TransAsia ATR Crash in Taipei

[vololiberista 205]

Again, if they were in any time-pressure this was result of their own actions. They further managed to make things worse by not controlling airspeed, flying dangerously close to stall, even keeping the best glide speed could have given them a better outcome.

Wait to you have an engine failure at less than 1,000ft. Make one mistake at identifying the exact cause and that's it!

Get yourself into a real ATR simulator and just see how you react. I'm absolutely certain you'll crash!

[Pastaiolo 1,688]

Yes, because we are not trained for it. They should be.

[MarkJHarris 128]

Training....I think only one post on PPrune in 40 odd pages mentioned what I 'm thinking. I used to fly the ATP, similarly under powered, then the Q400 which most definitely is not. (100-1500fpm on one!!) 

 

The PW126/7 and 150 engines all have one huge thing in common (not a 13'6" Prop) they all turn the same way! This mean all types ATP/J61, DHC8 1/2/300/400 and all ATR series aircraft have a CRITICAL engine. Remember this for a moment.

 

CRITICAL means one engine failing is more important than the other. With props that turn the same way, thrust line moves with angle of airflow, as you get a slight retreating blade effect. Unlike the yaw on an inline prop, with rotational flow over the tail, a twin will yaw whenever power or pitch is changed. Hence Turboprop pilots have a subconcious link between their power hand and their feet......

 

Anyway, OPC/LPL tests and training tend to concentrate on V1 Cut and failures of the CRITICAL engine. The test always occurs on the CRITICAL engine and it takes a good TRI/E and time to put failures of the other one into the syllabus.

 

So, all the crew on this flight were very used to shutting down the left engine....

 

Every time you went into the SIM you knew you'd get an engine failure and every time it would most likely be a LEFT ENGINE FAILURE.

 

Finally, Chinese Culture is very important. Deferring to your senior is important it seems. The Captain had 4000+ hours but the F/O was a Captain called in to cover with 7000+hrs and the Jump seat had a 16,000hr TRE on it. The CVR will tell who called for the left engine shutdown drill. You can be sure that none of the crew if junior in seniority would question that call.

[vc10man 732]

 

 

Finally, Chinese Culture is very important. Deferring to your senior is important it seems. The Captain had 4000+ hours but the F/O was a Captain called in to cover with 7000+hrs and the Jump seat had a 16,000hr TRE on it. The CVR will tell who called for the left engine shutdown drill. You can be sure that none of the crew if junior in seniority would question that call.

How remarkable that it was the same scenario shown on an Air Crash documentary on CNN/something similar channel  on a Yak-40 that crashed somewhere in the former USSR when deference to a senior pilot prevented a junior from taking unilateral action that could have saved the flight.

[KevinAu 441]

Wait to you have an engine failure at less than 1,000ft. Make one mistake at identifying the exact cause and that's it!

Get yourself into a real ATR simulator and just see how you react. I'm absolutely certain you'll crash!

Why don't you get yourself into a real simulator with some real training. What you would learn is that we do nothing but just fly the plane at v2 until we've climbed to acceleration altitude on a v1 cut. Do you know why? Because if we make one mistake below 1,000', that's it! So we wait until we are above accel height. Above acceleration altitude, we are above all obstacles and can clean up and start diagnosing and calling for memory items and checklists. Even on a prop with a critical engine, unless it is something like a prop runaway, there is nothing that critical that cannot wait until a safe altitude to deal with slowly and deliberately. It was lack of discipline and impulsivity that killed them, not the engine failure.

[dmncnpilot 39]

Why don't you get yourself into a real simulator with some real training. What you would learn is that we do nothing but just fly the plane at v2 until we've climbed to acceleration altitude on a v1 cut. Do you know why? Because if we make one mistake below 1,000', that's it! So we wait until we are above accel height. Above acceleration altitude, we are above all obstacles and can clean up and start diagnosing and calling for memory items and checklists. Even on a prop with a critical engine, unless it is something like a prop runaway, there is nothing that critical that cannot wait until a safe altitude to deal with slowly and deliberately. It was lack of discipline and impulsivity that killed them, not the engine failure.

I agree 100% By the time an airline pilot is done with training, things like; V1 cuts, engine failures, fires, proper use of the QRH, CRM and anything else you can imagine should be ingrained in the pilots brain. There is no reason whatsoever to diagnose anything below acceleration altitude unless you have a prop overspeed or a negative autofeather. CRM is crucial.

[vololiberista 205]

Why don't you get yourself into a real simulator with some real training. What you would learn is that we do nothing but just fly the plane at v2 until we've climbed to acceleration altitude on a v1 cut. Do you know why? Because if we make one mistake below 1,000', that's it! So we wait until we are above accel height. Above acceleration altitude, we are above all obstacles and can clean up and start diagnosing and calling for memory items and checklists. Even on a prop with a critical engine, unless it is something like a prop runaway, there is nothing that critical that cannot wait until a safe altitude to deal with slowly and deliberately. It was lack of discipline and impulsivity that killed them, not the engine failure.

I get myself into real simulators at least 4 days a week! It's part of my job!

You can quote theory to me until the cows come home! 600ft agl immediately after take-off an aircraft excepting GA will be in a high nose up attitude. Any delay, indecision or any mistake at that point will quickly turn into a stall. So now you're dealing with an engine failure and a stall recovery both at the same time. So many a/c have been lost this way!

The best way to avoid such an incident is to assume something WILL go wrong. Even so the survival chances are slight. Stalling at that altitude with a nose high attitude will result in a much longer stall recovery and 600ft or ewven 1,000 ain't enough!

[KevinAu 441]

I get myself into real simulators at least 4 days a week! It's part of my job!

You can quote theory to me until the cows come home! 600ft agl immediately after take-off an aircraft excepting GA will be in a high nose up attitude. Any delay, indecision or any mistake at that point will quickly turn into a stall. So now you're dealing with an engine failure and a stall recovery both at the same time. So many a/c have been lost this way!

The best way to avoid such an incident is to assume something WILL go wrong. Even so the survival chances are slight. Stalling at that altitude with a nose high attitude will result in a much longer stall recovery and 600ft or ewven 1,000 ain't enough!

And you can be hyperbolic all day if you wish. The only reason they stalled was because they impetuously shut down their only working engine. All they had to do was just pitch for v2 and fly out on the OEI path and do nothing else until above accel height. That's all. Their survival was guaranteed until they panicked and yanked the good engine's fuel cutoff, against any kind of proper training they should have had. You of all people should already know this, if you are indeed instructing air carrier pilots in a sim four days a week.

[mgh 89]

In the accident to G-OBME to the 737 adjacent to East Midlands Airport the crew had 24 min to sort it out before the engine eventually failed at 900 feet agl.

The official accident report reads in para 2.1.1 the reaction of the flight crew to the engine problem:
 

The speed with which the pilots acted was contrary to both their training and the instructions in the Operating Manual. If they had taken the time to study the engine instruments it should have been apparent that No 2 engine indications were normal and that No 1 engine was behaving erratically....  Their incorrect diagnosis of the problem must, therefore, be attributed to their too rapid reaction and not to any failure of the engine instrument system to display the correct indications.

 

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/4-1990%20G-OBME.pdf

[michal 44]

 

 

if you are indeed instructing air carrier pilots in a sim four days a week.

Fat chance. 

[petedob 3]

And you can be hyperbolic all day if you wish. The only reason they stalled was because they impetuously shut down their only working engine. All they had to do was just pitch for v2 and fly out on the OEI path and do nothing else until above accel height. That's all. Their survival was guaranteed until they panicked and yanked the good engine's fuel cutoff, against any kind of proper training they should have had. You of all people should already know this, if you are indeed instructing air carrier pilots in a sim four days a week.

It's probably more important at this point to understand why the aircrew shut down (or may have been attempting to restart) an engine during the phase of flight they were in. Was the aircraft not climbing acceptably? Did the crew panic? Who knows...stating that they panicked or all they had to do was to pitch for v2 and fly to a safe altitude is premature.  

[KevinAu 441]

It's probably more important at this point to understand why the aircrew shut down (or may have been attempting to restart) an engine during the phase of flight they were in. Was the aircraft not climbing acceptably? Did the crew panic? Who knows...stating that they panicked or all they had to do was to pitch for v2 and fly to a safe altitude is premature.

It's not that hard to understand. The only thing that would have required a quick reaction, off the cuff action to shut down an engine would have been a prop runaway or equivalently on a jet, an uncommanded reverse. Otherwise, all you should do is fly your speed and engine out path. That really is all there is. Anything more will go on the record by investigators as undisciplined, impetuous and entirely wrong. We've all been there, anytime some bell goes off, your first instinct is to do something. Which is exactly what happened here. I've had students do it, I've been with people in the sim who've done it, and I've probably been guilty of it myself a few times. But the proper reaction is to first, take a breath, then fly the plane, take a few more breaths, continue flying the plane to a safe altitude, then take a breath, then evaluate what just happened, then start the process beginning with the proper memory items. Yes it is supposed to take that long. It takes some discipline of mind to slow things down. When you don't have that discipline and react impulsively to a bell, then this is the kind of results that you get. You pull the wrong levers because it's just the lever your muscle memory is used to pulling. Technically, we call these 'brain farts'. Simple stuff.

[JB3DG 225]

I am reminded of that twin engine flight section in the Learning Center in FS9 where John King demonstrates a twin failure...His words at the end have stuck with me since. "There is no emergency, no matter how serious, that cannot be made worse, by going too fast."(ie reacting too quickly).

[michal 44]

It's probably more important at this point to understand why

Frankly investigative committees do not concern themselves in psychology and mind reading and attempt to have answers to questions 'why they did it', rather what it is that they did and whether it met SOPs. I don't see any attempt in explaining why Air China pilot took of from taxiway instead of runway in the middle of night at Anchorage airport or why Comair 5191 decided to take off from wrong runway or why Asiana crew failed to notice sinking speed and rapidly raising nose of their 777 before they struck a wall.

[petedob 3]

Frankly investigative committees do not concern themselves in psychology and mind reading and attempt to have answers to questions 'why they did it', rather what it is that they did and whether it met SOPs. I don't see any attempt in explaining why Air China pilot took of from taxiway instead of runway in the middle of night at Anchorage airport or why Comair 5191 decided to take off from wrong runway or why Asiana crew failed to notice sinking speed and rapidly raising nose of their 777 before they struck a wall.

They do...maybe you haven't run across any yet. This report transitions from "how" to "why" a helicopter accident occurred when investigators were unable to determine any mechanical or weather related contributions to the accident: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAB0703.pdf.