It seems to have escaped your notice that this accident occurred on section a that isn't fitted with ERTMS.

 

Not at all. No part of my post indicated that this was an ERTMS part of track, I dont know what they have an all their

lines in Spain, nor if it was class 1,2,3 or 4. So I dont know what you are aiming at or trying to say?

 

Besides, ERTMS mainly has to do with signals, not speed restrictions (depending on what class of ERTMS you operate in)

 

Anyways, the point I made in that post was: It does not matter what system you have, whenever you operate 

a train with or without passengers you are by law required to have ATC/ATP turned on in all of Europe.

The higher speeds you operate in, the more is required of that system in operation. 

 

 

you are by law required to have ATC/ATP turned on in all of Europe.

 

Which law is that?

Neither prevent overspeeding.

 

AWS warns the driver if a signal is displaying a caution or stop aspect by sounding a horn. The brakes are only applied if the driver doesn't press the ‘acknowledgement’ push button.

 

TPWS applies the brakes if it detects that a train has passed a signal that is at danger. At some signals if detects if a train is approaching at too high a speed to be able to stop at the signal.

 

Those are the only two systems in general use in the UK apart from a trial version of the European Train Control System (ETCS) installed on the Cambrian route in Wales. The first section from Pwllheli to Harlech was commissioned in 2010 and the remainder in 2011. Further trials with be carried out on the Hertford Loop.

 

 

 

Sorry Gerry but you are factually incorrect, AWS and TPWS are installed on the approach to speed restrictions as well as being used as their primary role for signal protection

 

basic TPWS is armed if the stop signal is at danger and is designed to stop a train before the point of conflict, 2 sensors (OSS) positioned on the approach to a stop signal will trip the train if its travelling too fast, another sensor at the signal (TSS) will apply the brakes if the signal is passed at danger

the driver is appearing in court anyway

 

 

Sorry Gerry but you are factually incorrect, AWS and TPWS are installed on the approach to speed restrictions as well as being used as their primary role for signal protection

 

A driver can cancel AWS and continue at an unchecked speed.

 

A driver can pass a TPWS location at an acceptable speed and then accelerate to a higher speed beyond it. Also it's currently fitted at approximately 13,000 main aspect signals protecting junctions and about 1150 Permanent Speed Restrictions. It is not required to be fitted at plain line signals, signals protecting level crossings or other signal locations

 

Nether prevent over speeding.

A driver can cancel AWS and continue at an unchecked speed.

 

A driver can pass a TPWS location at an acceptable speed and then accelerate to a higher speed beyond it. Also it's currently fitted at approximately 13,000 main aspect signals protecting junctions and about 1150 Permanent Speed Restrictions. It is not required to be fitted at plain line signals, signals protecting level crossings or other signal locations

 

Nether prevent over speeding.

 

TPWS prevents overspeeding at the commencement or approach to a PSR where it is installed

I agree it does not constantly monitor/govern train speed against permissible line speed, ATP does and we have that on the main line Padd- Bristol on the Western 

TPWS prevents overspeeding at the commencement or approach to a PSR where it is installed

But doesn't prevent it elsewhere as I said. The driver can still overspeed immediately after.

 

Quote from AWS and TPWS Handbook RS/522 Issue 1 June 2012

 

TPWS does not relieve the driver of responsibility for observing

signals and speed restrictions.

 

http://www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards/Traffic%20Operation%20and%20Management/RSSB%20Good%20Practice%20Guides/RS522%20Iss%201.pdf

The driver is always responsible for the safe operation of the train regardless of what is installed in the cab just like a signaller should not try and operate signalling equipment against the interlocking, my point is that in the UK we have measures to mitigate against a driver error, in the case of this disaster it would appear there was nothing other than maybe a primitive passive safety system to safeguard against a train overspeeding from a high speed section of line onto a serious curve with a great reduction of speed, given that the track and infrastructure look brand new I am somewhat surprised by this.

 

You initially quoted me as if I was talking garbage so I naturally defended my statement

He's now been charged with "reckless homicide"

My naivete knows no bounds. I couldn't believe that a train driver could be so outrageously stupid! I had it down to a mechanical/electrical failure. I really should get up to date on the state of human idiocy.  <_<

 

 

The driver is always responsible for the safe operation of the train regardless of what is installed in the cab

 

100% agree with this. Safety systems are good but not something to fall back on as systems can fail, they are their to try and prevent an accident. The Driver is where responsibility lays with safe operation of the train.

 

News reports are now saying he is being charged with homicide. 

My naivete knows no bounds. I couldn't believe that a train driver could be so outrageously stupid! I had it down to a mechanical/electrical failure. I really should get up to date on the state of human idiocy.  <_<

 

Drivers have been known to hang bags on the deadman's handle to avoid having to hold it down themselves. In the UK the design has to be changed to prevent that

Since this is what I do for a living, let me shed some light on it:

 

In Norway and Sweden we call call this system ATC (automatic train control). It is very much like the autopilot on an airplane: I can change the inputs on it and turn it off anytime (but thats ofcourse not allowed).

 

In our settings window we have some numbers we read into the ATS-computer and they look like this:

 

[ 1 3 ] [ 1 ] [ 0 6 ] [ 1 1 0 ] [ 0 ]

 

The first two numbers indicate my top speed multiplied by ten, in this case 130 km/h. The next number is the trains total length, in this case 100 meters or less. The third number indicates how many seconds it takes from the brakes are applied by me until all brakes are operating at the given force I want them to, in this case 6 seconds.

 

The large number (110) is the retardation or brake percentage converted into a unit that the ATS-system can read. One of the EMUs I drive has a brake percentage of 151% over the trains total dynamic weight. That converts to a retardation number of 110. The last digit is not in use in Norway but relates to allowing over-speed by percentage.

 

Point is that we can change theese settings anytime during our trip to and from. This means that the spanish driver COULD have manipulated the system so it would not respond properly.

 

If the ATC (ATP) FAILS, we switch the thing off and drive in maximum 80 km/h to the nearest maintenance base.

 

The point? You can change the settings? In Australia that is illegal.

I understand ATP. It cannot work if you can change the settings.

 

But thanks for giving others an example.

 

The other part if ATP is it will control your speed according to signal indication. Go past a red signal and it will apply the brakes. I haven't had experience operating it in this scenario, but I believe that once driver acknowledges the system he can proceed with authority, or if not obtain it.

Drivers have been known to hang bags on the deadman's handle to avoid having to hold it down themselves. In the UK the design has to be changed to prevent that

The Siemens equipment I have used wont allow you to hold the button down. So I would be surprised that that still goes on in the UK. Release activated equipment ensures that the 'handle' must be moved each time to reset the system.

 

 

So I would be surprised that that still goes on in the UK.

 

It doesn't. As I said the design has to be changed to prevent that

100% agree with this. Safety systems are good but not something to fall back on as systems can fail, they are their to try and prevent an accident. The Driver is where responsibility lays with safe operation of the train.

 

News reports are now saying he is being charged with homicide.

Matt ill give you an example. A signal system is interlocked. Never have I seen on single line track two signals at each end allowing entry to the same section. That is why it is called interlocking. If the interlocking fails, the signals fail. This system started over a hundred years ago from train accidents in the UK. They realised that when a lever was pulled, if it was not connected with other levers that affect the same section of track, it allowed human error which caused disasters.

Once a lever or signal and points was pulled (interlocking) then the other levers cannot be operated. So that is failsafe. It has been a highly effective system and I believe all rail systems use it as technology and signalling manufacturers have it underpinning their equipment which is sold across the world.

 

The driver has admitted he was speeding. The part I cannot figure out is how can a high speed train allow excessive speeds? The Spanish must be quite backward in their thinking if the ATP system wasn't set up correctly. Believe me, corrupt societies and companies that are allowed to go unchecked like the South Korean Airlines would not care about things like this because they can get away with it.

 

Put people of integrity and strong values into positions of power to overlook things like this and it is a check to stop accidents from happening. I don't understand how companies can turn a blind eye to equipment failure and safety. I have seen this happen and it tells me something. Self regulation does not work unless you have people that will do the right thing no matter what. And then if they leave and someone with no morals and ethics fills their place, it is disastrous. So to have a system of checks and balances and oversight without crippling regulation is very effective.