I agree with you to a certain extend but if you read the the BBC article, it is hinting that the MCAS system was resetting itself to the enable position again due to false readings.. if this is true.. then..

S.

Edited April 4, 20197 yr by simbol

25 minutes ago, simbol said:

I agree with you to a certain extend but if you read the the BBC article, it is hinting that the MCAS system was resetting itself to the enable position again due to false readings.. if this is true.. then..

S.

I did read it. We already know the mcas resets and runs repeatedly until full nose down if there us an aoa error. My question is did they flip the cutouts and LEAVE them off? If the cutouts were set to off and the trim kept running, then there is a really really bad flaw in the flight controls that is on a level deeper than the mcas and worse. If they flipped them back on, then they didn’t actually follow procedure.

Edited April 4, 20197 yr by KevinAu

Indeed, I can only comment of what the article says, it says pilots followed the correct procedures specified by Boeing.

Same information here: http://news.sky.com/story/ethiopia-crash-pilots-repeatedly-performed-correct-procedures-report-11683805

So if the MCAS keeps firing up despite of the cut off trim being disabled, we are looking at a incredible software bug or flaw.

Regards 

Simbol 

2 hours ago, KevinAu said:

The use by the spokesperson of the word ‘repeatedly’ is odd.

I think she is referring to the fact that the pilots were repeatedly carrying out the procedure because the MCAS continued to override their inputs and push the nose back down.

Quote

So if the MCAS keeps firing up despite of the cut off trim being disabled, we are looking at a incredible software bug or flaw.

Below is what I was going to post a week ago.....

 

I take issue with people stating that the 737 MAX is perfectly safe because there have been thousands of uneventful flights. However, until the investigation is completed, we do not know if some extremely rare issue (in the MCAS software, or the aircraft's systems) can result in an uncontrollable "runaway trim" scenario that is not able to be corrected by the standard procedure.

41 minutes ago, AviatorMan said:

I think she is referring to the fact that the pilots were repeatedly carrying out the procedure because the MCAS continued to override their inputs and push the nose back down.

No, you can’t ‘repeatedly’ carry out the procedure. Because once you cutout the stab trim, you LEAVE IT OUT. Reference page 7 of the AD I linked to. You cannot ‘repetedly’ perform ‘all’ of the procedure because the first time you do all of it, you’ve turned the trim off. You cannot turn it off again. In order to ‘repeatedly’ carry out the procedure, you will have to reengage the trim in order to disengage it again. And we all know what will happen when you turn the trim back on again during the MCAS fault. So, what these spokespeople probably really are saying is that the crew kept fighting the MCAS runaway with the yoke trim switch. They may have never cutout the trim as they should have or they may have incorrectly turned it back on again. You have to take what these government people say with lots of salt. They are neither pilots nor investigators. Wait for an actual investigator to say it before you accept it. The only way for what this minister says to be true in the way he seems to mean it, is if the cutout switches did not actually cut out the trim. That would be incredible, and even more so than the MCAS issue.

Edited April 4, 20197 yr by KevinAu

4 hours ago, Matthew Kane said:

Just rejoined AVSIM from some time away so I would love to rejoin these topics once again. This one is upsetting. Always loved the 737 so to see it end up like this is very upsetting. Boeing should have seen Project Yellowstone through to the end, which was meant to replace the entire fleet with a modern fleet of 3 Boeing Aircraft, instead they only released 1 of 3 of the aircraft in the Yellowstone Project with what became the 787.

When they abandoned Project Yellowstone they decided it was cheaper to patch the 737 and the 777 instead. 737 is very upsetting as from the front, those engines are no where near the original design of the 737-100. so you write software to overcome the imbalances.....yes it could work over time, but a bunch of former and now mostly dead  Boeing Engineers are rolling in their graves...Who could imagine this company could end up this way.

Too bad they tried to sue Bombardier for doing something new, but instead should have done exactly what Bombardier did all along, which is coming up with something new. Very upsetting to me being a Boeing Fan for many years. 

If I never fly in a 737-MAX in my lifetime so be it, and I do love the old school 737 and fly the PMDG NGX all the time in the sim. I just don''t agree with patching something that old for so long to save money, and to sue others for doing what you were supposed to be doing all along is unconscionable

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Yellowstone_Project

I couldn't agree more.  I have been a fan of Boeing for many years. They were one of the major pioneers of modern aviation and have produced some of the best aircraft ever.

For the past 10 years or so, however, they have been a big disappointment.  Starting with the long delays in 787 production, then the problem with the batteries.  Next, they abandon their plans to produce a brand new 737 replacement and instead opt to go with a 737 upgrade which turns out to have a serious problem.  Now they are dealing with another fiasco related to the KC46 aircraft for the Air Force. 

Meanwhile, Airbus has released their NEOs and A350 with great success and relatively few problems. 

Boeing executives had better wise up and fast,

Dave

2 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

No, you can’t ‘repeatedly’ carry out the procedure. Because once you cutout the stab trim, you LEAVE IT OUT. Reference page 7 of the AD I linked to. In order to ‘repeatedly’ carry out the procedure, you will have to reengage the trim in order to disengage it again. And we all know what will happen when you turn the trim back on again during the MCAS fault. So, what these spokespeople probably really are saying is that the crew kept fighting the MCAS runaway with the yoke trim switch. They may have never cutout the trim as they should have or they may have incorrectly turned it back on again. You have to take what these government people say with lots of salt. They are neither pilots nor investigators. Wait for an actual investigator to say it before you accept it. The only way for what this minister says to be true in the way he seems to mean it, is if the cutout switches did not actually cut out the trim. That would be incredible, and even more so than the MCAS issue.

I am reading the prune.org forums and pilots are saying that if you cutout the stab trim but the trim position is already maxed out due to the MCAS runway problem and you are very close the ground, it could be imposible for pilots to be able to regain control of the airplane using manual trim, specially if you are above 250kts since the higher the speed the airplane has the more difficult it is to move it manually.

So a theory is that they might have re-enable the stab trim in order to be able to trim the aircraft via the electric yoke trim into normal position and being able fly the airplane, however it appears the MCAS will override the yoke electrical trim as it is capable to trim faster than any electrical trim command executed by the pilots.

All these are discussions between professional pilots and I have no manuals from the real Airplane to confirm of course.

Regards,
S.

 

35 minutes ago, simbol said:

I am reading the prune.org forums and pilots are saying that if you cutout the stab trim but the trim position is already maxed out due to the MCAS runway problem and you are very close the ground, it could be imposible for pilots to be able to regain control of the airplane using manual trim, specially if you are above 250kts since the higher the speed the airplane has the more difficult it is to move it manually.

So a theory is that they might have re-enable the stab trim in order to be able to trim the aircraft via the electric yoke trim into normal position and being able fly the airplane, however it appears the MCAS will override the yoke electrical trim as it is capable to trim faster than any electrical trim command executed by the pilots.

All these are discussions between professional pilots and I have no manuals from the real Airplane to confirm of course.

Regards,
S.

 

And if they turned the trim back on, then they were clearly not following the procedure, despite what the minister says. Because the procedure clearly says ‘stay in the cutout position for the remainder of the flight’. And yes, like I said earlier, they may not have been able to or felt like they would have been able to, hand spin the wheel enough, in time. So, if they did flip the trim back on again for whatever reason, then they’re off the reservation and you cannot say they followed ‘all’ procedures. Unfortunately, some days, you realize too late, you should have just stayed in bed.

Edited April 4, 20197 yr by KevinAu

1 hour ago, KevinAu said:

And if they turned the trim back on, then they were clearly not following the procedure, despite what the minister says. Because the procedure clearly says ‘stay in the cutout position for the remainder of the flight’. And yes, like I said earlier, they may not have been able to or felt like they would have been able to, hand spin the wheel enough, in time. So, if they did flip the trim back on again for whatever reason, then they’re off the reservation and you cannot say they followed ‘all’ procedures. Unfortunately, some days, you realize too late, you should have just stayed in bed.

What amazes me, is this long discussion, reading opinions from people  many of whom never even flown any aircraft  in real life, criticizing professional pilots that had 40 seconds to figure out what to do. with poor information from the manufacturer, in an aircraft heading for the ground at 250 mph plus. My guess is that most of these folks in the same situation would have needed adult diapers before they hit the ground. 

Edited April 4, 20197 yr by Bobsk8

1 hour ago, KevinAu said:

And if they turned the trim back on, then they were clearly not following the procedure, despite what the minister says. Because the procedure clearly says ‘stay in the cutout position for the remainder of the flight’. And yes, like I said earlier, they may not have been able to or felt like they would have been able to, hand spin the wheel enough, in time. So, if they did flip the trim back on again for whatever reason, then they’re off the reservation and you cannot say they followed ‘all’ procedures. Unfortunately, some days, you realize too late, you should have just stayed in bed.

I disagree a bit, assuming our assumptions are correct (and we are assuming) they followed the procedure but given the circumstances of the flight (trim maxed out due to MCAS and airplane low altitude) the aircraft was in an irrecoverable state given the fact that they couldn't correct the attitude with manual trim.

Now under these circumstances you could argue (I am being the devils advocate here) that Boeing procedures were followed by the pilots to the letter, but the airplane was clearly irrecoverable forcing the pilots to take alternative actions in order to try to recover the flight.

Personally I think It is ridiculous that if a pilot if hitting the electronic Yoke trim in desperation, an automatic system can override it by moving the trim at a much faster rate overriding the pilots commands.

We will know much better with the full report, but personally after reading the initial finding I don't blame the pilots for this accident, to me this accident is the result of a fault that placed the pilots under a situation were the aircraft could not be recovered despite of following any appropriated training, procedures and checklists, which makes me think, the provided procedure by Boeing was not 100% fail safe as it appears it requires a minimum level of altitude in order to be successful.

S.

 

Just now, Bobsk8 said:

What amazes me, is this long discussion, reading opinions from people  many of whom never even flew any aircraft  in real life, criticizing professional pilots that had 40 seconds to figure out what to do. with poor information from the manufacturer, in an aircraft heading for the ground at 250 mph plus. My guess is that most of these folks in the same situation would have needed adult diapers before they hit the ground. 

I’ve been through a few situations myself, nothing like what these guys went through the last few seconds of their lives. Engine fire, loss of pressurization at FL340, cracked windscreen in flight, etc. What you have to understand is that as a professional pilot, it is imperative that you do it right, when you find yourself in this situation. My view of all this is if I died here, will they say I followed all the procedures and did everything right. Yes, you may be desperate, but it is imperative that you do not let that desperation cloud your judgement and cause you to do something that allows them to pin part of the blame on you. Like not following the last step which is leave the word not allowed trim off for the remainder of the flight. There is most likely a very good reason for that last step, and if you don’t follow each and every step of the abnormal exactly as spelled out, the outcome may be disastrous. The only time you go ‘off reservation’ is when you are faced with a situation not covered in the QRH. This one, at least for the Ethiopian crew, was covered. Even if they did follow the procedure exactly and did not turn the trim back on, they may still have died because they did not have enough time with the manual trim wheel. Which brings me to the point that you don’t do anything immediately (E190) except for getting the correct rudder in on a v1 cut, hitting the nose wheel disconnect switch on the runway if the steering fails and hitting the quick disconnect switch if a trim runs away. Those are the only things in flying that need to be done instantaneously. Because if you don’t recognize, process, and act ASAP, you will wreck. If they had recognized the situation faster, which they were equipped do to at that point, post lionair crash, they could have cutout the trim before it became unmanageable, which is the real key to dealing with any trim runaway situation. And these are things a professional crew is supposed to be mindful of and ready to handle before each takeoff, so they don’t end up needing adult diapers the last few seconds of their lives. It’s what the airline pays them for.

4 minutes ago, simbol said:

I disagree a bit, assuming our assumptions are correct (and we are assuming) they followed the procedure but given the circumstances of the flight (trim maxed out due to MCAS and airplane low altitude) the aircraft was in an irrecoverable state given the fact that they couldn't correct the attitude with manual trim.

Now under these circumstances you could argue (I am being the devils advocate here) that Boeing procedures were followed by the pilots to the letter, but the airplane was clearly irrecoverable forcing the pilots to take alternative actions in order to try to recover the flight.

Personally I think It is ridiculous that if a pilot if hitting the electronic Yoke trim in desperation, an automatic system can override it by moving the trim at a much faster rate overriding the pilots commands.

We will know much better with the full report, but personally after reading the initial finding I don't blame the pilots for this accident, to me this accident is the result of a fault that placed the pilots under a situation were the aircraft could not be recovered despite of following any appropriated training, procedures and checklists, which makes me think, the provided procedure by Boeing was not 100% fail safe as it appears it requires a minimum level of altitude in order to be successful.

S.

 

The most important thing about a trim runaway is to disable the system ASAP, before the trim state is unmanagable. Last year, our recurrent included a pitch trim runaway. We had people that crashed the sim because they didn’t hit the disconnect button in time. On my plane, the E190, but this applies to any plane except perhaps the second one, there are three things you have to recognize and act immediately, v1 cuts, nosewheel steering failures at high speed, and trim runaways. Any of these, if you don’t recognize and act immediately, you will crash. Even worse, we don’t even have a manual backup for the trim. If the two systems are out, that’s it, you’re flying the rest of the flight with the trim stuck where it is.  Those guys were at low altitude when the MCAS fault happened. It was imperative that they recognize it immediately because they had little altitude, and time, to play with. Because of that, they certainly could have complied with the procedure perfectly and still be dead, the initial delay sealing their fate.  Like I said, some days you should just not get out of bed.

22 minutes ago, KevinAu said:

I’ve been through a few situations myself, nothing like what these guys went through the last few seconds of their lives. Engine fire, loss of pressurization at FL340, cracked windscreen in flight, etc. What you have to understand is that as a professional pilot, it is imperative that you do it right, when you find yourself in this situation. My view of all this is if I died here, will they say I followed all the procedures and did everything right. Yes, you may be desperate, but it is imperative that you do not let that desperation cloud your judgement and cause you to do something that allows them to pin part of the blame on you. Like not following the last step which is leave the word not allowed trim off for the remainder of the flight. There is most likely a very good reason for that last step, and if you don’t follow each and every step of the abnormal exactly as spelled out, the outcome may be disastrous. The only time you go ‘off reservation’ is when you are faced with a situation not covered in the QRH. This one, at least for the Ethiopian crew, was covered. Even if they did follow the procedure exactly and did not turn the trim back on, they may still have died because they did not have enough time with the manual trim wheel. Which brings me to the point that you don’t do anything immediately (E190) except for getting the correct rudder in on a v1 cut, hitting the nose wheel disconnect switch on the runway if the steering fails and hitting the quick disconnect switch if a trim runs away. Those are the only things in flying that need to be done instantaneously. Because if you don’t recognize, process, and act ASAP, you will wreck. If they had recognized the situation faster, which they were equipped do to at that point, post lionair crash, they could have cutout the trim before it became unmanageable, which is the real key to dealing with any trim runaway situation. And these are things a professional crew is supposed to be mindful of and ready to handle before each takeoff, so they don’t end up needing adult diapers the last few seconds of their lives. It’s what the airline pays them for.

So you are claiming that all three crews, ( the two that died and the one that was saved by the extra pilot riding in the jump seat) where incompetent and not that that the Max was an accident waiting to happen. You won't convince me of that. 

43 minutes ago, Bobsk8 said:

What amazes me, is this long discussion, reading opinions from people  many of whom never even flown any aircraft  in real life, criticizing professional pilots that had 40 seconds to figure out what to do. with poor information from the manufacturer, in an aircraft heading for the ground at 250 mph plus. My guess is that most of these folks in the same situation would have needed adult diapers before they hit the ground. 

So how many hours of turbine time have you logged?  Your opinions have been among the most cynically critical in this thread, and I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that you don't have either an aerospace engineering degree or a turbine type rating in hand to base your snark on.  So if you're going to attack others for their lack of bona fides as a basis for having an opinion here, start first by gazing into the nearest mirror.

Let's assume that the MCAS is the problem here.  An MCAS problem causes a runaway trim, which is a known emergency condition covered by a critical memory item.  Regardless of how or even if the system's new features were taught in the training centers, one need not know the cause of the runaway to recognize that it has occurred, and then properly and promptly correct it with the critical action procedure if properly trained.  The corrective action as it exists today solves the problem regardless of cause because it completely depowers the trim motors.