So it seems that officials are dealing with an airliner that went amiss and nothing can be found of it. I'm not sure whether this brings some closure to family or alienates them more. :(

The BEA is the official French organisation responsible for technical investigations of civil aviation accidents and incidents. It's latrst statement dated 5 June 2009 reads: "A large quantity of more or less accurate information and attempts at explanations concerning the accident are currently being circulated. The BEA reminds those concerned that in such circumstances, it is advisable to avoid all hasty interpretations and speculation on the basis of partial or non-validated information. At this stage of the investigation, the only established facts are:

• the presence near the airplane’s planned route over the Atlantic of significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions;
• based on the analysis of the automatic messages broadcast by the plane, there are inconsistencies between the various speeds measured."

It is holding a press conference at midday today.

Some of the debris has been disavowed, some has not. I'll quote from the following link http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/...estigators.html ...

But today investigators said the wooden pallet and two buoys recovered was not from Flight 447, but just floating waste believed to be from a ship.Earlier, investigators had also claimed to have spotted a plane seat and a seven-metre piece of fuselage floating in the ocean from search planes thousands of feet up.They have not yet confirmed if those pieces of debris were from Flight 447 or not.

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Debris spotted about 340 miles (550 kilometres) northeast of Brazil's northern Fernando de Noronha islands by the helicopter crew so far includes a 23-foot (seven-metre) chunk of plane, an airline seat, an oil slick and several large brown and yellow pieces that Cardoso said probably came from inside the plane.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxThe mystery deepens ...

14-minute countdown to disasterAt 11pm on Sunday, the Airbus 330 was flying through black thunderstorms towering up 50,000 feet above sea-level, as updraft winds battered it at up to 100mph.14 minutes later, with its systems failing, the plane was breaking apart and plummeting into the Atlantic ocean with 228 people onboard.Exactly what happened during those terrifying moments may never be known, but the last messages sent out by the aircraft may give cluesAccording to the New York Post:At 11pm (2am GMT) pilot Marc Dubois sent a manual signal saying he was flying through an area of 'CBs' - black, electrically charged cumulonimbus clouds that carry violent winds and lightning.At 11.10pm, automatic messages relayed by the jetliner indicated the autopilot had disengaged.This suggested Dubois and his two co-pilots were trying to thread their way through the storm manually.At this point a key computer system had switched to alternative power and controls needed to keep the plane stable had been damaged.An alarm also sounded, indicating that the 'fly-by-wire' system on the Airbus that controls the flaps on the wings had shifted to 'alternate law'.Alternate law is an emergency back-up system that kicks in after an electronic failure. It enables the plane to keep functioning with less energy - but reduces stability, which would have been desperately needed as the pilots battled to bring the jet safely out of the turbulence.At 11.12pm, two key computers monitoring air speed, altitude and direction failed. These would have increased the pilot's loss of control over the plane.The loss of instruments showing air speed in particular would have been detrimental. The pilot was trying to fly a fine line between slowing the plane enough to navigate through the turbulence, and not slowing so much that the plane stalled mid-air, which would have been catastrophic.The messages show there was an inconsistency between the different measured airspeeds shortly after the plane entered the storm zone.At 11.13pm, control of the main flight computer, back up system and wing spoilers also failed.The last automatic message, at 11.14pm, indicated complete electrical failure and a massive loss of cabin pressure - catastrophic events, indicating that the plane was breaking apart and plunging toward the ocean.Last night Airbus warned airline crews to follow standard procedures if they suspect speed indicators are faulty.The Airbus telex was sent to customers of its A330s late yesterday. An industry official said such warnings are only sent if accident investigators have established facts that they consider important enough to pass on immediately to airlines.The recommendation was authorised by the French air accident investigation agency (BEA) looking into the disaster. It has said the speed levels registered by the slew of messages from the plane showed 'incoherence'.Airbus said its message to clients did not imply that the doomed pilots did anything wrong or that a design fault was in any way responsible for the crash.'This Aircraft Information Telex is an information document that in no way implicates any blame,' a spokesman said today.

Hello,

At 11.10pm, automatic messages relayed by the jetliner indicated the autopilot had disengaged.This suggested Dubois and his two co-pilots were trying to thread their way through the storm manually.

That's for me a important point ... the autopilot disengagementThis press article suggest the two pilots try to go in manuallyThis is a possible other suggestion not reported in this press article but suggested by many proffessionals:The autopilot disengaged automatically due to a attitude of the plane out the limit parameters fixed in the autopilot for a safe control (exeeding pitch or bank limit or a speed problem)Proffesssionals also suggest ..it's unlukely pilots want by will manually flying going in such wheater ....Regards.

From the latest news:Investigators know from the aircraft's final batch of automated messages, which were sent over a three-minute period, that there was an inconsistency between the different measured airspeeds shortly after the plane entered a storm zone.An industry official said warnings such as the one Airbus sent on Thursday are only issued if accident investigators have established facts that they consider important enough to pass on immediately to airlines.The recommendation was authorized by the agency looking into the disaster, which has said the speed levels registered by the slew of messages from the plane showed "incoherence."

belga1,Hand flying in severe turbulence is the norm, so a manual disconnect of the autopilot would be the norm.Geofa,I don't know what to make of the incident's having lasted fourteen minutes. On the one hand it tends to reduce the likelihood of a bomb. On the other hand, fourteen minutes also strongly suggests that the aircraft was not out of control until the very end of the accident sequence.Now ... If we focus on the discrepant airspeed readings, how might the crew have responded? I personally would have descended no matter what the risk because I would have immediately suspected icing and would have tried to get down to a lower, warmer altitude. (Just sitting there had already proved to be a losing strategy.)All,What would you have done?

Geofa,I don't know what to make of the incident's having lasted fourteen minutes. On the one hand it tends to reduce the likelihood of a bomb. On the other hand, fourteen minutes also strongly suggests that the aircraft was not out of control until the very end of the accident sequence.Now ... If we focus on the discrepant airspeed readings, how might the crew have responded? I personally would have descended no matter what the risk because I would have immediately suspected icing and would have tried to get down to a lower, warmer altitude. (Just sitting there had already proved to be a losing strategy.)All,What would you have done?

It might have been worse lower down. As far as the airspeed , flying on power settings and their expected airspeeds. Not being a jet driver however, I wonder if figuring out maneuvering speed based on power settings without an airspeed indicator is difficult?"Airbus, maker of the A330 jet that crashed on Monday, issued a warning late on Thursday that pilots should follow standard procedures -- to maintain flight speed and angle -- if they suspect speed indicators are faulty."It sounds to me in addition to weather, and a problem with airspeed indicators, the fundamental design of the aircraft may also have contributed:"The Airbus telex has revived a long-standing debate among pilots over whether the Airbus planes are overly complex.""This is a plane that is conceived by engineers for engineers and not always for pilots," Jean-Pierre Albran, a veteran pilot of Boeing 747s, told Le Parisien newspaper.

It might have been worse lower down. As far as the airspeed , flying on power settings and their expected airspeeds. Not being a jet driver however, I wonder if figuring out maneuvering speed based on power settings without an airspeed indicator is difficult?"Airbus, maker of the A330 jet that crashed on Monday, issued a warning late on Thursday that pilots should follow standard procedures -- to maintain flight speed and angle -- if they suspect speed indicators are faulty."It sounds to me in addition to weather, and a problem with airspeed indicators, the fundamental design of the aircraft may also have contributed:"The Airbus telex has revived a long-standing debate among pilots over whether the Airbus planes are overly complex.""This is a plane that is conceived by engineers for engineers and not always for pilots," Jean-Pierre Albran, a veteran pilot of Boeing 747s, told Le Parisien newspaper.

Where there's pitot icing that can't happen in a design sense there probably was also airframe icing that can't happen. If they flew into a region of well and truly supercooled droplets this might have overcome the anti-ice heating subsystems. In such a situation the power settings would not be a good substitute for a working ASI.Yes, lower down might have been worse. But then it might have been better. I'm simply saying that I personally would not have simply sat there, looking at direct evidence of icing. I suppose I'd have tried to turn the aircraft around as well as performing descent.As to the level of automation, I think it's like the old arguments about stick pushers. It can be demonstrated in simulators that on balance safety is higher if the stick pusher operates quickly and forcibly -- but it doesn't follow that all pilots will be comfortable with high levels of automation.I'm reminded of a naval carrier autoland system that was developed and tested during the 60s. It most definitely did a better job than the carrier pilots could do, especially in bad weather at night. But the pilots wanted none of it.

Where there's pitot icing that can't happen in a design sense there probably was also airframe icing that can't happen. If they flew into a region of well and truly supercooled droplets this might have overcome the anti-ice heating subsystems. In such a situation the power settings would not be a good substitute for a working ASI.If icing was the problem.... I am suspecting there is a design flaw that Airbus was well aware of-and now are rushing to take care of .

Why is it that Air France/Airbus are replacing in a hurry all their pitot tubes? I think they already have a pretty good idea what brought the plane down-and I don't think they think it is a bomb.

The story about mass replacement of pitot tubes is incorrect - someone misread an old Airworthiness Directive which was released in 2002, mandating the replacement of certain models of Rosemont pitot tubes that had been installed on various models of Airbus aircraft.The reason for the replacement was indeed due to indications that the heating elements inside the affected models might have been inadequate for ice prevention/removal in some circumstances - but the AF447 330 was manufactured in 2005, and would certainly have had the newer style pitot tubes right from the factory.Jim Barrett

Re: 'What would you do?'If I recall correctly, it was mentioned that there were three pilot crew members on Air France 447, and that might have led to some discussion on the flight deck about what to do in severe weather. That is only supposition, but in such circumstances it can be both distracting and and can lead to different decision making processes when there is an unusual chain of command. Often there can be a confusing dynamic when normal CRM divisions are altered, additionally, subordinate crew members can be intimidated by their more senior crew colleagues in such circumstances, and not 'speak up'. It is not always a bad thing to have three people on the flight deck in difficult situations (see Sioux City crash landing for an example of when it helped), but it isn't always so.That third pilot on AF 447 may have been merely jumpseating, or he may have been assisting, or maybe 'the spare', so that is admittedly somewhat speculative.The recent crash of a Turkish Boeing 737 at Schiphol also happened with three crew members on the flight deck - the two crew, and a third pilot undergoing training - and it is interesting to note that with three pairs of eyes on the flight deck, not one of them apparently noticed the airspeed dropping as they were on approach. Again a possible case of distractions and decision making not being at optimum, with maybe responsibilities divided in a less than optimum fashion.Sometimes the decision making process can be affected by 'get home-itis' too, particularly on long haul flights, which might have some bearing on AF 447 not turning around, or not taking a lengthy diversion. We may have the luxury of flying all the hours god sends in FS, but real airline pilots are strictly limited in what hours they can fly. Faced with a choice of getting home to France and your family, or a stay in a grotty hotel room for another week, that could have a bearing on the decision.Most people will be familiar with that scenario being at least partially to blame for the world's worst aircraft disaster - 583 fatalities - a collision between a KLM 747 and a Pan Am 747 at Los Rodeos, Tenerife, when there was not a single thing faulty with either aircraft. In that accident, it is known that Jacob van Zanten, the KLM P1, was worried about being out of hours for his flight, caused by delays at Los Rodeos, and that he throttled up for take off without clearance because of his impatience in wishing to get under way. He had already attempted to do so two times when holding on the runway and had been pulled up by his P2 for doing so, but the FO was reluctant to pull up his senior a third time (van Zanten was a very senior pilot at KLM and the 'poster boy' for much of its advertising). As a result, the FO instead blurted out a confusing 'we are at take off' to the tower, assuming he had done all he could and hoping that 'it would be alright', but of course it wasn't, and we know what happened next.So it is easy from the comfort of ones chair to say 'I would have done this', but we need to remember that we might (and likely would) have done exactly what AF 447's crew did if we found ourselves in whatever circumstances they were in. Whenever I have flown in horrible weather conditions, it has always been my number one priority to get on the ground. As they say, it's better to be on the ground wishing you were up there, than to be up there wishing you were on the ground. But then again, I've never been in command of an aircraft with 200 paying passengers expecting to be somewhere on time, and with an airline boss who'll want an explanation if I make a wrong call about going to a lower altitude, burning 10 grand's worth of jet fuel unnecessarily.I think I probably would have gone down lower if I started getting erroneous airspeed indications, and possibly even considered turning around if that was particularly unusual on the aircraft I was flying, but as I say, it's easy to be wise when you are looking at it in retrospect, which of course, AF 447's crew will never have the chance to do.Al

The story about mass replacement of pitot tubes is incorrect - someone misread an old Airworthiness Directive which was released in 2002, mandating the replacement of certain models of Rosemont pitot tubes that had been installed on various models of Airbus aircraft.The reason for the replacement was indeed due to indications that the heating elements inside the affected models might have been inadequate for ice prevention/removal in some circumstances - but the AF447 330 was manufactured in 2005, and would certainly have had the newer style pitot tubes right from the factory.Jim Barrett

That sure isn't what the news is reporting-but it wouldn't be the first time they were wrong... :( http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,525288,00.htmlI still suspect the 1st problem was entering such an area of storms. The pitot/airspeed if in fact the problem came as a result.

Hello,

Hand flying in severe turbulence is the norm, so a manual disconnect of the autopilot would be the norm.

It's maybe the norm for you ... but not for Air France :)One of Air France directives to pilots is to use the autopilot when in moderate or heavy turbulences ...AIRBUS criteria says that flying into moderate or heavy turbulence "YOU MUST NOT DISCONET THE AP"And this is understandable .. as in heavy turbulences .. the pilots can hardly read their instrumentations .. so the autopilot is there for perform the job (nevertheless .. the autopilot has also his limitations )

Air France suggests, that the ACARS messages of system failures started to arrive at 02:10Z indicating, that the autopilot had disengaged and the fly by wire system had changed to alternate law

Normally .. if you disconnect the autopilot you are not going in alternate law... so we can fairly conclude it was a deffect or more less a bad attitude of the plane who triggered out the autopilot and not the crew instead... IMHO.Now as background side:All those ACARS indications are coming from various and complex informatic , electronics and mechanical systems .. and only the specialists and conceptors have the material and the knowledge for analyse and gather results of this flow of informations ...We people are just informed of what those specialists and authorities let leak in the press ... and we are let to thinking by ourself ... meaning ... speculations :)Regards.

Hello,Another breaking news:Brazilian navy report the discovery of two males bodies .. and a lot of small debris who must pertain of the AF447Bodies .. are not human remains .. as I understand ... and it's can be a crucial indication ...Whait and see for confirmations from other sources..Hope it's true news this time ...Regards.

It's maybe the norm for you ... but not for Air France :)

That may be precisely the problem. By the way, Air France used to let pilots drink up to four hours before flight time. Do you suppose that everything Air France does is automatically for the better? And don't forget that AirBus Industrie are the folks who brought you the vertical stabilizer that could be failed by a copilot because the mal-designed flight control software made his efforts increasingly dangerous as the aircraft gained airspeed. So the AirBus book isn't necessarily the way the aircraft should be flown in extreme conditions.And don't smirk at me, please.

Hello,Please .. don't jump here and post :)This report is ruled out by experts ..Please read ....http://forums1.avsim.net/index.php?showtop...t&p=1587159Regards.

Belga1...No one in this thead is, "...jumping in here and posting."It was reported by FO, SO, and PAC from what I read. Some say they were too far away. Problem is no one knows where the A/C was when it ended control flight.I agree I don't have the answers, but then again, neither do you. This whole thread is about speculation based upon what appears to be current facts. That is how Incident investigations are done, and I've been involved in more than one or two.Thinking out loud is ok. Please don't tell me not to...its not your right.Braun