Matt ill give you an example. A signal system is interlocked. Never have I seen on single line track two signals at each end allowing entry to the same section. That is why it is called interlocking. If the interlocking fails, the signals fail. This system started over a hundred years ago from train accidents in the UK. They realised that when a lever was pulled, if it was not connected with other levers that affect the same section of track, it allowed human error which caused disasters.

Once a lever or signal and points was pulled (interlocking) then the other levers cannot be operated. So that is failsafe. It has been a highly effective system and I believe all rail systems use it as technology and signalling manufacturers have it underpinning their equipment which is sold across the world.

 

The driver has admitted he was speeding. The part I cannot figure out is how can a high speed train allow excessive speeds? The Spanish must be quite backward in their thinking if the ATP system wasn't set up correctly. Believe me, corrupt societies and companies that are allowed to go unchecked like the South Korean Airlines would not care about things like this because they can get away with it.

 

Put people of integrity and strong values into positions of power to overlook things like this and it is a check to stop accidents from happening. I don't understand how companies can turn a blind eye to equipment failure and safety. I have seen this happen and it tells me something. Self regulation does not work unless you have people that will do the right thing no matter what. And then if they leave and someone with no morals and ethics fills their place, it is disastrous. So to have a system of checks and balances and oversight without crippling regulation is very effective.

 

'It's okay, I'm only one beer over the limit', 'That speed limit is only for people who can't drive as well as me', 'This safety jacket is really hot and stuffy, I'll take it of and just be more careful', 'That pipe doesn't really need to repaired yet, we have a back-up', 'Properly shutting the gas flow before using a blow-torch to unfreeze the valve is such a bind, as long as you know what you're doing nothing can go wrong'. 'A go-around will delay us by 15 minutes, I can totally just cut the throttles and salvage this approach.'

 

People are good at fooling themselves is what I'm getting at. They're even better at it if they're motivated by big bonuses and/or the fear of losing their job.

 

Getting back to the train system, according to my newspaper on the section of track where the accident occurred the ERTMS is not yet operational. Instead the older ASFA-system is still in use. It will warn the driver with visual and audible signals if he goes to fast, but will only brake automatically if the train exceeds 200 km/h or drives through a red signal.

The driver is always responsible for the safe operation of the train regardless of what is installed in the cab just like a signaller should not try and operate signalling equipment against the interlocking, my point is that in the UK we have measures to mitigate against a driver error, in the case of this disaster it would appear there was nothing other than maybe a primitive passive safety system to safeguard against a train overspeeding from a high speed section of line onto a serious curve with a great reduction of speed, given that the track and infrastructure look brand new I am somewhat surprised by this.

 

You initially quoted me as if I was talking garbage so I naturally defended my statement

I don't think there is a system of interlocking where it can be tampered with.

 

It is hard wired. You would have to interfere with circuitry etc which would be instant dismissal at the very lightest of penalties. I think some countries may have a jail sentence waiting for these kinds of extremely serious crimes.

'It's okay, I'm only one beer over the limit', 'That speed limit is only for people who can't drive as well as me', 'This safety jacket is really hot and stuffy, I'll take it of and just be more careful', 'That pipe doesn't really need to repaired yet, we have a back-up', 'Properly shutting the gas flow before using a blow-torch to unfreeze the valve is such a bind, as long as you know what you're doing nothing can go wrong'. 'A go-around will delay us by 15 minutes, I can totally just cut the throttles and salvage this approach.'

 

People are good at fooling themselves is what I'm getting at. They're even better at it if they're motivated by big bonuses and/or the fear of losing their job.

 

Getting back to the train system, according to my newspaper on the section of track where the accident occurred the ERTMS is not yet operational. Instead the older ASFA-system is still in use. It will warn the driver with visual and audible signals if he goes to fast, but will only brake automatically if the train exceeds 200 km/h or drives through a red signal.

Well the local suburban trains here in Perth where I live (and I think other Australian states would have it) definitely have automatic speed reduction by brakes if speed is exceeded. And that is speeds of 60km/hr. It make me wonder in Australia if there is such a safe system with the trains here being normal,( that is 130km/hr limits with other lines much slower, like 110 or 90) then why does Europe with such advanced technology and living standards use systems that don't provide protection.

 

This is very interesting. I would like to know the specifics of this track in Spain and why a high speed train was operating when they (if it is the case) are using such a weak ATP system. It is ridiculous if that is the case. I would say in Germany you could never speed with their ATP. I believe some folks just have it right. And then the Spanish......

I don't think there is a system of interlocking where it can be tampered with.

 

It is hard wired. You would have to interfere with circuitry etc which would be instant dismissal at the very lightest of penalties. I think some countries may have a jail sentence waiting for these kinds of extremely serious crimes.

 

Well the local suburban trains here in Perth where I live (and I think other Australian states would have it) definitely have automatic speed reduction by brakes if speed is exceeded. And that is speeds of 60km/hr. It make me wonder in Australia if there is such a safe system with the trains here being normal,( that is 130km/hr limits with other lines much slower, like 110 or 90) then why does Europe with such advanced technology and living standards use systems that don't provide protection.

 

This is very interesting. I would like to know the specifics of this track in Spain and why a high speed train was operating when they (if it is the case) are using such a weak ATP system. It is ridiculous if that is the case. I would say in Germany you could never speed with their ATP. I believe some folks just have it right. And then the Spanish......

 

Small side-note: Europe is not a country, it's a continent containing 40-odd countries with a huge variety of languages, cultures, histories, forms of government, and economic conditions, so making sweeping statements about 'Europe' is rather difficult.

 

Now I don't know anything about the Spanish rail system, but I can make some educated guesses:

- Train safety systems are not cheap. To the best of my knowledge, a (then) state of the art system will be installed when a line is built. Given the large investment needed and the possible disruption to the rail system, the safety-system is not upgraded whenever a new technology comes along, but only once every few decades. As you might have heard the Spanish government doesn't exactly have huge piles of cash at its disposal at the moment...

- Given that ASFA does have a maximum speed, I'm guessing that at the time it was built it was not possible or practical to have a system that could deal with different speed limits for different sections of track*, so instead only a blanket speed limit was installed. Note again that is just my best guess.

*Though apparently I does warn you that you are going to fast, so why that same signal can't trigger an automatic brake I'm not sure. I'm sure it made perfect sense at the time to whoever made that choice.

 

In the Netherlands the train will automatically come to a complete stop if you exceed 140 km/h for even a microsecond, but you can happily drive through red signals all day, as long as you keep the speed below 40 km/h. They're currently upgrading the system to get rid of that minimum speed, but it's a multi-year (and expensive) project.

There are numerous differences between the exact implementations of safety systems between different countries, or even between lines in the same country, they probably all made good sense at the time.

The point? You can change the settings? In Australia that is illegal.

I understand ATP. It cannot work if you can change the settings.

 

But thanks for giving others an example.

 

 

 

Well, I did operate on a pure ATP-system while I was driving the subway in Oslo. That system was locked completely. It restricted my speeds, braked automatically when we entered a speed restriction zone and could not be altered.

There was however a bypass-button on the back wall only to be used if it failed competely and put the emer-brakes on.

 

In Scandinavia (and most of Europe), trains in general run on ATC/ETCS (or ERTMS). The human machine interface on theese systems is a panel in which train configs are set up.

 

When im driving the train, I operate on a D-ATC stretch. That is a partially ATC-equipped part of the norwegian

rail system (most of Norway is D-ATC). This is what D-ATC does:

 

-Guards top-limit speed at drivers discretion(which is 130 km/h on all D-ATC areas)

-brakes automatically when approaching a switch or restricted signal and nothing is done by the driver

-applies emergency brake when passing a stop-signal

-Shows only 3 dashed lines in normal ops on indicator (no speed limit shown)

 

Wanna have a look:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G61IiAcQZiA

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfYbR6luFwA

 

Other than that, It will not guard me when I approach a speed reduction zone. Its a very basic system and works perfectly fine in lower speed areas (below 130 km/h)

 

Thats why Im so shocked to learn that a high-speed train in Spain can enter a severe speed reduction zone

without any brake intervention systems.

 

Seems like I have to review my knowledge about ATC/ERTMS requirements on HST-ops in Europe..

Now an accident in Switzerland

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23494203

Well, I did operate on a pure ATP-system while I was driving the subway in Oslo. That system was locked completely. It restricted my speeds, braked automatically when we entered a speed restriction zone and could not be altered.

There was however a bypass-button on the back wall only to be used if it failed competely and put the emer-brakes on.

 

In Scandinavia (and most of Europe), trains in general run on ATC/ETCS (or ERTMS). The human machine interface on theese systems is a panel in which train configs are set up.

 

When im driving the train, I operate on a D-ATC stretch. That is a partially ATC-equipped part of the norwegian

rail system (most of Norway is D-ATC). This is what D-ATC does:

 

-Guards top-limit speed at drivers discretion(which is 130 km/h on all D-ATC areas)

-brakes automatically when approaching a switch or restricted signal and nothing is done by the driver

-applies emergency brake when passing a stop-signal

-Shows only 3 dashed lines in normal ops on indicator (no speed limit shown)

 

Wanna have a look:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G61IiAcQZiA

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfYbR6luFwA

 

Other than that, It will not guard me when I approach a speed reduction zone. Its a very basic system and works perfectly fine in lower speed areas (below 130 km/h)

 

Thats why Im so shocked to learn that a high-speed train in Spain can enter a severe speed reduction zone

without any brake intervention systems.

 

Seems like I have to review my knowledge about ATC/ERTMS requirements on HST-ops in Europe..

 

I've seen people refer to the train in Spain as a semi-highspeed train, whatever that means, but presumably one of the things it means is that the rules are different than for full HST-ops?

Well, I did operate on a pure ATP-system while I was driving the subway in Oslo. That system was locked completely. It restricted my speeds, braked automatically when we entered a speed restriction zone and could not be altered.

There was however a bypass-button on the back wall only to be used if it failed competely and put the emer-brakes on.

 

In Scandinavia (and most of Europe), trains in general run on ATC/ETCS (or ERTMS). The human machine interface on theese systems is a panel in which train configs are set up.

 

When im driving the train, I operate on a D-ATC stretch. That is a partially ATC-equipped part of the norwegian

rail system (most of Norway is D-ATC). This is what D-ATC does:

 

-Guards top-limit speed at drivers discretion(which is 130 km/h on all D-ATC areas)

-brakes automatically when approaching a switch or restricted signal and nothing is done by the driver

-applies emergency brake when passing a stop-signal

-Shows only 3 dashed lines in normal ops on indicator (no speed limit shown)

 

Wanna have a look:

 

 

 

Other than that, It will not guard me when I approach a speed reduction zone. Its a very basic system and works perfectly fine in lower speed areas (below 130 km/h)

 

Thats why Im so shocked to learn that a high-speed train in Spain can enter a severe speed reduction zone

without any brake intervention systems.

 

Seems like I have to review my knowledge about ATC/ERTMS requirements on HST-ops in Europe..

If you get authority to pass a Stop signal is there a way around it? Or still get emergency?

 

Thanks for your informative post. I'll watch those videos now.

I've seen people refer to the train in Spain as a semi-highspeed train, whatever that means, but presumably one of the things it means is that the rules are different than for full HST-ops?

 

Really? Now Im confused. At the train-driver school here in Norway, we where taught that every HST-ops in Europe had to have full authority ATC. Whenever we operate at speeds above 130 km/h in Norway (think I wrote 160 in another post, which is wrong), there has to be a full-authority ATC or F-ATC which guards everything including

speed zones. It even guards you on small restrictions going from 210 to 190 km/h.

 

Thats why Id never imagine that theyd build hst-lines in Spain without a ETCS/ERTMS-system guarding every part of it, escpesially where there is a serious speed reduction.

 

 

If you get authority to pass a Stop signal is there a way around it? Or still get emergency?

 

Thanks for your informative post. I'll watch those videos now.

 

 

In the video, looking just below the "glareshield", the ATC-interface is the white, rectangular panel with all the buttons, digital displays and lights. On that panel there is a red button which we press whenever we get authority to pass a stop-signal. Why that switch isnt guarded is beyond me...

Apparently, the train driver was simply busy on the phone when he crashed the train.

 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/30/francisco-jose-garzon-amo-phone-spain-train-crash_n_3676913.html

Apparently, the train driver was simply busy on the phone when he crashed the train.

 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/30/francisco-jose-garzon-amo-phone-spain-train-crash_n_3676913.html

 

This is kind of being taken out of context. He was on a working phone with dispatch regarding the route coming into the station. I guess that sort of thing is protocol with this railroad, not sure exactly.

 

Some media is making it sound like he was using a phone to make a phone call but that Huffington article covers it well enough. It seems he was well distracted coming into his destination or not sure of something.

 

I wonder how they used to do this back in the 1800's, I guess they used to just drive the train back then. No systems to protect the driver. Would have been a blast to drive those old steamers

This is kind of being taken out of context. He was on a working phone with dispatch regarding the route coming into the station. I guess that sort of thing is protocol with this railroad, not sure exactly.

 

Some media is making it sound like he was using a phone to make a phone call but that Huffington article covers it well enough. It seems he was well distracted coming into his destination or not sure of something.

 

I wonder how they used to do this back in the 1800's, I guess they used to just drive the train back then. No systems to protect the driver. Would have been a blast to drive those old steamers

Not really. A distraction is a distraction whether you are being distracted by your honey or your dispatcher. That is why in aviation, when in sterile cockpit conditions, we are not allowed to have contact with the company or do any other company tasks not related to the immediate phase of flight, unless it is necessary for an emergency.

 

 

Not really. A distraction is a distraction whether you are being distracted by your honey or your dispatcher.

 

That is why I was questioning if this was protocol or not. I believe there were two crew on board so not sure why the other crew member wasn't tasked with trying to figure out the schedule over that phone 

So then it's not really out of context. There was a distraction to the driver. Either way the context is bad. If someone else was supposed to handle the call then there was a violation of procedure. If he was the only driver, then he allowed an unimportant task to distract from his primary duty and caused loss of life.

 

 

So then it's not really out of context.

 

Well if the headlines are saying he was using a (or his) phone. but really he was following company protocol in using a phone to talk with dispatch that is two different things.

 

Airlines use a push to talk which is better but if using a phone that is standard equipment on a train is allowed when communicating with dispatch means he was not breaking any rules at the time.

I guess you're reading the headline as if it was "train driver talking to girlfriend on phone prior to crash." That must be why you think there is some kind of false context here. All the headlines say is that he was on the phone and that is all I read into it and that is really enough. Whether or not it was personal or company related, the distraction to driving is the same. I don't understand what the difference between a ptt or a phone makes, since what matters is that you are trying to think about something other than the driving task at hand, which is where the danger begins.