Mike, By quoting your post my intent was not to question your story, only to clarify in my mind the rules pertaining to Class B airspace. I have no problem believing pilots violate regulations regarding minimum equipment every day. And if any controllers are going to shrug it off as non-critical I have to believe these guys around NYC are as capable as any.I am looking at the TAC on skyvector.com and I see the Mode C line at 30, which is different than the Class B limit.And while you are correct that the floor of the Class B is 1500ft (I see spots where it drops to 1100) if I read the chart correctly this area is all Class E above 700ft AGL, so technically controlled airspace above 700ft.Here again I am simply looking for a clarification of my understanding from a current RW pilot, as I only play one on PC.Joe

Roger on the Mode C line, and no problem Joe, I often need to be corrected at my age (65). As I like to say, Don't get old if you can reasonably avoid it. Thanks for the tip re skyvector.com, which I had never heard of till now. I'll look the TAC chart up later.By the way, I'm not a current RW pilot. While I do have a PPL, I haven't flown as a PIC in forty years. And I had only 110 hours when I quit. So I'm happy to acknowledge your expertise, and I must say that I'm impressed with your level of knowledge given that, as you put it, you only play a pilot on PC.

The video to me looked like both aircraft was in straight and level flight on a diagonal path to each other, but it may just be the angle of the camera. The piper looked like it started turning to the right to attempt to avoid the helo, but it was too late.

Roger on the Mode C line, and no problem Joe, I often need to be corrected at my age (65). As I like to say, Don't get old if you can reasonably avoid it. Thanks for the tip re skyvector.com, which I had never heard of till now. I'll look the TAC chart up later.By the way, I'm not a current RW pilot. While I do have a PPL, I haven't flown as a PIC in forty years. And I had only 110 hours when I quit. So I'm happy to acknowledge your expertise, and I must say that I'm impressed with your level of knowledge given that, as you put it, you only play a pilot on PC.

They probably didn't have mode C veils when you were flying Mike. Most of this airspace stuff happened after the Cerritos Crash in Los Angeles quite a bit later from when you were flying. Mode C VeilRef: AIM 3-2-3Description• Mode C veils exist within 30 nm of mostClass B airports. (A list of these airportsis available in FAR 91, Appendix D,Section 1)• Some Class B airspaces extend beyondthe Mode C veilRequirements/Limitations• Mode C transponder• Certain exemptions apply. Refer to FAR

They probably didn't have mode C veils when you were flying Mike. Most of this airspace stuff happened after the Cerritos Crash in Los Angeles quite a bit later from when you were flying. Mode C VeilRef: AIM 3-2-3Description• Mode C veils exist within 30 nm of mostClass B airports. (A list of these airportsis available in FAR 91, Appendix D,Section 1)• Some Class B airspaces extend beyondthe Mode C veilRequirements/Limitations• Mode C transponder• Certain exemptions apply. Refer to FAR

As I recall, after the 1968? collision of a DC-9 and a Cherokee? over central Indiana, TCAs -- Terminal Control Areas -- were established essentially immediately. But again as I recall, these were cylinders, not inverted wedding cakes. And you're right -- I never heard the term "Mode C veil" till I read your post here. Transponders existed, and most rational GA pilots operating in the areas around large airports had them, but there was no systematic requirement for having them that I recall other than for IFR -- and that might have been only for aircraft of 12,500 pounds and up, I really don't remember clearly.EDIT: In fact, I now remember that I flew into Newark three times, White Plains five or six times, and Baltimore once -- each time in one of the trainer Cherokees owned by the Princeton FBO. None of these trainers had transponders, so maybe I wasn't so rational after all. The controllers didn't mind at the time but today you probably would have to declare an emergency to come in with inadequate equipment.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxAs for Cerritos, I remember it well -- another accident that should never have happened. ATC deficiency in a very real sense, but an alert crew probably would have seen the Navion coming.

As I recall, after the 1968? collision of a DC-9 and a Cherokee? over central Indiana, TCAs -- Terminal Control Areas -- were established essentially immediately. But again as I recall, these were cylinders, not inverted wedding cakes. And you're right -- I never heard the term "Mode C veil" till I read your post here. Transponders existed, and most rational GA pilots operating in the areas around large airports had them, but there was no systematic requirement for having them that I recall other than for IFR -- and that might have been only for aircraft of 12,500 pounds and up, I really don't remember clearly.As for Cerritos, I remember it well -- another accident that should never have happened. ATC deficiency in a very real sense, but an alert crew probably would have seen the Navion coming.

In fact, I'll trot out a related war story ...Without bothering to say how it came to be, when I was sixteen I was privileged to ride the jumpseat of a BOAC 707, JFK to Heathrow. During the entire descent and approach the captain did the flying and, as I recall, worked the radios. He had his copilot doing nothing but searching the skies around them, stabbing his index finger against the windshield in the direction of every target he saw, which he then called as to aircraft type, clock direction, high/low/level and apparent distance -- all this even though we were in radar contact with ATC.Not surprisingly, both men had been RAF fighter pilots during WW2 so they were quite used to keeping a constant and careful lookout for other traffic. :)

In fact, I'll trot out a related war story ...Without bothering to say how it came to be, when I was sixteen I was privileged to ride the jumpseat of a BOAC 707, JFK to Heathrow. During the entire descent and approach the captain did the flying and, as I recall, worked the radios. He had his copilot doing nothing but searching the skies around them, stabbing his index finger against the windshield in the direction of every target he saw, which he then called as to aircraft type, clock direction, high/low/level and apparent distance -- all this even though we were in radar contact with ATC.Not surprisingly, both men had been RAF fighter pilots during WW2 so they were quite used to keeping a constant and careful lookout for other traffic. :)

"Not surprisingly, both men had been RAF fighter pilots during WW2 so they were quite used to keeping a constant and careful lookout for other traffic."A good practice and one that should remind all airmen that those who rely on ATC for traffic avoidance in VFR conditions that they are making a deadly mistake. See and be seen is paramount to survival."Air traffic controller suspended, was chatting on phone with girlfriend during Hudson River crash"http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2009/0...ded_over_h.htmlBraun

More insight:A reporter and photographer are taken on a ride in a four-seat Cessna 172SP above the Hudson River corridor just days after a fatal midair collision on the route. Air traffic controllers warn the 78-year-old pilot of other aircraft in the airspace throughout the flight. New York Times, (08/11) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/nyregion...tml?_r=3&hp Claude

Interesting development:ational Transportation Safety BoardWashington, DC 20594FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: August 17, 2009SB-09-44************************************************************NTSB RELIEVES AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS GROUP OF PARTYSTATUS IN HUDSON RIVER MIDAIR COLLISION INVESTIGATION************************************************************The National Transportation Safety Board today removed the National Air Traffic Controllers Association as a party to its investigation into the August 8 midair collision of two aircraft over the Hudson River that killed all 9 persons aboard.Under the Safety Board's procedures, organizations and agencies are invited to participate in NTSB investigations if they can provide technical expertise. At the outset of the investigation, the organizations sign an agreement to abide by NTSB party rules. Among the rules parties agree to is that they will not reveal investigative information being learned through that process, nor publicly comment on it. Parties agree that only the NTSB will release factual information on the progress of the investigation and discuss the progress of the investigation with the public, including the news media.On Friday, August 14, NATCA convened a press conference to discuss information released earlier that day by the NTSB. The organization was subsequently reminded of its responsibilities as a party to the investigation. This morning, NATCA issued a press release again discussing the information released, and conducted another press conference this afternoon.Patrick Forrey, NATCA President, was informed today that his organization has been removed as a party to the investigation.In light of conflicting interpretations of factual information released by the NTSB on Friday, the Board takes this opportunity to address the issue of the Teterboro controller's interaction with the accident airplane in the minutes before the collision:According to preliminary data provided to the Safety Board by the Federal Aviation Administration, the controller cleared the accident airplane for departure at 11:48:30. The first radar target for the airplane was detected at 11:49:55, at about 300 feet. The controller initiated a non-business-related telephone conversation at 11:50:31. Prior to the Teterboro controller instructing the pilot to contact Newark Tower at 1152:20, there were several aircraft in the Hudson River Class B Exclusion Area in the vicinity of the airplane, some of which were potential traffic conflicts. These were detected by radar and displayed on the controller's scope in Teterboro tower. The Teterboro controller did not alert the airplane pilot to this traffic prior to instructing him to change his radio frequency and contact Newark. The accident helicopter was not visible on the Teterboro controller's radar scope at 1152:20; it did appear on radar 7 seconds later - at approximately 400 feet.At 1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data processing system detected a conflict between the accident airplane and the accident helicopter, which set off aural alarms and caused a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. The controller terminated his non-business-related telephone call at 11:53:13. The collision occurred at 11:53:14.As the Safety Board stated in its media release on Friday, the role that air traffic control might have played in this accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation progresses. The Board is waiting for more detailed air traffic control-related data from the Federal Aviation Administration. Any opinions rendered at this time are speculative and premature."Although we appreciate the technical expertise our parties provide during the course of an investigation," NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said, "it is counterproductive when an organization breaches the party agreement and publicly interprets or comments on factual information generated by that investigation. Our rules are set up precisely to avoid the prospect of each party offering their slant on the information. I regret that we have had to remove NATCA from the investigation."

[NTSB said that we] regret that we have had to remove NATCA from the investigation."

At the risk of waxing political, NATCA is a union. Like all unions its sole concern is furthering the interests of its membership at the cost of others, and part of that concern is putting as positive a spin as possible on news that reflects negatively on the membership.