IIRC, the child at the controls pushed the yoke forward and the aircraft went into an unrecoverable Mach Tuck.Chhers,- jahman.

Was that Aeroflot Flight 593?

Was that Aeroflot Flight 593?

Yes, Aeroflot 593 seems to be the flight (and I stand corrected, Mach Tuck was not involved).Again there is a man-machine interface problem with Airbus, as the AP disengages aileron axis control without issuing an audible warning. The crew remained unaware (and later confused by what looked like to aircraft entering a holding pattern) for the aircraft to overbank and nosedive.Finally the article states that "despite the struggles of both pilots to save the aircraft, it was later concluded that if they had simply let go of the control column, the autopilot would have automatically taken action to prevent stalling, thus avoiding the accident."Cheers,- jahman.

While I agree that on the A310 A/P roll channel being seperate from the pitch channel is not a good idea (only aircraft I know that does that except the default MS 737) Who expects a captain to let his teenage son take the left hand seat and even worse not monitor what he is doing?The kid was trying to roll the aircraft with the A/P engaged, is that really the designers fault? Reminds me off a picture that I have of my little brother sitting in the captains chair of a 767 'on the ground' he's gripping on to the yoke for dear life, why would anyone let a child do that at crz alt?

Yes, Aeroflot 593 seems to be the flight (and I stand corrected, Mach Tuck was not involved).

You beat me to it!

To say what you say requires an assumption that once stalled, the aircraft was unrecoverable. Is it your contention that the aircraft was unrecoverable? Because if not, you are just making a lot of uneducated noise.

You misundertand. The a/c was perfectly recoverable. and in fact had any of the crew been on the ball the recovery would have hardly been noticed.vololiberista

You misundertand. The a/c was perfectly recoverable. and in fact had any of the crew been on the ball the recovery would have hardly been noticed.vololiberista

So how does flying into the storm be the primary cause of the crash then?

So how does flying into the storm be the primary cause of the crash then?

Let's just say this: As a rule UK pilots are trained and told NOT to consider flying through any kind of thunderstorm. All UK airlines follow this policy and instill this into their aircrew.Thunderstorms of the Tropical Convergence are the worst possible and you take a massive risk of at best 50-50. In this case it is considered that the a/c in itself (airframe wise) would probably have survived but the crew chose a. The Captain elected to take a risk b. The crew did not prepare for the risk ( there was no discussion or instructions given by the Captain). C. The Captain left his post at a critical point.(he failed in his duty of care to the passengers and in his responsibilty for his junior crew). D. None of the crew including the Captain (who should have instinctively seen what the problem was) followed standard recovery procedures at any point once the AP went out.In some ways this accident is as bad as the Aerflot one in as much as a child instead of three "un-qualified" crew could have been at the controls (though probably a child would have done better). In the 40's and 50's Air France had so many accidents that they earned the name "Air Chance". Looks like a rebranding ceremony is in the offing!!!!vololiberista

Edited January 14, 201214 yr by vololiberista

Airliners today are so far advanced, it's easy to plug in the flight plan, sit back, and read the paper. Reminds me of the american fighter pilots of the late 50's.. when it was thought there would be no dog fighting in the air to air missile age. That started Top Gun, and a back to basics fighter training. I'm sure, as a result of these kinds of problems, yearly flight sim training probably covers these issues. I recall a similar airliner losing AS/ALT, and it turned out that the ground crew forgot to un-tape the backup pitot tubes, and SP ports! Seems like to me, pilots could do 30 second walk around.One of the things I've learned in my business... It's never the 10,000 dollar part that fails... but the 1.25 one the mucks up the whole project.

Airliners today are so far advanced, it's easy to plug in the flight plan, sit back, and read the paper. Reminds me of the american fighter pilots of the late 50's.. when it was thought there would be no dog fighting in the air to air missile age. That started Top Gun, and a back to basics fighter training. I'm sure, as a result of these kinds of problems, yearly flight sim training probably covers these issues. I recall a similar airliner losing AS/ALT, and it turned out that the ground crew forgot to un-tape the backup pitot tubes, and SP ports! Seems like to me, pilots could do 30 second walk around.One of the things I've learned in my business... It's never the 10,000 dollar part that fails... but the 1.25 one the mucks up the whole project.

Pilots do do a walk around.......Even on Cathay Pacific.

Pilots do do a walk around.......Even on Cathay Pacific.

If you think there's no complacency during some (many?) of these walk-arounds, you're mistaken.

If you think there's no complacency during some (many?) of these walk-arounds, you're mistaken.

Complacent pilots don't last long, especially in quality airlines.And if you get into lazy habits, the Check pilots will ground you (they have ways of finding out).Don't believe me? Ask some real Airline pilots.To me it looks like the fatal error made was the PIC had very low confidence and thus 'froze'.Basic pilot skills are stalling that such a Professional would never make that mistake.If the Pilots were psychologically geared to be 'aware' in their training (to expect emergencies at any time) then their attitude would have been completely different.I think flying successfully is 80% of your mental attitude (psychology) and 20% your 'ability'.If you fly not expecting a thing to happen to you (not being ready for emergencies and not being aware that you may have to act instantly) you could end up 'frozen' like the poor pilot did.Human Factors were brought in Crew Resource Management (CRM) in the Eighties after the KLM twin 747 disaster in the holiday resort.I think we still have a while to go.

You misundertand. The a/c was perfectly recoverable. and in fact had any of the crew been on the ball the recovery would have hardly been noticed.vololiberista

Completely right. NO one was on the ball. My point above clears this up.They allowed panic into their cockpit, a big no no.http://jeffwise.net/...ed-an-airliner/Even a comment from an A330 Captain here simplifies it:Overall a pretty good article, but there are a couple of technical errors in the article and comments. One statement is certainly correct: "Bonin's behavior is difficult for professional aviators to understand."If the two pilots had simply sat on their hands when this incident first occurred, it would have all come out OK. There have been a number of similar loss of airspeed incidents due to the particular model of pitot tube (all since replaced). The incidents last only a short while. In all the other cases, competent pilots continued to fly the airplane in a normal pitch and power combination with no ill effects. This was not a sidestick issue. In my opinion, this was a pilot competence issue. This is not a Boeing/Airbus issue either; Boeings have also stalled at altitude and subsequently crashed. It is inexcusable for the stall warning to have been going off for so long without positive nose-down input from the pilots. There is no extra energy to make a level flight (or climbing) stall recovery at altitude. A nose-down recovery is the only thing that will allow the angle of attach to be sufficiently reduced for a return to normal flight. At 2:10:30 they were well on the way to a recovery, but apparently failed once again to understand basic aerodynamics.Consider also that the stall angle of attack at high altitudes is greatly reduced from that at lower altitudes (due to several somewhat technical aerodynamic factors outside the scope of explaining here). Having flown (and taught) high altitude stalls in an A330 simulator, it is not difficult to recovery from a stall in this regime, but the pilot has to actually DO IT.When referring to TOGA "I'm in TOGA, huh? " he is referring to the TOGA position of the thrust levers - which is the full forward position used primarily for full-thrust takeoffs and go-arounds (as well as emergency maneuvers). Note that the engines are hung below the center of gravity; this produces a nose-up pitch moment, which also can reduce nose-down elevator authority. Had they actually pushed the stick forward (which they didn't for very long) they may have also needed to reduce power to aid in a timely stall recovery. This is the standard stall recovery now being emphasized in airline training."Thanks to the effects of the anti-icing system, one of the pitot tubes begins to work again. " The pitot tubes are constantly heated. This model of pitot tube was replaced with another about the time of this accident (some airlines faster than others). The internal geometry of this pitot tube is primarily responsible for the clogging - not a heating issue. Pilot selected anti-ice refers to engine or wing anti-ice.When in dual input mode lights in front of each pilot flash illuminate to show that both pilots are making sidestick inputs. An option exists for an automatic warning to say "Dual Input" when this occurs. I don't know if AF had that option. Each sidestick has a button that allows that sidestick to override the other (the last one pushed has control). The same button also disconnects the autopilot. The override button is intended to override faults, and allow a complete takeover, not solve a fight over who has control (not that there was one). Airline pilot discipline is to be very clear on who is flying the airplane - and as we see in the article, when a transfer of control takes place , e.g., the statement: "I have the controls."In alternate law, the same pitch law applies as in Normal law.That is, g-load/pitch rate demand. When the sidestick is in neutral the airplane is essentially stable in pitch. The pilots would need to push the stick forward to reduce the angle of attack and recover from the stall. The airplane would not pitch over by itself Cessna 172 style. But these airplanes are designed to be flown by professional aviators with training in these factors and type ratings in this airplane. The transcript indicates that there was a lot they did not understand.As mentioned in one comment the stabilizer trim was virtually full nose up. This is a result of the sidestick being held back for a long period of time - not some design flaw or data error. (the flight control system moves the elevator to meet pilot demand, then automatically trims the stabilizer for efficiency). The full nose-up trim reduces the nose-down elevator authority - as it would on any airplane. Again, this may not have actually been factor since they didn't command a nose down attitude for the recovery anyway.The author is an A330 captain.I'm NEVER flying Air France!!! I'll stick with Cathay Pacific.Even British Airways and QANTAS have better pilot attitudes than we have seen here.

Complacent pilots don't last long, especially in quality airlines.And if you get into lazy habits, the Check pilots will ground you (they have ways of finding out).Don't believe me? Ask some real Airline pilots.

Just so you know, the majority of my friends are either airline pilots, flight instructors, or some other professional pilot. I'm telling you that if you believe there's no complacency in the airlines, you're mistaken. There's a human factor involved, so there's no getting around it. You seem to be living in a fantasy world where you believe there are no lazy or complacent airline pilots. Shall I list the fatal accidents caused by complacency (on the pilot level) at the airlines? Yes?Colgan 3407Comair 5191Air France 447 (the one we're talking about here! Complacency! Comon!)Air Midwest 5481These are a handful of crashes in the last ten years where a contributing or major factor was "complacency".I challenge you to ask some real airline pilots.

I think everyone who flies and bumps into pilots on a regular basis knows that there are some complacent, or poor pilots out there (I've certainly come across a few over the years, including one or two who I would actually refuse to fly with, and several who are now dead because of that fact too actually), just like everyone who drives buses probably knows there are some naff bus drivers out there, teachers will know some naff teachers, and basically I suspect any other profession known to man is likely to suffer from the same phenomenon.Sometimes pilots are indeed wrongly blamed for crashes, but sometimes they are not without blame. It can be hard to be critical of pilots when we are pilots ourselves, but we have a duty not to ignore that this can be the case and we should resist the temptation to close ranks out of some kind of misguided sense of loyalty to three people in the pointy end, when we also have a duty to three hundred people who are sat behind them.Al

Quote,"this was a pilot competence issue"The crews decision to penetrate the cell(barring any weather radar issues),shows incompetence.Or a systemic failure in the training department at the least.As far as their being no complacency,or short cuts at the airlines,Only a person that has never worked at an airline would say that.

Airliners today are so far advanced, it's easy to plug in the flight plan, sit back, and read the paper.

Go on, say that again, I dare you... :(

Complacent pilots don't last long, especially in quality airlines.And if you get into lazy habits, the Check pilots will ground you (they have ways of finding out).Don't believe me? Ask some real Airline pilots.

It's true that they do, but you'll always have that 1% that can get away with murder without ever being found out, and they're in every walk of life...

Just so you know, the majority of my friends are either airline pilots, flight instructors, or some other professional pilot. I'm telling you that if you believe there's no complacency in the airlines, you're mistaken. There's a human factor involved, so there's no getting around it. You seem to be living in a fantasy world where you believe there are no lazy or complacent airline pilots. Shall I list the fatal accidents caused by complacency (on the pilot level) at the airlines? Yes?Colgan 3407Comair 5191Air France 447 (the one we're talking about here! Complacency! Comon!)Air Midwest 5481These are a handful of crashes in the last ten years where a contributing or major factor was "complacency".I challenge you to ask some real airline pilots.

I'm here to answer questions, but one point on the Colgan crash is that it was complacency induced by fatigue. For the record, I would have been more than happy to fly with the crew on that aircraft if they hadn't been pushed to their physical limits. All humans have a point beyond which they can no longer function properly and they were pushed well past this point on the night in question.Rónán O Cadhain, A330 Captain.