Not sure what you are trying to get at. Maybe I should not have used the term 'sure you are stalling'. A pilot can't 'correctly' determine that he is in a stall without some outside observation to confirm that. I mean that, from what the pilot can observe, he/she has made the judgement that the aircraft is approaching stall or stalling. I am not a pilot nor have ever pertained to being one.

 

Edit: to Kevin, not Ró!

 

Perhaps if they had practiced it though, they would have better recognised when they were in one...

 

Rónán O Cadhain.

 

Agreed. However if they didn't believe their instruments were showing true values then they could have clearly been showing that the aircraft was approaching (or in) stall, and they still wouldn't have done anything to recover.

Not sure what you are trying to get at. Maybe I should not have used the term 'sure you are stalling'. A pilot can't 'correctly' determine that he is in a stall without some outside observation to confirm that. I mean that, from what the pilot can observe, he/she has made the judgement that the aircraft is approaching stall or stalling. I am not a pilot nor have ever pertained to being one.

 

Edit: to Kevin, not Ró!

 

Alright, this is what I am leading you to. All a stall recovery is, is just a push of the stick to increase airspeed. Which is something that a pilot should have been taught on his very first flight. There is no difference between a stall recovery and basic everyday normal flying. A properly trained pilot would already have as basic instinct established from his first flights, that a push or pull of the stick is his main speed and angle of attack control. If a properly trained pilot perceives that he's flying too slowly, his basic instinct would have him push on the stick. A properly trained pilot would not need to use outside "observation" and "confirmations" to determine that he needed to "execute" a stall recovery. There is no borderline between normal flying and stall recovery. It would be seamless to a pilot who has been taught the correct basics. A properly trained pilot would have just pushed the stick forward whether or not the word "stall" popped up in his head.

There must be a point at which a pilot decides they need to set TOGA and push the nose down though. The "observations" and "confirmations" I'm talking about aren't any special extra stimulus, just looking at the HSI, airspeed etc. Otherwise wouldn't the other crews of 330s/340s that reported spurious stall warnings after UAS events just pushed the nose down by default? Or are you saying that the crew of AF447 should have known the aircraft was approaching stall without any knowledge of the airspeed or horizon?

There must be a point at which a pilot decides they need to set TOGA and push the nose down though. The "observations" and "confirmations" I'm talking about aren't any special extra stimulus, just looking at the HSI, airspeed etc. Otherwise wouldn't the other crews of 330s/340s that reported spurious stall warnings after UAS events just pushed the nose down by default? Or are you saying that the crew of AF447 should have known the aircraft was approaching stall without any knowledge of the airspeed or horizon?

 

You've got it still stuck in your head that there is something that separates normal flying from a "stall recover" that needs to be set into motion through perception and realization. A properly trained pilot wouldn't need to know he was stalling to recover from a stall. All he would have needed to see and believe was that the speed was way too slow. Then his basic instincts instilled from good basic training would have him push forward on the stick, which is what he would do in any other flight regime as well if he needed more speed. A stall recovery is no different than pushing forward for airspeed, which is how planes fly whether they are stalling or in cruise. And which should have been taught to a student from day one. TOGA's got nothing to do with any of this.

You've just said that the pilot will "believe that the speed was way too slow". How is that different from me saying that the observations included looking at the airspeed? This is at the point where the airspeed is doing the following:

 

 

The CAS changes from 274 kt to

156 kt. The CAS ISIS changes

from 275 kt to 139 kt then goes

back up to 223 kt.

The Mach changes from 0.80 to

0.26.

What I am saying is that you do not need to identify a stall to make the proper actions to recover or prevent it. All you need to do is identify that you are flying slower than desired, and correct for that as you would in any flight regime any other day. Now, if what you are saying is that those pilots did not believe their instruments at all, then I don't believe that there was a solution for them except for a parachute either. I mean, if the airspeed is showing 0, and you don't believe that, and Betty is yelling "stall...stall" at you and you don't believe it..... I really don't have a solution for that even in 10,000 hours of flying. Sorry. I'd say it's just another example of Darwinism.

Well Kevin this is the problem, it is very likely they didn't think they we're flying to slow, in fact a few cues suggested they we're in an overspeed situation one of which was a high level of background noise. The PF deployed the speed brakes and reduced thrust to idle, but then he also whacked them into TOGA and yanked back.

 

After reading the final report my head hurts even more, the truth is no one can really know what they thought, we all know what they should have done, but the reality was just 3 minutes of fear and confusion sadly.

Well Kevin this is the problem, it is very likely they didn't think they we're flying to slow, in fact a few cues suggested they we're in an overspeed situation one of which was a high level of background noise. The PF deployed the speed brakes and reduced thrust to idle, but then he also whacked them into TOGA and yanked back.

 

After reading the final report my head hurts even more, the truth is no one can really know what they thought, we all know what they should have done, but the reality was just 3 minutes of fear and confusion sadly.

 

I'm reading it at the moment, and from what I've read so far that pretty much summarises it unfortunately.

After reading the final report my head hurts even more, the truth is no one can really know what they thought, we all know what they should have done, but the reality was just 3 minutes of fear and confusion sadly.

 

So is there anything to be learned here? Does it mean mo' better technology needed? More better Betty yelling "stall...stall" in a slightly different tone of voice or inflection? Flashing numbers or symbols on the PFD? A mechanical white gloved hand that reaches out from the panel to slap the pilot in the face? If they never even believed their instruments or any other cues to recognize a slow speed or stall situation, what good does practicing stalls even do? Is it an indictment of the ab initio training system? Is it an indictment of those who grew up in flying relying on pitch+power=performance formulas? Or is it just plain dumb stupidity that no amount of technology and training can overcome?

I have to review the report, but I thought that the instruments were not functioning correctly due to a failure. The pilots failed to recognize the problem, trusted the instruments, as they are trained to do. They initially reacted appropriately to what they saw and as things quickly went downhill they failed to recognize what was actually happening.

 

So KevinAU, if you found yourself in zero visibly conditions and believed that your plane was over speed, what would you do? Dive and let the plane tear itself apart or pull up and slow down to a safe speed?

 

What if as you pull "up" the airspeed keeps increasing according to the instruments? What instruments are correct? Your altitude is increasing, the airspeed is getting alarmingly high and you're in the middle of strong turbulence?

 

In hindsight, it sounds like better training would have helped a lot here. The pilots should probably have recognized the nature of the failure sooner and worked to get the nose down. At the same time I don't see how they would have otherwise perceived "speed" accurately enough to disregard over speed and know to put their nose down before the stall, especially under those conditions.

I have to review the report, but I thought that the instruments were not functioning correctly due to a failure. The pilots failed to recognize the problem, trusted the instruments, as they are trained to do. They initially reacted appropriately to what they saw and as things quickly went downhill they failed to recognize what was actually happening.

 

So KevinAU, if you found yourself in zero visibly conditions and believed that your plane was over speed, what would you do? Dive and let the plane tear itself apart or pull up and slow down to a safe speed?

 

What if as you pull "up" the airspeed keeps increasing according to the instruments? What instruments are correct? Your altitude is increasing, the airspeed is getting alarmingly high and you're in the middle of strong turbulence?

 

In hindsight, it sounds like better training would have helped a lot here. The pilots should probably have recognized the nature of the failure sooner and worked to get the nose down. At the same time I don't see how they would have otherwise perceived "speed" accurately enough to disregard over speed and know to put their nose down before the stall, especially under those conditions.

 

I haven't read the final either, but from what I already have read before, their instruments were actually functioning correctly during the descent. Their airspeed had gone invalid momentarily during cruise flight, causing the autopilot to disengage and the pilot to pull back for whatever reason and stall the plane. From that momentary invalid airspeed indication, they disregarded all indications of airspeed afterwards, even though the failure had passed. The invalid airspeeds they got afterwards were due to them actually being so slow that there was no airspeed to register. So it was actually a case of the pilots not trusting the instruments.

 

When you ask me if I believe that my plane is overspeeding, is it because of what I see from the instruments or just a notion that appeared in my head?

 

If I pulled up and the airspeed increased and the altimeter increased as well, that would indicate to me that my pitot tube might be blocked. I would push the aircraft over to a level pitch attitude and reevaluate from there, checking to see whether my airspeed indicator is behaving like an altimeter.

 

That however, was not what they got. Their airspeed bounced between invalid and up to very low.

I sure hope that isn't what really happened in that cockpit!

I would definitely suggest reading the report, the aircraft never got slow enough for the speeds to be invalid, that would have meant the aircraft was flying below 60kts, I'm fact that's a mistake, airspeed would still be displayed normally, only stall warning is inhibited below 60kts

 

It makes a very interesting and sobering read

Sorry for the necro-post but...

 

There was an interesting theory posted over on pprune; somebody suggested that the PF was committing suicide, it was pretty much dismissed out of hand as being out of character; but brought into mind the (i think) Egypt Air accident with the discredited captain.

I am not sure that the PF even realised that he had the controls hard back, they had completely lost awareness, both the PF and PNF were out of there depth, confused, and i dare say scared.

 

With the final report i'll confess i am reluctant to fly Air France in future, to the point were my holiday this year i have chosen a more expensive airline.

Sorry for the necro-post but...

 

There was an interesting theory posted over on pprune; somebody suggested that the PF was committing suicide, it was pretty much dismissed out of hand as being out of character; but brought into mind the (i think) Egypt Air accident with the discredited captain.

I am not sure that the PF even realised that he had the controls hard back, they had completely lost awareness, both the PF and PNF were out of there depth, confused, and i dare say scared.

 

With the final report i'll confess i am reluctant to fly Air France in future, to the point were my holiday this year i have chosen a more expensive airline.

 

I don't buy the suicide theory in the slightest. I'd say you're right on the point about him not realising he had the controls full back though.

 

As for whether you fly with them or not, while I don't want to paint all of their pilots with the same brush, I certainly think they're training department has massive scope for improvement.

 

Ró.