Actually it looks like it was so equipped with the European Train Control System - Level 2

 

"In Spain, Level 2 was commissioned on the Madrid-Barcelona high-speed rail line in October 2011, allowing the speed to be raised to 310 km/h (193 mph) with Madrid-Barcelona travel times reduced to 2 hours 30 minutes"

But the accident occurred on the Madrid to A Corunna line which runs in a totally different direction. The rain was being controlled by ASFA not by ETCS.

High speed rail systems usually use cab signaling because of the speed they go, the operator can't reliably read track side signals, so the signal information is transmitted right into the cab including speed restrictions. The operator should follow the signal aspects himself, but if he fails to do that, the computers, should slow or even stop the train automatically. It looks like that system may have failed here. This is how it works on the TGV in France, I would be very surprised if this train didn't have a similar system.

 

http://www.railfaneurope.net/tgv/signals.html

 

Otherwise known as ATP. ATP doesn't fail. If it does, trains stop running. It needs to be failsafe, and anything but is a safety issue.

 

It just goes to show you air travel is safer. But trains are safer than cars. Cars are safer than motorbikes.

At first they were trying to say it was a loose metal plate,it's clearly the drivers fault in the video.

 

Are you sure?

Are you claiming this purely based on a Youtube recording by an uncalibrated CCTV camera operating at an unkown frame-rate?

At least one expert (or 'expert' I'm not sure which) claimed that merely exceeding the speed limit should not on it's own have been enough to derail the train. Why was there no safety system to limit the train's speed (and/or why didn't it work)? Pinning everything on the nearest scape-goat doesn't make for better safety.

 

Hopefully the investigation will answer that question.

 

The driver was detained for questioning so is there something that driver may have did to contribute to accident. It is still a machine that needs to be monitiored,and to my understanding there were two engineers and the authorites only have taken one in for questioning. Yes my assumption could be flawed by the video, but the fact remains human error could be factor!

there were two engineers and the authorites only have taken one in for questioning.

It's reported that the driver had taken over the train about 100 km from the accident site and that the second driver had left the cab. Trains are generally single-manned these days.

Otherwise known as ATP. ATP doesn't fail. If it does, trains stop running. It needs to be failsafe, and anything but is a safety issue.

 

 

Nothing in life doesn't fail, unless there's a law of physics that says it can't fail. Complex systems made by humans can and do fail, although  we can engineer them such that the chance of failure is very low. In the end though, no matter how many failsafes and back-ups you introduce, the chance of things failing is never zero. As an example, the Dutch ATP system only works if the train is going over 40 km/h.

 

 

The driver was detained for questioning so is there something that driver may have did to contribute to accident. It is still a machine that needs to be monitiored,and to my understanding there were two engineers and the authorites only have taken one in for questioning. Yes my assumption could be flawed by the video, but the fact remains human error could be factor!

 

Sure, human error probably was involved. But saying that the driver's actions played a part in the accident is something very different to saying the accident was completely and solely the driver's fault.

I would have thought that all train drivers should be aware of sections of track that require reduced speeds...

Nothing in life doesn't fail, unless there's a law of physics that says it can't fail. Complex systems made by humans can and do fail, although we can engineer them such that the chance of failure is very low. In the end though, no matter how many failsafes and back-ups you introduce, the chance of things failing is never zero. As an example, the Dutch ATP system only works if the train is going over 40 km/h.

 

 

 

Sure, human error probably was involved. But saying that the driver's actions played a part in the accident is something very different to saying the accident was completely and solely the driver's fault.

 

Look up the meaning failsafe before you dig deeper.....

In the UK on the national network, AWS and TPWS protects trains from overspeeding where there is a large reduction in permissible speed, ATP is partially fitted to the Western and Chiltern and offers the best protection.AWS is the most primitive where the driver receives a warning horn in the cab which must be acknowledged to remain in control, its a passive system in that it allows the driver to overspeed if acknowledged. TPWS cannot be acknowledged, if the train is too fast through the overspeed sensors a brake demand will be initiated which will stop the train. 

 

I am very surprised that in this incident there appears to be no automatic safety system to mitigate a driver error, I imagine there will be some hefty recommendations made in the public inquiry

Otherwise known as ATP. ATP doesn't fail. If it does, trains stop running. It needs to be failsafe, and anything but is a safety issue.

 

 

 

 

Since this is what I do for a living, let me shed some light on it:

 

In Norway and Sweden we call call this system ATC (automatic train control). It is very much like the autopilot on an airplane: I can change the inputs on it and turn it off anytime (but thats ofcourse not allowed).

 

In our settings window we have some numbers we read into the ATS-computer and they look like this:

 

            [ 1 3 ]  [ 1 ]  [  0 6 ]  [ 1 1 0 ] [ 0 ]

 

The first two numbers indicate my top speed multiplied by ten, in this case 130 km/h. The next number is the trains total length, in this case 100 meters or less. The third number indicates how many seconds it takes from the brakes are applied by me until all brakes are operating at the given force I want them to, in this case 6 seconds.

 

The large number (110) is the retardation or brake percentage converted into a unit that the ATS-system can read. One of the EMUs I drive has a brake percentage of 151% over the trains total dynamic weight. That converts to a retardation number of 110. The last digit is not in use in Norway but relates to allowing over-speed by percentage.

 

Point is that we can change theese settings anytime during our trip to and from. This means that the spanish driver COULD have manipulated the system so it would not respond properly.

 

If the ATC (ATP) FAILS, we switch the thing off and drive in maximum 80 km/h to the nearest maintenance base.

 

At first they were trying to say it was a loose metal plate,it's clearly the drivers fault in the video.

 

The loose metal plate was the cause of the previous train accident in France near Paris a few days ago, not in the Spanish tragedy.

In the UK on the national network, AWS and TPWS protects trains from overspeeding where there is a large reduction in permissible speed,

Neither prevent overspeeding.

 

AWS warns the driver if a signal is displaying a caution or stop aspect by sounding a horn. The brakes are only applied if the driver doesn't press the ‘acknowledgement’ push button.

 

TPWS applies the brakes if it detects that a train has passed a signal that is at danger. At some signals if detects if a train is approaching at too high a speed to be able to stop at the signal.

 

Those are the only two systems in general use in the UK apart from a trial version of the European Train Control System (ETCS) installed on the Cambrian route in Wales. The first section from Pwllheli to Harlech was commissioned in 2010 and the remainder in 2011. Further trials with be carried out on the Hertford Loop.

Look up the meaning failsafe before you dig deeper.....

Or you could just explain to me which definition of fail-safe you are using, so that you actually get across the point you are trying to communicate.

 

In structural integrity having a failsafe design means that if one structural component fails, there is another component that can carry the load.

I'm guessing the definition you are using is that if the ATP fails it automatically shuts down the train. Thing is though, that means there is some way of detecting that the ATP has failed and then sending a signal to the brakes and engine to stop the train.

However unless there is some clever passive system guaranteed to work by the laws of physics (unlikely, but possible) both the failure detection and the brake signalling systems can themselves break down. So in the case of a failure of the ATP it's possible that the system thinks it is actually still working, or does realise it isn't working, but still doesn't or can't order the train to stop.

The Titanic's designers also thought it was fail-safe, because even if you broke part of it, the watertight compartments would prevent the ship from flooding completely. Turns out you could overwhelm that safety-system.

 

 

 

Since this is what I do for a living, let me shed some light on it:

 

In Norway and Sweden we call call this system ATC (automatic train control). It is very much like the autopilot on an airplane: I can change the inputs on it and turn it off anytime (but thats ofcourse not allowed).

 

In our settings window we have some numbers we read into the ATS-computer and they look like this:

 

            [ 1 3 ]  [ 1 ]  [  0 6 ]  [ 1 1 0 ] [ 0 ]

 

The first two numbers indicate my top speed multiplied by ten, in this case 130 km/h. The next number is the trains total length, in this case 100 meters or less. The third number indicates how many seconds it takes from the brakes are applied by me until all brakes are operating at the given force I want them to, in this case 6 seconds.

 

The large number (110) is the retardation or brake percentage converted into a unit that the ATS-system can read. One of the EMUs I drive has a brake percentage of 151% over the trains total dynamic weight. That converts to a retardation number of 110. The last digit is not in use in Norway but relates to allowing over-speed by percentage.

 

Point is that we can change theese settings anytime during our trip to and from. This means that the spanish driver COULD have manipulated the system so it would not respond properly.

 

If the ATC (ATP) FAILS, we switch the thing off and drive in maximum 80 km/h to the nearest maintenance base.

 

 

 

There are many different train safety systems, sometimes even on the same line (the high-speed line from Amsterdam to Paris suffered a significant delay when the Dutch and Belgian safety systems, both specifically designed for that line, couldn't talk to each other.), so the system on this train is probably different from what is used in Norway and Sweden.

There are many different train safety systems, sometimes even on the same line (the high-speed line from Amsterdam to Paris suffered a significant delay when the Dutch and Belgian safety systems, both specifically designed for that line, couldn't talk to each other.), so the system on this train is probably different from what is used in Norway and Sweden.

 

...really Mr. Holmes?

 

Yes they are indeed very different, such is also the case regarding signalling, pre-signalling, F-ATC, D-ATC or for that matter the dimension of the tracks..

 

But my point is: Everything must be designed with the option to TURN IT OFF or MANIPULATE IT in case it FAILS..

 

That was the point I made and you clearly missed it.

 

All train ops going past 160 km/h in Norway requires an F-ATC authority. That system will kick you in the behinds if you dont pay attention or dont brake properly when you approach a switch or a speed reduction zone.

 

Regarding that, lets use some logic:

 

1:High-speed train ops requires FATC and pre-signalling

(it does not matter how different it is from Norway or Sweden or Uzbekistan for that matter, its the same basic and logic function. What differs is if you use euro-balise in an ERTMS-system or an internally designed system or whatever it may be)

 

2:That system has either failed

 

or 

 

3:The train driver has manipulated that very system so it did not respond the way it was supposed to.

 

There simply is NO WAY you enter a curvature at severe overspeed in a high-speed train system unless you have done something very stupid or the ATC/ATP-system has failed.

 

 

It is not impossible for it to fail, but it is highly unlikely.

 

What is going to be interesting to see is how the train driver was able to enter a curve at such a speed when so many redundant systems are designed into the train to prohibit something like this from happening.

Never happen ole USA or Canada as the train system was built for the 19th century. Can still train hop as drifter.

...really Mr. Holmes?

 

It seems to have escaped your notice that this accident occurred on section a that isn't fitted with ERTMS.