.... time for Boeing to bin those big engines and just use NGs...

That link to the pprune discussion makes for very interesting reading, especially from the ex-Voodoo pilot..

Off-topic..Robot planes are fine.... for the military... as long as no humans are on board them at all..

33 minutes ago, threegreen said:

John,

please excuse if my wording sounded harsh in any way, it wasn't meant to be. I was merely astounded because the purpose of MCAS had been discussed at length. No harm done I hope.

Without wanting to go off-topic, when the day comes that aircraft fly themselves with no pilots I can't see how I'm still interested so much in (commercial) flying. Aviation is so much about people, pilots and the required teamwork in any flight deck, ATC as the pilot's best friend, etc. On the other hand, I'm a bit skeptical about 'robot planes' because of the psychological part - considering the general public lack knowledge about flying in general and the abundance of misinformation about aircraft and aviation as a whole out there I would assume not too many people would happily put themselves in aircraft with no pilots.

Sounds like we are birds of a feather, all of us here, when it comes to the dissing of the team and travel spirit that civilian flying offers via automation.  Some automation is good, I am in IT and as such I called myself a "change merchant" in the past.  But change cannot be screwed into place, it needs to be like an anesthetic, unobtrusive and still giving us purpose in other venues.  I just do not know if our hurried world is ready to accept that, what are we trying to hurry ourselves into?  In an effort to seek Utopia we may create a dystopian society.  I hope we settle somewhere in between, so people can take time outs, when they need, and work their hearts out, which gives us purpose.

11 hours ago, Bobsk8 said:

If you look at the video  I posted above on this thread.  from a real 737 pilot with over 12,000 hours, he explains the normal pitch up under full power of all 737's and the increased pitch up of the Max, due to  the larger engines and forward placement of the engines  

As skelsey says that guy is talking rubbish, it's a nacelle lift issue not engine thrust rotation issue. And at no stage does MCAS engage the throttle, where is he getting this nonsense from!?

As referenced earlier in the thread a nice explanation of the problem is described here https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-fi-boeing-max-design-20190315-story.html

I've been saying for years (since AF447) any sudden automation changes or flight law changes like this should be audibly announced or at least a message shown in the PFD!

📢 MCAS TRIMMING
📢 MCAS ENGAGED 

📢 AoA INPUTS DISAGREE
📢 AoA INPUTS DISAGREE

As mentioned above the fact that the 737 already has an AoA INPUTS DISAGREE light BUT YOU HAVE TO PAY EXTRA FOR IT is an absolute discgrace, a safety light bulb worth about 5 bucks that they charge 1000s for... and if that wasn't bad enough a system that doesn't bother to disable when it has conflicting information, it just follows the one that disagrees with GPS information, altitude and speed information... I am sorry but it is pure negligence.

 

Edited March 22, 20197 yr by DellyPilot

12 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

As skelsey says that guy is talking rubbish, it's a nacelle lift issue not engine thrust rotation issue. And at no stage does MCAS engage the throttle, where is he getting this nonsense from!? Nice history of the system described here https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-fi-boeing-max-design-20190315-story.html

I've been saying for years (since AF447 actually) any sudden automation changes or flight law changes like this should be audibly repeated or at least a message shown in the PFD!

📢 MCAS TRIMMING
📢 MCAS ENGAGED 

📢 AoA INPUTS DISAGREE
📢 AoA INPUTS DISAGREE

The fact that the 737 already has an AoA INPUTS DISAGREE light BUT YOU HAVE TO PAY EXTRA FOR IT is an absolute discrace and might have possibly saved lives in both of these crashes. Boeing have commited to installing this for free now. But OMG what a terrible system that will not disable MCAS during a AoA situation. Pure negligence.

 

My respect for Boeing that I have had for years, has disappeared after this debacle. 

59 minutes ago, HighBypass said:

.... time for Boeing to bin those big engines and just use NGs...

Problem is it wouldn't be competitive against the A320Neo, let alone a larger CSeries/A220 design. The airlines liked the idea of not having to retrain their pilots and the shorter development timeline of the MAX series, while getting a more economical aircraft. Starting to look like maybe Boeing should have gone for a significant re-design, if not a clean sheet design outright. Or maybe they should have bought the CSeries years ago.

 

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeings-future-plans-threatened-by-airbus-bombardier-pact/

Edited March 21, 20197 yr by goates

1 minute ago, goates said:

...Starting to look like maybe Boeing should have gone for a significant re-design, if not a clean sheet design outright...

Whole new type approval/certification hoops to jump through for that I presume? I wonder why Boeing didn't want to go down that route?? 

You are making this sound as if the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed..

As best I can tell, this can be fixed with a software update, which was initiated after the Lion Air crash, but may well get hung up in the FAA approvals process after all the scrutiny..

The real outstanding question in my mind is how come the Ethiopian aircrew was unable to deal with the problems they were faced with... Surely they must have been aware of what happened to Lion Air, and how to turn off the trim motors..

Perhaps hanging honking great engines of the front of a wing rather than underneath it may introduce a fatal flaw to a good 55 year old design?

A good question Bert - would the Ethopian crew have been aware of the details of Lion Air and the action to take..

On 3/21/2019 at 5:42 PM, Bert Pieke said:

You are making this sound as if the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed..

As best I can tell, this can be fixed with a software update, which was initiated after the Lion Air crash, but may well get hung up in the FAA approvals process after all the scrutiny..

The real outstanding question in my mind is how come the Ethiopian aircrew was unable to deal with the problems they were faced with... Surely they must have been aware of what happened to Lion Air, and how to turn off the trim motors..

That's not the outstanding question at all.  And yes the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed.

What annoys me is couch experts casually saying 'oh sure its obvious it was MCAS, I would have just turned off the STAB TRIM switches immediately'. HAHA

Its not that simple, you are climbing and suddenly the stick shaker goes, the trim wheel is whirring away (but with STS is does that anyway), warning lights are flashing, the yoke gets real heavy (maybe we are stalling) and as you apply thrust thinking you are countering some kind of stall, (high speed? is it a microburst? windshear?) the stabilizer sensitivity grows (faster you go more MCAS wants to kill you) to the point where you can't even keep the nose level now with all your force, your FO has 200 hours and isn't much use.. quick get the QRH.. then suddenly it stops and the plane climbs rapidly.. what the hell.. this is a terrifying scenario.

Sure as you sit there in your comfy chair it looks easy, they could have just engaged the autopilot and MCAS would have disabled! But they were in a high stress scenario with out proper training, Boeing in their wisdom decided on not informing crews about this totally new system! 

And finally (yes I will stop) even if it might be true that the best x% of pilots would have figured it out, the ones that browse PPRUNE and AVSIM, its still tough to say what that % is...

By definition 50% of crews are below average competency, and this aircraft will kill some % of them. It shouldn't be flying, the first and only thing I have ever thanked word not allowed for.

 

Edited March 22, 20197 yr by Jim Young

42 minutes ago, HighBypass said:

Whole new type approval/certification hoops to jump through for that I presume? I wonder why Boeing didn't want to go down that route?? 

Thanks, forgot to mention Boeing's reason to not starting from scratch. Airlines liked cheap training and economics, and Boeing liked the cheaper and faster certification process.

58 minutes ago, DellyPilot said:

That's not the outstanding question at all.  And yes the Boeing MAX design is fatally flawed.

....

By definition 50% of crews are below average competency, and this aircraft will kill some % of them. It shouldn't be flying, ...

Fair enough, the MCAS system as currently designed is by definition fatally flawed.  That does not mean that it cannot be fixed by a software update and a perfectly safe airplane emerge from the redesign..

Lets see what the accident investigation into the second crash uncovers.

Was it really MCAS and a malfunctioning AoA sensor the second time also..?

1 hour ago, Bert Pieke said:

That does not mean that it cannot be fixed by a software update and a perfectly safe airplane emerge from the redesign..

That might not be quite true, I believe the software patch that they were working on (and was due for release before the Ethiopa Air crash sadly) was delayed because there is now internal disagreement over whether the changes go far enough, they may possibly need hardware changes or additional connections/AoA vanes/warning lights. 

Just for clarity here is an extract from the Lion Air 601 (didn't crash) report

The pilot performed three Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) consisting of Airspeed Unreliable, ALT DISAGREE, and Runaway Stabilizer. http://avherald.com/h?article=4bf90724/0000&opt=0

Why is IAS DISAGREE being presented when the real problem is AoA DISAGREE (broken AoA vane)? Why is the wrong warning standard and the real warning an optional extra Boeing?

This led them to going through 2 useless checklists, it was only the 3rd one (suggested by the 3rd jump seat pilot who perhaps had a better chance of noticing the pitch trim spinning) that solved the problem. But they had never heard of MCAS because Boeing considered it not worth mentioning or adding additional checklists for.

The Runaway trim checklist did include STAB TRIM CUTOUT, but it wasn't a traditional runaway situation because the moment the pilot trimmed the plane the situation stopped, so in previous 737NG training that doesn't technically count as "Runaway" and in the confusion it might not feel like it either.

In hindight they should have looked at the pitch wheel and noted it moving or read the new angle.. but just when it all stops a few seconds later the plane lurches forward again as MCAS dials in another 2.5 degrees.. and again until both pilot trim and pilot control column forces cannot compete with the stabiliser. Mental design. 🤦‍♂️

In the Ethiopia crash it seems to happen much earlier in the flight (flaps may have come up earlier) and with a less experienced FO and no jump seat pilot the captain going through these checklists in his 2nd language and all the time accelerating (trying to avoid stalling) to 380kts! The captain handled it poorly almost certainly but bloody hell its an accident waiting to happen.

For reference here is the constant sound (duration of flight and uncancelable) of the 737 stick shaker, imagine trying to go through all those checklists with this blaring away! 

 

1 hour ago, Bert Pieke said:

Was it really MCAS and a malfunctioning AoA sensor the second time also..?

Looks like it but its not known yet as the CVR data hasn't been leaked.. yet!

 

 

Edited March 22, 20197 yr by DellyPilot

2 hours ago, HighBypass said:

Perhaps hanging honking great engines of the front of a wing rather than underneath it may introduce a fatal flaw to a good 55 year old design?

A good question Bert - would the Ethopian crew have been aware of the details of Lion Air and the action to take..

Well the placement of the Max’s engines, or the NG’s for that matter, don’t look significantly different than the Neo’s. I have issues with Boeing after this incident, but I think the implication that the Max is fatally flawed or fundamentally flawed by virtue of the placement and size of the engines is hyperbolic. I’m not picking on you, it’s just a theme I’ve scene in a lot of articles and comments. 

12 minutes ago, IUBrian said:

don’t look significantly different than the Neo’s. I have issues with Boeing after this incident, but I think the implication that the Max is fatally flawed or fundamentally flawed by virtue of the placement and size of the engines is hyperbolic.

They are quite a big bigger relative to the plane and further forward but I agree its not impossible to make this work.. but as has been shown they really messed it up.

This is something Boeing really have to reflect on, I never thought I would say it but I feel safer in an Airbus. It has this built in from the ground up not patched on like an old bandage. 

Understood Brian, no worries. 

6 minutes ago, IUBrian said:

....don’t look significantly different than the Neo’s.....I’m not picking on you, it’s just a theme I’ve scene in a lot of articles and comments. 

Understood Brian, no worries. If by Neo you are referring to the A320 Neo, then I would say that the Airbus was designed from the outset with large turbofan engines as the powerplant of choice. As you know, the 737 was originally fitted with small diameter turbojets (JT8D) - the LEAP engines alter the weight & balance somewhat. A quick & dirty lookup on wiki suggests a weight increase of about 600 kg, so that's just over a tonne shifted forward of the wing...