Really, all thay had to do was to fly attitude/thrust when they first received the inconsistent airspeed warning. That at least would have given them time to sort things out. and probably the a/c would have then recovered by itself!What is sad is that all three pilots ignored "BASIC" training! Stuff that is drilled into you until you can do it in your sleep instinctively!vololiberista

Personally I think it should be company policy to have the captain in the cockpit well before traversing the ITCZ with storms appearing on the scope (it takes 15 minutes to get your wits fully about you after waking-up).Cheers,- jahman.

A good Captain would never have left the flightdeck with such storms imminent!!Another point is to "always" react to a stall warning or stick shaker/pusher. Only after that is it possible to determine whether the warning was eroneous!Try in in the sim. Immediately you hear the stall warning stick forward. You may only loose 50ft!The tragedy of G-ARPI in 1972 was a similar example. The stick shaker went off three times because someone had pulled in the slats too soon after take-off and before the correct flap retraction speed, thus putting the a/c into an immediate deep stall. Instead of reacting instinctively they turned the warning "OFF".vololiberista

The key sentence in PT-MVB narrative, with my emphasis, is

They reported receiving a stall warning, noted the flight law switched to Alternate Law, and saw messages indicating NAV ADR DISAGREE and NAV IAS DISCREPANCY. They reported the airspeed fluctuations and warnings lasted about one minute, and they controlled the airplane by pitch and power reference, per applicable checklist procedures until normal airspeed indications

That is just what the AF447 crew didn't do.

Neither did that AF crew react properly to a stall, mgh.

Neither did that AF crew react properly to a stall, mgh.

That is true. But if they had responded to the loss of airspeed indications, it's unlikely they'd have stalled the aircraft.

And if they hadn't flown into the weather, neither would they have had to lose instrumentation.

The key sentence in PT-MVB narrative, with my emphasis, is

They reported receiving a stall warning, noted the flight law switched to Alternate Law, and saw messages indicating NAV ADR DISAGREE and NAV IAS DISCREPANCY. They reported the airspeed fluctuations and warnings lasted about one minute, and they controlled the airplane by pitch and power reference, per applicable checklist procedures until normal airspeed indications

That is just what the AF447 crew didn't do.

+1!Cheers,- jahman.

All good discussion, and I'm relieved to conceed that this incident was not caused by human malfeasence, but by human error. This is important to remember because malfeasence is hard to address, but human error can be addressed with increased training. NOTE: early after the crash I was one of the vocalists of the "bomb" theory. Very glad to have been disproven.I spent 15 years as an Air Traffic Controller along with 30 years as an aviator (SEL). During my time in ATC I spent 4 years as an instructor. I often would tell my ATC students that unforseen distractions, chain of events, and the failure to FOLLOW SOP REGARDLESS of what you percieved was frequently a major contributor in aviation accidents. For illustration I would reference Eastern Airlines Flight 401. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Air_Lines_Flight_401I think if you read the wiki synopisis of this almost 40 year old event and compare it to the events surrounding the Air France crash you will agree that the "Black Swan" that befell Air France 447 (Black Swan -- unforseen major incident, but in hindsight entirely predictable) is almost entirely a outcome of the human condition and far less so a failure in technology (sidesticks, warnings, and the like).My 2 cents on this sad yet all too human tragedy.Braun

Very sad read,It is interesting to realise how the human mind goes into fear and shock. Maybe a warning should appear on the EICAS to suggest alternate law?

Very sad read,It is interesting to realise how the human mind goes into fear and shock. Maybe a warning should appear on the EICAS to suggest alternate law?

As has been posted on the previous page, alternate law is annunciated on the ECAM.Although a lot of people (not necessarily in this thrad) have mentioned that recovering from a stall is part of a pilot's basic training. The important point is that basic training, or possibly the type rating course, is for most airline pilots also the last time they will ever practice it. Stall recovery technique is / was not a part of the recurrent training since it was encountered so rarely in practice. In addition the stall recovery technique for airliners was usually aimed at powering out of an approach to stall with minimum loss of altitude: thrust to TOGA, release back pressure on stick (as opposed to push stick forward) is what was usually recommended.That will work if you are approaching a stall (although setting TOGA thrust will pitch the nose up, which doesn't help matters), but is far less effective at getting you out of a stall if it is fully developped.I agree that the side-sticks being uncoupled is a contributing factor, but it is a small one. Considering stalls in yoke equipped aircraft where the Pilot Flying continued to pull back (e.g. Colgan) I don't think having linked side-sticks would have been the magic bullet that would have prevented the accident. Especially if the consider the complete lack of reaction to all the other cues the pilots had.

If you remember there was a Russian accident where there was a child at the controls. Later in the simulator they demonstrated that recovery would have been achieved by not touching the controls! Certainly in my bible it states that for recovery from gross upsets to wait until the a/c is established in its deviation from normal flight (this would only take a few seconds) thus the correct recovery technique can be positively applied with the likelyhood of success. Even with an inverted spiral dive!!One has to say that even a layman would say something is wrong if they say that the a/c was falling out of the sky at 10,000fpm with full power and nose high. The problem is that all they had to do during the period of loss of IAS was to fly attitude and thrust which is practiced regulary by some airlines and perhaps now by AF?vololiberista

Although a lot of people (not necessarily in this thrad) have mentioned that recovering from a stall is part of a pilot's basic training. The important point is that basic training, or possibly the type rating course, is for most airline pilots also the last time they will ever practice it.

Which is exactly why it matters so much how these kinds of basics are taught to a student during their first flight lessons. It is why it is better to teach under the "pitch is for speed" phrase than it is to tell them "pitch is for altitude". As an instructor it is your job to instill upon your students proper fundamentals that last with them that can be drawn upon on the darkest night, decades away from when you last saw them, which can save their lives.

The crew and in particular the Captain screwed up even before they set foot in the aeroplane!!!!! He clearly elected to fly direct through the intense bad weather. No-one else did. Everyone else both before the AF take-off and after, And, even incoming traffic All made large deviations to avoid the storms!!!!!!!!AF "Took a chance!" (a classic attack of French superbia!) and failed. If I were a family member of someone on board I would be asking for massive damages and I'm sure many will now that the facts are out. One can talk about dissorientation until the cows come home, but the crew made mistake after mistake after mistake. And, the Captain well he was on another planet clearly. He should never ever have left the cockpit with an approaching mega storm! etc etc moreover it was his "duty" to correctly monitor his crew.vololiberista

The crew and in particular the Captain screwed up even before they set foot in the aeroplane!!!!! He clearly elected to fly direct through the intense bad weather. No-one else did. Everyone else both before the AF take-off and after, And, even incoming traffic All made large deviations to avoid the storms!!!!!!!!vololiberista

There were two storm fronts. They might not have been anticipating the larger one. Your weather radar can only go so far.

The crew and in particular the Captain screwed up even before they set foot in the aeroplane!!!!! He clearly elected to fly direct through the intense bad weather. No-one else did. Everyone else both before the AF take-off and after, And, even incoming traffic All made large deviations to avoid the storms!!!!!!!!AF "Took a chance!" (a classic attack of French superbia!) and failed. If I were a family member of someone on board I would be asking for massive damages and I'm sure many will now that the facts are out. One can talk about dissorientation until the cows come home, but the crew made mistake after mistake after mistake. And, the Captain well he was on another planet clearly. He should never ever have left the cockpit with an approaching mega storm! etc etc moreover it was his "duty" to correctly monitor his crew.vololiberista

To say what you say requires an assumption that once stalled, the aircraft was unrecoverable. Is it your contention that the aircraft was unrecoverable? Because if not, you are just making a lot of uneducated noise.

Edited January 13, 201214 yr by KevinAu

If you remember there was a Russian accident where there was a child at the controls. Later in the simulator they demonstrated that recovery would have been achieved by not touching the controls!

IIRC, the child at the controls pushed the yoke forward and the aircraft went into an unrecoverable Mach Tuck.Chhers,- jahman.