pilots up in a Cessna 150 Aerobat or something similar once a year to run through a few basic stall and spin recoveries with some rubber suction blanking plates over the intruments.

 

And guess what? If I happened to know that one airline did go to that trouble, and another did not, can you imagine which airline I would avoid. The idea of being sat in seat 37A on an airliner and knowing that there's a distinct possibility that you know more about basic flying techniques than the guys up front who are being paid to drive the thing, is a worrying prospect.

 

Al

[503(V) Driver 0]

it is insane not to do so, and indeed criminally irresponsible to put someone in the driving seat of an airliner who does not know such fundamentals from an actual experience standpoint.

I couldn't agree more. Well Said.

[iainsmith 9]

than the guys up front who are being paid to drive the thing, is a worrying prospect.

 

Another worrying thing is that often both guys aren't being paid to fly the thing. A lot of right seat occupants actually pay the airline several thousand pounds (or dollars or euros) for the privilege of flying the aircraft in order to clock up actual flying hours. They've had full simulator training but the first time they occupy the right seat they have zero hours actual flying of that B737 or A320 or whatever.

 

Iain Smith

[Kepti 108]

[Houghton11 12]

He he...Topic moved to Hangar Chat I see.

 

My flight training consisted of basic flying, which eventually, before starting to fly solo, lead us to stall and spin avoidance and recovery in theory. This, of course, is not enough. Both my school and teacher understood that, and we made around 50 or so either stalls or spins in practical during the PPL training. I can't imagine a PPL holder who wouldn't had done this, at least in Europe/or USA.

 

Agreed,

 

In Canada, Stall avoidance and recovery is mandatory is all the initial license categories (Glider/PPL/Rec.). Power-on/off/Flaps up/down and all the variations thereof are practised regularly. I don't think there isn't a jurisdiction anywhere that doesn't make stall recovery an actual practised manoeuvre. Surely even in JAR regions a couple demonstrated stall recoveries is required on the flight test?

 

A demonstrated spin recovery in Canada is technically only mandatory in the commercial license. Something that changed around 2000ish. Like the poster above mentions, I think you would be very hard pressed to find a FTU in Canada that wasn't making their pilots spin the airplane at least a couple times during their PPL/Rec./Glider. For me, it was a whole 1.5 hour flight with the CFI which everyone did. He brought us up and spun the ###### out of us a couple times (150's the best for this. 172 too gentle :lol: ). Then we spend the remaining time going through all sorts of spin scenarios and recovery. Setting up the aircraft like a slow final turns, try spme clean configuration spins...insips...all that stuff. He wanted us to recover that airplane like it was muscle memory. Sure you don't have to do it but really...it's worth the extra $$$. If he was comfortable with the recoveries he would "clear" the instructor and student to practice it when they had time. If not then he couldn't really deny you a flight test recommendation later on as it wasn't required.

 

It wasn't on the flight test though of course.

 

The only place I think you used to find a pretty good opposition to this kind of training is in the States. They spearheaded a lot of change in the Private Pilot syllabus back in the early 90's (? I think that's about right). There is an argument behind it; focusing on the onset of a spin should be just as important. But grumbles i've been hearing from some US youngsters transiting through to Alaska has been lot's of training outfits are fitting it back into their syllabus' anyways.

 

For the Air France case though, I doubt these pilots didn't know how to recover from a stall initially, but I do gather that the stall behaviour on those big airliners is something that is kind of complex to simulate and may not be focused on all that much. I don't see them fuelling up a big Airbus either just to practice recoveries in the real world.

 

This whole terrible event is what everything is in aviation: a whole wack of avoidable factors that just compounded on top of each other. We will learn...well...hopefully.

[Matthew Kane 1,343]

In Canada, Stall avoidance and recovery is mandatory is all the initial license categories (Glider/PPL/Rec.). Power-on/off/Flaps up/down and all the variations thereof are practised regularly. I don't think there isn't a jurisdiction anywhere that doesn't make stall recovery an actual practised manoeuvre. Surely even in JAR regions a couple demonstrated stall recoveries is required on the flight test?

 

+1

 

I did my flight training in Canada and they continue to hold a high standard in training. The first 10 hours of training for me included stalls and spins. I have heard other nations don't require spins anymore so for that one I disagree. Canada doesn't require spins on your test but you must do it in your training with your intructor.

 

I remember the door of my old C150 kept opening during my spin training in the middle of winter up over Georgina Township in Ontario, I would recover the spin, level the plane, Power back to cruise, then slam the door :lol:

 

My instructor just laughed and said don't worry about that door, it's not doing anything anyways. So we would do it again, everytime that fregin door would open. I was worried more about the minus 20 degrees outside then falling out really :o

[Chock 17,769]

Another thing I think is worth mentioning here, is we are all aware that with high profile air accidents, there is often an agenda beyond simply finding out what was the cause of the loss of the aircraft. AAIBs are, under Annex 13 (the rules concerning AAIs), mandated to find the cause, but it is not their job to apportion blame, merely to present the facts as they can determine them. Having done that, this however is where the problems start, when pressure is exerted to favour one thing over another as the prime candidate for blame. As we know, you can stick to the facts and still put a slant on one of them over another one, with a bit of creative emphasis.

 

Under Annex 13's rulings, many organisations, including the aircraft manufacturer, the country where it was registered, the country the operator is from, and the country where the incident occurred are all entitled to participate in the investigation to some degree. The entitlement is not always taken up, and there is occasionally some wrangling on the matter, but it has generally led to things being at least as fair as they can be, not always, but most of the time. It can affect things adversely on occasion, most famously when two 747s collided at Los Rodeos, thus involving a US airline, US maker, a Dutch airline and Spanish ATC. If the stage was ever set of a disagreement to ensue, this was surely it...

 

KLM and the Dutch investigators blamed the Spanish Tower ATC, Spanish ATC and Spanish investigators blamed the KLM's pilot (who ironically, was initially sought by KLM to be on the investigative team until they learned it was he who was at the controls and had been killed), Pan Am and Boeing blamed mainly KLM's pilot, and the Spanish ATC to a lesser degree. Most independent witnesses would probably have agreed with the US findings I should think, but the parties involved in the actual investigation failed to come to a complete agreement on the matter.

 

But worse than a disagreement, where the truth will invariably out even if not always with a consensus, is the situation where AF 447 is concerned: You have a French Airline (in fact the national French airline), en route to France, flying a (principally) French Airliner, with the BEA (French AAI) conducting the proceedings. Under those circumstances, even a blind man could see that there is a lot of vested interest in France coming out of such an investigation as best it can, and doubtless there will be pressure exerted in order that the investigation finds fault with the crew rather than the equipment or the airline, purely as a damage limitation exercise. This has happened before, certainly in France, with the Air France A320 which crashed at Habsheim during an airshow. Now, in both these cases, I do tend to think that the crew were indeed largely at fault, at least from what I know of the facts, but an almost entirely French investigation does not inspire confidence in expecting anything other than a conclusion least harmful to France, rather than one most useful to aviation safety at large. And this is not a dig at France either, I'd fully expect my own country to do much the same thing in similar circumstances and I'm sure it will have indeed done so on occasion, and I wouldn't put it past most other countries either.

 

From the outset, we have all pretty much said that the AF447 tragedy was likely a combination of some poor piloting decisions/training, and some poor design on the part of the aircraft (notably the pitot tubes), and this is essentially what the final AAI report has also stated. But we know that the headlines will focus on the poor piloting skills because that is a vastly more dramatic headline than some mysterious aircraft part which Joe Average does not understand. However, that is not to say that this will ultimately be a bad thing, because the important issue here is that if the BEA and other organisations with a vested interest choose to focus on blaming the pilots, then one can hope that the need to be very transparent in having remedied the situation, will result in them actually choosing to do something about the matter, and more importantly, to be seen to be doing something about it.

 

Thus one hopes that in blaming the pilots, what they really blame is the airline for letting down those pilots and their passengers, by providing inadequate training. A pilot can make a poor decision, but when a pilot is not furnished with the knowledge to prevent him or her from doing that as opposed to making a correct choice, then can you really blame the pilot, or is there someone far more culpable, with the advantage of being able to exert pressure from their position higher up the food chain?

 

The BEA report states that the standard of training of the pilots on board AF447 was in line with the required regulations, but then again, the number of lifeboats aboard the RMS Titanic was actually above and beyond being in line with the required regulations at that time, and we all know how that one turned out. One can only hope that as in the case of that tragedy 100 years ago, the findings of the AF447 investigation also stimulate an appropriate change to the regulations. There are enough bodies in the Atlantic, without us adding to the total by fomenting a culture which is content to allow companies to simply comply with the minimum of regulations where transporting large numbers of passengers is concerned.

 

Al

[FLEX1978 373]

Another worrying thing is that often both guys aren't being paid

 

I wouldn't say often.. and it's not both guy's, just the the new rightseater.. however, yes unfortunately that is the reality like many other industry's now, shell out a huge amount of money and be in dept for many years in the hope that eventually you will have a comfortable retirement.

[iainsmith 9]

I wouldn't say often.. and it's not both guy's

 

Yes I realise it's not both guys who are inexperienced. I meant that in the sense that only one of them was being paid not both. Sorry if I confused you. I think it happens more often than you might think with the low cost arilines.

[Avantime 81]

Remember this is a PARTIAL PANEL high altitude upset+stall in IMC+Thunderstorm (major updraughts/downdraughts) conditions. I'd doubt many airline pilots have high altitude upset training let alone under partial panel or stormy conditions.

 

It's like that Tupolev 154 high altitude stall and spin accident after the pilots climbed above their max altitude for their given weight in order to avoid a CB. How many pilots do spin training in an Airbus or Boeing? And then there's icing, how many pilots have heard of tailplane icing (And the need to pull back on the controls to unstall the aircraft) before the Colgan crash?

[Matthew Kane 1,343]

Remember this is a PARTIAL PANEL high altitude upset+stall in IMC+Thunderstorm (major updraughts/downdraughts) conditions.

 

Kind of like giving a calculator to someone before they learn math......

 

Basics are learned from the start and built from there up. Otherwise you will be disoriented given the situation if you never learned from the basics and up.

 

Colgan crash?

 

Different situation compared to Air France as this one was a perfectly operating aircraft in mis-configuration on approach and not at high altitude.

 

...

 

Cheers Iain and hope you are keeping warm. It is cold here in Tawa tonight

All the best mate.

[Chock 17,769]

And then there's icing, how many pilots have heard of tailplane icing (And the need to pull back on the controls to unstall the aircraft) before the Colgan crash?

 

You are quite correct Iain, in highlighting that whilst the Colgan incident is a different incident, the overriding problem is the same; that of inadequate knowledge or training on what to be aware of, and that lack of knowledge leading to a crash.

 

But just to be clear, the aircraft isn't necssarily stalled in those circumstances, deploying the flaps changes the airflow to the elevator, and the build up of ice on the tailplane's leading edge can increase the angle of attack of the airflow over the tailplane to a point where the downwash from the deployed flaps pushes the angle of attack even higher, and moves the centre of lift past the elevator hinge, the tailplane may stall, but it doesn't have to, the elevator is forced downwards into a vacuum, and that is what pushes the aircraft into a dive. The control forces are so great it is unlikely that even both crew members would be able to pull back on the controls and pitch the elevator into a climb position. The only feasible way to resolve it is to have enough altitude to be able to retract the flaps, restore a stable airflow to the tailplane, and then bring the stick back, but since the flap deployment usually occurs at low altitude, the chances are that it is game over.

 

The real solution to that issue would be to periodically disengage the autopilot when cruising in potential icing conditions, in order to check that the autopilot has not been applying excessive trim to overcome icing on the tailplane, since you would not notice that if not flying manually. If it has, you would either descend into warmer air to de-ice the tailplane, or consider landing with less flaps, or even no flaps if you were not sure the icing had cleared.

 

Al

[kama2004 74]

In my flight training in Canada in 2006, there was just a theoritical training about spin recovery. Then a demonstration by the trainer of recovering the plane. All the rest of the training was basically to recognize sign of stall and avoid them. There was of course significant number of exercice of straight direction stall. It took me a couple of years to complete my training because of time constraint and town move and I had three different instructors during this period. Same approach for all of them about spin. You have felt one, you have seen how the instruction get out of it and thats it.

 

I had to pursue training with an aerobatic annotation to actually fly airplate out of spin (fun time). Unusual attitude recovery is one of the first portion of this training and I think any professional pilot should go through this syllabus.

 

So I would not say that it is mandatory anymore in Canada for PPL to perform spin recovery durign PPL training.

[Chock 17,769]

As you say Pierre, it's not as if it's a pain in the &@($* to do spin and stall recoveries, that, and aerobatics are great fun. I absolutely love practicing spin recoveries, it's the best fairground ride you'll ever go on.

 

On advanced flying course I did a few years ago, I even had to initiate a spin from a pull up starting at 1,000 feet AGL. It was a requirement to do that maneuver before they would let you fly solo from that airfield with their aircraft. You had to dive to 1,000 feet AGL, then haul right back on the stick to vertical, then kick the rudder and yank the stick back to spin it, the spin commenced at about 1,250 feet or something if I recall correctly. Now that is fun, think I pulled out with about 400-500 feet to spare, might have been lower, I was too busy watching the G meter as I pulled out. Not as mad as what you see some stunt pilots doing of course, but it was bloody exciting all the same.

 

Al