I'm not sure I'm a big believer in "partial control" flight systems during key stages of flight (approach/takeoff).  Pilot takes full control and co-pilot can do scanning of instruments and situation awareness during those key stages of flight.  There have been numerous fatal incidents because of partial control systems with extremely senior professional pilots with many 1000's of hours ... I'd argue that "partial control" flight systems have caused more fatalities than prevented.  

 

FAA doesn't seem to evaluate how partial automated systems can cause more problems than they try to solve ... it almost always goes down in history as "pilot error" ... which I guess is technically correct, but I'm not aware of any pilot briefing that asks the pilot if an automated system "saved them from incident"?  And would any pilot honestly answer that question if it were presented?  The assumption is that partially automated systems are better but there is no metric to suggest that is the case, easier for the pilot doesn't necessarily mean safer.

 

Sorta like "Checklists" for emergency situations, FAA used to require they be followed to the letter during an emergency, that policy lead to some highly undesirable results ... so much so they eventually adjusted the policy.

 

My 2 cents.

 

Cheers, Rob.

Agreed Bobsk8, as long as the airspeed gauge is included in the scan. The Asiana Airlines crash in KSFO was mainly caused by the pilots "setting and forgetting" the A/T and not being aware their speed was decreasing until it was too late.

 

Absolutely NO excuse for a professional.

 

My instructors used to say - First and foremost FLY the aircraft.

 

Vic

 

Guy that taught me has over 30,000 hours, and was a senior check pilot for Delta. so I tended to trust what he said. The problem with the Asiana crash was that apparently not one of the 3 pilots in the cockpit bothered to look out the window at the runway when  a student with a few hours of dual landing instruction could mostly likely  see that the approach was way too low to make the runway. 

The list of what they did wrong is a checklist of poor CRM. Too busy figuring out what to do - they stopped flying the a/c. If any one of them bothered to look outside, it wouldn't have happened.

 

 

 

Vic

Hey guys. First and foremost, thanks for all the advice. I tried flying smaller airplanes, and I feel I have better control. I flew a tutorial video a couple of times, and I am getting a better handle of it. Right now, I am trying to fly VOR to VOR on a stock airplane, the Bonanza A36. I am having a problem tuning the VOR radio. I am able to set the ADF frequency, but the plane doesn't seem to be receiving a station. Furthermore, some buttons on the radio are not clickable, and I wonder if I have to buy add-ons to make them active. Can anyone offer help?

 

Again, thank you for your responses. I started simming with large aircraft, and my frustrations come from lack of fundamentals, and now I think I am on the right track.

 

Damian

I was taught on an Airline full motion sim by an instructor pilot for Delta, to always land with the autothrottle on.

 

Did he specify what aircraft he was talking about ?  777/787 that may be the case, but I believe 737/747/757/767 most airlines  have a A/P off= A/T off policy. Google "pitch coupling"

Did he specify what aircraft he was talking about ?  777/787 that may be the case, but I believe 737/747/757/767 most airlines  have a A/P off= A/T off policy. Google "pitch coupling"

 

We were in the 767-400ER. He trained pilots in just about every plane that Delta used over the years, so I don't know if they were all included in his statement. 

Damian, for a look at the fundamentals you may want to check out this link:

 

http://www.flyaoamedia.com/aviator-90/

 

Disclaimer, I've not actually signed up to watch the material, but I've heard good things about it

I've done the free Aviator 90 course, it is pretty good for the fundamentals.

 

 

Sorta like "Checklists" for emergency situations, FAA used to require they be followed to the letter during an emergency, that policy lead to some highly undesirable results ... so much so they eventually adjusted the policy.

 

My 2 cents.

 

Cheers, Rob.

 

Last time I checked PTS emergency checklists were part of the requirements. What policy has been adjusted? And why is wrong to follow emergency checklists? 

Last time I checked PTS emergency checklists were part of the requirements. What policy has been adjusted? And why is wrong to follow emergency checklists? 

 

I wouldn't (and didn't) say "wrong" to follow emergency checklists.  Amendments to checklists are pretty common ... but I believe this was a result of several emergency checklists on commercial aircraft that were so lengthy that by the time the pilot(s) could complete the checklist, the emergency situation would have (and was) unrecoverable.

 

There were many incidents ... one example was a long diagnostics checklist for fuel pressure problem ... rather immediately recommending emergency call and diversion to closest viable runway ... the lengthy checklist process put the pilots out of reach of viable airports by the time they completed the emergency checklist (only to find out it wasn't a fuel pressure problem but it was a fuel calculation problem and they ran out of fuel).

 

There are numerous other incidents where pilots ran thru long checklists rather than declare an emergency, resulting in serious incidents that were avoidable.  If you read some of the GA manufacturer's checklist they appear to be more concerned about legally protecting themselves rather than any workable checklist for human pilots.

 

On the other topic of "partial automation of systems" this article provides some insight to what I was suggesting: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304439804579204202526288042

 

Cheers, Rob.

I wouldn't (and didn't) say "wrong" to follow emergency checklists.  Amendments to checklists are pretty common ... but I believe this was a result of several emergency checklists on commercial aircraft that were so lengthy that by the time the pilot(s) could complete the checklist, the emergency situation would have (and was) unrecoverable.

 

There were many incidents ... one example was a long diagnostics checklist for fuel pressure problem ... rather immediately recommending emergency call and diversion to closest viable runway ... the lengthy checklist process put the pilots out of reach of viable airports by the time they completed the emergency checklist (only to find out it wasn't a fuel pressure problem but it was a fuel calculation problem and they ran out of fuel).

 

There are numerous other incidents where pilots ran thru long checklists rather than declare an emergency, resulting in serious incidents that were avoidable.  If you read some of the GA manufacturer's checklist they appear to be more concerned about legally protecting themselves rather than any workable checklist for human pilots.

 

On the other topic of "partial automation of systems" this article provides some insight to what I was suggesting: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304439804579204202526288042

 

Cheers, Rob.

 

Could point out which accidents related to "lengthy emergency lists"? NTSB cases? 

 

Also could you provide any examples of manufacturers checklists unusable for human pilot?

Could point out which accidents related to "lengthy emergency lists"? NTSB cases? 

 

Also could you provide any examples of manufacturers checklists unusable for human pilot?

 

Sounds like you're on a mission and your "interpretation" of what I said seems unusual i.e. "unusable"? Not what I said ... anyway, the more public one is Flight 143 (Air Canada) and others like British Midland Flight 092, Eastern Air Flight 855, Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 ...

 

As for manufacturer checklists, Beechcraft (take your pick, just about any single or twin piston variant).

 

Cheers, Rob.

Sounds like you're on a mission and your "interpretation" of what I said seems unusual i.e. "unusable"? Not what I said ... anyway, the more public one is Flight 143 (Air Canada) and others like British Midland Flight 092, Eastern Air Flight 855, Hapag-Lloyd Flight 3378 ...

 

As for manufacturer checklists, Beechcraft (take your pick, just about any single or twin piston variant).

 

Cheers, Rob.

 

 

Rob, I looked at the cases you provided. None of them had anything to do with "lengthy emergency checklists" 

You are either misinformed or misinterpreting something.

 

I'm familiar with many aircraft including Beechcrafst (single/multi) .I can't recall any "lengthy" or "unusable" emergency checklists. I did have various  in-flight emergencies. Emergency checklists as well as normal ops checklists  do serve a vital purpose. Pilot do get sidetracked, destructed, stressed..

 

As far as manufacturer legal protection they have nothing to do with "unhuman" check lists. Yes they get sued a lot. Cessna 172 for example staring with R model and added more fuel sump drains on each wing and "under the belly" due to legal lawsuits. But you can blame for that lawyers rather than manufacturers.

 

Flight emergencies  actions are pretty standard. First - fly airplane (best glide). Second - deviate (find emergency field/place). Third (if time allows) - go through emergency checklist (fix or feather/restart/secure and etc). And lastly declare an emergency. If any of this action violated it's not a problem of emergency checklists

Just as CRM procedures have been "honed" through the years, so have checklists and use of same. There have been instances where both pilots have been so focused on the checklist that they forgot the first step - fly the aircraft.

 

I think you and Rob are basically saying the same thing. I did not interpret his post to mean that checklists were "wrong". I understood, and agree based upon my knowledge, that there were enough instances of issues involving CRM and checklists that warranted changes over the YEARS. What we see now is the current state of the system, refined through experience.

 

Vic

sd_flyer,

 

My understanding of the outcome from those NTSB investigations from those incidents did result in FAA adjustments to both standard checklists and emergency checklists.  I'm venturing to suggest this is actually pretty normal for FAA and/or manufacturers to make adjustments to checklist on a pretty regular basic (certainly on the commercial side) ... I don't think any checklist is "perfect" (and they should be questioned and updated).  

 

With the Beech it's not the emergency checklist ... it's the manufacturers "normal" checklist that is exhaustive ... sounding more like legal protection than something a pilot has the time to implement ... almost along the lines check for missing or cracked rivets ... something that would be in a maintenance checklist perhaps, but not something your average GA pilot will do even with a walk around.

 

Vic got the idea, now and future checklist will continue to be refined and adjusted as flights continue and manufacturers and FAA learn from mistakes ... checklist do have an importance.

 

Cheers, Rob.