While you type that from the comfort of your home after nearly 3 years of analysis since the crash, it may be a good idea to read the transcript again whilst keeping in mind they only had 3 minutes to figure it all out

Three minutes is a long time to miss clear indications the aircraft was stalling, take control and fly the aircraft out of trouble. Arguments about the benefits of yokes versus sidesticks, as in the OP's link, are at the periphery. Aircraft with yokes have crashed in similar circumstances.

Stall training is instilled into you until it becomes instinctive. As soon as they had lost their airspeed indications (something that they did indentify) they should have shot for attitude / thrust. It is the standard recovery in every text book as well. Yanking the stick back and holding it there does nothing but crash the aeroplane. Try it! It even works in the sim!!

The crew made mistake after mistake after mistake. I too have read the transcripts thoroughly. The job of the captain at least is to constantly think about what may happen to the aircraft in any given situation. He is guilty of dereliction of duty at least. Leaving his post as the a/c was about to enter extreme weather is something that I would never do nor have ever done!!!.

vololiberista

I am not going to get into details regarding the storm since you have obviously not actually studied the data, flightpath and nobody saw what was on the AF447 radar.

 

Regarding the stall, if you look at the fdr traces you can see the PF was constantly making roll inputs due to roll being direct. It is highly likely his aft stick inputs were initially being made subconsciously as he was trying to keep the wings level.

 

I am curious as to how many of you armchair experts have flown in alternate law at cruise altitude at night?

 

In no way am I saying the PF didn't panic and screw up however you need to look at the whole picture.

 

 

It was a poor navigational choice, poor CRM, poor systems knowledge and ultimately poor piloting skills, with possibly some inherently poor control layouts in the design as a contributory factor, but ones which should not affect matters if the other things don't occur.

 

In other words, as with almost all modern-day aircraft crashes, it was a cascade of simple things combining to lead to disaster. However, the poor piloting and the less than ideal CRM is absolutely preventable, and that's nothing to do with any design feature on the aircraft at all, or the weather, but everything to do with what was quite evidently an insufficient level of training and skills, since the aircraft could very likely have been flown out of trouble with the correct course of action.

 

Needless to say, it is easier for us to sit here and say that, but ultimately, that is what the pilots are being paid for. Thus pilots should do their job properly, but it is the responsibility of their company to ensure that they are equipped with the all skills and knowledge necessary to make that possible. And if that means getting them all into Cessna 152s and spending a week teaching them stall and spin recoveries, and then another week teaching them how to correctly divide responsibilities by having them build some rafts in the p***ing rain on some trendy course, and then having them all do tests on what absolutely every ECAM message means, and then having them fly simulators with nothing on the clock but the maker's name, then that's what they should do. I'm pretty sure all the passengers on AF447 would have happily paid ten quid more for their tickets at point A, to cover the cost of that kind of training commitment and ensure they arrived at point B, but sadly, they are not in a position to comment on it now.

 

Al

Very good article!

Scary human error! Fly-by-wire does pose some new security concerns, although a brilliant feature, every coin has a flip side I am afraid.

 

Poor people on that flight.

I seem to remember reading something that said Bonin did not have much experience with flying in alternate law. IIRC, when the A330, or any airbus for that matter, loses any sort of flight data/instrumentation i.e. the pitot system becoming iced over, the aircraft switches from Normal to Alternate Law.

As alternate law has significantly less flight envelope protection than normal law (http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm), if Bonin believed he was in Normal Law, whereas he was actually in Alternate Law, this could account for the disbelief that he seemed to show by consistently pulling back on the flight controls, maybe thinking that the aircraft itself would not let itself attain the AOA actually achieved.

 

Anyway, it's easy to sit here and comment like this, but at the end of the day, unless you were there, I guess we'll never know the true story.

Al did you read the article?

The pitot tubes were not the main cause of the crash.

 

According to the article this was the last part of the recording:

02:14:23 (Robert) “Damn it, we’re going to crash… This can’t be happening!”

02:14:25 (Bonin) “But what’s going on?”

The captain, now acutely aware of the aircraft’s pitch, has the final word:

02:14:27 (Dubois) “Ten degrees of pitch…”

There the recording ends.

 

Not what Rob posted...

How many of your are type rated on an Airbus FBW Aircraft?

 

How many of you can explain the difference between normal law, alternate law with and without stabilities and direct law...?

 

Before you sit here having a pissing contest between yourselves... Stop and think......

 

I'm sure errors were made, and we will learn from them.

 

I have seen pilots of all nationalities have problems in the simulator when faced with unreliable airspeed. It's easy when you know it's coming, but factor in a failure, or some weather or just being dog tired then let something slip in like this...

 

All of a sudden your getting conflicting information... Dark or night lightening all around you, buffeted up against the 5 point harness... Then let's see how well you do!

 

For the record yes I'm a type rated Airbus pilot with a bunch of PIC on it! How flying the MD ;)

And that sums it up.. Nobody 'including anyone with a type rating' knows what it's like to be handed a aircraft in Alt2 law in that kind of situation.

Sorry... Just kinda gets under my skin when people who have never signed the tech log of a commercial airliner start second guessing the actions of a crew.... Last time I was in the Airbus training center (Jan) between about 20 Airbus pilots 320/330 people were discussing this incident... Think how much flight time they have between them... And you know what? They were still not sure....

Sorry... Just kinda gets under my skin when people who have never signed the tech log of a commercial airliner start second guessing the actions of a crew.... Last time I was in the Airbus training center (Jan) between about 20 Airbus pilots 320/330 people were discussing this incident... Think how much flight time they have between them... And you know what? They were still not sure....

 

bollocks, have you never discussed law or politics? but your not qualified ..

This is an open forum regarding all things aviation

For those of you able to read french, a link to a former A340 Captains comments on AF447 and flight safety in general in Europe.

 

http://henrimarnetcornus.20minutes-blogs.fr/

 

Go into the Archives and back to 2009-06 and continue upto today.

 

Apparantly nor EASA, DGAC, BEA, AIRBUS or Air France did take any action on numerous Near Misses regarding frozen pitot tubes, all Pitot Thales AA, prior to the crash of AF447.

 

FROZEN PITOT TUBES???

The aircraft, including those systems, equipment and appliances required for type-certification, or by operating rules, must function as intended under any foreseeable operating conditions, throughout, and sufficiently beyond, the operational envelope of the aircraft.

I don't think AF447 was opperating outside those limits.

In this case it was the Pitot Thales AA which was faulty. They was eliminated after the loss of AF447 by a Airworthiness Directive.

 

An Airworthiness Directive is issued when an unsafe condition exists.

 

An unsafe condition exists if there is factual evidence (from service experience, analysis or tests) that:

(a) An event may occur that would result in fatalities, usually with the loss of the aircraft, or reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:

(i) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, or

(ii) Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or

(iii) Serious or fatal injury to one or more occupants unless it is shown that the probability of such an event is within the limit defined by the applicable airworthiness requirements

 

There are big money in play here, and it is very convenient to give the pilots all the fault. They are all 3 dead, together with 225 cabin crew and passengers, and have no way to defend themselves.

 

So, in my view, the realy responsible are the Authorities, EASA, DGAC and BEA as well as AIRBUS and Air France who did not react on those Near Misses.

 

Same story with the Concorde. Incidents in Washington and Dakar before the actual crash in Paris.

 

Frightening I think, when those public services, paid by ourselves to look after our safety in the air, are not doing what they are supposed to do.

Well, at last, they did, but after the crash of AF447.

 

Soeren Nielsen

Don't forget this one: Same sh%$t, different piles

 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gPUXdo9OJc25NfkvghW7ZBYoynjg

I am not going to get into details regarding the storm since you have obviously not actually studied the data, flightpath and nobody saw what was on the AF447 radar.

 

Regarding the stall, if you look at the fdr traces you can see the PF was constantly making roll inputs due to roll being direct. It is highly likely his aft stick inputs were initially being made subconsciously as he was trying to keep the wings level.

 

I am curious as to how many of you armchair experts have flown in alternate law at cruise altitude at night?

 

In no way am I saying the PF didn't panic and screw up however you need to look at the whole picture.

 

Are you an armchair expert? I'm certainly not. I have 8,000 hours in the air. Yes I have studied the storm pictures. I would have avoided it like the plague as did every other flight that night. Alternate law effectively means "Over to you Mr. Pilot. Your the expert so get me out of this!"

You can argue the point until the cows come home. But it doesn't take much to realise that if you are falling out of the sky at 10,000fpm with engines at full throttle and the nose pointing at the moon you are in a stall. A deep one at that. You can make all the excuses you like but the airmanship on that flight was sub zero!

vololiberista

Do yourself a favour a favour and 'actually study' take a look at the flightpath taken by AF447 and the storm traces, intensity of the storm cells the aircraft actually passed. I am not even going to bother arguing that point with you since you are obvioulsy going on articles you have read over the past few years and nothing based on fact.

 

You continue to show a complete lack of knowledge on the subject every time you post. The aircraft was never in a deep stall, the crew also comented on the V/S and audio cues suggesting they believed all cues on the PFD may have been incorrect, they also commented on the background noise which was inconsistent with an aircraft stalling at low speed.

 

So I will say it again, look at the big picture, thank god you are not an investigator.. Perhaps they should hand it over to you. Case closed three clowns on the flightdeck just decided to pull all the way into the atlantic..