59 minutes ago, mabe54 said:

https://theberkshireedge.com/family-of-sheffields-samya-stumo-files-lawsuit-against-boeing/

This forced Boeing's hand and the change of attitude of the CEO. You can find the YouTube of the family and lawyer talking to the press. Now it became real.

Cheers,

 

The article incorrectly asserts that Rosemont Aerospace is the company that “designed the MCAS” system on the -8. That’s not correct. Rosemont designed and manufactured the AOA probe, they had nothing to do with the design of MCAS.

In the case of the Lion Air crash, it is still very much an unsettled question as to exactly what caused the incorrect AOA reading on the captain’s side that lead to the repeated activation of the MCAS system. It could have been caused by a defective probe, but is is equally possible that the false reading could have been caused by problems in the wiring between the probe and the ADIRU.

In the case of the Ethiopian crash, the FDR data seems to indicate that the AOA probe suffered some sort of catastrophic failure just prior to the aircraft becoming airborne. The AOA reading instantly went from its normal reading to full “up”, and the probe heating system failed at the same moment. A bird strike on the probe is one theory, but there are other possibilities.

Rosemont is no fly-by-night company. They have been a leading manufacturer of AOA sensors and pitot-static probes for decades - their products are used on thousands of different airliners, including almost every model Boeing manufactured in the last several decades.

Unfortunately, in both MAX crashes, the destruction of the airframe on impact was so complete, that there is probably no way to determine what caused the false AOA readings on either aircraft.

Do not see where anyone is blaming the pilots.  In any accident, everything is looked at including the pilots.  They are just one component. 

5 hours ago, Bobsk8 said:

Just listened to the news this morning, and Boeing finally admitted it is their fault according to the newscast. Guess they finally quit trying to blame the pilots/ 

As much blame as Boeing should take for its design that created the situation, you still cannot ignore any pilot errors made during the event. In the case of the second crash, it appears at this point to me that the fo likely made a serious error by reengaging the trim system against the qrh procedure, without command from and without advising the captain. Until that point, the mcas had run the trim down twice, but they had managed to keep the airplane climbing. Only after this event do they crash when the reengagement allows the mcas to run the trim another segment downward.

This is very similar to the colgan crash where the young and inexperienced fo reflexively and without command, retracted the flaps on the captain while he was in the throes of trying to recover from the stall. They may very well have recovered were it not for that action.

It is not unknown for aircraft to land safely even after significant trim runaways. Years ago, an Eagle E145 experienced a trim runaway flying into ord. They followed the qrh, disengaged and left off the pitch trim and landed safely even though the plane flew in a state of mostly uncontrolled flight.

So, you do have to look at how the pilots handled the situation and look at all the factors, including their experience and age. Two accidents where the pm took a significant action without command that may have significantly made the situation worse. Why? Both pm were young and inexperienced. Does this mean older and more experienced pilots would not act this way? Maybe. Maybe not. Does the discipline to not act reflexively like this come with age or hours or both?

None of this takes any fault away from Boeing or the FAA for the mcas disaster. But an objective final report will devote pages to the pilot error aspects of these crashes.

4 hours ago, KevinAu said:

As much blame as Boeing should take for its design that created the situation, you still cannot ignore any pilot errors made during the event. In the case of the second crash, it appears at this point to me that the fo likely made a serious error by reengaging the trim system against the qrh procedure, without command from and without advising the captain. Until that point, the mcas had run the trim down twice, but they had managed to keep the airplane climbing. Only after this event do they crash when the reengagement allows the mcas to run the trim another segment downward.

This is very similar to the colgan crash where the young and inexperienced fo reflexively and without command, retracted the flaps on the captain while he was in the throes of trying to recover from the stall. They may very well have recovered were it not for that action.

It is not unknown for aircraft to land safely even after significant trim runaways. Years ago, an Eagle E145 experienced a trim runaway flying into ord. They followed the qrh, disengaged and left off the pitch trim and landed safely even though the plane flew in a state of mostly uncontrolled flight.

So, you do have to look at how the pilots handled the situation and look at all the factors, including their experience and age. Two accidents where the pm took a significant action without command that may have significantly made the situation worse. Why? Both pm were young and inexperienced. Does this mean older and more experienced pilots would not act this way? Maybe. Maybe not. Does the discipline to not act reflexively like this come with age or hours or both?

None of this takes any fault away from Boeing or the FAA for the mcas disaster. But an objective final report will devote pages to the pilot error aspects of these crashes.

Whatever Boeing says in their press releases now can be quite different from the defense their lawyers will advance in the inevitable law suits to follow. Their defense may emphasize the maintenance actions perhaps not taken prior to the Lion accident, and the crew adherence to the guidelines and checklists in the Ethiopian accident.

It seems to me that these two terrible accidents are not akin to the catastrophic hardware failures such as United 232 in Sioux City or USAir 427 in Pittsburgh. The 737 Max accidents are, sadly, primarily procedural shortcomings by Boeing, the airlines, and the flight crews. At the end of the day there will be plenty of fault to go around.

 

On 4/5/2019 at 11:41 PM, Jim Young said:

Personally, I was shocked to see the pilot in command was 29 years old..

My old man was made captain at Laker at 30 in the 70s, is that ok or shocking? 

I find the attempts to divert blame to the crew dissapointing

• Foreign pilots/airlines are untrustworthy, not as good, poorly trained as us etc
• Crew didn't follow SOP
• [when it comes out they followed SOP] They followed SOP too rigidly, should have realised SShaker + IAS DISAGREE was invalid and it was AoA vane earlier 
• In my (totally different) AC I would have been fine 🤦‍♀️
• They should have kept flaps 1 / not engaged AP
• Bet it was the FO that re-engaged AP STAB TRIM (except he suggested STAB TRIM CUTOUT in the first place showing good airmanship)

On several forums, packed with brilliant and knowledgeable AC/system designers, engineers, pilots and enthusiasts we've all been analysing with 20/20 vision, from the comfort of a couch, cup of coffee, full flight data logs, expert opinions and blogs, no SShaker blaring away or impending death.. please give them a little bit of a break, they were faced with a confusing and overwhelming situation and despite following the SOP sadly several holes in the cheese aligned and they had no way out. An accident waiting to happen. Who knows the % of well trained crews that would have survived this but its nowhere near 100%. 

Just a couple of other points on why maybe they didn't reduce power, Bole airfield is 7657ft and Cpt PFD was reading lower IAS, combined with the mentally overwhelming Sshaker blaring + IAS DISAGREE (are we stalling?), then the plane is pitching forward but reducing thrust you feel could exacerbate pitch forward movement.. easy to judge it now.. but only 40 seconds to weigh this all up before you're in a flying coffin. Just very sad.

Incidentally I found the following page pretty helpful.. surely needing both (male) pilots physical strength to manually trim should be an FAA certificate fail? Cars have had power steering +40 years!

https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html
 

Edited April 7, 20197 yr by DellyPilot

13 hours ago, Wink207 said:

The 737 Max accidents are, sadly, primarily procedural shortcomings by Boeing, the airlines, and the flight crews

Not even close to the truth.

5 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

I find the attempts to divert blame to the crew dissapointing

No attempt by me to blame the pilots at all!!!  You mean information about them should not be out there in the discussion?  It must be hitting a nerve somewhere because it is upsetting some when info about the pilots is mentioned.  As I stated above, they are just one component of the accident investigation and, to be really, really honest, this is the first time ever I have heard both the pilots in one aircraft being in their 20's.  Is that an issue?  I doubt it as they appeared to be competent in some of the reporting.  I would have felt more at ease if they had been piloting a 737 or A320 instead of the 737MAX.

We have equally identified mistakes made by boeing and the crew. Just because there is an aspect of manufacturer defect here, does not mean you sweep any pilot errors under the rug and then elevate them on a pedestal. Because if you don’t identify the mistakes a crew makes in a situation like this, then no one else will be any wiser and the same mistakes will be made again with the same results.

Edited April 7, 20197 yr by KevinAu

5 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

We have equally identified mistakes made by boeing and the crew. Just because there is an aspect of manufacturer defect here, does not mean you sweep any pilot errors under the rug and then elevate them on a pedestal. 

I think your comments on this forum are pretty outrageous especially from a fellow pilot.. you continue to make criticisms of them without knowing all the information, you blamed the FO for switching the STAB TRIM back on but without any evidence for that or even an appreciation of why they might have done that.. when information comes out to prove your assertions wrong you then swtich tack..

So for the record and to be crystal clear, please could you restate all the mistakes you have identified the crew made?

To reiterate one of my questions if I may: Would switching on the right autopilot rather than the left autopliot have made a difference? Or do both autopliots use the same possibly bad data? Or am I totally mixed up and there's only one autopilot which can be activated by left or right switches?

25 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

Incidentally I found the following page pretty helpful.. surely needing both (male) pilots physical strength to manually trim should be an FAA certificate fail? Cars have had power steering +40 years!

https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html
 

Power steering does fail on cars as well. There are planes that don’t even have manual trim available once the trim motors are failed. The certification authorities have never envisioned this kind of extreme failure scenario. Trim failures were envisioned as jammed stabs or runaways which pilots would be able to identify and stop immediately vis memory item. Therefore, they disregarded the scenario of the trim stuck in an extreme position. However, the mcas failure is unique as a runaway because it manifests itself more prominently as other, more attention getting annunciations, thereby costing pilots time in properly identifying it and allowing the trim to achieve extreme angles.

5 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

I think your comments on this forum are pretty outrageous especially from a fellow pilot.. you continue to make criticisms of them without knowing all the information, you blamed the FO for switching the STAB TRIM back on but without any evidence for that or even an appreciation of why they might have done that.. when information comes out to prove your assertions wrong you then swtich tack..

So for the record and to be crystal clear, please could you restate all the mistakes you have identified the crew made?

The biggest error.

1.Switching the stab cutouts back on.

2.If that was done by the pm, doing it without being commanded to and without announcing it.

Understandable, but errors non the less are

3.The amount of time they took to eventually get to cutting out the trim.

4.Leaving the throttles at takeoff power.

Again understandable in the confusion, but if somebody had caught these, they may be alive still.

Really don’t understand why these points I make should elicit such hostility. You shouldn’t read any accident reports or sit in on any recurrent training we get because you’d leave enraged.

 

4 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

Power steering does fail on cars as well. 

How is this at all relevant at all? 

15 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

Therefore, they disregarded the scenario of the trim stuck in an extreme position. However, the mcas failure is unique as a runaway because it manifests itself more prominently as other, more attention getting annunciations, thereby costing pilots time in properly identifying it and allowing the trim to achieve extreme angles.

They didn't disregard it, it is addressed in the link I sent above. And it has nothing to do with MCAS, it is pure extreme trim scenario, Boeing officially recommend in 1982 the Rollercoaster or Yo-Yo technique, yes unbelievable but true! 

Rather than just fix this trim system with power assistance over the last 40 years (and potentially incur retraining costs) they just ignored it. Very sad.

https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html

For you and others who don't have time to wade through the very informative link
 

Extract from the Boeing 737-200 Pilot Training Manual February 1982 page 04.80.31. Edited for brevity. Runaway and Manual Stabiliser - Recovery from Severe Out-of-Trim 

"In an extreme nose-up out-of-trim condition, requiring almost full forward control column, decelerate, extend the flaps and/or reduce thrust to a minimum practical setting consistent with flight conditions until elevator control is established. Do not decrease airspeed below the minimum maneuvering speed for the flap configuration. A bank of 30 degrees or more will relieve some force on the control column. This, combined with flap extension and reduced speed should permit easier manual trimming. 

If other methods fail to relieve the elevator load and control column force, use the "roller coaster" technique. If nose-up trim is required, raise the nose well above the horizon with elevator control. Then slowly relax the control column pressure and manually trim nose-up. Allow the nose to drop below the horizon while trimming. Repeat this sequence until the airplane is trim. 

If nose-down trim is required, slowing down and extending the flaps will account for a large degree of nose-up pitch. If this does not allow manual trimming then the reverse "roller coaster" can be performed to permit manual trimming." (I read somewhere it was called the Yo Yo manoeuvre) 

Boeing "Airliner" magazine published in May 1961 discussed the above subject as it applied to the Boeing 707 by stating: "To trim the stabilizer manually while holding a high stick force on control column. As the airplane changes altitude, crank in the desired trim change. Correct airplane attitude after a few seconds with elevators. Relax stick force again and crank in more trim. Repeat this procedure as necessary until proper 'trim' position of stabilizer is established." 

22 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

How is this at all relevant at all? 

They didn't disregard it, it is addressed in the link I sent above. And it has nothing to do with MCAS, it is pure extreme trim scenario, Boeing officially recommend in 1982 the Rollercoaster or Yo-Yo technique, yes unbelievable but true! 

Rather than just fix this trim system with power assistance over the last 40 years (and potentially incur retraining costs) they just ignored it. Very sad.

https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stabilizer-trim-loads-and-range.html
 

I don’t know how the car power steering is relevant here. You were the one who first brought up that power steering had existed for 40+ years, whatever that had to do with this in your mind.

It is disregarded in the sense that the faa does not make a requirement for the manual trim to work in an extreme out of trim condition. The unloading technique was a technique recommended by boeing because they realized the manual trim would not work in an extreme out of trim situation. A mere recommendation to give you something because you were in a certification void.

I think what you are trying to say is that they should have had a power assistance for the manual trim. Is that right? Well, the problem with that concept is that it is well....powered. The point of the trim cutout function is to cut out all possible power to the trim system in order to stop a bad command. That bad command can come from anywhere, possibly even a third ‘manual’ motor as you envision. All you’re doing is proposing a third trim system.

Edited April 7, 20197 yr by KevinAu

2 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

The biggest error.

1.Switching the stab cutouts back on.

 

Several points. The Captain is using all his force to pull back on the column while the FO is struggling to crank the trim wheel. The Captain then applies Trim up switch (several times) and the stabiliser barely moves, perhaps because the motor is disabled or perhaps because it is fighting aero forces too. Perhaps in the very stressful situation with one hand the captain flicks the STAB TRIM switches to on hoping to help trim back up so he can relax control pressure.

This is just one hypothesis but you have already stated this is his biggest error. I find that hard to comprehend from another pilot but fair enough we should consider all the mistakes the crew made... but the idea that another crew would have easily coped with it is absurd.

8 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

2. If that was done by the pm, doing it without being commanded to and without announcing it.

Slapped wrist, yep, definite error if it was one of them should have been announced, despite the dire situation

9 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

3.The amount of time they took to eventually get to cutting out the trim.

This is an interesting one, so at what point would you have identified (without hindsight) that this was runaway trim scenario.

So as a recap at 05:40:05 the first MCAS even happens and the planes climb is arrested. The stick shaker is still sounding and the DONT SINK WARNING sounds 10 seconds later. The Captain says trim up and then 15 seconds later at 05:40:35 the FO announces STAB TRIM CUT OUT.

Ok, really? So you are saying they should have realised straight away at 5:40:15 when the plane stopped climbing that MCAS had triggered and they were in TRIM RUNAWAY situation? This is an incredible assertion IMO.

18 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

4.Leaving the throttles at takeoff power.

Yep, this was the final nail in the coffin and pasting from my above post these are my thoughts:

Just a couple of other points on why maybe they didn't reduce power, Bole airfield is 7657ft and Cpt PFD was reading lower IAS, combined with the mentally overwhelming Sshaker blaring + IAS DISAGREE (are we stalling?), then the plane is pitching forward but reducing thrust you feel could exacerbate pitch forward movement.. easy to judge it now.. but only 40 seconds to weigh this all up before you're in a flying coffin. Just very sad.

I am not enraged and there is no no hostility at all, you are banging the crew error drum for days now and as a internet contrarian you're getting some nice forum action. Fine, I get how it works.  

And yes all accident reports have to consider the actions of the crew, its a factor in every crash. But as a pilot a little bit of empathy for the situation they faced is in order, to me so far at least the errors they made are all a product of the inadequate training and poor design of multiple systems within the aircraft.